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3ABSTRACT
NOTION, NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONSENT
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy)
Andrea Marco Steingruber
Arbitration is a consensual and private mechanism of dispute resolution which leads to
an enforceable arbitral award. In the traditional field of commercial arbitration the
agreement to arbitrate is considered to be the cornerstone of arbitration. On the other
hand, in the international context, arbitration has become increasingly used in other
areas, like investment arbitration and sport arbitration, where the consensual nature of
arbitration appears to be different.
At the beginning of the study it will be underlined that, when speaking about the
consensual nature of arbitration, one needs to differentiate between consensual as one of
the essential criteria for arbitration’s qualification and consent as a condition for the
validity of the arbitration agreement. This differentiation is especially important in sport
arbitration where, between the athletes and sport organisations, there is often induced
consent rather than bargained consent. By sustaining that the consensual character of
arbitration needs to be differentiated, but not abandoned, the thesis clearly takes a
contractual, or better, a consensual approach. It is preferable to speak of a consensual
approach, because the agreement to arbitrate does not always take the form of an
arbitration agreement in the traditional sense. This is particularly the case in investment
arbitration.
This thesis is a comparative study. However, not only a comparison of national laws
and different arbitration rules will be undertaken, but the thesis will also consider the
evolution of arbitration by discussing the implications that evolution has had on the
perception of the consensual character of arbitration. Moreover, and above all, the main
body of the thesis will be dedicated to a comparison focused on the consent issues of the
three main areas where arbitration is nowadays used in an international context:
commercial arbitration, investment arbitration and sport arbitration. It will be stressed
that, although already in the classical area of commercial arbitration, the structures of
arbitrations may be of different types, ranging from bi-party situations to multiparty
scenarios, and might play a role when considering the consensual nature of arbitration,
this becomes even clearer when one analyses the other fields of arbitration. The thesis
then also takes into account that, in the various phases of the arbitral process, the
expectations with regard to the consensual character of arbitration may be different.
In the thesis it will be argued that the reason the consensual nature of arbitration
evolved over time, and the reason that it is different among the various fields of
arbitration, might be seen in the fact that there is an inherent tension between the
contractual and the jurisdictional side of arbitration. In this situation of “inherent
tension” consent may be perceived as being more or less present. Nevertheless, the
“intensity” of consent does not affect the basically consensual character of arbitration.
While the four traditional theories (jurisdictional, contractual, mixed/hybrid and
autonomous) used to explain the juridical nature of arbitration focus rather on the
relationship between State and arbitration, the thesis attempts to indicate other solutions
which seem to be more able to explain the use of arbitration in the different areas/fields
where arbitration is expected to resolve disputes.
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EJCL Electronic Journal of Comparative Law
ER English Reports
et al. et alii / and others
etc. et cetera, and so on
et seq. et sequitur
European Convention European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
1961 (Geneva)
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European Comm. HR European Commission of Human Rights
European Ct. HR European Court of Human Rights
EWCA Civ Neutral citation for England and Wales Court of Appeal civil
division decisions
EWHC England and Wales High Court
EWiR Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht
F 2d The Federal Reporter Second Series
F 3d The Federal Reporter Third Series
FAA United States Federal Arbitration Act
Fair Empl Prac Cas Fair Employment Practice Cases
FCEC Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors
FEI Fédération Equestre Internationale (International Equestrian
Federation)
FFG Fédération Française de Gymnastique
FIA Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
FIBA Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur (International
Basketball Federation)
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FINA Fédération Internationale de Natation (International
Swimming Federation)
FIS Fédération Internationale de Ski (International Ski Federation)
FJS Fiches juridiques suisses
Fn. Footnote
FOB Free on board
FOSFA Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations
FS Festschrift
FSLA Fédération Suisse de Lutte Amateur (Swiss Amateur Wrestling
Federation)
F Supp Federal Supplement
GAFTA Grain & Feed Trade Association
Gaz. Pal. Gazette du Palais
GDR German Democratic Republic
GE Genève / Geneva
Geo Wash J Int'l L &
Eco
George Washington University Journal of International Law
and Economics
Hastings Int'l & Comp
L Rev
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
HKC Hong Kong Court
HKHC Hong Kong High Court
HKLJ Hong Kong Law Journal
HKLR Hong Kong Law Report
HL House of Lords
IAAF International Association of Athletics Federations
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IBA Rules IBA Rules on the taking of Evidence in International
Commercial Arbitration, 1999
Ibid. Ibidem, in the same place
IBF International Boxing Federation
ICAS International Council of Arbitration for Sport
ICC Bulletin International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration Bulletin
ICE Institution of Civil Engineers
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICJ Reports International Court of Justice Reports
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
ICSID Reports International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Reports
ICSID Review-FILJ ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal
i.e. id est, that is
IECL International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
IF/IFs International federation / International federations
INCOTERMS ICC International Commercial Terms
Int. ALR International Arbitration Law Review
Int'l International
Int'l Bus Law International Business Lawyer
Int'l Fin L Rev International Financial Law Review
Int'l Law International Lawyer
ILA International Law Association
ILM International Legal Materials
ILR International Law Reports
IOC International Olympic Committee
IPRax Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts
IPRG Internationales Privatrecht Gesetz / Swiss PIL
IPRspr Die deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des
internationalen Privatrechts im Jahre
Iran-US CTR Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports
ITA International Trade Administration
J./J Judge
JBL Journal of Business Law
JCP Juris-Classeur Périodique, La Semaine Juridique
J Int'l Arb Journal of International Arbitration
Journal des Tribunaux (Belgian) Journal des Tribunaux
Juris-Classeur Proc Civ Juris-Classeur (procedure civile)
JWIT Journal of World Investment & Trade
KTS Konkurs-Treuhand und Schiedsgerichtswesen
Law & Policy in Int'l
Bus
Law & Policy in International Business
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LDIP Loi fédéral sur le droit international privé
LIA Law on International Commercial Arbitration
LJ Lord Justice of Appeal
LJJ Lords Justice of Appeal
Lloyd's Rep. Lloyd's Law Reports
Lloyd's MCLQ Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series
Louisiana L Rev Louisiana Law Review
Mealey's IAR Mealey's International Arbitration Reports
MBL Major League Baseball
MFN Most-favoured-nation
Minn L Rev Minnesota Law Review
MIT / MITs Multilateral Investment Treaty / Multilateral Investment
Treaties
MITIs Multilateral investment treaties or instruments
Model Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration adopted 21 June 1985
MR Master of the Rolls
NADA Nationale Anti Doping Agentur (German Anti-Doping Agency)
NBA National Basketball Association
NCAA National Collegiate Athletic Association
NCPC Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (French Code of Civil
Procedure)
NE North East Reporter
Ned Jur Nederlands Jurisprudentie
Netherlands CCP Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure
New L J New Law Journal
New York Convention 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
NFL National Football League
NHL National Hockey League
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
No. / no. Number / number
Nos. / nos. Numbers / numbers
NOC/NOCs National Olympic Committee/National Olympic Committees
NSWLR New South Wales Law Reports
NW J Int'l L & Bus Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
NYAD New York Appellate Division
NYC New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958)
NYLJ New York Law Journal
NY L Sch J Int'l &
Comp L
New York Law School Journal of International and
Comparative Law
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NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities
p. / pp. page / pages
para. / paras paragraph / paragraphs
PC Privy Council
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
PGA Professional Golf Association
PIL Private International Law
PRC People Republic of China
Proc. Procedure
PWC PriceWaterhouseCoopers
QB Queen's Bench
QBD Queen's Bench Division
RabelsZ Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
Privatrecht
RCADI Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la
Haye / Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of
International Law
RDAI/IBLJ Revue de droit des affaires internationales / International
Business Law Journal
Rep. Report
Rev. arb. Revue de l'arbitrage
Rev. crit. dip. Revue critique de droit international privé
RHDI Revue hellénique de droit international
Riv. dell’arb. Rivista dell'arbitrato
RIW Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft
Rome Convention EC (Rome) Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations 1980
RPS Recht und Praxis der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit
RSDIE Revue Suisse de droit international et de droit européen
RUAA Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 2000
Rutgers L Rev Rutgers Law Review
s. Section
SAR Stockholm Arbitration Report
SchiedsVZ Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (German Arbitration Journal)
SchwZIER Schweizeriche Zeitschrift für internationals und europäisches
Recht
S Ct Supreme Court of the United States
SDNY Southern District of New York
SJ La Semaine Judiciare, Geneva
SLT Scots Law Times Reports
SLR Singapore Law Reports
SOCOG Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games
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SpuRt Sport und Recht (Zeitschrift für Sport und Recht)
Subs. subsection
Swiss PIL Swiss Private International Law Act of 1987
TAS Tribunal arbitral du sport
Texas Int'l LJ Texas International Law Journal
TGI French Tribunal de Grande Instance
Tulane L Rev Tulane Law Review
UCC Uniform Commercial Code
UCI Union Cycliste Internationale
U Cin L Rev University of Cincinnati Law Review
UCP 500 Uniform Customs and Practices relating to Documentary
Credits – ICC publication no. 500
UEFA Union of European Football Associations
U Ill L Rev University of Illinois Law Review
UK United Kingdom
UKPC Neutral citation for decisions of the Privy Council
U Miami Inter-Am L
Rev
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
UNCITRAL Notes UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
US United States
USA United States of America
USADA United States Anti-Doping Agency
USOC US Olympic Committee
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
v. versus
Vanderbilt L Rev Vanderbilt Law Review
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Vol. Volume
vs. versus
WADA World Anti-Doping Agency
WADA-Code World Anti-Doping Agency Code 2009
WADA-Code 2003 World Anti-Doping Agency Code 2003
WAMR World Arbitration and Mediation Report
Washington
Convention
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 1965
WBA World Boxing Association
WBC World Boxing Council
WIPO Expedited Rules WIPO Expedited Rules
WL Westlaw
WLR The Weekly Law Reports
WM Wertpapier-Mitteilungen
WTAM World Trade and Arbitration Materials
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WTO World Trade Organisation
WuB Entscheidungssammlung zum Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht
Yale LJ Yale Law Journal
YBCA Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration
ZBB Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft
ZfRV Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung
ZIP Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht und Insolvenzpraxis
ZK-IPRG-Name Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG (Zurich Commentary) on the
Swiss PIL/ author
ZPO Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure)
ZVglRwiss Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechstwissenschaften
(all Laws and Rules in the list of Abbreviations and in the thesis refer to the ones at present in
force)
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the notion, nature and extent of consent in international
arbitration.
Arbitration, and in particular commercial arbitration, is a consensual and private
mechanism for dispute resolution which leads to an enforceable arbitral award. The
contractual foundations of arbitration constitute the fundamental difference between
arbitration and litigation.1 An important cornerstone for the “consensual”
characterisation of international commercial arbitration is undoubtedly the New York
Convention which, despite its title, also deals with the recognition of arbitration
agreements.2 However several issues with regard to the parties’ consent to arbitrate arise
already in the classic field of commercial arbitration:
- different courts and arbitral tribunals may have distinct approaches to the
interpretation of arbitration agreements;
- different national laws may be applicable to the substantive validity of the
arbitration agreements;
- the procedural needs may be in conflict with the parties’ consent to arbitrate
exclusively with a particular other party; and
- although according to the New York Convention and to most national arbitration
laws arbitration agreements have to be “in writing”, the question about extending
them to non-signatories may arise.
Moreover, especially when considering other areas in which this alternative dispute
resolution mechanism is becoming more and more applied, the consensual nature of
arbitration is debated and even questioned. Indicative of this tendency is the following
passage quoted from an article about “Formula 1 Racing and Arbitration: the FIA
Tailor-Made System for Fast Track Dispute Resolution”:
“More and more, the classical concept of arbitration based on consent is being
supplemented by other concepts of arbitration which largely ignore this requirement.
This is so especially in the areas of sport, consumer transactions, and investment
arbitrations based on treaties or national statutes. This is only natural, as arbitration
becomes the most common method for settling international disputes. One may choose
to cling to the dogma of consent and when no true and meaningful consent exists, rely
1 At least when the forum of litigation is not based on a jurisdictional clause.
2 See Article II(1) NYC.
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on a fiction of consent. But if we merely preserve the appearance of consent, this
justification for arbitration is no longer compelling. Indeed, it may be more accurate
and intellectually honest to simply admit that arbitration without consent exists.
Having made that admission, one can then investigate the requirements that have come
to replace consent”.3
Purposes of the thesis
This thesis seeks a) to demonstrate that the qualification of arbitration as a “consensual”
mechanism for dispute resolution needs to be differentiated and b) to analyse if,
perhaps, it should even be abandoned.
On the one hand it seems that a differentiation has to be made because there are
different types of arbitration. While commercial arbitration has been the traditional
domain of arbitration, in the past decades other important fields of arbitration have
appeared and developed. Not all of these new areas have the same features as
“classical” commercial arbitration and the same “consensual intensity”. The
characterisation as “consensual” has therefore to be questioned or, at least, filled with a
different content. Furthermore, the structure of arbitrations can differ. The structural
variety is large. It ranges from bi-party situations to multiparty scenarios, which in their
turn can be of a different nature (e.g. a multiparty arbitration from the outset or it
becomes such due to procedural mechanisms that arise in a later stadium of the arbitral
proceeding), from a horizontal type of arbitration (e.g. between two or more private
corporations in commercial arbitration) to a vertical one (e.g. the State–investor
relationship in investment arbitration or the relations between athletes and sport
organisations in the field of sport). These structural differences possibly require the
qualification of “consensual” to be differentiated.
On the other hand, while the asserted consensual nature of arbitration is of relevance
from the outset of a proceeding, and for this reason there are significant parts of the
thesis devoted to analysing how consent to arbitration is given at the beginning, it also
seems to be important to analyse whether the expectation of the consensual character of
arbitration has to be upheld in equal measure throughout all phases of the arbitration
process, or if there are other needs which, possibly, make it appear less important.
3 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186.
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The starting point of the differentiation seems at first to be quite theoretical. However,
on the basis of theoretical reflection, the thesis will examine questions which are of
practical relevance, for instance:
- how consent to arbitrate is given;
- which law shall govern the arbitration agreement or, more particularly, consent as an
element of the substantive validity of it; and, conversely, according to which law
will a possible lack of consent be judged;
- how consent should be interpreted;
- which relationship exists between consent as part of the substantive validity of an
arbitration agreement and its formal validity (requirement to be “in writing”);
- which, if any, are the implied terms when consenting to arbitration;
- how consent to arbitrate influences procedural mechanisms like joinder and
intervention of third parties or consolidation of arbitral proceedings, and which
solutions adopted (or to be adopted) by treaties, national laws or arbitrational rules
are, or would be, the most respectful of parties’ consent in this respect.
Even more theoretically, the other goal of the thesis is to discuss whether the
qualification of arbitration as a “consensual” mechanism for dispute resolution should
be abandoned or not. However, this question, which may at first sight be deemed even
more academic, does have a practical side. In fact, to abandon the characterisation
“consensual” does not mean that parties’ consent could not be relevant to other aspects.
Some of these aspects have just been mentioned. Furthermore, another issue which is
often considered in order to put in doubt the existence of parties’ consent is the unequal
bargaining power of the parties to the arbitration agreement. Therefore the process of
concluding the arbitration agreement, particularly the forces and interests which are at
stake in the process, but also the specific needs arising in arbitration areas other than
commercial arbitration, will be analysed. Here the (substantive) validity of the
arbitration agreement will be scrutinised.
To reach its objective the thesis also discusses the historical evolution of the concept of
arbitration and the juridical nature of it, both with particular regard to issues concerning
consent.
Summarising, the thesis will thus examine the notion, nature and extent of consent from
different perspectives:
- the definition perspective;
- the historical perspective;
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- the scope/extent perspective;
- the chronological perspective with regard to the course of the proceeding; and
- the structural perspective.
Methodology
The basic methods employed in this study will be research and qualitative analysis of
primary and secondary legal sources; these will include national and international laws
and rules, the case law of national courts and arbitral tribunals, and academic treatises.
The most important arbitration conventions, many arbitration laws and rules, the
practice of the main arbitration institutions and of the courts of various States, as well as
the views of several commentators will be critically assessed. However, with regard to
the arbitration laws and the practice of the State courts, more attention will be given to
those of England, France and Switzerland. And with respect to the arbitration
institutions and their rules the focus will also be on institutions based in the
aforementioned countries, i.e. the LCIA, the ICC and the Swiss Chambers of
Commerce. This preponderance is justified mainly on objective reasons: it is for
example impossible to discuss the “group of companies” doctrine without considering
the ICC and respectively France, or sport arbitration without bearing in mind that the
CAS has its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland. On the other hand England, where the
dispute resolution mechanism of arbitration has always played an important role, is not
only the home of another major arbitration institution, the LCIA, but is, most notably, a
common-law country. The choice of countries upon which greater attention will be
focused in the thesis thus also permits a comparison between jurisdictions with a civil
law (France and Switzerland) or common law (England) legal background. Moreover,
England, France and Switzerland are three arbitration-friendly nations with a long and
important tradition in the field of arbitration.
Notwithstanding the fact that the focus will be on the jurisdictions of England, France
and Switzerland, and respectively on the arbitration institutions based in these three
countries (LCIA, ICC and the Swiss Chambers of Commerce), other countries will be
considered when they are of interest to the analysis of the consensual nature of
arbitration. For instance, when discussing consolidation in commercial arbitration the
focus will be broadened to include Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, New
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Zealand and the United States of America—because these jurisdictions have
experienced interesting solutions when dealing with this procedural mechanism.
The analysis of laws and rules is not limited to a comparative assessment of different
jurisdictions and institutions, but has a historical dimension as well. Indeed, with
particular respect to the discussion of the relevance of parties’ consent to procedural
mechanisms in commercial arbitration a comparison is drawn between the old
arbitration rules of the Swiss Chambers of Commerce and the Swiss Rules in force now
for international arbitration.
Finally, it is evident that a comparison of the different applications on fields of
arbitration is of paramount importance. This comparative assessment will be conducted
through all the study. In the First Part the comparison will have the starting point of
commercial arbitration, in the Second part the three international areas where arbitration
is established as a dispute resolution mechanism—commercial arbitration, investment
arbitration and sport arbitration—will then be analysed separately.
Delimitation of the thesis
Given the wide range of issues covered by the thesis, it would be sensible to indicate
how the scope of it will be delimitated by focusing on the relevance of parties’ consent.
The delimitation is detailed below, taking two important topics of the study as
examples:
- While the thesis will deal with the extension of arbitration clauses to non-
signatories, its goal is not to agree or disagree with the “group of companies”
doctrine or with different advocated solutions (this subject has already been written
about and debated extensively). The intermediate objective of this study will be,
after analysing the different solutions or tendencies, to answer the question of what
the role played by the parties’ consent to arbitrate is. Of relevance in this context
will be the analysis of the interplay between the formal (requirement to be “in
writing”) and the substantive conditions of arbitration agreements’ validity.
- With regard to procedural mechanisms, and in particular consolidation, it will not be
argued whether consolidation provisions should be implemented or not. The
intermediate aim of the thesis in this context will rather be, after pointing out other
needs which have to be considered and different solutions which have already been
adopted in practice, to suggest a way to implement consolidation provisions while
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taking into account the fact that in commercial arbitration the parties will usually
have signed different arbitration agreements and, for that reason, there is the
important issue of parties’ consent to arbitration. Or, in other words, to propose a
way forward which appears to be the most respectful of parties’ consent.
Furthermore, with the analysis of the consolidation provisions contained in the
NAFTA, but also in some recent BITs, a comparison will be made and the question
answered if, and possibly why, in investment arbitration the issue of parties’, and in
particular investors’, consent is less relevant.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two Parts, each of which is sub-divided into three chapters.
While the First Part discusses rather the theoretical aspects related to “Consent”, the
Second Part analyses and compares the consensual character of arbitration in the three
main areas of international arbitration: commercial, investment and sport arbitration.
The First Part consists of three chapters:
- I. deals with “Consent”;
- II. deals with “The phenomenon of arbitration”; and
- III. deals with “The arbitration agreement”.
In Chapter I. the thesis begins by making a brief historical/philosophical overview of
“Consent” (section 1.), then the diverse understandings of the instrument through which
“Consent” is expressed, i.e. the contract, are pointed out (section 2.). After that the
consensual nature, as one of the essential criteria for arbitration’s qualification (section
3.), is discussed and, finally, the concept of “Consent” as a condition for the substantive
validity of the arbitration agreement (section 4.) is analysed.
Chapter II. consists of four sections. It begins with the classical characterisation of
arbitration (section 1.), then it examines the historical evolution of the concept of
arbitration (section 2.), and finally the juridical nature of arbitration is discussed
(section 3.).
The last Chapter (III.) of the First Part begins with a definition of the arbitration
agreement (section 1.), and a description of the effects of the arbitration agreement
(section 2.). After that the law governing the arbitration agreement (section 3.), and the
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determination of jurisdiction (section 4.) are discussed. Finally, the requirements for the
validity of the arbitration agreement are analysed (section 5.).
The Second Part consists of three chapters:
- IV. deals with “Commercial arbitration”;
- V. deals with “Investment arbitration”; and
- VI. deals with “Sport arbitration”.
In this part of the thesis the different areas in which arbitration currently plays a
significant role in an international context will be discussed and compared.
Chapter IV. begins by making some general remarks on the consensual character of
commercial arbitration and the possible exception of arbitration with the Chambers of
Commerce of (former) communist countries (section 1.). Then it turns to discuss the
content of the arbitration agreement (section 2.). After that the determination of the
existence of parties’ consent and its scope is analysed (section 3.). Later, agency and
consent (section 4.), as well as the transfer of the arbitration agreement and consent
(section 5.), are considered. A longer section is then devoted to parties’ consent with
regard to the extension of arbitration agreements, in particular within groups of
companies (section 6.). Finally, the relevance of parties’ consent with respect to
procedural mechanisms is examined (section 7.).
In Chapter V. the thesis gives a brief historical overview of the evolution of the use of
arbitration clauses included in States’ contracts (section 1.), and turns then to explain
national investment laws (section 2.) and BITs (section 3.). Later, ICSID arbitration and
other forms of arbitration contained in multilateral treaties are briefly discussed (section
4.) and, subsequently, the requirement of consenting “in writing” in investment
arbitration is concisely mentioned (section 5.). A more extensive section is then
dedicated to the many ways consent to arbitration can be expressed (section 6.).
Afterwards the temporal sequence of consent to arbitration and the relevance of the time
of consent (section 7.), as well as the amicable negotiation period (section 8.), and the
interpretation of consent (section 9.) are discussed.
After treating the differences between treaty and contract claims (section 10.), section
11. deals with the essential criteria for arbitration under ICSID, the role of consent in
defining them and its expansion. Subsequently, the scope of consent and its limitations
(section 12.) will be discussed and the irrevocability of consent (section 13.) analysed.
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Afterwards, an important section is devoted to the scrutiny of the expansion of consent
because of treaties provisions, i.e. the most-favoured-nation and the umbrella clauses
(section 14.). And, finally, the relevance of parties’ consent with regard to procedural
mechanisms is discussed (section 15.).
The last Chapter (VI.) of the Second Part discusses sport arbitration. It begins with a
description of the structural organisation of sport (section 1.) and a portrayal of the main
arbitral instances in the sport’s field (section 2.). Then the use of arbitration for
resolving sport disputes (section 3.) and the different types of arbitration agreements in
sport are analysed (section 4.). After that the substantive validity of the arbitration
agreement with regard to issues related to parties’ consent (section 5.) and the case of
mandatory arbitration (section 6.) are discussed. And, finally, the relevance of parties’
consent with regard to procedural aspects is considered (section 7.).
Having international commercial arbitration as the starting point of the comparison is
justified by the fact that it is the classical arbitration form which rests on an arbitration
agreement of the parties. And it is precisely the arbitration agreement which shows that
the parties have consented to resolve their dispute by the mean of arbitration—ousting
States’ courts.
Organisational notes
In order to facilitate easier reading of the thesis, the provisions contained in
conventions, national laws, arbitration rules, standard forms, charters and codes cited in
the main body of this study are reproduced as an annex.
The accentuations in the thesis in cursive and bold are the author’s. These accentuations
should facilitate the understanding and the arguments of the text by highlighting
important words/sentences.
The accentuations in the thesis in cursive are used for the emphasis of cited
authors/passages or for foreign words/sentences.
The use of the forms he/him in the text are to be treated as gender neutral and equally
applicable to she/her.
39
FIRST PART
The First Part will deal with the two main concepts which are of relevance for this
thesis, i.e. “Consent” (Chapter I.) and “The phenomenon of arbitration” (Chapter II.), as
well as the foundation of the expression of consent to arbitration, i.e. “The arbitration
agreement” (Chapter III.).
I. CONSENT
1. BRIEF HISTORICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW
The most important, universally accepted, and considered in all legal systems the
fundamental, condition of a contract is: consent of the parties, i.e. the mutual will of the
parties that a contract with a particular content shall regulate their legal relationship.4
Will in the legal sense as a social phenomenon is almost impossible to separate from the
expression of that will, as only the externalised will can be of social relevance.5
In archaic legal systems it was the spoken (formal) word which was of relevance;6 the
inner will remained unconsidered.7 Statements were made by the means of rigid
formulas8 which displayed their effect without considering the true will of the parties.9
An opposite position was later taken by the Enlightenments’ “voluntarism”. Pursuant to
the ideas of this movement the form of the statement had to give way to the subjective
will.10 This view continued to be present in the “will theory”,11 according to which the
true reason for recognising and enforcing contractual obligations is that they are
“willed” by the obligor,12 and, therefore, when concluding a contract, the true internal
will of the parties has to be considered.13 On the other hand, the contrary view was
4 Bucher E., OR, p. 110.
5 Ibid., footnote 2.
6 See, e.g. the ancient Germanic law diction “Ein Mann—ein Wort” (“One man—one word”), cited by
Bucher E., OR, p. 122, footnote 42 (my own translation).
7 Bucher E., OR, p. 121.
8 The formulas were often accompanied by formal, ritual acting. This formalism fulfilled the need of
visualisation for primitive people (see, e.g. for old Roman law Kaser, p. 39).
9 Bucher E., OR, pp. 121–122.
10 Ibid.
11 Willenstheorie of the German Pandektistik.
12 Zweigert/Kötz, p. 326.
13 Bucher E., OR, p. 122.
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taken by the “declaration theory”14 which sustained that, in the interest of certainty in
commerce, the external should rather be relied on, for the statement’s addressee
apparent, declaration.15 Thus, you would be bound not so much by what you actually
meant as by what your addressee reasonably supposed you intended.16
Nowadays consensual agreements, which in Roman contract law were restricted to
some clearly defined types of contracts,17 are considered to be the general principle.18
Therefore, as formal requirements are generally no longer necessary or, at least, less
important, it is recognised today that the parties can conclude a contract by expressing
their will not only explicitly but also in an implied way.19 While the underlying theory
is that a contract is the outcome of “consenting minds”, each party being free to accept
or reject the terms of the other, in order to determine whether an agreement has come
into existence an objective standard is normally applied.20
2. DIVERSE UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE INSTRUMENT
THROUGH WHICH CONSENT IS EXPRESSED: THE
CONTRACT
The primary rule that governs the law, practice, and regulation of arbitration in the vast
majority of national jurisdictions is the freedom of contract.21 Freedom of contract22
allows the parties to write their own rules of arbitration—indeed, it permits them to
have the agreement establish the law of arbitration for that particular transaction: the
parties can customise the arbitral process to fit their needs, eliminate legal rules or trial
techniques that might prove inconvenient or unsuitable, and maintain procedural
elements they believe necessary to achieving fairness, finality, and functionality.23
14 Erklärungstheorie.
15 Bucher E., OR, p. 122.
16 Zweigert/Kötz, p. 326.
17 “Emptio venditio”, “locatio conductio”, “mandatum” and “societas” (see Kaser, pp. 190 et seq.).
18 Bucher E., OR, p. 116.
19 See, e.g. Bucher E., OR, p. 113.
20 See, e.g. for English law English Private Law, para. 8.01, and for Swiss law Bucher E., OR, pp. 123-
124.
21 See Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 369.
22 Which has not always been accepted as a legal principle—far from it, as it is also captured in Sir Henry
Maine’s famous phrase: “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract”. (Zweigert/Kötz, p. 325).
23 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 369.
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Although it has been observed that the general principles of interpretation of arbitration
agreements are very similar under the various national laws,24 on the other hand it has
been sustained that the idea of contract—the object of interpretation—illustrates the
gap that can exist between legal systems and methods.25 Common law lawyers and
courts revere the contract, which they consider the establishment of the law between the
parties—their rights and obligations; the contract is seen as the final expression of the
parties’ intent, and, unless the document fails to express the parties’ basic agreement,
the courts must not supplement or supplant it.26 Conversely, lawyers trained in codified
law27 have often seen the detail and complexity of contracts drafted by common law
lawyers as unnecessary, counterproductive and lacking synthetic quality.28
These differences are also reflected in the way common lawyers and civil lawyers draft
arbitration agreements. The former, generally, try to cover every eventuality, hoping the
wording will extend to unseen or unexpected situations, and if not that a court or
tribunal will imply a term by analogy to what is provided expressly in the agreement.29
The latter, by contrast, rely on and expect the law to regulate the situation; they deal
only with specific issues which are covered in the contract itself.30
To Asian lawyers, the contract has minor significance and it is considered nothing more
than a relatively perfunctory documentary reflection of the parties’ commercial
relationship.31 From the point of view of a US commentator, lawyers, courts and
contracts are not as sacrosanct in Japan as they are in the United States,32 and the
Western observer is surprised to find how tenaciously the Japanese cling to their old
practices despite all the changes in the circumstances of life.33
Notwithstanding the existing differences among legal systems with regard to the
understanding of the instrument of “contract”, with respect to international arbitration
agreements another tendency can be observed: a move towards harmonisation and
uniformity. On the one hand, the effect of international conventions on arbitration, such
24 Poudret/Besson, para. 304.
25 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 3.
26 Ibid. It has been observed that if contractors made explicit arrangements for every imaginable
contingency which might arise in the agreed exchange only one rule would be needed : “pacta sunt
servanda” (Zweigert/Kötz, p. 327).
27 E.g. in Europe, the continental lawyers, for instance the French or German ones.
28 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 3.
29 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-4.
30 Ibid.
31 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 3.
32 Ibid.
33 Zweigert/Kötz, p. 300.
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as the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the New York Convention,34
has been to establish what is usually required for a valid international arbitration
agreement and to indicate the parameters within which such an agreement will operate,
and, on the other hand, arbitration institutions recommend model arbitration clauses
which are often inserted by the parties in commercial contracts as a mere formality.35
3. THE CONSENSUAL NATURE AS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
CRITERIA FOR ARBITRATION’S QUALIFICATION
Each notion can be recognised by lawyers through an intellectual operation called
qualification.36 The qualification is effected by a variable number of criteria, in function
of the considered notion and of its degree of understanding’s difficulty for the lawyer.37
Arbitration is considered to be a consensual dispute resolution mechanism.38 Indeed, the
“origine volontaire de la mission de l’arbitre”39 is regarded as one of the essential
criteria to qualify arbitration.40 However, not only is “parties’ consent” a criterion to
qualify the notion “arbitration”, but “consent” is itself a notion.
While according to one view the concepts (notions) are to be given the same meaning as
they have in substantive national law, according to the theory of qualification developed
by Rabel41 they are to be understood in the light of comparative law, independently of
the lex fori.42
3.1. Qualification
The delimitation of arbitration’s borders is the result of the lawyers’ well known
intellectual operation called qualification; to qualify is to link the studied object to a
34 The New York Convention has been described as “the single most important pillar on which the edifice
of international arbitration rests” (Wetter, Present Status, p. 93).
35 See Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, paras 3-02 et seq., who also consider that the arbitration
clauses are often “midnight clauses”, i.e. the last clauses to be considered in contract negotiations.
36 See Jarrosson, Notion, p. 246.
37 Ibid.
38 See, e.g. Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 2 ad Article 176 Swiss PIL, p. 291, who speak of “mode
conventionnel de règlement des litiges” referring to the notion of arbitration as commonly understood
under Swiss law.
39 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 21, prefers to use the adjective “volontaire” instead of “conventionnel”,
because it is more precise permitting to include the type of arbitration based on a last will which is
contained in a testament.
40 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20.
41 Rabel, Das Problem der Qualifikation, RabelsZ 5 (1931) 241.
42 Zweigert/Kölz, pp. 6 et seq.
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notion.43 Although the terminology used by the parties may represent a first indication
in the process of qualification, this indication is nevertheless not decisive.44 To qualify a
dispute resolution mechanism as arbitration implies very classically that in a particular
situation the existence of a number of essential criteria has cumulatively to be fulfilled.
The absence of one of the criteria brings with it the disqualification of arbitration.45
Often avoided in the doctrine, the question as to whether a particular dispute resolution
mechanism qualifies itself as “arbitration” is however not simply a semantic
“amusement”.46 Indeed, only the process of qualification can determine whether the
regime of arbitration will be applicable or not.47 The question of qualification can be of
relevance throughout the arbitral proceeding.48
3.2. Notion
For philosophers “notion” is the object of knowledge.49 Notion has also been defined as
the general idea of the object proposed to the work of the spirit, and juridical notion has
been considered the highest degree of development to which the juridical spirit
aspires.50 The question has been raised as to whether notion should be distinguished
from concept.51 Generally, scholars seem to use the two terms without giving them a
different meaning.52 “Arbitration” and “Consent” are both notions (or concepts).53
Yet a juridical concept does not remain immobile, it changes when the reality evolves.54
Moreover, the juridical notion is relative, i.e. it is variable.55 The juridical notion does
not only vary in the space, but it varies also in a relative manner, i.e. with regard to
other notions.56 The notion of arbitration, which was at the beginning quite a strict and
43 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20.
44 Rigozzi, para. 464.
45 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20.
46 Rigozzi, para. 462.
47 See, e.g. Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, under “why does it matter”, p. 31.
48 See also Rigozzi, para. 463.
49 See Jarrosson, Notion, p. 216 citing Lalande, V° Notion.
50 See Jarrosson, Notion, pp. 217 and 219 citing Geny.
51 Ibid.
52 The term “notion” is, e.g. used by Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, see, e.g. the title “La notion d’arbitrage”,
No. 2 ad Article 176 Swiss PIL, p. 291. The term “concept” is, e.g. used by Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, see,
e.g. p. 186. Both terms are, e.g. used by Rigozzi, see, e.g. paras 314 et seq. See also Jarrosson, Notion, p.
217.
53 About the notion of “Consent”, see under I.4.
54 Jarrosson, Notion, p. 219.
55 On this understanding of relativity of the notion being variable, see Periphanakis, p. 74.
56 See Jarrosson, Notion, p. 228.
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conceptual notion has, as a result of different types of arbitrations, during the time
considerably developed. This process has in particular been facilitated by the fact that
the notion of arbitration has a tendency to expansionism which is frequently supported
by a principle in favour of arbitration.57 This principle can be found in most countries
which have adopted a pro-arbitration policy.58
The notion of arbitration has become a wide one, which applies to more and different
hypotheses, and leads to a modification of its content from where its characterisation as
a notion with a variable content59 was derived.60 On the other hand, the variable content
of arbitration leads to problems when searching for a unique criterion and therefore it
may be necessary to make recourse to more criteria.61
3.3. Criterion
The notion cannot be studied without its corollary: the criterion. Indeed each notion
needs signs of recognition62 which allow the lawyer to know whether a particular
situation with which he is confronted leads to this or that notion, and this is precisely the
role of the criteria. The criterion is, in other words, an element which links a situation to
a notion.63
After considering the “origine volontaire de la mission de l’arbitre” as one of the
essential criteria to qualify arbitration, Jarrosson observed that renouncing to parties’
consent when making recourse to arbitration excludes the qualification as arbitration.64
Therefore, compulsory arbitration can, in his opinion, not be deemed true arbitration,
but rather a variety of exception jurisdiction.65
57 See Jarrosson, Notion, p. 228. In particular, the US courts have consistently held that arbitration
agreements must be interpreted in favour of arbitration, as was the case in Mitsubishi v. Soler
(Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc, 473 US 614, 105 S Ct 3346, 3355 et seq.,
1985).
58 See Karrer/Kälin-Nauer, p. 31; Raeschke-Kessler/Berger, paras 282 et seq. (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para.
7-61).
59 Comparative law also creates notion with variable content, as a particular notion can have a different
content according to different national laws (Jarrosson, Notion, p. 225). Indeed, when the qualification is
done in accordance to the lex fori, the concepts are to be given the same meaning as they have in the
substantive national law (see Zweigert/Kölz, pp. 6 et seq.).
60 Jarrosson, Notion, p. 242.
61 Ibid.
62 Intellectual means.
63 See Jarrosson, Notion, p. 244.
64 Jarrosson, Frontières, pp. 20-21.
65 Ibid. See also, e.g. DFT 115 II 366 (also cited by Jarrosson, Frontières, footnote 42).
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4. CONSENT AS A CONDITION FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE
VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS OR THE NOTION
OF CONSENT
Given that arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution method, the cornerstone of
arbitration is the agreement of the parties.66 An arbitration agreement is substantively
valid when it fulfils the ordinary requirements for the conclusion of a contract.67
Therefore, consent to arbitration is given when the parties have reached agreement with
regard to the essential elements of the arbitration agreement and their agreement is not
vitiated by related external factors (e.g. error, duress, misrepresentation).
4.1. Reaching agreement: offer and acceptance
The process by which parties reach agreement is commonly understood as the
acceptance by one party of an offer made by the other.68 This is the classical arbitration
schema based on an offer (of arbitration) and an acceptance of it.69
4.1.1. Offer
An offer is an expression of willingness to contract on the terms stated in it as soon as
those terms are accepted by the party to whom the statement is made, and it can be
made either expressly or by conduct but most probably not by mere inactivity since this,
standing alone, is normally equivocal and so unlikely to induce one party to believe that
the other intends to be bound.70 An offer must be certain and cannot be vague. It may
only be accepted by a person to whom it has been made.
Particular kinds of offers are those contained in BITs.71 In the majority of cases they
constitute a unilateral offer by the State involved to all investors from the other State
party to settle disputes by arbitration, which is solely revocable by means of an
66 See, e.g. Abdulla, p. 15.
67 See, e.g. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-34.
68 See also English Private Law, para. 8.05.
69 See also Rigozzi, para. 468.
70 English Private Law, para. 8.05.
71 On the ways of expressing consent to arbitration in investment arbitration, see more in detail under V.6.
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instrument of equal ranking.72 Some, however, merely contain declarations of intent to
make such offers in the future.73
4.1.2. Acceptance
Acceptance is a final and unqualified expression of assent to the terms of an offer.
Assuming that an offer has been made an agreement comes into existence when the
offer is accepted either expressly (by words of acceptance) or implied by conduct.74
4.1.3. Essential elements of the arbitration agreement
The essentialia negotii of an arbitration agreement75 are twofold—an agreement
between the parties that any dispute between them will be resolved by arbitration, and
an indication of the dispute or legal relationship, which will be the subject matter of
arbitration.76 On these two aspects consent must be reached by the parties to have a
substantive valid arbitration agreement.77
4.2. Intent, expression of the intent, interpretation of the intent
In order to determine the existence of parties’ consent, arbitrators will resort—
particularly in commercial arbitration—to the general principles of contractual
interpretation.78 Of importance therefore is the question as to which law should govern
the arbitration agreement. National contract laws adopt either a subjective theory, where
investigation into the intentions of the parties prevails, or an objective theory, which
relies primarily on the meaning of the text, or sometimes a mixed approach, where the
meaning of the text is merely taken into consideration if and to the extent that the
intentions of the parties cannot be established.79 If it is not possible to establish the true
and common intent of the parties, or should such intent differ, the parties’ declarations
72 Cremades, p. 162.
73 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-22.
74 English Private Law, para. 8.07.
75 About the essential elements of the arbitration agreement, see also under IV.2.
76 Abdulla, p. 18 with references to Poudret/Besson, paras 155-156, and BSK-IPRG-Wenger, paras 28 et
seq. ad Article 178 Swiss PIL. So also, e.g. DFT 129 III 675.
77 See, e.g. Berger/Kellerhals, paras 270 et seq.
78 See also Abdulla, p. 18.
79 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-11; Fontaine/De Ly, p. 120.
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will normally be interpreted following an objective standard. Similar rules of
interpretation are to be found in public international law.80
4.2.1. Contract as the outcome of “consenting minds”
During the conduct of contractual negotiations a differentiation has to be made between
the negotiation of the terms of the agreement and the decision of the parties’ intention to
create a legal relationship.81 However, while the underlying theory is that a contract is
the outcome of “consenting minds”—each party being free to accept or reject the terms
of the other—to speak of “consenting minds” may be misleading. Indeed, parties are
judged by what they have said, written or done, not by what is in their minds—in other
words an objective standard is applied, as is the case under English82 or Swiss law.83
4.2.2. Objective test under English law
In determining whether an agreement has come into existence, the law normally applies
an “objective” test: if A so conducts himself as to induce B reasonably to believe that A
has agreed to terms proposed by B, then A will generally be bound by those terms even
though he may not in fact have intended to agree to them.84 Under the objective test, a
statement by A can be an offer if it induces B reasonably to believe that A intended to
be bound by it on acceptance, even though A had no such intention. A will not,
however, be so bound if B knew that A had no such intention, nor, probably, if B simply
had no view on this question.85
4.2.3. Principle of confidence under Swiss law
Under Swiss law, in ascertaining whether an agreement has been concluded, one must
first seek the true and common intent of the parties beyond the wording they actually
used.86 Therefore, it is necessary to examine not only the wording of the contract but
also the whole set of circumstances surrounding the contract, inter alia, the context of
80 See, e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-11.
81 Bucher E., OR, p. 112.
82 As an example of common law jurisdiction.
83 As an example of civil law jurisdiction.
84 English Private Law, para. 8.02.
85 English Private Law, para. 8.05.
86 Abdulla, p. 18.
48
the conclusion of the contract, the conduct of the parties before and after the conclusion
of the contract, the interests at stake, as well as commercial/trade usage.87 If it is not
possible to determine the true and common intent of the parties or should such intent
differ, the parties’ declarations will be construed pursuant to the “principle of
confidence”.88 In this second phase of interpretation, the judge or the arbitrators must
construe the declarations or behaviour of a party as they would be understood bona fide
by the addressee in light of all of the circumstances.89 The “principle of confidence”
thus implies that a party is bound by the objective meaning of its declarations or
conduct, even though such a meaning may be at odds with the actual intent of the
party.90
4.2.4. Interpretation in public international law
Similarly, there are different schools of thought for interpretation in public international
law: according to the subjective school the goal of the interpretation is to determine the
intent; pursuant to the objective school, the goal of interpretation must be to ascertain
the meaning of the text, there being a presumption that the parties’ intent is reflected in
this text; and in the teleological school, the focus is primarily placed on the object and
purpose of the treaty.91
The concept of consent is, in any event, in investment arbitration a difficult one. Indeed,
given the absence of a meeting of the minds between investor and host State, consent
has to be constructed from the standing consent given by the State by treaty and the
subsequent consent given by the investor at the time the claim is submitted to
arbitration.92
4.2.5. Where does one look for consent to arbitration?
Traditionally, i.e. in commercial arbitration, the place where consent to arbitration has
been expressed is in an arbitration agreement. Therefore, it has been argued that since in
all national jurisdictions, as well as in the public international law sphere, arbitration is
87 Abdulla, p. 18.
88 On this principle (“Vertrauenprinzip”), which materialises more or less the “declaration theory”, see,
e.g. Bucher E., OR, pp. 122 et seq.
89 See, e.g. DFT 69 II 322 or DFT 95 II 328/329.
90 Abdulla, p. 19.
91 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-11; Sinclair I., pp. 114 et seq.; Brownlie, pp. 602 et seq.
92 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
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considered to be consensual in nature (save for exceptional statutory schemes93), the
arbitration agreement is the ultimate foundation of the arbitral process.94 Particularly
in commercial arbitration the arbitration agreement often takes, but not always, the form
of an arbitration clause contained in the document that regulates the main contract. With
regard to non-signatories it has been observed that the generally-accepted notion of the
arbitration agreement being “separable” from the main agreement gives rise to the
question of whether the parties must have consented to the non-signatory being bound
by the arbitration agreement itself, or whether this can be inferred from consent to be
bound by the contract as a whole.95
On the other hand, when considering investment arbitration it has also been argued that
we are now in “the era of arbitration without contractual relationships”.96 Indeed, while
in investment arbitration consent to arbitration expressed through direct agreement
between the parties—as happens in commercial arbitration—is not unknown, often
there is no arbitration agreement in the traditional sense and consent to arbitration is
given by the host State through its State legislation, through bilateral investment
treaties, or multilateral treaties.
4.2.6. Difference in interpretation of consent between commercial and
investment arbitration
An arbitration agreement in a contract is specific by its very nature, as it is shaped to
meet the needs of a given transaction.97 Moreover, both drafters are present in the
arbitration and may thus explain their intentions. Whatever the contents of the
applicable law, the arbitration will take ample account of these intentions.98 Therefore,
it has been observed that when contracts are interpreted in international commercial
arbitration one may venture to say that the search for the real intentions dominates.99
However, when it is not possible to establish the true and common intent of the parties,
the parties’ declarations will normally be interpreted following an objective standard.
93 And, possibly, for cases where arbitration is forced/induced. On “induced arbitration”, see under
II.2.3.2.
94 Wetter, Connection, p. 333.
95 See Hosking, p. 302.
96 Werner, Trade Explosion, pp. 5 et seq.
97 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
98 Kaufmann-Kohler, ICSID Awards, p. 206.
99 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
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Furthermore, the search for the real intention may be difficult where non-signatories are
involved.
In contrast, dispute resolution provisions in treaties define jurisdiction in the abstract
for an unlimited number of future investments. As in treaty arbitration proceedings
only one of the drafters is the respondent State, whilst for the claimant (the investor) the
dispute resolution provision is res inter alios acta—it has been argued that more
objective criteria will by essence prevail and the subjective element will play a lesser
role.100
5. COMMENTS
Among legal scholars the views about consent differ. For some scholars the “origine
volontaire de la mission de l’arbitre” is one of the essential criteria to qualify
arbitration.101 For others, the classical concept of arbitration based on consent is being
supplemented by other concepts of arbitration which largely ignore this requirement and
they speak of the “dogma of consent” which should no longer be a justification for
arbitration when consent is merely a fiction.102 They argue that it may be more accurate
and intellectually honest to simply admit that arbitration without consent exists.103 In
between these two positions, and considering in particular arbitration in the domain of
the resolution of sport-related disputes, it has also been suggested that there should be a
shift in the question of consent from the stage of qualification to the validity of the
arbitration agreement.104 The advantage of such an approach is that, while the question
of arbitration’s qualification has always to be examined ex officio, the validity of the
arbitration agreement has only to be considered when it is contested by one of the
parties involved in the dispute.105
With regard to the consensual nature of arbitration, it has to be observed that with the
growing acceptance of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism and its use in
areas other than the traditional one of commercial arbitration, the consensual
character of arbitration tends to decrease. This is mainly due to the fact that the
100 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
101 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20. See, e.g. also Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 2 ad Article 176 Swiss PIL,
p. 291, who speak of “mode conventionnel de règlement des litiges” referring to the notion of arbitration
as commonly understood under Swiss law.
102 See, e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186.
103 Ibid.
104 See Rigozzi, para. 478.
105 Ibid.
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relationships between the parties in investment dispute arbitration and sport arbitration
have another structure, when compared to commercial arbitration, with the consequence
that the process of reaching an agreement to arbitrate appears to be different. The most
extreme position is, however, represented by the case of mandatory arbitration, where
arbitration is seen as such an accepted mechanism for dispute resolution that the State
itself recognises that arbitration is the most sensible method to resolve disputes in a
particular area of life and obliges the parties to make recourse to it.
In legal writings a distinction has also been made between specific consent (arbitration
as a contract, which is to be found in commercial arbitration) and general consent
(arbitration as a governing arrangement, which is to be found in investment
arbitration):106
- With regard to specific consent it has been observed that where consent is given
after the dispute has arisen107 it is specific to the dispute, whereas when consent is
given in advance108 it is specific to the relationship between the private parties.109
The degree of specificity of the consent to arbitration affects the breadth of the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and the degree to which the disputing parties have
conceded their right to adjudicate a particular dispute in the courts.110 It has also
been observed that, in principle, arbitration that is authorised by an agreement to
arbitrate, based on a specific consent, cannot go beyond the private relationship
between the disputing parties, i.e. the subject-matter of the dispute cannot affect the
interests of either third parties or the State in the regulatory sphere because neither
third parties nor the State (acting in a sovereign capacity) have consented to the
arbitration.111
- On the other hand it has been sustained that under investment treaties States consent
generally to the compulsory arbitration of disputes with foreign investors as a
group.112
However, in my opinion, while in investment arbitration the condition of consent is
placed in a new light which is different from the traditional contractual concept of
arbitration, treaty-based arbitration has to be seen as a consensual dispute resolution
mechanism. Nevertheless, in my view, distinct types of consent to arbitration have to be
106 See Van Harten, pp. 62 et seq.
107 Compromis arbitral or submission agreement.
108 Arbitration clause.
109 Ibid.
110 See, e.g. Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 1-13.
111 Van Harten, p. 62.
112 See Van Harten, p. 63.
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differentiated. For this classification of different forms of consent two aspects have to
be distinguished:
- on the one hand, consent to arbitration can be directed to a defined person, i.e. be
individual, or be addressed to a group of persons who are still not individualised
(identified), i.e. be general;113
- on the other hand, consent to arbitration can be expressed after a dispute has arisen
or can be given before and for the case of the breaking out of a dispute, i.e. consent
can refer either to a concrete (existing114) dispute or to an abstract (future115) one.
By combining the two sides, it is therefore suggested that there are different types of
consent which can be classified as follows:
a. Individual-concrete consent
This type of consent is one that can be found in submission agreements116 where
consent is given by the defined parties after the dispute has arisen.
b. Individual-abstract consent
This type of consent is one that can be found in arbitration clauses where consent is
given by the defined parties before the dispute has arisen.
c. General-abstract consent
This type of consent is one that can be found in investment arbitration in what has been
called “public offer of arbitration”117 and which encompasses “consent through host
State legislation”, “consent through BITs” or “consent through multilateral treaties”.
The State gives its consent to a group (investors) to arbitrate possible future disputes
before the disputes themselves have arisen.118 Furthermore, it can also be found in
113 Considering the issue of non-signatories, it can however be asked whether this division is so clear-cut.
114 Expression used by Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-02.
115 Ibid. I think the word “abstract” has to be preferred, because when signing an arbitration clause the
breaking out of a dispute is not certain (this is clearly also underlined in Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/
Partasides, para. 3-02 : “the parties to a contract may agree to an arbitration clause, they hope that there
will be not need to invoke it”.
116 On the particular importance of the “compromiso” or specific submission in Latin America, see
Grigera Naón, Freshfields, pp. 150 et seq.
117 Cremades, pp. 149 et seq.
118 The State even gives its consent before the investor has made his investment in the host country,
providing thus the investor with a certainty in respect to the dispute resolution mechanism.
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sport arbitration, when a sport organisation gives its consent to submit to arbitration
disputes of which it does not know the exact nature and importance with parties about
whom it does not even know the identity.119
d. General-concrete consent
While this type of consent seems at first sight less obvious, examples can be found
where special purpose tribunals120 are established to undertake resolution of certain
types of dispute. For instance, a number of claims commissions or claims tribunals have
been set up in order to deal with the legal and economic consequences of
nationalisations, revolutions, wars or other events affecting a large number of parties in
the same way.121 Contrarily to the cases of investment arbitrations considered under c),
here the State gives its consent when the consequences affecting a large number of
parties have already arisen. Often compensation is payable to successful claimants
from a special fund.122 The arbitration tends therefore to be a method to allocate
resources to a group of persons who have been affected by a same event. In these sorts
of arbitrations there is generally no formal arbitration agreement between the claimants
and the parties against whom claims are brought in this type of tribunal, but parties who
have a claim falling within the declared jurisdiction of such a tribunal have the right to
submit their claims to those tribunals.123
The foregoing categorisation of different types of consent could have several
advantages—for example it could permit:
- a better explanation of the reach of an agreement to arbitrate where there is no
horizontal and bi-polar situation, like in the traditional situations of commercial
arbitration;
- to distinguish different types of consent in investment arbitration124 and sport
arbitration;125 and
- the making of a distinction as to how consent has to be interpreted.126
119 See Rigozzi, para. 332.
120 See, e.g. the United Nations Compensation Commission or the Claims Resolution Tribunal for
Dormant Accounts (“CRT”) in Switzerland. On the CRT, see “The Claims Resolution Process on
Dormant Accounts in Switzerland” (January 2000), ASA Special Series No. 13, edited by Pierre A.
Karrer.
121 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 3-39.
122 See, e.g. the special fund that receives a percentage of the proceeds from sales of Iraqi oil in the case
of the United Nations Compensation Commission.
123 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 3-39 and 3-41.
124 See, e.g. between consent given through a direct arbitration agreement or through treaties.
125 See, e.g. between consent given through arbitration clauses in sport-related contracts, licences,
athletes’ declarations or in regulations of sport organisations.
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Finally, it has to be observed that due to the fact that arbitration “becomes the most
common method for settling international disputes”127 or the “natural forum for
international disputes”,128 there is sometimes a tendency to assume consent to
arbitration where in fact there is not really such consent.129
II. THE PHENOMENON OF ARBITRATION
1. CLASSICAL CHARACTERISATION OF ARBITRATION
This part of the thesis will deal with the classical characterisation of the notion of
arbitration. This characterisation is still influenced by the form of arbitration which is
considered to have existed since the dawn of commerce130 and which for many years
has been the predominant one: commercial arbitration. It has been pointed out that
there is no legal definition for arbitration.131 Indeed, as arbitration is a dynamic dispute
resolution mechanism varying according to law and international practice, national laws
do not attempt a final definition of it.132 At most, a definition can be inferred from the
provisions defining the arbitration agreement contained in the various legislations.133 On
the other hand, definitions of “arbitration” have been provided by legal authors.134
Arbitration can be characterised as a private and consensual alternative (to national
courts) dispute resolution mechanism which leads to a final and binding determination
of parties’ rights and obligations.135 Lalive has observed that a broad conception of
arbitration is particularly justified in the international field, where arbitration is the only
means of assuring an effective resolution of disputes.136
126 E.g. between consent given through arbitration agreements and consent given through treaties.
127 See Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186.
128 See Lionnet, p. 606.
129 See, e.g. in particular the case law of French State courts related to the extension of arbitration
agreements within the groups of companies discussed later on in this thesis under IV.6.2.3.1. and IV.6.3.
130 See, e.g. Mustill, History, p. 43.
131 Jarrosson, Notion, para. 779.
132 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 1-6.
133 Poudret/Besson, para. 1.
134 See, e.g. the comparative overview given by Poudret/Besson, para. 2.
135 See Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 2 ad Article 176 Swiss PIL, p. 291; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 1-7 et
seq.
136 Lalive, FJS 946, Ch. I.1, p. 2.
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1.1. A private mechanism for dispute resolution
Arbitration is a mechanism for dispute resolution by private individuals. Arbitrators do
not hold public office and are not vested with pre-existing jurisdictional powers, which
they acquire only because of the parties’ consent.137 The parties may, within the limits
of the relevant law, confer powers upon the arbitral tribunal directly or indirectly.138
They have the ultimate power to determine the form, structure, system and other details
of the arbitration.139 However, while the jurisdictional function of the arbitrators is
fundamentally analogous to that of judges,140 arbitrators have no capability to make use
of the coercive powers over property and persons that are conferred by the State upon a
national court when exercising their function.141 The reason for this is that the source of
the jurisdictional authority of arbitral tribunals is strictly private.142
1.2. The consensual nature of arbitration
The principal characteristic of arbitration is that it is chosen by the parties143 by
concluding an agreement to arbitrate. This is considered the foundation stone of
international commercial arbitration, as it records the consent of the parties to submit to
arbitration—a consent which is indispensable to any process of dispute resolution
outside national courts.144 Such processes depend for their very existence upon the
agreement of the parties. Thus, this element of consent is essential, as without it, there
can be no valid arbitration.145
It has been rightly sustained that the contractual arrangement must be understood
broadly in the sense that the parties’ consent can be given in different ways and
successively.146 Thus, while in investment arbitration there is no arbitration agreement
in the traditional sense, the arbitrators' jurisdiction nevertheless stems from the initial
consent of the State or public entity (expressed in the signing of the treaty) and the
subsequent consent of the claimant, who accepts the arbitrator’s jurisdiction by starting
137 Poudret/Besson, para. 7.
138 According to rules of arbitration, whether institutional or ad hoc.
139 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 1-11.
140 See Clay, pp. 103 et seq.
141 See Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 5-07.
142 Rigozzi, para. 479.
143 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 1-11.
144 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01.
145 See also Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 1-09.
146 Poudret/Besson, para. 4.
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the arbitration.147 Therefore, the contractual nature of arbitration does not entail that the
arbitration agreement must be “mutual”, i.e. give the parties the same right to refer
disputes to arbitration.148 Indeed, it is possible to confer upon one party the unilateral149
right to initiate an arbitration proceeding.150 Notwithstanding these particularities, also
in investment arbitration—like in commercial arbitration—the attempt to emancipate
arbitration from a State justice system is clear und unavoidable.151
It has also been observed152 that continental European jurists153 in particular attach great
importance to the wishes of the parties—l’autonomie de la volonté.154 In so doing they
appear to suggest that this consent, together with an appropriate set of rules, is sufficient
to turn international arbitration into an autonomous, delocalised process that takes place
independently of national law.155 Although for many this goes too far, as it attaches too
much importance to the wishes of the parties and not enough to the framework of
national laws within which the arbitral process must take place, the consent of the
parties remains the essential basis of a voluntary system of international commercial
arbitration.156 However, while on the one hand the (over-?) emphasis of the autonomie
de la volonté has led some scholars to consider compulsory arbitration as not true
arbitration,157 on the other hand with regard to fields of arbitration other than
commercial arbitration, the consensual nature of arbitration has even been
questioned.158
1.3. An alternative to national courts
By agreeing to arbitration the parties remove their relationships and disputes from the
jurisdiction of national courts altogether. In fact, the parties not only choose not to
submit their disputes to the default national courts, but by refusing to conclude a
jurisdiction agreement they also choose not to submit the disputes to alternative national
courts. However, this aspect of the characterisation of arbitration has, with regard to
147 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
148 Poudret/Besson, para. 4.
149 On unilateral arbitration, see, e.g. Prujiner.
150 Poudret/Besson, para. 4.
151 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
152 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01.
153 Especially the French ones.
154 See, e.g. Jarrosson, Frontières.
155 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01. On this development followed, in particular, by the
French State courts, see under III.3.3.2.2. and also III.4.3.2.2.
156 Ibid.
157 See, e.g. Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20.
158 See, e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186; Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
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international arbitration, been criticised as well. Lalive argued that to speak of removal
of the dispute from ordinary State jurisdiction has no or, at least, another sense in
international arbitration, where one of the essential scopes of the arbitration
agreement is precisely to prevent the conflict of jurisdictions and to remedy the
extreme incertitude which in general reigns with regard to the determination of this
“ordinary judge”, i.e. the competent judge—of which State?159 Moreover, it has been
observed that while a forum selection clause is concerned with the rules that determine
which forum may hear a dispute, the arbitration agreement is an act which vests
jurisdictional power in a given jurisdiction in the first place (here, a specified arbitral
tribunal).160 Therefore, arbitration agreements, contrarily to jurisdiction agreements
which keep the dispute within the boundaries of the jurisdiction of national courts, take
it to a different adjudicatory forum.161
The result of this difference in the nature of the arbitration agreement is that certain
assumptions have been made regarding the parties’ presumed intent in including such a
clause in their contractual relations.162 Indeed, because of the specific nature and far-
reaching consequences of choosing an arbitration clause, there is a presumption that the
level of intent—the volitional intensity—from parties who consent to insert such
clauses is greater than the level of intent in selecting a mere forum selection clause.163
The aforesaid view has, however, recently been challenged by arguing that, despite their
notable differences, both arbitration and jurisdiction agreements are essentially the same
in nature and have the same objective—therefore arbitration and jurisdiction agreements
should constitute equal alternatives to the default jurisdiction rather than hierarchically
ordered dispute resolution clauses.164
This critic is surely justified, in particular with regard to the lack of a coherent
international framework securing the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements.165
However, while, at least in commercial arbitration, a bigger and fairer competition
among fora, i.e. in particular between arbitral tribunals and State courts166 is undeniably
desirable, we will see later on that in other fields of arbitration there is not really an
159 Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, p. 271.
160 Chang, p. 806.
161 Brekoulakis, Notion, p. 354.
162 Chang, p. 806.
163 Ibid.
164 Brekoulakis, Notion, pp. 355 et seq.
165 Ibid.
166 So in particular Brekoulakis, Notion, p. 364.
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alternative to this dispute resolution method, mainly because of the wish for
neutrality167 and the perceived need of a consistent case law.168
1.4. The final and binding determination of parties’ rights and
obligations
The final and binding determination of parties’ rights and obligations is the criterion of
the jurisdictional mission of the arbitrator.169 Bucher, for example, emphasises the
power of arbitrators to render an award which becomes res judicata in the same way as
a judgment.170 The procedures that have to be followed in order to arrive at a binding
decision by way of arbitration may be described as judicial.171 An arbitral tribunal is
bound to “act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a
reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent”.172
While the quotation is from the English Arbitration Act 1996,173 the obligation is one of
general application.174
In a modern conception arbitration is not limited to resolving disputes in a traditional
way, but it may equally do so by filling gaps in contracts, revising and adapting them—
particularly where the law applicable to the main contract authorises the judge to do so
or when the parties have vested the arbitrators with such powers.175 However, the final
and binding determination of parties’ rights and obligations distinguishes arbitration
from other forms of alternative dispute resolution.176
Moreover, a number of legal systems make a distinction between contractual and
judicial arbitration.177 The test for distinguishing between the two different institutions
is the binding nature of the decision that results from the process: contract-like or
167 This is particularly the case in investment arbitration, but as well in sport arbitration.
168 This is particularly the case in sport arbitration with the CAS.
169 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 21.
170 Bucher A., Arbitrage, p. 22 para. 24.
171 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 1-17.
172 Ibid. Emphasis in the original text.
173 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 33(1)(a).
174 See, e.g. UNCITRAL Model Law Article 18. Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 1-17.
175 Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, p. 292. Because of the fact that arbitrators like judges are not always
required to decide a dispute and sometimes only have to supplement or complete the agreement between
the parties, Oppetit casts doubt on the jurisdictional character of arbitration (Oppetit, Arbitrage).
176 On these other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, see, e.g. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 1-32 et
seq.
177 See, e.g. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands (Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 185).
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judgment-like.178 It is only if the parties intend a decision to be binding like a judgment
that it constitutes an award and the process an arbitration.179
1.5. Comments
The difficulty of each characterisation is defining the borders of what has still to be
considered part of a particular notion. This is no less true for the notion of arbitration. It
has been observed that the approach followed in the United States in this respect is more
pragmatic than the one of European, and particularly French, lawyers.180 A very
important role in this context is played by parties’ consent. Indeed, as Jarrosson
observed, the Anglo-Saxon approach of stressing the will of the parties not only reduces
the jurisdictional power of the arbitrator but the control of qualification through the
judge.181
The strong contractualisation of arbitration in the United States permits the parties to
adapt this institution to their needs and particular desires. As a contractual dispute
resolution method, arbitration has its raison d’être in its commercial utility which
should only be limited in concrete cases by principles of justice and public order rather
than supposed exigencies of definition.182 While the risk of such an approach is that
some scholars would then not denominate a particular dispute resolution mechanism as
arbitration, the critique of these scholars mainly originates in the a priori idea that a
particular dispute resolution mechanism has to fulfil some essential characteristics183
from which it is impossible to depart without losing the qualification as arbitration.184
On the other hand, it has been observed that in the United States a judge may eventually
put forward the question of whether an arbitrator was really authorised by the parties to
act, but will never ask whether a certain type of arbitration was “real arbitration”.185
It has also been contended that the notion of arbitration should generally be distinct and
larger in the field of international arbitration, so as to allow learning from similar
178 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 185.
179 For Italian law, Bernardini, Arbitrato, p. 17; for French law, Jarrosson, Notion, p. 162 et seq.; for
German law, Berger, Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 53-54; for Swiss law, Ehrat in Basler
Kommentar, p. 1415.
180 Rigozzi, para. 661.
181 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 14.
182 Rau/Pédamon, p. 483.
183 See, e.g. Jarrosson, Notion.
184 Rau/Pédamon, p. 482.
185 Rau/Pédamon, footnote 54, citing Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, pp. 29-30.
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foreign institutions or notions which are different from the ones pertaining to a
particular country.186 Similarly, consideration should also be given as to whether a
distinct qualification has to be envisaged for types of arbitration which are not
commercial arbitration. With regard to sport arbitration it has, in particular, been argued
that while the process of qualification has to be done bearing in mind the peculiarities of
this type of arbitration, on the other hand these peculiarities do not justify a complete
detachment from the traditional concept of arbitration.187 However, the expansion of
the use of arbitration in fields other than the traditional one of commercial
arbitration, i.e. in the fields of investment and sport arbitration, has changed the
perception of the consensual nature of arbitration.
2. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT AND THE
CONSENSUAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION
Although arbitration has been considered a relative concept, the exact content of which
depends on the applicable law,188 this part will focus on the relativity and variability of
the notion of “arbitration” in a temporal dimension. In fact, as other concepts have, the
notion of arbitration has evolved and changed over time.189 On the other hand, it has to
be observed that there are recognisable traits of arbitration which were present in the
past and are still present today.
Arbitration is an institution which preceded courts190 and which must have existed since
the dawn of commerce.191 Yet shortly after the appearance of State courts, arbitration
assumed the position of the younger (and weaker) brother and it was reduced to an
exception, the limits and the functioning of which have been firmly controlled by the
courts themselves.192 However, while not too long ago the domain of international
trade was still seen as the only area where arbitration was the dominant method of
settling disputes,193 more recently, in particular considering the developments in the
186 Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, p. 270.
187 See Rigozzi, para. 671.
188 Schlosser, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, p. 1 para. 1. This “geographical” dimension is discussed all through
the present thesis by its comparative analysis.
189 Jarrosson, Notion, p. 367.
190 The thesis was also developed that arbitration stays at the origin of State justice. This view is the one
of B. Matthias and then particularly M. Wlassak—and their followers (e.g. R. Monier and, more recently,
A. Magdelain).
191 See Mustill, History, p. 43.
192 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 38.
193 Ibid.
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fields of sport and investment arbitrations, it has been observed that arbitration has
developed into the most common method for generally settling international
disputes.194
During this time not only the areas in which arbitration is applied and its functions have
changed, but the consensual character of arbitration has also undergone a
transformation.
2.1. The traditional concept of arbitration
At the outset any decision to make recourse to arbitration was taken by the parties after
the dispute had broken out (compromis arbitral). Arbitration had, therefore, a pure
consensual character with a peace restoration function.195
Arbitration was already known in Mesopotamia.196 Several examples of conflicts
between States were resolved by mediation or arbitration by a third power.197 Moreover,
not only Assyrian merchants of the 19th and 18th centuries B.C. frequently resorted to
arbitration, but arbitral procedure was also used in certain areas of family law, in
particular in relation to succession.198 Pre-Islamic Arabia knew arbitration199 and the
institution was later kept on and developed in the Islamic world.200 From the beginning
arbitration has been employed in different areas and in different cultures and the issue
of differentiating arbitration from similar institutes201 was not unknown.
Not surprisingly arbitration also made its appearance in ancient Greece, even though it
was not always easy to distinguish from similar practices such as “amiable
composition” and conciliation.202 The concern with re-establishing peace and security
in human relations on the one hand, and the Greek cities’ hermetic approach to
jurisdictional questions, on the other, allowed both private and inter-state arbitration to
develop into a particularly appreciated and widespread practice which found its apogee
194 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186.
195 See Rigozzi, paras 315-316.
196 See Lafont, p. 557.
197 Ibid.
198 Lafont, p. 558.
199 Clay, pp. 3-4.
200 Jakubowski, p. 176.
201 See, e.g. also Gaurier, pp. 189-223, on the question whether the private dispute resolution in imperial
China was arbitration or mediation.
202 Velissaroupoulos-Karakostas, p. 9.
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with the restoration of democracy around 400 B.C. when the Athenians enacted a law203
on private arbitration.204 In particular, Greek cities gave access to the law to persons and
property which were on the margins, or outside the scope of the application of the law
and thereby protection from the civil courts.205 Therefore, the tendency to extend the
scope of application of the law and of protection by giving the possibility of recourse
to a neutral dispute resolution forum was already established in the past.
However, arbitration’s major development came under the Roman Empire.206 From a
technical point of view Roman arbitration207 was founded on two conventions:
- the receptum arbitri;
- the compromissum.208
The arbitral award was definitive and there was no mean of reformation appeal (ex
sententia arbitri ex compromisso ... appellari non posse).209 However, the nature of
arbitration was strictly contractual and the respect of the arbitral award could only be
assured indirectly by providing the compromissum with a penal clause permitting, if
necessary, recourse to the actio ex stipulatu to the winning party.210
While Byzantine arbitration was based on the Roman model for this institution, an
important characteristic in Byzantium was the implication of members of the Church
acting as arbitrators, and the development of parallel arbitration within Canon law211—
the rules for such arbitration were different from the legislative rules.212 This tendency
towards emancipation of arbitration from a dispute resolution system controlled by the
State was therefore also present in the past.
2.2. The modern concept of arbitration
With the coming of the modern State justice system, arbitration had undergone a
transformation.213 While the history of arbitration is built on the position of States and
their jurisdictions with regard to the acceptance of this alternative mechanism for
203 Preserved by Demosthenes 21.94.
204 Velissaroupoulos-Karakostas, pp. 19 et seq.
205 See Velissaroupoulos-Karakostas, pp. 9-10.
206 Clay, pp. 6-7.
207 On Roman arbitration, see, e.g. de Loynes de Fumichon/Humbert.
208 See Kaser, p. 214.
209 C. 2,55(56),1 (Caracalla 213).
210 Rigozzi, para. 317. See also Kaser, p. 214.
211 On arbitration in Canon law, see, e.g. Lefebvre-Teillard.
212 Papadatou, p. 349.
213 Rigozzi, para. 318.
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solving disputes,214 the exclusive exercise of public power on which State justice is
based does not necessarily enter into conflict with arbitration whose origin is purely
consensual.215 Indeed in medieval England, where recourse to arbitration was common,
there was a healthy and continuous working relationship between judges and arbitrators,
and judges in all the King’s courts often acted as arbitrators, both informally and
formally.216 However the relationship between the courts and the arbitral process was
much closer under the English system than was the case in mainland Europe where
there was the tendency to favour what, in current jargon, would be called “institutional”
arbitration.217 Different legal traditions have, therefore, influenced, and they still
influence, different perceptions of arbitration.
Later, the struggle that many legal orders went through to establish a monopoly of the
administration of justice in the central political authority left a residual government
antagonism towards—and a related tendency to suspect—private tribunals.218
Nevertheless, with time the State has begun to develop a judicial control of the awards
and to recognise that decisions taken by individuals may under certain conditions have
the same effects as judgments taken by its own tribunals: it is the consecration of the
jurisdictional function of arbitration.219
The aftermath of the First World War then saw the rise of idealistic internationalism
which provided fertile soil for the growth of an international spirit in the field of
commercial arbitration.220 Two features may be particularly mentioned in this context:
- The inauguration of the ICC, with its associated Court of Arbitration.221 Indeed, the
rule of law in transborder arbitration has been substantially influenced by private
arbitration institutions.222
- The emergence over the past decades of a network of international instruments
pertaining to international commercial arbitration, as a result of which arbitration
agreements have become reliable, whereas arbitration awards have become more
efficient (more readily enforceable) than court decisions on the international
scene.223
214 See Bernardini, Justice arbitrale, p. 14.
215 Rigozzi, para. 318.
216 Roebuck, Sources, p. 259.
217 See Mustill, History, pp. 44 et seq.
218 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 51.
219 Rigozzi, para. 319.
220 Mustill, History, p. 48.
221 Ibid.
222 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 27. See also, e.g. the LCIA.
223 Most importantly, the 1958 New York Convention, the 1961 European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration and the 1965 ICSID Convention (Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 39).
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In commercial arbitration today the parties mainly agree to make recourse to arbitration
before the dispute has broken out (generally by inserting an arbitration clause into the
main contract), reducing therefore the pure consensual character of arbitration.224
Indeed, the acceptance of and recourse to arbitration are often a necessary pre-
condition to entry into the international market-place.225
Also the UNCITRAL Model Law’s progressive, modern arbitration regime has had
considerable influence on State arbitration laws both through direct adoption or more
indirectly.226 It has been designed to provide States with a highly advanced statutory
framework of arbitration law—in effect to make it possible, especially for developing
States, to become instantly supportive of arbitration and thereby able to participate in
transborder commerce.227
The tendency towards acceptance and facilitation of arbitration as an essentially
party-designed and controlled dispute resolution mechanism, in full flood as the 1980s
began, has continued unabated.228 In the described development two doctrines,
apparently linked, but in fact almost entirely distinct, have come up:
- the concept of a “transnational” procedural law; and
- the concept of “the new lex mercatoria”229 which is concerned with substantive not
procedural law.230
The need for emancipation from the State justice system, per definitionem national,
has, however, not only been of extreme importance in the context of international
trade, but even more in the domain of international economic relations with the
involvement of national States themselves as economic actors, where reasons related to
neutrality are essential. Furthermore, considerations related to a speedy resolution of the
disputes231 and of having the most possible uniform decisions are important in the field
of sport arbitration. Finally, reasons about efficiency have led to the consideration of
arbitration as an appropriate means to solve, for instance, consumer disputes.232
224 Rigozzi, para. 319.
225 See also Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 25.
226 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 57.
227 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 26.
228 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 57.
229 On lex mercatoria, see, e.g. Berger, Law Merchant; Carbonneau, Lex mercatoria; Cremades/Plehn;
Dasser; Goldman, Applicable law, Frontières, Lex mercatoria, Perspectives; Kahn, Lex mercatoria;
Kahn, Pluralisme; Lando; Lowenfeld; Mustill, Lex mercatoria; Paulsson, Lex mercatoria.
230 Mustill, History, pp. 51-52.
231 See for the Olympic Games, Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics.
232 On arbitration of consumer disputes, see, e.g. Brafford.
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2.3. New fields of arbitration
Although it is a commonplace to say that arbitration is consensual,233 it has been
observed that in the new fields of arbitration there is to a certain extent a decline in the
consensual character of arbitration.234 In the meantime, however, there is a general
growing consensus with respect to the choice and use of arbitration as the most
common method for settling international disputes.235
2.3.1. Arbitration based on international treaties
The resolution of international investment disputes has been seen as “new territory for
international arbitration”.236 Indeed, in the many international treaties, of which the best
known are the NAFTA and the ICSID, the preferred dispute resolution mechanism is
arbitration, whether institutional arbitration237 or ad hoc arbitration.238 Investment
disputes differ in several respects from ordinary commercial disputes,239 and it has been
observed that with investment arbitration the circumference of arbitration’s scope of
application has been widened to include disputes of a mixed political and commercial
character.240 However, the greatest difference to commercial arbitrations is the source
of the tribunal’s power.241 While commercial arbitrations require an arbitration
agreement between the parties, investment arbitration may be possible without such an
arbitration agreement in the ordinary sense.242
An impressive number of investment laws, bilateral investment treaties (BITs),243 and
multilateral investment treaties or instruments (MITIs)244 implement a process which
233 Paulsson, Privity, p. 234.
234 Rigozzi, para. 323.
235 So, e.g. also Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 186.
236 See Paulsson, Privity, p. 234.
237 For example, arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID, under the ICC Rules or under the SCC
Rules.
238 For example, arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See Lalonde, p. 191.
239 See, e.g. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 28-8 et seq.
240 Carbonneau, Arbitration, p. 41.
241 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-11.
242 Ibid.
243 BITs have proliferated over the last three decades (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-5). At the end of 2006
there were 2,573 BITs (see UNCTAD, Recent developments in international investment agreements
(2006-June 2007), IIA Monitor No. 3 (2007), available under:
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Startpage.asp?intItemID=2310 (last accessed 22 July 2008).
244 For examples of MITIs, see, e.g. Lalonde, pp. 190-191, and Cremades, pp. 160-161.
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allows private complainants direct access to arbitration against a State and public
authorities, irrespective of the existence of a contractual agreement to that effect.245
Through this new type of investment conventions we have entered the era of arbitration
without contractual relationship between the parties to the dispute246—or arbitration
without privity.247 It is nothing short of a revolution of the (traditional) arbitration
theory, which postulates that arbitration is the product of a contract: either an arbitration
clause for future disputes or an arbitration agreement for existing disputes.248
In the overwhelming majority of the treaties the provisions set forth the consent of each
State to the submission of such disputes to one or more forms of arbitration specified
in the treaty, and, in the event of a dispute with the State, the investor concerned may
resort to the appropriate form of arbitration on the strength of the State’s consent in
the treaty.249 The expression “on the strength of the State’s consent” denotes the concept
of “advance consent”250 contained in thousands of BITs by which States offer their
consent to investors to refer future investment disputes to arbitration.251
The provisions provided in investment laws or treaties by which a State generally agrees
to arbitrate investment disputes constitute a unilateral standing offer to arbitrate with
any party fulfilling the requirements.252 The State gives its general-abstract consent to
arbitrate.253 The offer is accepted by the investor, who therefore consents to arbitrate,
when it initiates arbitration proceedings against the State.254 While there is no
arbitration agreement in the traditional sense, the resolution of a dispute by private
judges without the parties’ consent would not be arbitration.255 Moreover, in
investment arbitration a clear and unavoidable attempt to emancipate arbitration from a
State justice system is given.256 It has also been said, about this technique, that it implies
consent more than it requires an express and specific manifestation of it.257
Furthermore, the vast majority of these international instruments have one common
feature: the dispute-settlement provisions require the consent of the State party, before
245 Lalonde, pp. 189-190.
246 Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6.
247 Paulsson, Privity, p. 234.
248 Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6.
249 Teitelbaum, p. 226.
250 See Dolzer/Stevens, p. 132.
251 Teitelbaum, p. 226. See also Parra, ICSID.
252 Cremades, pp. 160 et seq. and Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-12.
253 See under I.5.
254 Ibid.
255 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
256 Ibid.
257 Stern, p. 241.
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the investor is able to avail itself of one form of arbitration or the other.258 It is
because of this asymmetry between the consent of investors and the advance consent of
host States that investment arbitration has also been described as “arbitration without
privity”.259
In investment arbitration we do not only assist a phenomenon that I would call the
“verticalisation” of arbitration, but also the declining importance of the classic
“mirror arbitration” scheme. Whereas the classic theory (commercial arbitration)
postulates the equal situation of both contracting parties, in which each of them can
initiate arbitration proceedings and each of them, if a defendant, can counterclaim,
under the new generation of investment conventions, it is not so: only the aggrieved
investor can bring a claim, and whether the defending State can bring a counterclaim is
unclear.260 This new reality, under which our traditional understanding of arbitration
is challenged, has steadily expanded, and it has been observed that it could result in a
parallel and autonomous international arbitration framework giving unprecedented
power to individual complainants against States.261
While in investment arbitration the issue is primarily that parties’ consent to arbitration
is normally not expressed in an arbitration agreement in the classical sense, the situation
in what in the thesis is called induced arbitration is rather inverse in the sense that the
issue of the substantive validity (consent) of the arbitration agreement arises above all.
2.3.2. Induced arbitration262
2.3.2.1. General
The doctrine has often raised the question: is it still considered arbitration when a party
has certainly concluded an arbitration agreement, but did not really have a choice
other than to do so?263 The issue, which in the commercial domain has been
traditionally raised with regard to the arbitral tribunals of the Chambers of
258 Kaufmann-Kohler/Stucki, Foreword, p. I.
259 Teitelbaum, p. 226.
260 Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6. See under V.11.3.3.
261 Lalonde, p. 190.
262 I use the expression “induced arbitration” and not “forced arbitration”, because some French authors
employ the French diction “arbitrages forcés” rather for “mandatory arbitration” (see, e.g. Jarrosson,
Frontières, p. 20). On the other hand, Rigozzi utilises the diction “arbitrage forcé” for what in this thesis
is called “induced arbitration”.
263 Rigozzi, para. 475.
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Commerce of those nations that were part of the former Eastern Bloc264 and is still
important today in cases relating to the People’s Republic of China,265 is also of
relevance in the domain of sport arbitration266 as well as in consumer transactions or
working contracts arbitrations. In all these domains a cutback of the consensual nature
of arbitration can be perceived.
In relation to sport arbitration it has, for instance, been observed that when one
examines the circumstances of the purported consent to arbitration, it often appears to
have been entirely fictional.267 However, it is not only the consensual basis268 of
arbitration which has been questioned. Indeed, considering that the procedures devised
by most sports federations appear to be so connected to the organisation that no outsider
has the remotest chance of standing on an equal footing with his adversary—which is of
course the federation itself. It has also been argued that to speak of a consensual process
seems an abuse of language.269
2.3.2.2. Arbitration based on an arbitration agreement contained in articles of
association
Arbitration can result from the acceptance of pre-existing articles of association of legal
entity or from a set of rules governing joint ownership that contain an agreement to
arbitrate.270 Such arbitration should, however, not be confused with decisions taken by
the bodies of legal entity, in particular by sports or professional associations.271 A
typical example of arbitration based on an agreement contained in articles of association
is arbitration before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).272 Indeed, the articles of
association of the sport federations often provide for appeal to the CAS273 against their
decisions.274
In reality the problem in this context is less the circumstance that arbitration is based on
articles of association, but rather the fact that the athletes who wish to participate in
264 Goldman, RCADI, p. 353.
265 On this issue, see under IV.1.
266 See Rigozzi, para. 475.
267 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
268 See the expression used by Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
269 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
270 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 5.
271 Ibid.
272 See also Rigozzi, para. 473.
273 On the appeal arbitration procedure before the CAS, see Articles R47 et seq. CAS Code.
274 Poudret/Besson, para. 5.
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sport competitions, especially at a professional level, will not have any other choice
than to adhere to the articles of association of a particular sport federation.275 In other
words, it is again the problem of what I have called “induced” arbitration.276
2.3.2.3. Comments
The question which seems to be of importance here is whether in the presence of an
arbitration agreement it is really necessary to examine the circumstances in order to
qualify arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism. I do not think so.
Indeed, also in commercial arbitration there may be situations in which the examination
of the circumstances would lead to the conclusion that consent is fictional. This could,
for instance, be the case in a monopolistic market where an enterprise necessarily has to
buy goods from a monopolistic supplier, and the two parties have concluded an
arbitration agreement “suggested”277 by the monopolist. In such situations consent
might have to be considered far more fictional than in circumstances where, for
example, a consumer signs an arbitration agreement contained in a contract of adhesion
for the buying of goods whose market structure is characterised by the presence of
(quasi) pure competition.
In the United States the courts consider that the economic supremacy of one of the
parties should be considered a quite normal circumstance.278 Indeed, it has been
observed that the dramatic shift in attitude in the US courts towards arbitration and
towards the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate makes it almost certain that even
adhesive contracts imposed on persons with no realistic alternatives but to sign them
will be treated as enforceable agreements to arbitrate, at least in any situation in which
the arbitration process meets at least minimal standards of due process.279
The issue here is essentially one of the abuse of a dominant position in a particular
market, or of other behaviours which can be taxed as anti-competitive practices leading
to such a dominant position, and it should therefore be considered by competition or
antitrust legislations. In fact, it cannot be that, for instance in cases of consumer
arbitration, arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution system has a changeable
275 See also Rigozzi, para. 474.
276 Ibid. Rigozzi speaks of “arbitrage forcé”.
277 Or induced.
278 Rigozzi, para. 813.
279 Haagen, p. 3.
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qualification depending on the market structure of the good or service that a consumer is
buying. The question about qualification should only depend on the existence of what
is considered the cornerstone of arbitration, i.e. an agreement to arbitrate, from the
functions of which arbitration fulfils and from the way in which this is done (therefore,
the meeting of minimal standards of due process).
On the other hand, issues regarding the validity of arbitration agreements may arise.
Indeed, the importance of the expression “the circumstances of the purported consent”
used by Paulsson, when speaking about the fact that consent in sport arbitration is
fictional,280 is that it implies that the focus on consent is shifted from the question
about the qualification of arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism
to one of the validity of the arbitration agreement. With respect to the validity of
arbitration agreements, Rigozzi has rightly observed that a tendency can be perceived to
minimise the role of consent when looking at the validity of the arbitration agreement
and considering the situations in which one party can legitimately force another party to
accept arbitration.281 This evolution can be seen in Germany where the old section
1025(2) ZPO282 received a much more restrictive interpretation by the courts and was
then abolished.283
2.3.3. Mandatory arbitration
In the domain of mandatory or compulsory arbitration consent to arbitration becomes
completely irrelevant. In fact, it is the State itself that decides that some disputes have
to be compulsorily submitted to arbitration. This type of arbitration is not based on an
arbitration agreement between the parties, but on a legislative act imposing upon them
that the dispute has to be resolved through arbitration.284
While mandatory arbitration was present in the past,285 it has been noticed that there is a
growing tendency toward compulsory arbitration forms and also the phenomenon of
using the word “arbitration” to label dispute resolution mechanisms which are not based
280 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
281 Rigozzi, para. 813.
282 According to old section 1025(2) ZPO if one party took advantage of his dominant economic or social
position to procure the other party’s agreement to arbitratation or to obtain, with respect to possible
proceedings, a superior position (Übergewicht), especially in the selection of arbitrators, the agreement
was unenforceable (see Várady/ Barceló/von Mehren, p. 54).
283 Rigozzi, para. 813.
284 See also Rigozzi, para. 326, and Rubino-Sammartano, Arbitrato interno, p. 5.
285 Compulsory arbitration was, e.g. already very developed during the French Revolution (see
Huys/Keutgen, No. 7, pp. 5-6 with references).
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on parties’ consent.286 A “new field” where this evolution can well be seen is sport
arbitration.287 Indeed, the trend of creating arbitration mechanisms through legislative
acts for resolving sport disputes seems to generalise. Although here arbitration is not
based on parties’ consent, there is no doubt that the jurisdictions of the States, whose
law imposes recourse to arbitration in the field of sport, will consider these
proceedings as true arbitrations.288 The most significant area in sport with compulsory
arbitration is now the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA-Code)289 which designates the
CAS as the exclusive competent instance to hear appeals in cases relating to doping
arising from competition in an international event or in cases involving international-
level athletes.290 In fact, with the transposition of this provision into different national
legislations, arbitration before the CAS is de facto compulsorily provided for by the
law.291
Following the classical characterisation of arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution
mechanism, in the legal doctrine it has been considered that arbitration which is
compelled by the law is not true arbitration, but rather a type of “jurisidictions
d’exception” where the power to judge has been delegated by the State and for which
the legislator has decided to apply partly or completely the regime of arbitration.292 For
Jarrosson the fact that the denomination “arbitration” is used while renouncing the
parties’ consent to arbitration excludes the qualification of arbitration.293
On the other hand, scholars have remarked that compulsory arbitration does exist and
that, nationally, it is used as a supposedly cheap and informal method of resolving
disputes in particular areas.294 In the doctrine the view has been expressed that as far as
the law gives freedom to the parties to nominate their arbitrators and decide about the
procedure to be applied in the course of the proceeding, compulsory arbitration
represents a special type of arbitration.295 In order to back this view, it has also been
argued that by rendering compulsory arbitration in a particular domain the State
includes in some way this type of arbitration in the application field of the law of
286 See Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 15.
287 See, e.g. in the United States the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, in particular its section
220509 of the United States Code.
288 See Rigozzi, para. 470.
289 The World Anti-Doping Code is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement (see Rule 44 of the
Olympic Charter).
290 See Article 13.2.1 WADA-Code.
291 Rigozzi, para. 472.
292 Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 20.
293 See Jarrosson, Frontières, pp. 20-21.
294 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01, footnote 3.
295 Rubino-Sammartano, Arbitration, pp. 27-28.
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arbitration, so that the question of qualification as arbitration in the sense of this
legislation has not got real scope.296 Furthermore, it has been sustained that in the sport
field, while arbitration is imposed by the State, it is not a lesser private dispute
resolution mechanism. Indeed, the AAA arbitrators which are empowered by the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act297 to decide on the participation on the
Olympic Games remain individuals which are not vested with any prerogative of
public power.298
It appears that the different positions on how mandatory arbitration should be
considered also have something to do with the juridical (only juridical?) nature of
arbitration.
3. THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION
Four theories have been suggested with respect to the juridical nature of arbitration: the
contractual, the jurisdictional, the mixed or hybrid, and the autonomous theory. These
theories aim to show how the international arbitration process, with extensive
detachment but with some recognition and support required from the national legal
system, can be explained in light of the sovereignty and control of the national legal
order, or, in other words, how the legal system relates to the arbitration mechanism.299
No one viewpoint has received universal support in theory or practice, and even at a
regional level States treat the juridical nature of arbitration in a different manner.300
Nevertheless, it has been observed that:
“La principale différence entre le modèle américain et le modèle européen de
l'arbitrage tient cependant à ce qu'aux Etats-Unis, l'aspect conventionnel est de loin
prédominant”.301
These theories ignore, or at least do not fully correspond with, what happens in the real
world of international commercial arbitration. However, one needs to consider these
theories and their effect on contemporary international arbitration practice, because
296 Rigozzi, para. 471.
297 See sections 220501 et seq. of the United States Code.
298 Rigozzi, para. 480.
299 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 5-4 et seq.
300 Ibid.
301 Rau/Pédamon, p. 452.
73
there may be practical consequences in following one rather than another.302
Nevertheless, as it is not fully settled whether arbitration is of a contractual,
jurisdictional or mixed nature, one should not unduly favour the contractual over the
jurisdictional element.303
3.1. The jurisdictional theory
The jurisdictional theory is based on the quasi-judicial role of the arbitrator, as an
alternative to the local judge and with the acceptance of the local law, and relies on
State power to control and regulate arbitrations which take place within its
jurisdiction.304
In the first half of the 20th century Lainé and other French authors were particularly
concerned with discerning whether an arbitral award rendered abroad had to be enforced
in accordance with the procedure applicable to foreign judgments or that used for
contracts.305 While Lainé accepted that the source of the arbitrator’s authority was the
parties’ agreement, he sustained that the activity performed by the arbitrators was that of
judging and that, consequently, the arbitral award was not a contract but rather a
judgment.306
In Del Drago307 it was then pointed out that an arbitral award (like a judgment) is not
self-executing: if not voluntarily given effect by the parties it will have to be enforced
by the courts.308 So at least at the stage of enforcement it is evident that the
jurisdictional theory stands only with the support of the latter.309
Later, Pillet suggested that once the arbitrators had been appointed, as long as they did
not decide an issue they had not been asked to, the arbitration agreement was
completely irrelevant.310 The latter’s sole function was to put the arbitration in motion,
302 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 5-6 and 5-7.
303 Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 159.
304 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 5-9 and 5-11.
305 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 51.
306 Lainé, pp. 650-653. See also Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 53.
307 CA Paris, 10 December 1901, Clunet 314 (1902). See also the discussion in Rubellin-Devichi, para.
10-11; Schlosser, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, para. 41.
308 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-12.
309 Ibid.
310 Pillet, p. 537.
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after which the proceedings developed a life of their own.311 However, Pillet’s strict
separation of the agreement to arbitrate and the award was criticised, because it reflects
neither arbitral practice nor arbitration laws.312
Today, Article V(1)(d) NYC illustrates clearly the importance of the parties’
agreement with respect to the arbitral procedure.313 Therefore, it has been underlined
that right up until the delivery of the final award, the arbitration agreement exerts a
powerful influence on the proceedings.314
A second line of thought, of the followers of the jurisdictional theory, stressed the
source of the arbitrator’s powers as being the State rather than the parties’ arbitration
agreement.315 This position is well illustrated by Motulsky:
“Les arbitres sont des particuliers, auxquels l'ordre juridique permet d'exercer une
fonction qui est en principe réservée à l'Etat”.316
This leads to Mann’s famous formula, “lex facit arbitrum”.317 At the heart of Mann’s
view is the premise that318 every sovereign State is entitled to prohibit or permit the
carrying-on of any activity within its territory, and that, therefore, each arbitral proceeding
is subject to the law where it takes place.319 One implication of Mann’s argument is
that although the arbitrator is usually required to obey the will of the parties, as
expressed in their arbitration agreement, this is due solely to the fact that the lex loci
arbitri320 stipulates, in the particular case, that he should do so.321 Following Mann’s
view, arbitration detached from all municipal laws is a myth, or at least only exists by
virtue of permission granted by the lex loci arbitri.322 On the other hand, it has been
observed that Mann gives insufficient consideration to the role of the parties’ arbitration
agreement.323
311 Pillet/Niboyet, p. 724.
312 See Rubelin-Devicchi, p. 17.
313 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 54.
314 Ibid.
315 See also Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 55.
316 Motulsky, p. 14. See also Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 55.
317 Mann, p. 159.
318 Possibly, subject to the rules of public international law.
319 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, pp. 56-58.
320 On the role of the lex loci arbitri in international commercial arbitration, see also Goode; Mistelis, Lex
arbitri.
321 See Mann, pp. 160 et seq.
322 Ibid.
323 See Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, pp. 59-60.
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In practice the jurisdictional theory can most clearly be seen in countries where
arbitration institutions were/are attached to the national Chambers of Commerce and,
thus, retain a close connection with the State, as was/is the case in several former
socialist countries and some others considered to be emerging markets.324 Moreover the
theory finds expression in a number of legal issues relating to the arbitration process,
such as the immunity of arbitrators, or in the provisions about the independence,
impartiality and neutrality of arbitrators.325
3.2. The contractual theory
The contractual theory emphasises that arbitration has a contractual character: it has its
origins in and depends, for its existence and continuity, on the parties’ agreement.326
The exponents of this view deny the primacy or control of the State in arbitration and
argue that the very essence of arbitration is that it is “created by the will and consent of
the parties”.327
Originally, the supporters of the contractual theory considered that an award was a
contract made or completed by the arbitrators as agents (or “mandataires”) of the
parties.328 However, in his opinion for the court in the Del Drago case,329 Lainé showed
the weaknesses in the classical version of the contractual theory.330
The French Cour de cassation in Roses331 later formulated the ratio of the contractual
theory in the following way: “Arbitral awards which rely on an arbitration agreement
constitute a unit with it and share with it its contractual character”.332 Therefore, without
subscribing to the idea that the arbitration award is a contract made by the arbitrators
who act as agents of the parties, the Cour de cassation stated emphatically that
arbitration has a contractual starting point and that the award is, in principle, of a
contractual nature too.333
324 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-15.
325 Ibid.
326 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-16.
327 See US judgment, Reily v. Russel, 34 Mo 524 (1864) 528 (ibid.).
328 See, e.g. Merlin, pp. 139-150.
329 CA Paris, 10 December 1901, Clunet 314 (1902).
330 See in particular Lainé, pp. 650 et seq.
331 Cas., 27 July 1937, Roses v. Moller et Cie, I Dalloz 25 (1938). See also discussion in Klein, 47 Rev.
crit. dip. 255 (1958) 255-256; Rubellin-Devichi, paras 12-13, 36; Schlosser, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, para.
41.
332 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 36.
333 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-17.
76
Taking into account Lainés’ critique, a number of 20th century scholars334 have,
nevertheless, argued that arbitration is still essentially private and/or contractual in
nature, belonging to the law of obligations rather than that of procedure.335 In particular
for Klein, arbitration consists of a number of contractual acts, tightly linked to each
other.336 But also in more recent times the contractual nature of arbitration has been
stressed:
“In drafting the award the arbitral tribunal needs to have in mind the people who are to
read it. The parties come first. The award is intended for them. They contracted for
arbitration. The award is the result of that contract or the relationship or circumstances
that led to the arbitration”.337
However, while this last passage shows the importance of the parties and of the contract
to arbitrate, the words “or the relationship or circumstances that led to the arbitration”
brings the awareness of the declining importance of the contract intended in the
classical sense to light. Yet, the declining importance of the contract to arbitrate
intended in the traditional sense goes hand in hand with the increasing significance of
the question on consent to arbitration—this is independently from the fact of whether
the consent is expressed in a classical arbitration agreement or not.
In the past Merlin338 and Foelix,339 when considering the arbitral award as a contract,
regarded compulsory arbitration as outside their definition.340 Also, more recently, it has
been reaffirmed that the resolution of a dispute by private judges without the parties’
consent is not arbitration.341 Or, with the words of Jarrosson:
“Quant à l'origine volontaire de la mission de l'arbitre, elle est, elle aussi, essentielle.
Les arbitrages forcés ne sont donc pas de véritables arbitrages, mais une variété de
juridictions d'exception, …. En bref, s'affranchir de la volonté des parties pour le
recours à l'arbitrage exclut la qualification d'arbitrage”.342
Moreover, considering investment arbitration, it has been suggested that we are now in
an era of arbitration without contractual relationship between the parties to the
334 See, e.g. Klein, pp. 49 et seq. and pp. 186 et seq.
335 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, pp. 39 et seq.
336 Ibid.
337 Lloyd/Darmon/Ancel/Dervaird/Liebscher/Verbist, p. 27.
338 Merlin, p. 139.
339 Foelix, pp. 463 et seq.
340 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 35.
341 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
342 Jarrosson, Frontières, pp. 20 et seq.
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dispute343—or arbitration without privity.344 This tendency is well illustrated in the
“unilateral commencement of proceedings” provided for in the ICSID Convention, as
well as in certain bilateral treaties and national investment laws, the NAFTA and the
Energy Charter Treaty.345 However, it was rightly observed that although there is no
arbitration agreement in the traditional sense, the resolution of a dispute by private
judges without the parties’ consent is not arbitration.346
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, particularly in the United States and France, the
contractual component in commercial arbitration is still very important. Indeed, in the
United States while the double nature—contractual and jurisdictional—of arbitration is
perfectly admitted, it has been observed that the main difference between the American
approach and the European one is that in the United States the contractual aspect is by
far predominant.347
3.3. The mixed/hybrid theory
Elements of both the jurisdictional and the contractual theory are to be found in modern
law and practice of international commercial arbitration. The basic idea of the
mixed/hybrid theory developed by Sauser-Hall is well illustrated by this passage:
“Bien que puissant son efficacité dans l’accord des parties qui se manifeste par le
contrat d’arbitrage, il [l’arbitrage] a un caractère juridictionnel impliquant
l’application de règles de procédure”.348
Sauser-Hall treated the arbitration agreement as similar to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause, in that the decision-making powers of the municipal courts were substituted for
those of the arbitrators.349 As a result, the conditions for the validity of the arbitration
agreement depended essentially on private law, but procedural law applied to the
removal of national court jurisdiction and the judging of the dispute involved in the
arbitral process.350 According to the mixed theory we have, therefore, a private justice
system created by contract.351 Or, as Motulsky put it:
343 Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6.
344 Paulsson, Privity, p. 234.
345 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
346 Ibid.
347 Rau/Pédamon, p. 452.
348 Sauser-Hall, p. 471.
349 See Sauser-Hall, p. 531.
350 Sauser-Hall, p. 552.
351 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-26.
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“L'arbitre est un juge privé”.352
Klein and Rubellin-Devichi rejected the use of the exclusive jurisdiction clause analogy,
arguing that the arbitral clause created a private jurisdiction as well as excluding that of
the municipal courts.353 Moreover, Klein and Rubellin-Devichi have also criticised
Sauser-Hall for separating the contractual and procedural elements of arbitration.354 On
a purely practical level, the disadvantage of this separation of the arbitration agreement
from the procedure is, as Mustill (then) J. pointed out, “that this piles up the proper laws
absurdly high”, capable of producing four different legal systems which have to be
considered.355
Subsequent followers of the mixed theory, such as Motulsky,356 have toned down
Sauser-Hall’s distinction of the contractual and procedural aspects of arbitration,
contenting themselves with indicating the predominance of the contractual features at
the beginning of the arbitral process, and the procedural matters once the arbitration
proceeding has begun.357
An effect of the hybrid or mixed theory is to acknowledge the strong, though not
overwhelming, connection between arbitration and the place where the tribunal has its
seat.358 While he has also been criticised for doing so, Sauser-Hall believed in
submitting arbitration to the laws of its seat.359 The main reasons which have been
individuated for giving the lex loci arbitri such prominence are: that the arbitrator’s
right to make binding adjudications derives from a delegation by the State of its
exclusive powers in this field, that every act is subject to the law in force where it
occurs, and that, in the vast majority of cases, the application of the law of the seat and
the use of its courts works more efficiently and justly than any other system.360
It has been argued that while the consensual nature of arbitration is instrumental in
initiating arbitration proceedings, after proceedings have commenced, the parties have
352 Motulsky, p. 46.
353 Klein, p. 267; Rubellin-Devicchi, p. 95.
354 See Klein, pp. 200-201; Rubellin-Devicchi, pp. 17-18, 29, 88-89.
355 Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G. [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
446 at p. 455. As Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, footnote 200 at p. 62, pointed out, this case shows
how under Sauser-Hall’s scheme, which is essentially that adopted in England, four different laws may be
applicable, namely the lex fori, the proper law of the main contract, the proper law of the arbitration
agreement and the procedural law of the arbitration. See also Rubellin-Devichi, p. 111, for a similar view.
356 See in particular Motulsky, p. 31.
357 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 62.
358 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-26.
359 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 63.
360 Sauser-Hall, pp. 531 et seq.
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only limited autonomy and the arbitral tribunal is empowered to make important
decisions.361 On the other hand, it was also rightly observed that the parties’ contract
operates right up to the time the award is enforced.362 Thus, both the contractual
origin and the jurisdictional function have an important influence on arbitration.
Nowadays, the mixed theory still influences the way of describing the chronological
course of the international commercial arbitration process:
“International commercial arbitration is a hybrid. It begins as a private agreement
between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings, in which the wishes of
the parties are of great importance. Yet it ends with an award that has binding legal
force and effect and which, on appropriate conditions, the courts of most countries of
the world will recognise and enforce. The private process has a public effect,
implemented with the support of the public authorities of each state and expressed
through its national law”.363
In conclusion, it can be observed that such hybrid situations de facto exist, as can be
seen in the cohabitation of the jurisdictional approach of the New York Convention with
the contractual approach followed by French law364 or in the United States.365
3.4. The autonomous theory
From the 1960s a growing disenchantment with the traditional way of analysing
arbitration in terms of contract and jurisdiction has led some jurists to look beyond the
structure of the arbitration to its social and economic context.366 The autonomous theory
considers that arbitration evolves in an emancipated regime and, thus, has an
autonomous character.367 Racine considers that autonomy is present at each stage of the
arbitral process with the autonomy of the arbitration clause, the autonomy of the
applicable law and the autonomy of the arbitral award.368
The theory was originally developed by Rubellin-Devichi who rejected the mixed
theory on the basis that the concepts of contract and jurisdiction are “antinomiques” and
observed that:
361 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-22.
362 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 62.
363 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 1-19.
364 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-26.
365 See Rau/Pédamon.
366 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 67.
367 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-27.
368 Racine, p. 311.
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“Or l’arbitrage assume une fonction propre, en droit interne comme en droit
international. ... Ce rôle particulier fait de l’arbitrage une institution autonome
étrangère au contrat comme à la juridiction. ..., il faut admettre, croyons-nous, que sa
nature n'est ni contractuelle, ni hybride, mais autonome”.369
She argued that the jurisdictional and contractual features of arbitration are so
interconnected that it is impossible and undesirable to try to separate the procedural
and contractual parts of it; moreover, since no distinct segment of the arbitral process
is strictly one or the other, it would distort the nature and hinder the development of
arbitration to apply the rules relating to either procedure or contract to any part of the
arbitral process.370 Even the award, the jurisdictional element of arbitration par
excellence, betrays its contractual origins when, as is often the case, the giving of
reasons is dependent on the agreement of the parties.371 Therefore, Rubellin-Devichi
remarked:
“II est hors de question d'appliquer au compromis le régime des contrats et à la
sentence celui des jugements. La sentence n'est pas un jugement, le compromis n'est
pas un contrat comme les autres”.372
According to Rubellin-Devichi arbitration has to be seen as a whole rather than in
terms of its jurisdictional or contractual parts. In so doing the emphasis should be less
on the structure of the institution than on its use and purposes, and arbitral law has to
fulfil users’ expectations.373 To Rubellin-Devichi, all that the mixed theory374 achieved
was to make arbitration and its rules “proteïforme” or infinitely variable.375 It has also
been rightly observed that autonomy does not mean independence, and that it is
impossible to conceive autonomy as full. Consequently, autonomy is a question of
degree and it would be wrong to think that arbitration is or is not autonomous.376
Indeed, Racine expressed the view that arbitration can be more or less autonomous.377
Rubellin-Devichi sees arbitration as one of the many instruments of the international
legal order, one of whose functions is to develop the lex mercatoria.378 While Samuel
remarked that the continuing popularity of clearly localised arbitration organisations
369 Rubellin-Devichi, pp. 363 et seq.
370 Ibid., and p. 17.
371 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 68.
372 Rubellin-Devichi, p. 17.
373 See Rubellin-Devichi, p. 18.
374 On the mixed/hybrid theory, see before under II.3.3.
375 Rubellin-Devichi, p. 364.
376 Racine, p. 308.
377 See Racine, p. 308.
378 Rubellin-Devichi, pp. 123-128.
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tends to refute Rubellin-Devichi’s view,379 on the other hand, it has been rightly
observed that the autonomous theory has the advantage that it is compatible with the
modern forms of non-national, transnational and delocalised arbitration, as it does not
attach too much value to the seat of arbitration and its law.380 In particular, Goldman
argued that:
“toute recherché d’un système de rattachement correspondant à la nature de
l’arbitrage débouche sur l’inéluctable nécéssité d’un système autonome, et non
national”.381
Rubellin-Devichi also believes that complete autonomy of the will is necessary for the
full development of arbitration.382 By giving the parties the maximum freedom of
choice, user expectations will be satisfied and arbitration will prosper as an
institution.383
Other scholars384 have also followed a more functional approach in explaining the
nature of arbitration. However, it has been observed that the major problem here is that
empirical data which would cast some light on the functions of arbitration is limited and
often quite unrepresentative of the arbitral industry as a whole.385 Recently, however,
efforts have been made to have more representative surveys.386 Nonetheless, as has been
pointed out, it is also necessary to know what arbitration is from a structural angle
before one can design rules to fulfil its needs.387 The functional view leads to focus
arbitration more on the users (“to reflect the market place”388) and on the purposes.
This is well reflected in the following passage:
“International arbitration has developed because parties sought a flexible, non-national
system for the regulation of their commercial disputes. They wanted their agreement to
arbitrate to be respected and enforced; they envisaged fair procedures, fashioned
according to the characteristics of the particular case but not copying any national
procedural system; they expected the arbitrators would be impartial and fair; they
believed the ultimate award would be final and binding, and they presumed that it
would be easily enforceable. Arbitration, organised the way they considered it
appropriate, is how the parties have decided to determine disputes between them”.389
379 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 72.
380 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-29.
381 Goldman, RCADI, p. 350.
382 See Rubellin-Devichi, pp. 118-119.
383 Rubellin-Devichi, pp. 364-365.
384 See, e.g. David, Arbitration, p. 82; Stone, pp. 162-163.
385 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 71.
386 See the PWC/Queen Mary survey 2006. On the results of the 2006 survey, see Mistelis, Research
Report. A second survey has then been concluded in 2008 (see PWC/Queen Mary survey 2008).
387 Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, p. 70.
388 Expression used by Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-33.
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Luhmann observed, when speaking about legal systems, that people who do not work in
the system appear as “clients”—thus the main question becomes how the system serves
its client.390 Arbitration has a distinctive element: the users-oriented perspective is
supported by the arbitration’s fundamental principle of party autonomy. On the other
hand, it has to be questioned how far-reaching party autonomy is in types of arbitration
which are not commercial. Have investors, in the case of investment arbitration,
athletes, in the case of sport arbitration, or consumers, in the case of consumer
arbitration, really the same extent of party autonomy?
3.5. Comments
Observing that the traditional theories attempting to explain the juridical nature of
arbitration have been developed focusing on (international) commercial arbitration, it
may be asked whether with the increasing use and importance of arbitration in other
fields (in particular investment arbitration and sport arbitration) other approaches to
describe the phenomenon “arbitration” may be useful. For traditional theories it can
be said that the relationship between State and arbitration is of central importance, in
these further possible approaches the fact that arbitration can be used in different
fields is of major significance. The scope for our purpose is, however, primarily to
show the importance of different possible approaches for explaining the relationship
between consent and forms of arbitration which are not commercial and based on a
classical arbitration agreement.
3.5.1. Legal pluralism
It has been argued that the best—and perhaps only—manner to justify in theory an
“own and autonomous legitimacy” of international commercial arbitration is legal
pluralism.391 Following legal pluralism all social bodies may be the source of a legal
order and not only the State.392 Moreover, in a pluralist approach the recognition of
such orders by the State is not a condition of their existence.393 This presupposes a re-
thinking of the traditional State-centric paradigm of law making and a shift towards a
390 Luhmann, p. 227.
391 Rigozzi, para. 342.
392 See Francescakis, Preface; Kahn, Pluralisme, p. 99.
393 Teubner, Legal Pluralism, pp. 278 et seq.
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paradigm of spontaneous creation of law by the international business community.394
The mercantile order is created, elaborated by the enterprises which control
international exchanges, by those that belong to the industrial sector and control the
production unities, by the banks which conduct the monetary and financial flows.395
Rigozzi suggested that there is a distinct legal order for each type of arbitration.396 The
notion of arbitral legal order would then cover an ensemble of juridical principles which
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of arbitration.397 The arbitral legal order
would have its source in the will of the parties, and this independently from all national
reference.398 Rigozzi tries with the concept of arbitral legal order, which is autonomous
from the national legal orders, to reconcile the contractual origin of arbitration, its
jurisdictional function and its autonomous character with respect to the State legal
order.399
It has also been observed that the development in recent years of the system of
arbitration has been of particular efficacy as an instrument to bypass the State and
interstate juridical orders, thereby possibly breaking the institutional obstacle—which
could have been represented by the State or the international tribunals competent in the
domain of the international economic relations pursuit by private persons—towards the
idea of the existence of a lex mercatoria.400
In the field of sport it is understandable that sport organisations are seduced by the idea
of making recourse to arbitration for guaranteeing in a certain way the tightness of the
juridical order of sport.401 Indeed, while the field of (international) sport arbitration is
different from arbitration of international commercial disputes—because of the object of
the dispute—on the other hand it is similar because of the inherent transnationality.402
In investment arbitration the system of arbitration has even been developed by the
States themselves with the conclusion of BITs and MITs. Thus, the States created a
system of dispute resolution which is alternative to the State courts. The investor “of the
other State” may then accept this other alternative dispute resolution system or not.
Sometimes, the investor has even to choose a method of dispute resolution ab initio,
394 Lynch, p. 28, footnote 136.
395 Kahn, Pluralisme, p. 100.
396 Rigozzi, para. 344.
397 Coipel-Cordonnier, p. 16.
398 Clay, pp. 215 and 218.
399 Rigozzi, para. 345.
400 See Kahn, Pluralisme, p. 103.
401 Rigozzi, para. 343.
402 See also Rigozzi, para. 343.
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which precludes him from subsequently re-litigating the dispute in other fora (so-called
“fork in the road” provisions); at other times he must waive his rights to pursue any
other form of dispute resolution, once he has elected to pursue investment arbitration.403
As already observed: “jurisdiction in international law depends solely upon
consent”.404
Rigozzi also argued that the arbitral legal order is not excluded from entering into
contact with the national legal order.405 Nevertheless, in these situations of conflict the
State legal order does not necessarily prevail over the arbitral legal order.406 Indeed, in
his view, arbitration deploys its effects in its own legal order, and it is ultimately a
hazard or an accident which submits to State courts a dispute which the will of the
parties wanted to have excluded from them.407
3.5.2. Systems theory
Systems theory views systems as open to the environment and adaptive. By ceasing to
regard systems as closed, it is possible to focus on the way they interact with their
respective environments, and in particular how they are dependent upon them. It is the
environment which determines the operating conditions of systems, and systems have to
adapt to survive.408
Given that systems are seen as being both open to the environment and adaptive, it
seems clear that they can be directly influenced, regulated, and even determined, by
their environment. Their very flexibility and adaptability depends upon their being able
to respond to changes in the environment, either by making internal modifications, or by
altering their mode of operation.409
The distinction between system and environment is a key feature of the open system, as
it focuses attention on concepts like the relationship between input and output, the
ability of a system to adapt to its environment, the re-establishment of equilibrium
403 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.52.
404 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
405 See Rigozzi, para. 346.
406 See, e.g. Cas. 23.3.1994 Hilmarton v. OTV, Clunet 1994, p. 701 et seq., in which the French Cour de
cassation has justified the recognition and execution (in France) of an arbitral award in spite of the fact
that it had been annulled by the State’s Courts of Switzerland where the arbitral tribunal had its seat
(ibid.).
407 Rigozzi, para. 346, citing Rigaux.
408 See Teubner, System, p. 13.
409 Ibid.
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through control and regulation, or the “rational” organisation of a system towards a
particular end.410
The goal of arbitration functions is to provide a neutral forum to resolve disputes
capable of delivering final and binding awards which are based on a fair trial. In doing
this arbitration has great capacity to adapt:411 both historically and especially in
relation to the external context within which it has to operate. Arbitration, because of
party autonomy and its consensual nature, is also more “informal” than national justice
systems. This also leads to a bigger capacity for adaptation and confers upon arbitration
an advantage when compared to national courts.
The adaptive feature is one of the most distinctive characteristics of arbitration.412 In all
the adaptation processes’ parties’ consent seems to play a fundamental, albeit—in the
various fields where arbitration is used (commercial arbitration, investment arbitration,
sport arbitration)—different role. Indeed, the consensual nature of arbitration may be
more (in commercial arbitration) or less (for instance, in sport arbitration) present. This
could be regarded as a sort of “relativity of consent”. In the extreme case of adaptation,
i.e. mandatory arbitration, the consensual characteristic of arbitration is even
abandoned.
However, while the systems theory may be useful in explaining the cause of the
differences existing in the various types of arbitration as an adaptation process, one may
question whether it is really a process of adaptation or rather a process of self-
referentiality.
3.5.3. Self-referentiality and autopoiesis
The idea of self-reference and autopoiesis413 presupposes that systems seek the fixed
points of their mode of operation in themselves and not in the environmental
410 See Teubner, System, p. 14.
411 It has been rightly observed that arbitration owes its justification to its adaptability (see Várady/
Barceló/von Mehren, p. 39).
412 See, for instance, in the field of sport arbitration the observation of Briner, Thoughts, p. 257: “The
particular challenge posed to the CAS system is to adapt traditional arbitration to the specific
environment of international sports”.
413 On autopoiesis, see Maturana/Varela. The term Autopoiesis literally means “auto (self)-creation”
(from the Greek: auto—αυτό for self- and poiesis—ποίησις for creation or production) and expresses a
fundamental dialect between structure and function. It has been coined as a definition of life by the
Chilean scientists Maturana and Varela. The origin of the term is clearly biological. However, its
usefulness has also been considered for the understanding of social systems (see Beer and Luhmann).
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conditions to which they adapt themselves as best they can,414 or, to put it more
precisely, they look for those points in a self-description which function as a
programme of internal regulation, organising the system in such a way that it
corresponds to this self-description.415 It has been observed that the notions of self-
observation and self-description are crucial to the understanding of self-referential
systems.416 Again, the passage of Lew/Mistelis/Kröll cited under II.3.4.417 is indicative
in this respect.
Self-organisation refers to the ability of a system to spontaneously produce an
autonomous order; order is not imposed from the outside, but is produced internally
through the interplay of the components of the system.418 The concept of self-
production is particularly difficult to understand. Indeed self-production appears to
contradict the obvious fact that much of what occurs within a system is brought about
by the external factors.419 What is different, however, is the way in which the
environment influences self-producing law420 and also, possibly, self-producing arbitral
legal orders.421
Self-regulation is the dynamic variant of self-organisation. A system can be described as
self-regulating if it is able to not only build up and stabilise its own structures, but to
alter them according to its own criteria.422 Autopoiesis423 is a particular combination of
various mechanisms of self-reference, where the self-production of elements can be
regarded as only a minimum condition for autopoiesis.424 In the case of self-
referentiality parties’ consent may be seen as the foundation stone on which the
ability of the arbitral system to produce an autonomous order rests. However, the
degree of the consensual character for different types of arbitration may vary:
sometimes the contractual characteristics may appear to prevail, at other times the
jurisdictional ones.425
414 As it is assumed in open systems.
415 Teubner, System, p. 15.
416 See Teubner, System, p. 19.
417 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-30.
418 See Teubner, System, pp. 19 et seq.
419 Ibid.
420 Teubner, System, p. 21.
421 On arbitral legal orders, see Rigozzi, para. 344, with citations.
422 Teubner, System, p. 20.
423 On the discussion as to whether autopoiesis can be applied to social systems and law, see, e.g. Beer;
Luhmann, pp. 1 et seq.; Teubner, System, pp. 25 et seq.
424 Teubner, System, p. 22.
425 On the fact that one should not unduly favor the contractual over the jurisdictional element, see
Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 159.
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III. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The arbitration agreement is the cornerstone of the arbitration process,426 as there can be
no arbitration between parties that have not consented to arbitrate their disputes.427 On
the other hand, the arbitration agreement also establishes an obligation for the parties to
arbitrate.428 Arbitration agreements have both a contractual429 and a jurisdictional430
character431 and fulfil a number of different functions:
1. they evidence the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration;
2. they establish the jurisdiction and authority of the arbitral tribunal over that of the
courts;
3. they are the basic source of the power of the arbitrators.432
While a widely established requirement is that there be a written agreement in writing,
during the last decades the accepted notion of what constitutes a written agreement has
become more and more flexible.433
1. DEFINITION
The majority of statutes and international conventions provide for a definition of the
arbitration agreement,434 although they do not define arbitration as such.435 One of the
most comprehensive provisions is Article 7(1) UNCITRAL Model Law, its definition
covers two types of arbitration agreement: one that submits already existing disputes to
arbitration (compromis—submission agreement) and one that covers disputes that may
arise in the future (clause compromissoire—arbitration clause).436 The term “arbitration
agreement” is used to refer to either or both of these forms.437 The clause
426 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 85.
427 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-1.
428 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-1.
429 By virtue of the required agreement of the parties.
430 By virtue of conferring jurisdiction upon the arbitration tribunal.
431 Lew, Arbitration Clause, pp. 114 et seq.
432 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-2.
433 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 92.
434 The Swiss PIL is one of the exceptions, as it does not provide for a definition of the arbitration
agreement (see also BSK-IPRG-Wenger, para. 3 ad Article 178 Swiss PIL).
435 Poudret/Besson, para. 149.
436 See, e.g. Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-02; Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 85.
437 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 85.
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compromissoire is much more frequent in practice, as an agreement to arbitrate is easier
to reach when lawsuits are a not-too-likely theoretical possibility.438
The distinction between arbitration clauses and submission agreements was of
paramount importance when submission agreements alone were valid and enforceable,
and arbitration clauses were only enforceable if followed by a submission agreement.
The requirement that consent to arbitration be renewed after the emergence of the
dispute has been repealed in most other jurisdictions.439 Nowadays, the distinction
between arbitration clauses and submission agreements has lost most of its
significance.440 This evolution means, on the one hand, more acceptance of arbitration
as a dispute resolution method and a strengthening of its jurisdictional nature, and,
on the other hand, a decrease in its consensual character: consent to arbitration is an
“anticipated consent” about the mode of resolution of a dispute which may—
hypothetically—arise in the future, but which is not yet real.
2. THE EFFECTS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The effects of the arbitration agreement can be sub-divided into a positive effect and a
negative effect.
2.1. Positive (direct) effect
The positive or direct effect of a valid arbitration agreement is to establish a special
forum—the arbitration forum—for disputes between the parties. This alternative
jurisdiction will have the authority to resolve those disputes or types of dispute which
the parties have consented to refer to it.441 Conversely, it is a contractual obligation of
the parties to have their disputes submitted to arbitration.442 Indeed, bringing
438 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 85.
439 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 386. See, for example, Article 2 of the Colombian Decree No. 2279
of 7 October 1989, as amended by Law No. 23 of 21 March 1991, which states that both arbitration
clauses and submission agreements are valid; Article 1416 of the Mexican Code of Commerce, as
amended on 22 July 1993. On this issue, see Grigera Naón, Latin America; Hoagland; Zivy; Treviño. The
Brazilian arbitration statute dated 23 September 1996 maintained a clear distinction between arbitration
clauses and submission agreements, not allowing the implementation of the arbitration clause to be at the
discretion of the defendant. See Articles 3 et seq. and the commentary Bosco Lee.
440 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 386.
441 Lew, Arbitration Clause, p. 125.
442 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-81.
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proceedings in a national court would be a breach of the arbitration clause.443 The
arbitration agreement vests the arbitrators, either expressly or through the rules chosen
or the law which governs the arbitration, with all powers necessary to fulfil their
mission.444
2.2. Negative (indirect) effects
The negative or indirect effect of an arbitration agreement is to exclude the dispute from
the jurisdiction of national courts; indeed the arbitration agreement removes the national
courts’ normal authority to consider and resolve disputes between the parties.445
The existence of a valid arbitration agreement prevents courts from entertaining
jurisdiction when faced with an action on the merits.446 It is for this reason that the issue
of the validity of the arbitration agreement is crucial: it is the condition for the valid
transfer of jurisdiction from national courts to arbitration tribunals and the enforcement
of the final award.447 To decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement it is,
however, necessary to determine the law which should govern it and according to
which its validity should be decided.448 Under some laws449 the courts do not even have
jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement before the arbitrators
have ruled on the issue. It is this indirect effect of the arbitration agreement which also
plays a fundamental role in its enforcement.450
2.3. Investment arbitration
The direct and indirect effects of arbitration agreements, as discussed above, are also
clearly reflected in Article 26 ICSID Convention.451
443 See, e.g. Lew, Arbitration Clause, p. 125.
444 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-81.
445 Lew, Arbitration Clause, p. 127.
446 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-82. See, e.g. UNCITRAL Model Law Article 8; England, Arbitration Act
section 9; Switzerland, PIL Article 7; France, NCPC Article 1458; Germany, ZPO section 1032.
447 Lew, Arbitration Clause, p. 128.
448 Ibid. On the law governing the arbitration agreement, see under III.3.
449 See, e.g. France, NCPC Article 1458.
450 On this aspect, see in particular Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 7-82 et seq.
451 See also Lew, Arbitration Clause, p. 128.
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3. THE LAW GOVERNING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
As a matter of fact, it is the law applicable to the arbitration agreement which
determines jurisdiction, existence and extent of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, by
governing:
- the validity of the clause, including the arbitrability of future disputes; and
- its scope of application, from both a subjective and an objective viewpoint.452
The law governing the arbitration agreement is determined by the law governing
arbitration itself.453 Indeed the latter will decide if and to what extent the parties should
be free to submit their arbitration agreement to the law of their choice.454 However,
while national courts normally refer to the conflict-of-law rules of the lex fori to
determine the lex arbitri, it is more difficult to establish this law when arbitral tribunals
are involved.455 After briefly discussing the law governing arbitration in the next section
(3.1.), the laws governing the formal validity (section 3.2.)—respectively the
substantive validity (section 3.3.)—of the arbitration agreement will be considered.
3.1. The law governing arbitration
De Ly summarised456 the four different theories of connecting factors for the
determination of the lex arbitri:
- the lex arbitri should be connected with the place of arbitration;
- party autonomy, i.e. choice of arbitral procedural law (with the relevant mandatory
law limitations);
- delocalised arbitration (without reference to any national legal system);
- unilateral conflicts (effectively substantive rules) which provide for arbitral
proceedings deregulated from the procedural law of the seat of arbitration.457
452 Bernardini, Law applicable, p. 198.
453 Poudret, Droit applicable, p. 23.
454 Ibid.
455 See also Ahrens, p. 21.
456 See De Ly, pp. 22-23.
457 Mistelis, Lex arbitri, pp. 167 et seq.
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3.1.1. Application of national arbitration laws vs. delocalisation
The question as to whether international arbitration should be attached to a particular
national legal system or not has been long debated. While France, since the 1960s, has
shown a trend towards detachment of arbitration from any national law system458 (legal
delocalisation459), others have affirmed the necessity of the strict attachment of
arbitration to the law of the seat of arbitration.460 The absence of localisation will also
be accentuated with the growth of electronic arbitration.461 Another form of
delocalisation is geographical delocalisation462 which implies submitting an arbitration
to a lex arbitri other than that of the seat.463
3.1.2. National arbitration laws: seat of arbitration vs. party autonomy
How should arbitration be connected to the legal system? Two broad tendencies can be
distinguished:
1. using the seat as the connecting factor between an arbitration and a legal system:464
this does not only mean, however, that all the conditions of validity are regulated by
the law of the seat directly (substantive rules), but also that this law may determine
which laws are applicable for determining these conditions when the law of the seat
does not itself decide the issue by substantive rules (conflict-of-law rules);
2. party autonomy: the parties can submit arbitration, and therefore the formal and the
substantive validity of their arbitration agreement, to the law of their choice.465
While the first factor emphasises the procedural nature of arbitration (like a court, the
arbitration has its closest connection to the State of its location),466 the second reflects
the consensual or contractual character of arbitration (like a contract, the arbitration
458 Ahrens, p. 21 with citations.
459 See also Park, Judicial Controls, p. 243.
460 See, e.g. in particular Mann, pp. 157 et seq.
461 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 93. See also Kaufmann-Kohler, Place of Arbitration, pp. 350 et
seq.
462 The distinction between “geographical” delocalisation and “legal” delocalisation was made by Mayer,
Delocalisation, p. 44.
463 Poudret/Besson, para. 121.
464 Modern arbitration law and practice have accepted the prima facie test in favour of the seat as
determinative of the lex arbitri albeit with occasional qualifications (Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 161).
465 See Poudret, Droit applicable, pp. 23-24.
466 The importance of the seat of arbitration stems from the theory of the jurisdictional nature of
arbitration (Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 172). On the jurisdictional nature of arbitration, see under II.3.1.
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is governed by the law chosen by the parties).467 Geographical delocalisation,
connecting the arbitration to the law chosen by the parties, has been referred to as the
“autonomistic” approach as opposed to the “territorial” approach based on the seat of
the arbitration.468 However, it has been observed that the approach of geographical
delocalisation is a marginal phenomenon which is tending to disappear.469 Therefore,
one should not unduly favour the contractual over the jurisdictional element.470
On the other hand, it should always be remembered, and it is widely recognised by
modern arbitration statutes and rules,471 that decisions about arbitration and applicable
law are normally made to, as closely as possible, carry out the intentions of the
parties.472 Consequently, to reach a decision as to the jurisdiction whose lex arbitri will
apply, arbitral tribunals shall look first at the arbitration agreement and second, at the
institutional rules chosen by the parties, because the lex arbitri has two components:
- the internal lex arbitri which regulates the arbitration procedure before and within
the arbitral tribunal;
- the external lex arbitri which provides the regulatory framework for arbitration
proceedings in relation to courts which may perform a supervisory function or may
have to assist the arbitral proceedings.473
3.2. The law governing the formal validity of the arbitration
agreement
The formal validity of the arbitration agreement is generally directly regulated in most
international conventions and national arbitration laws by a substantive rule of private
international law.474 Such a substantive rule facilitates the determination of the law
applicable to formal validity, but by no means solves all problems.475 Indeed, as has
been observed, the coexistence of a uniform law and national laws poses the highly
controversial question of their respective fields of application.476
467 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Place of Arbitration, p. 337.
468 Goode, pp. 24-28.
469 See Poudret/Besson, para. 121.
470 See also Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 159.
471 See, e.g. Article 15(1) ICC Rules; Article 14(1) LCIA Rules.
472 Mistelis, Lex arbitri, p. 158.
473 Ibid. and also p. 163.
474 See NYC Article II; European Convention 1961 Article I(2)(a); UNCITRAL Model Law Article 7;
Germany, ZPO section 1031; England, Arbitration Act 1996 section 5; Netherlands, CCP Article 1021;
Switzerland, PIL Article 178.
475 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-37.
476 Berger, Arbitration, pp. 133-134.
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While it is now generally accepted that the New York Convention sets a maximum
standard and, therefore, arbitration clauses cannot be submitted to stricter requirements
under national law, national arbitration laws often adopt a more permissive definition of
“writing” than the New York Convention.477 When an arbitration agreement, which
does not meet the form requirement of Article II NYC, satisfies the more lenient form
requirements of the applicable national law, the question as to the relationship of the
different form requirements arises.478 On the other hand, the question of whether Article
VII NYC, which reserves the application of the most favourable law or treaty, can be
invoked in all cases is disputed.479
Although the provisions of the New York Convention are only directly binding on
courts in the Member States and not arbitration tribunals,480 there are good reasons why
an arbitration tribunal should base its decision, when the issue of formal validity arises
in proceedings before it, on the New York Convention.481 The widespread applicability
of the New York Convention and the fact that enforcement under the Convention482 is
only possible if the form requirement is met, are strong arguments in favour of the
application of Article II NYC; on the other hand, if the arbitration agreement does not
meet the form requirements of Article II NYC but does satisfy the more lenient
requirements of the law at the seat of arbitration, the tribunal should nevertheless
assume jurisdiction to give effect to the parties’ agreement.483
3.3. The law governing the substantive validity of the arbitration
agreement
There are different approaches to determining the law applicable to all other issues of
the agreement in the various legal instruments and international practice:
- some laws take a traditional conflict of laws approach;
- others contain specific substantive conflict rules;
477 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-39 and 6-41.
478 Ibid.
479 See Poudret/Besson, para. 187. Van den Berg, NYC, pp. 178-179.
480 ICC Case No. 5730 of 1988, 117 Clunet 1029 (1990) 1033; see also the critical comment by Loquin,
114 Clunet 934 (1987) to the Bonmar decision of the Paris Court of Appeal (CA Paris, 20 January 1987,
Bonmar Oil NV v. Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activités, XIII YBCA 466 (1988) 469).
481 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-48.
482 Indeed, the arbitrators should render an enfoceable award (see van den Berg, NYC, p. 189 et seq. with
further references); the obligation to render an enforceable award is expressly mentioned in some
arbitration rules such as the ICC Rules Article 35.
483 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-48 et seq.
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- French arbitration law determines the validity of the arbitration agreement on the
basis of the parties’ intent, without any reference to a national law.484
3.3.1. Traditional conflict of laws approaches
While the New York Convention and most national arbitration laws do not provide for
special provisions dealing with the law applicable to the substantive validity of the
arbitration agreement, they do, however, deal with the issue in the annulment and
enforcement stadium where the lack of a valid arbitration agreement in general
constitutes a defence against an application to set aside or enforce an award.485 It has
been observed that although these provisions address the issue only from the
perspective of the annulment or enforcement judge, there is a strong argument in favour
of applying the same criteria at the pre-award stage.486 Indeed, the application of
different criteria at the pre-award stage could create the danger of divergent
decisions.487 This is the reason why in various countries488 the courts determine the law
applicable to the arbitration agreement in accordance to the principle laid down in
Article V(1)(a) NYC.489 However, uncertainties can only be avoided when the national
arbitration law itself directly contains a provision determining the law applicable to the
arbitration agreement. Section 48 of the Swedish Arbitration Act, with a rule similar to
Article V(1)(a) NYC, is a rare example of such a provision.490
In conclusion, it can be observed that in general the law applicable to the arbitration
agreement, whether it deals with the issue of the applicable law directly or simply from
the perspective of the annulment or enforcement court, is submitted to the same two
criteria: the law chosen by the parties and in the absence of such a choice the law of the
place of arbitration.491 However, as in practice it is rare that the parties expressly choose
the law applicable to the arbitration agreement492 and most arbitration rules are silent493
484 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-48 et seq.
485 See Article V(1)(a) NYC; comparable provisions can be found in most national arbitration laws,
including Article 36(1)(a)(i) UNCITRAL Model Law (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-53 et seq.).
486 In favour of such an approach, see, e.g. Corte d'Appello Genoa, 3 February 1990, Delia Sanara
Kustvaart - Bevrachting & Overslagbedrijf BV v. Fallimento Cap Giovanni Coppola srl, XVII YBCA
542 (1992) 543 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-55).
487 Ibid.
488 For an overview of some countries, see Poudret/Besson, para. 300.
489 Ibid.
490 For a more detailed analysis of the provision, see Hobér, Sweden, p. 355; see also Article 7 Mercosur.
491 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-58.
492 See van den Berg, NYC, pp. 291-292.
493 An exception is Article 59(c) WIPO Rules. However, this article is subject to further interpretation
(see Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-60).
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regarding the issue of the law governing the arbitration clause,494 the national courts
have considered that a choice of law in the main agreement generally extends to the
arbitration agreement.495 On the other hand, commentators are divided496 on this
delicate and important question.497
3.3.2. Other approaches
3.3.2.1. Switzerland: conflict of laws rule in favorem validitatis498
Article 178(2) Swiss PIL provides for a rare example499 of a substantive rule on the
validity of an arbitration agreement.500 While, generally, an agreement which does not
fulfil the requirements of the law chosen by the parties is invalid, Article 178(2) Swiss
PIL also permits the enforcement of an agreement considered to be valid under the law
governing the merits of the dispute, and notably the law applicable to the main
agreement, or under Swiss law. The purpose of this provision is to avoid, insofar as
possible, any disagreement as to the validity of the arbitration agreement.501 Therefore,
in upholding the validity (in favorem validitatis) of an arbitration agreement, this
provision goes further than any of the traditional conflict of laws approaches.502
3.3.2.2. France: material rule of Private International Law
The path chosen by French law, first developed in Dalico503 and later followed in other
French court decisions,504 is particular, because it rejects the conflict of laws approach
494 Blessing, Law Applicable, p. 170.
495 See Poudret/Besson, paras 297 and 300.
496 In favour or considering that there is a strong presumption: Collins, p. 127; Lew, Arbitration clause,
para. 136; Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, p. 63; Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, paras 2-86. Against:
van den Berg, NYC, p. 293; Schlosser, para. 254, who, however, recognises the application of the chosen
law to the arbitration agreement where the seat of the arbitration was not yet determined at the time of the
choice of law.
497 Poudret/Besson, para. 297.
498 See also Abdulla, p. 18.
499 An approach in favorem validitatis is also to be found in Article 9(6) Spanish Arbitration Act (see also
Mantilla-Serrano).
500 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-63.
501 Abdulla, p. 18, footnote 12. See also DFT 119 II 380, 384.
502 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-64.
503 French Cas., 20 December 1993, Comité populaire de la municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v. Dalico
Contractors, 121 Clunet 432 (1994).
504 See, e.g. Cas., 21 May 1997, Renault v. V 2000 (formerly Jaguar France), Rev. arb. 537 (1997), with
note Gaillard; CA Paris, 25 November 1999, SA Burkinabe des ciments et matériaux v. société des
ciments d'Abidjan, Rev. arb. 165 (2001) 168 in relation to the rules governing the assignment of the
arbitration clause; Cas., 5 January 1999, Banque Worms v. Bellot, Rev. arb. 85 (2000) 86.
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in favour of a substantive rule of international arbitration law which directly determines
the prerequisites of the validity of an arbitration agreement.505 According to this
approach the existence and validity of an arbitration clause depends, provided that no
mandatory provision of French law or international ordre public is affected, only on the
common intention of the parties, without it being necessary to make reference to a
national law.506 From the French perspective this approach is considered more
favourable and thus prevails over the New York Convention by virtue of its Article
VII.507
3.3.3. International arbitration practice
The arbitration practice is even less homogenous. Indeed, the proceeding before the
arbitrator is peculiar: on the one hand, not being an organ of a particular State, he does
not have a lex fori compelling him to apply the rules of conflict of such law, and, on the
other hand, he is not bound, in particular, to respect the provisions of the New York
Convention, which are addressed to courts.508
While in many cases a traditional conflict of laws approach is adopted and there is wide
consent that the primary factor in determining the applicable law is party autonomy, the
differences relate mainly to the relevant connecting factors where the parties have not
chosen the law applicable to the arbitration agreement.509 Arbitration practice shows
that the international arbitrator may take at least three different approaches in these
cases 510 in order to determine the substantive law of the arbitration clause: the law of
the seat, the law governing the main contract, and the general principles of law and
trade usages.511 Nevertheless, there seems to be a tendency in privileging the application
of the provisions of the place of arbitration.512 However in arbitration practice there is
also a trend to detach the question of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement from
any national law and to determine it by reference to the parties’ intent and general
principles applicable to international arbitration, taking particular account of the
505 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 436-437.
506 Ibid.
507 See Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 449.
508 Bernardini, Law applicable, p. 200.
509 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-68.
510 Blessing, Law Applicable, pp. 171 et seq., has identified not less than nine different approaches used in
international arbitration practice to determine the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. These
solutions have also been advocated with regard to arbitrability (Blessing, Arbitrability, p. 192).
511 Bernardini, Law applicable, pp. 200-201.
512 Ibid.
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limitations imposed by public policy.513 A well known example of this approach is the
preliminary award in Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain.514
4. DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION, WITH PARTICULAR
REGARD TO ISSUES CONCERNING PARTIES’ CONSENT
4.1. General
Before an arbitration tribunal can decide on the substantive issue in dispute it must
determine that it has jurisdiction. Due to the hybrid character of arbitration the
jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal is based on a complex mixture of contractual and
jurisdictional elements, i.e. the will of the parties as expressed in the arbitration
agreement, and the different laws applicable to the various aspects of the arbitration
agreement; the consequence of this complexity is that the question of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction is frequently a matter of dispute.515 To strengthen the jurisdiction of the
arbitration tribunal and to minimise challenges being used to delay or derail arbitration
proceedings most modern arbitration laws employ different techniques:
- the so called “competence-competence” principle; and
- the principle of separability.
While under the autonomy/separability principle, arbitrators have jurisdiction to rule on
any dispute over the existence or validity of the main contract, under the competence-
competence principle they have the power to rule on any question relating to their
jurisdiction or, in other words, to the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement as
such.516 Another technique in support of the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal found
in national laws517 is to permit the tribunal to start or continue arbitration proceedings
even though the jurisdiction of the tribunal is being challenged in the courts.518
513 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-73 and 6-74.
514 Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical France et at v. Isover Saint Gobain, IX
YBCA 131 (1984).
515 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 14-10. Approximately one third of ICC awards involve a jurisdictional
challenge to the tribunal.
516 Dimolitsa, p. 228.
517 See Article 8(2) UNCITRAL Model Law; Sweden, Arbitration Act section 2; Germany, ZPO section
1032(3).
518 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 14-20.
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4.2. Competence-competence
The competence-competence rule has a dual function. Like the arbitration agreement it
has, or may have, both positive and negative effects, even if the latter have not yet been
fully accepted in a number of jurisdictions.519
The positive effect of the principle of competence-competence means that the arbitral
tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.520 This principle is the
transposition, in a qualified way, to arbitration of the general procedural principle that
any court is entitled to decide on its own jurisdiction.521 In doing so, the question as to
whether the parties consented to the arbitration agreement has to be determined
separately from whether they agreed on the main contract.522 The competence-
competence principle also allows arbitrators to determine that an arbitration agreement
is invalid and to make an award declaring that they lack jurisdiction without
contradicting themselves.523 The principle has found recognition in most modern
arbitration laws524 as well as international Conventions.525 And, even if such provisions
did not exist, arbitration tribunals have traditionally assumed a right to rule on their own
jurisdiction, as was the case in TOPCO v. Libya,526 where the arbitrator relied on a
customary rule.527 De Boisséson considers that the principle derives from one of validity
of the arbitration clause, itself a “customary international rule”.528 Moreover, it has also
been observed that the most solid justification for the principle lies in the presumed will
of the parties to confer on the arbitrators all aspects of their disputes, including
519 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 660.
520 In addition, the so called “positive competence-competence” doctrine, if understood broadly, also has
a bearing on whether courts can decide on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction before the tribunal has itself dealt
with the issue; for the different understandings of the doctrine of competence-competence, see Park,
Allocation, pp. 25 et seq. (see also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 14-13, footnote 6).
521 Dimolitsa, p. 228.
522 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-15.
523 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 658.
524 See Article 16(1) UNCITRAL Model Law, and in non Model Law countries, e.g. Switzerland, PIL
Article 186; England, Arbitration Act section 30. An exception is the Chinese Law where the tribunal has
no competence-competence but the decision on jurisdiction is either taken by the arbitration institution
under the rules of which the arbitration takes place or by the courts.
525 See, e.g. Article 41(1) ICSID Convention.
526 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, preliminary award on jurisdiction, 27 November 1975, French original in 104
Clunet 350 (1977), with introduction by Lalive, “Un grand arbitrage pétrolier entre un Gouvernement et
deux sociétés privées étrangères”, 104 Clunet 320 (1977). For excerpts in English, see IV YBCA 176
(1979).
527 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 14-18.
528 De Boisséson, para. 732.
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jurisdiction, while the courts retain the power to control their decision but not to take
their place.529
However, it has been submitted that competence-competence can only be completely
efficient where the arbitral tribunal has real priority over the courts.530 It is therefore
important that the latter refrain from ruling not only on the merits of the disputes but
also on the conflict of jurisdiction until the arbitral tribunal has rendered a decision.531
This is the so-called negative effect of competence-competence, which has been
emphasised by French scholars532 and is anchored in Article 1458 NCPC.533 The basic
dilemma is the following:
- on the one hand, if the legitimacy of arbitration is based on consent, how can a
court refer a party to arbitration—especially concerning the method of dispute
settlement—unless it first determines for itself that the party has entered a valid
arbitration agreement? and
- on the other hand, if every existence, validity, or scope question is retained for full
court scrutiny, opportunities for obstructing the arbitration process will abound, as a
party bent on delay or obstruction will raise issue after issue for court
determination.534
4.3. The principle of separability
The doctrine of separability recognises the arbitration clause in a main contract as a
separate agreement, independent and distinct from the main contract.535 However, it has
been observed that the separability (autonomie)536 of the arbitration clause is an
ambiguous expression.537 Indeed, the French case law led French authors to distinguish
between material separability (autonomie matérielle), i.e. from the main contract, and
529 See Poudret/Besson, para. 457.
530 Poudret/Besson, para. 458.
531 Ibid.
532 Namely, Fouchard and Gaillard. See, e.g. Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 660 and 671-682.
533 Poudret/Besson, para. 458.
534 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 89.
535 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-9. For the development of the doctrine, see Samuel, “Separability of
arbitration clauses – some awkward questions about the law on contracts, conflict of laws and the
administration of justice”, 9 ADRLJ 36 (2000).
536 About the different terminologies used to refer to “separability”, see Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman,
para. 389.
537 Poudret/Besson, para. 162.
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legal separability (autonomie juridique ou de rattachement), i.e. from the law of the
main contract or even from all legal systems.538
4.3.1. Material separability
4.3.1.1. General
Schwebel observed that when the parties to an agreement containing an arbitration
clause enter into that agreement, they conclude not one but two agreements, the arbitral
twin of which survives any birth defect or acquired disability of the principal
agreement.539 The essence of the doctrine lies in that the validity of an arbitration
clause is not bound to that of the main contract and vice versa.540
The doctrine of separability is now recognised in most modern arbitration laws541 and
arbitration rules,542 as well as in the decisions of arbitral tribunals543 and State courts.544
It is also mentioned in the European Convention.545 However, full acceptance of the
doctrine is still outstanding, for instance, in certain Arab countries.546 Nevertheless, the
doctrine has been characterised as a general principle of international arbitration,547 and
French authors548 particularly do not hesitate to speak of a true transnational rule of
international commercial arbitration.549 Many arbitral awards have recognised the
separability of the arbitration agreement as a general principle of international
538 Poudret/Besson, para. 162, with reference, in particular, to Ancel, pp. 81-83; Blanchin, pp. 13-15; and
Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para 388.
539 Schwebel, pp. 1-60, especially at p. 5.
540 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-9.
541 See, e.g. Article 16(1) UNCITRAL Model Law; Switzerland, PIL Article 178(3); Netherlands, CCP
Article 1053; Sweden, Arbitration Act section 3; China, Arbitration Law section 19(1). For further
references, see Sanders, Quo Vadis, pp. 172 et seq.
542 Article 6(4) ICC Rules; LCIA Article 23; AAA ICDR Article 15; Article 21(2) UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.
543 See, e.g. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic; see summary of the preliminary award contained in IV YBCA 177, 179 (1980) Libyan
American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 ILM 1 (1981); VI YBCA
89, 96 (1981).
544 E.g. in France: Cas., 7 May 1963, Ets Raymond Gosset v. Carapelli, 91 Clunet 82 (1964); CA Paris, 7
December 1994, Société V 2000 v. Société Project XJ 220 ITD et autre, Rev. arb. 245 (1996); for further
references, see Fouchard Gaillard Goldman, para. 391.
545 See Article V(3) European Convention.
546 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-21. See, e.g. Turck, “Saudi Arabia”, ICCA Handbook, 4; El Ahdab, p.
610.
547 See Dimolitsa, p. 221.
548 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 398
549 Poudret/Besson, para. 167. See also Berger, Arbitration, 121; Lew/Mistelis/ Kröll, para. 6-22.
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commercial arbitration, without considering it necessary to justify such recognition with
reference to a particular national law.550
4.3.1.2. Separability as a mean to strengthen and protect the jurisdiction of arbitrators
The doctrine of separability is another technique which strengthens and protects the
jurisdiction of arbitrators.551 However, while competence-competence empowers the
arbitration tribunal to decide on its own jurisdiction, separability ensures that it can
decide on the merits, as any challenge to the main agreement does not affect the
arbitration agreement.552 Therefore, even though these two principles are separate and
each has its own scope, there is a logical connection between them.553 Indeed, they are
both based on the presumed will of the parties to submit all disputes to the
arbitrator.554 As observed by Sanders, this presumption is strengthened by the clause,
common in international arbitration, referring to all disputes “in relation to” the
contract, including those concerning the existence and validity.555
4.3.1.3. The effect of separability
The arbitration clause may survive the nullity, termination, repudiation or novation of
the main contract, although two reservations should be made:
- The arbitration clause is part of a main contract and even has an accessory nature.
Nevertheless, this does not exclude the fact that the arbitration clause remains valid,
like a jurisdiction agreement, if the contract is null or void or has been terminated.
This depends naturally on the will of the parties, but it can be presumed that this is
what they intended.556
- There might exist a defect common to the contract and to the arbitration clause
which renders them both null and void.557
Thus, while the effect of separability is limited, thereby preventing the fate of the main
contract automatically affecting the arbitration agreement, the agreement may still,
550 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 406. On this issue, see Yves Derains, Les tendances de la
jurisprudence arbitrale internationale, 120 Clunet 829 (1993), especially at 832 et seq.
551 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-10 and 14-19.
552 Ibid.
553 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 416.
554 Poudret/Besson, para. 167, with references.
555 Sanders, Autonomie, p. 33.
556 See Mayer, Séparabilité, pp. 261-265.
557 Ibid.
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however, be tainted by the same defects.558 Nevertheless, even in those cases the
doctrine of separability requires that the question as to whether the parties consented to
the arbitration agreement has to be determined separately from whether they agreed
on the main contract.559
On the question about whether the principle of separability should be extended where
the very existence of the main contract is in dispute, there are different views.560 In
France in the Ducler case561 the Paris Court of Appeal held that the inexistence or
nullity of the main agreement does not affect the arbitration clause which is completely
separable from it.562 And more recently in Omenex563 the Cour de cassation also held
that the validity of the arbitration agreement is not affected by the nullity or inexistence
of the main contract.564 Poudret/Besson observed that the French case law is based on
the “principle of validity” and separability of the arbitration agreement.565
In England, section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that an arbitration agreement
contained in another agreement “shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or
ineffective because that other agreement …did not come into existence”.566 It has been
rightly observed that the text of the new law no longer makes a distinction between
various grounds of invalidity of the main contract.567 There might be cases where
although the main contract never came into existence the parties agreed on arbitration so
that all disputes arising out of work done under the non-existing main contract have to
go to arbitration.568 Merkin emphasised that section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is not
a mandatory provision, because it is based on the presumed intent of the parties, and,
therefore, it will only apply in its full scope if the arbitration clause is sufficiently
wide, for instance if it covers all disputes “in connection with” the main contract, as is
usually the case.569
558 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 6-14 et seq.
559 Ibid.
560 See Poudret/Besson, para. 167. Sanders, Autonomie, p. 33. Broches, UNCITRAL, paras 15-16.
Goldman in Cas., Rev. arb. 1989, p. 641 et seq. The opinion of Goldman is not only shared by several
other authors but has also been followed by the French courts since the Navimpex judgment.
561 Rev. arb. 1990, p. 675, with a note by Mayer; Rev. arb. 2002, p. 792, with a note by Mayer.
562 See Poudret/Besson, para. 167.
563 Cas., Omenex v. Hugon, Rev. arb. 2006, p. 103, with a note by Racine.
564 Poudret/Besson, para. 167.
565 Ibid.
566 Emphasis added.
567 Poudret/Besson, para. 176.
568 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 6-15. See also Shackleton.
569 Merkin, p. 35 ad Section 7.
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4.3.2. Legal separability
Another consequence of separability is that the arbitration agreement may be governed
by a different law from that of the main contract or even independently from all legal
systems.570 This aspect has played an important role, especially with regard to French
case law.
4.3.2.1. Submission of the main contract and of the arbitration agreement to different
laws
The principle of separability not only means that the validity of the main contract and of
the arbitration agreement must be determined separately, but also that they can be—and
often are—governed by different laws.571 In France this second aspect of separability
was underlined by the judgments in 1970 and 1972 respectively in the Hecht case.572
4.3.2.2. Validity of the arbitration agreement independently of any national law
In 1975 the Paris Court of Appeal, in its Menicucci judgment, had the opportunity to
clarify the significance of the Hecht judgment. Recalling that an arbitration clause
inserted into an international contract is completely autonomous, the court held that,
given its separability, such an arbitration clause is valid independently of reference to
any national law.573
It has been observed that in the Menicucci judgment the principle pursuant to which the
validity of an arbitration clause in international contracts resulted solely from the will of
the parties, independently of any reference to the law of the main contract and to any
national law, was thus confirmed.574 This has been seen as the pinnacle of autonomy.575
The case law initiated by the Menicucci judgment was followed not only by the Paris
Court of Appeal but also by other courts until being confirmed and clarified by the Cour
570 On the law governing the arbitration agreement, see under III.3.
571 Poudret/Besson, para. 178.
572 Rev. arb. 1972, p. 67, with a note by Fouchard = Clunet 1971, p. 833, with a note by Oppetit (Court of
Appeal of Paris); Rev. arb. 1972, p. 89, with an article by Francescakis, pp. 67-87 = Clunet 1972, p. 843,
with a note by Oppetit (Cour de cassation). See also Poudret/Besson, para. 179.
573 Poudret/Besson, para. 180.
574 Ancel, p. 77.
575 Ibid.
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de cassation in the Dalico576 judgment. Indeed, this last judgment contains an important
clarification, namely that the common intention of the parties is subject to mandatory
rules of French law and international public policy, these being the only limits to
consensualism where the matter is referred to a French court.577
It has been observed that French case law has often ensured the validity and
effectiveness of arbitration agreements which would have been held invalid if applying
a conflict of law approach, and that it has allowed the triumph of consensualism,
tempered by material rules of which the content is difficult to determine in advance
because they result from international public policy, which is in itself an uncertain
concept.578 On the other hand, it has been argued that the exclusion of all national laws
should logically lead to an exclusion of that chosen by the parties, which is difficult to
reconcile with the consensualism that this case law claims to uphold.579
4.3.3. Comments
The French conception of separability has remained isolated,580 and it has been argued
that it is hardly in a position to ensure the uniform regulation of international arbitration
to which it aspires.581 Yet in other fields where arbitration is used today and where, on
the one hand, there is not necessarily a main contract between the parties and, on the
other hand, the structure of the relationships between them is different, the following
has been observed:
- with regard to investment arbitration—“jurisdiction in international law depends
solely upon consent”;582
- with regard to sport arbitration—there is at least a presumption in favour of
arbitration.583
In view of the distinction made by French case law between material and legal
separability, it could also be asked whether there might be yet another form of
576 French Cas., 20 December 1993, Comité populaire de la municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v. Dalico
Contractors, 121 Clunet 432 (1994).
577 Poudret/Besson, para. 180. More recently in the Uni-Kod case (Cas., Uni-Kod v. Ouralkali, Rev. arb.
2005, p. 959, with a note by Seraglini) the Cour de cassation reaffirmed the rule of Dalico.
578 See Poudret/Besson, para. 182.
579 Ibid.
580 See, however, a Luxembourg award which applied this French case law (ICC Award No. 8938 =
YBCA 1999, p. 174).
581 Poudret/Besson, para. 182.
582 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
583 See Netzle, p. 47; Rigozzi, para. 833. On this aspect, see under VI.3.3.3.
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separability: a sort of personal separability. In this type of separability the parties who
have consented to arbitrate may be different not only from the parties of the main
contract, but also from the initial parties of the formally valid arbitration agreement.
Such a type of separability could perhaps be useful to explain the extension of the
arbitration agreement to non-signatories, provided that the latter and the original parties
have all consented to arbitration. Moreover, it might also be an argument to overcome
the difficulties of the requirement for arbitration agreements to be “in writing”, because
it could be argued, as has been done by the Swiss Federal Tribunal,584 that this condition
has only to be fulfilled by the initial parties to the arbitration agreement. Furthermore,
such separability may possibly also be useful in investment arbitration where the host
State gives, on the one hand, its general and abstract consent to arbitrate through a treaty
with another State (the investor’s State), and, on the other hand, a consent to the
investor of its counterpart/s (the other State in the case of BITs or the others States in
the case of a multilateral treaty) to resolve an individual and concrete investment
dispute through arbitration. Indeed the position of the investor which could be seen to
be in the “sphere of influence” of the investor’s State and the position of the non-
signatory which could be seen to be in the “sphere of influence” of the signatory party is
comparable in two aspects:
- the requirement “in writing”, as between who claims against a non-signatory and the
non-signatory there is no single written document containing the consent of both
parties like there is no single written document containing the consent of both
parties between the host State and the investor;585 and
- the requirement of consent, as both the non-signatory like the investor must,
nevertheless, have consented to arbitration.
5. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
Whether a dispute should be resolved by arbitrators (instead of courts) depends on the
existence, validity, and scope of an arbitration agreement (whether such an agreement
has come into existence, whether it is valid, and whether the dispute falls within its
584 DFT 129 III 727, consid. 5.3.1., p. 735. See also under III.5.3.4.3.
585 See under V.5.
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scope).586 Limitations on the possibility to refer the resolution of disputes to arbitration
are given by their arbitrability.
5.1. Formal validity
It is essential that the formal aspects of the arbitration agreement be addressed, basically
because it is also on formal grounds that the enforcement of any award is upheld or
dismissed and that arbitral tribunals are deemed to enjoy or to lack competence.587
Indeed, international conventions and treaties as well as most bodies of national statute
law stipulate the need for arbitration clauses to be recorded in writing.588 While the non-
essential clauses, such as those concerning procedure, are normally not subject to the
formal requirements of the arbitration agreement,589 the essentialia negotii have to fulfil
them.
5.1.1. The justification for a written form requirement
In the literature the various justifications for a written form have been grouped into two
key categories, as follows:
5.1.1.1. Proving initial consent
While the right of access to a court is generally considered a fundamental right of every
citizen in a civilised State and as such is embodied in most if not all human rights
conventions,590 it is not an absolute right, since, within defined limits, parties are
generally free to contract for arbitration and thereby exclude themselves from a court.591
With the exclusion of a court considered to be a significant decision States have an
interest, as part of the public administration of justice, to ensure that any such
agreement reflects a genuine consent; one way of policing the exclusion of access to a
court is to insist that the arbitration agreement be in writing—this is the most commonly
cited justification for the form requirement.592
586 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, pp. 86-87.
587 Cremades, p. 150.
588 See also Cremades, p. 151.
589 An exception is English law with section 5(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Poudret/Besson, para. 153).
590 E.g. Article 6 ECHR.
591 Landau, Written Form, pp. 21 et seq.
592 Ibid.
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5.1.1.2. Proving the terms of the agreement
Aside from considerations concerning initial consent, the written form requirement has
also been justified on the basis that, once parties have consented to arbitration, there is
an interest in ensuring that the type of arbitration, and the terms of the process, are
clear and capable of proof.593
5.1.2. Differences in the requirement
Most international conventions and national arbitration laws contain substantive conflict
of laws provisions with regard to form requirements.594 However, in spite of significant
harmonisation, partly due to the different times at which the various rules were drafted,
national laws differ considerably as to what satisfies the requirement of a written
agreement.595 Moreover, while some laws require writing only for evidentiary purposes
(ad probationem),596 others make it a condition of validity (ad validitatem).597 The
difference has essentially to be seen in the fact that, if writing is only an evidentiary
requirement, the arbitration agreement can also be established by tacit acceptance.598 On
the other hand France—for international arbitrations—and Sweden do not have
requirements of form, and thus oral agreements are sufficient.599
5.2. Substantive validity
5.2.1. Consent
5.2.1.1. Existence
Consent to arbitration may be relatively easy to establish if the arbitration clause is
contained in a contract negotiated between and signed by the parties.600 In order to
593 Landau, Written Form, pp. 21 et seq.
594 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-6.
595 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-11. The New York Convention, for example, adopted in 1958, contains a
very narrow definition of “writing”.
596 See, e.g. Article 1021 Netherlands CCP, Article 9 Spanish Arbitration Act.
597 See, e.g. Article II NYC, Article 25 ICSID Convention, Article 178 Swiss PIL (Poudret/Besson, para.
183).
598 Poudret/Besson, para. 183.
599 See Heumann, pp. 32-33, for Sweden.
600 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-35.
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determine the existence of the parties’ consent, arbitrators will make recourse to the
general principles of contractual interpretation601 (e.g. the principle of interpretation in
good faith, the principle of effective interpretation, the principle contra proferentem).602
In practice these principles of interpretation prove most valuable with respect to
pathological clauses, i.e. incomplete, defective or contradictory clauses.603 Nevertheless,
when entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties should strive to express their
consent in an unequivocal manner with regard to the essential elements of such
agreement, so as to restrict any room for interpretation and ensure the validity of the
arbitration agreement.604
On the other hand, when contracts are concluded by reference to general conditions, the
arbitration clause may not have been the object of specific attention by the parties, since
the general conditions or any other document containing the arbitration clause may not
be attached to the contract itself.605 Furthermore, the parties may also conclude a
contract without reference to an arbitration clause but in the context of a series of
contracts which include an arbitration agreement.606
5.2.1.2. Scope
Insofar as the existence of the parties’ consent has been determined, the arbitration
agreement is deemed to cover all disputes between the parties, provided that they are
arbitrable and arise out of the relationship to which the arbitration agreement refers.607
5.2.1.2.1. Whom it binds
As a general rule the arbitration clause binds only the parties that have originally
agreed to it.608 However, questions as to consent to arbitration may arise if claims are
brought by or against parties who are not expressed to be a party to the contract
containing the arbitration agreement.609 The arbitration agreement must, like any
contract, be concluded between two or more parties who are determined or
601 Abdulla, p. 18.
602 See Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 473 et seq.
603 Abdulla, p. 19.
604 Ibid.
605 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-35.
606 Ibid.
607 Abdulla, p. 19.
608 See, e.g. Abdulla, p. 20.
609 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-36.
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determinable.610 This requirement causes problems where there are more than two
parties (multi-party arbitration) or where the arbitration agreement is held to include
persons or companies who have not signed it (extension).611 In these latter cases the
central issue is whether the arbitration agreement can be extended to a non-signatory.
5.2.1.2.2. What it encompasses
a. Disputes covered by the arbitration agreement
It is important to ensure that the wording adopted in an arbitration agreement is
adequate to fulfil the intentions of the parties.612 Most arbitration agreements are
broadly worded, and, usually, when parties agree to resolve any disputes between them
by arbitration, they intend to resolve all disputes between them by this method (unless a
specific exception is made).613 This is, in particular, also the case when the model
clauses of arbitration institutions are adopted by the parties.614 From the case law it has
generally emerged that there are three categories of claim that are potentially within the
scope of an arbitration agreement:
- contractual claims (including claims incidental to the contract, such as quantum
meruit);
- claims in tort; and
- statutory claims, i.e. claims that arise out of legislation which might bind the parties,
such as securities and antitrust legislation.615
In all three categories of claim it is essential that a determination is made as to whether
a particular claim or defence has sufficient connection with the contract to be covered
by the arbitration agreement.616
b. Set-off and counterclaims
There are cases in which a respondent party will seek to introduce a counterclaim or
raise a set-off against the claim. In general, this is possible provided the counterclaim or
610 Poudret/Besson, para. 154.
611 Ibid.
612 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-38.
613 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-63; see also Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, paras 3-38 et seq.
614 See, e.g. the ICC Model clause which covers “All disputes arising out or in connection with the
present contract”.
615 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-40.
616 Ibid.
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set-off relates to the same contract as the main claim.617 On the other hand, the difficult
problem is where a respondent wishes to counterclaim or raise a set-off arising under a
different contract between the same parties, because in this situation the counterclaim or
set-off is not covered by the arbitration agreement, and, as a consequence, the
arbitration tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the counterclaims and set-off
claims.618
Although the situation may be different if the contracts underlying the main claims and
on which the counterclaims and set-off are based are closely related and form part of the
same economic venture,619 the existence of a separate arbitration or choice of forum
clause is, generally, considered to exclude the possibility of a set-off.620
A set-off of a claim from a different contract is also possible if the chosen arbitration
rules allow a set-off to be raised.621 However, while most arbitration rules contain
provisions on counterclaims, only some of them deal with set-off622 even though both
institutions have a striking resemblance.623
5.2.2. Arbitrability
5.2.2.1. In general
Arbitrability, sometimes also referred to as “objective arbitrability”, relates to whether
or not the subject matter of the dispute may be validly submitted to arbitration.624 Or, in
other words, it involves determining which types of dispute may be resolved by
arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain of the courts.625 The concept
should be distinguished from the one of “subjective arbitrability” which encompasses
capacity and broadly refers to whether or not a specific entity or person may be party to
an arbitration.626
617 Berger, Set-Off, pp. 64-65. See, e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 19(3).
618 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-68.
619 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-69.
620 Berger, Set-Off, pp. 74-79.
621 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-70.
622 See Article 19(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 30(5) ICC Rules; Article 42(c) WIPO
Arbitration Rules; Article 21(5) Swiss Rules.
623 Berger, Set-Off, pp. 53 et seq., stating the reasons for such reluctance.
624 Abdulla, p. 21.
625 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-12.
626 Abdulla, p. 21.
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While, in principle, any dispute should be just as capable of being resolved by a private
arbitral tribunal as by the judge of a national court, it is, however, precisely because
arbitration is a private proceeding with public consequences that some types of dispute
are reserved for national courts, whose proceedings are generally in the public
domain.627 Whether or not a particular type of dispute is “arbitrable” under a given law
is in essence a matter of public policy628 for that law to determine.629 The decision as to
which types of disputes are the exclusive domain of national courts, and which can be
referred to arbitration differs from State to State reflecting the political, social and
economic prerogatives of the State, as well as its general attitude towards arbitration.630
5.2.2.2. With regard to consent’s issues
It has been observed that the issue of arbitrability is one of the most important threshold
questions in the arbitration process.631 In fact, party autonomy is impotent before this
barrier which constitutes a clear limitation of parties’ consent to arbitrate.
Nevertheless, especially for international cases,632 when a court is trying to decide
whether to enforce an arbitration agreement, the tendency is to break down the barriers
prohibiting arbitration.633 Moreover, the trend in most legal systems is toward
expanding the boundaries of arbitrability, at least with respect to international
arbitration and disputes over enforcement of the arbitration agreement.634 Therefore, the
ambits where parties can consent also expand.
5.2.3. Capacity
The concept of capacity is twofold. On one hand, it relates to the capacity of a person or
entity to enter into an arbitration agreement on its own behalf and act as a party to
627 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-12.
628 Although in general limits on arbitrability of disputes arise from public policy only few laws make
express reference to the notion of “public policy”, as, e.g. the French NCPC Article 2060.
629 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-13.
630 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 9-35. See also Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, p. 71.
631 Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, p. 217.
632 On the differentiation between national/international context, see, e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth Inc, 473 US 614, 105 S Ct 3346, 3355 et seq (1985) where the US Supreme Court
held that in an international context the ambit of arbitration may be wider than in a national context and
declared antitrust disputes to be arbitrable which in American Safety Equipment Corp v. JP Maguire &
Co, 391 F 2d 821, 826 et seq. (2d Cir. 1968) were still held not to be arbitrable in a domestic context (see
Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 9-36).
633 See Várady/Barceló/von Mehren, pp. 218-219.
634 Ibid.
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arbitral proceedings; on the other hand, it deals with the capacity of a party to enter into
an arbitration agreement in the name and on behalf of another person or entity
(agency).635
The majority of arbitration laws are silent on the capacity to arbitrate, which is usually
on the same footing as the capacity to contract in general.636 The general rule is that
any natural or legal person who has the capacity to conclude a valid contract has the
capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement.637 Except for restrictions aimed at
protecting consumers, national laws rarely impose restrictions on the capacity to
conclude arbitration agreements.638 However, with regard to the authority necessary to
agree to arbitration on behalf of another person, there is great diversity among
national laws.639
5.3. Relationship between formal requirements and consent
5.3.1. The functions of the formal requirements in respect with consent
In the literature the justification for a written form requirement for “proving initial
consent”640 has been subdivided in several different, but related aspects:
5.3.1.1. “Cautionary” function
The requirement of writing has a “cautionary” function, in that it distinguishes the
conclusion of an arbitration agreement from other types of transaction, thereby alerting
the parties to the special significance of the agreement.641 In turn this should provoke
proper consideration before initial consent to the agreement is given.642
On the other hand, considering the fact that parties usually insert a short model clause,
recommended by an arbitration institution, as a formality and that the arbitration clause
635 Abdulla, p. 24. On agency, see under IV.4.
636 Poudret/Besson, para. 270.
637 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-25.
638 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-33.
639 Poudret/Besson, para. 274.
640 See under III.5.1.1.1.
641 Landau, Written Form, p. 22.
642 Ibid.
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in a commercial contract is often a “midnight clause”,643 one may ask how relevant the
“cautionary” function really is. In any case, with respect to the “cautionary” function,
regard should be given to whether the arbitration agreement was entered into by
seasoned businessmen, or by people with little experience.644
5.3.1.2. “Evidential” function
Writing has an obvious “evidential” function as it facilitates the resolution of a dispute
as to whether or not an arbitration agreement was actually consented to and
concluded.645 Given the importance of the rights that are thereby excluded,646 there has
been a perceived need to be able to prove a party’s consent to arbitration with particular
certainty.647
5.3.1.3. “Channeling” function
The imposition of a writing requirement has a “channeling” function, allowing for
certain types of agreement to be singled out as special legal mechanisms with particular
attributes, and, requiring that particular transactions take a prescribed form in order to
attract specific legal consequences or characteristics.648 In this way parties have to take
a conscious decision to invoke the particular legal device, while knowing the
consequences of such a choice.649
643 See Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-02.
644 See Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 February 1984, Tradax Export SA (Panama) v. Amoco Iran Oil
Company (US), XI YBCA 532 (1986), para. 10. See also Obergericht Basel, 5 July 1994, XXI YBCA
685 (1996).
645 Landau, Written Form, p. 23.
646 The right of access to court which is generally considered a fundamental right of every citizen in a
civilised State. See, e.g. in particular Article 6 ECHR which, however, is not considered to be an absolute
right. On human rights and arbitration, see, e.g. Besson, Human Rights; Jarrosson, Convention; Landrove,
European Convention, Samuel, ECHR; Wedam-Lukic.
647 Landau, Written Form, p. 23.
648 In England, the requirement of writing in section 5 of the Arbitration Act 1996 constitutes, partly, a
“scope” provision; if an agreement is in writing, the 1996 Act will apply, with all its legal consequences;
if an agreement is not in writing, it will still have some limited existence in English law, but outside of the
regime of the 1996 Act.
649 Landau, Written Form, p. 23.
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5.3.2. Conformity with Article II(2) NYC as presumption of “meeting of the
minds”?
Although, in principle, the form of the arbitration agreement does not concern questions
regarding its formation, as these questions have to be judged under the applicable law, it
has nevertheless been pointed out that if an arbitration agreement conforms to the
requirement of Article II(2) NYC, there exists a strong presumption that there is a
“meeting of the minds” between the parties since the requirements of Article II(2) NYC
are fairly strict.650 Indeed, it may even be argued that, as far as the arbitration agreement
is concerned, if Article II(2) NYC is complied with, the parties can be deemed to have
consented to arbitration, except where lack of consent can be proven.651
5.3.3. Towards a triumph of substance over form
While in the New York Convention the emphasis is on a signed agreement, in the
modern laws of arbitration this requirement has largely disappeared.652 In most of them
all that is required is some written evidence of an agreement to arbitrate.653 In some
systems of law an oral agreement to arbitrate will be regarded as being “in writing” if it
is made “by reference to terms which are in writing”;654 or if an oral agreement “is
recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of the parties to the
agreement”.655
It has been observed that in these modern arbitration laws there has in effect been a
triumph of substance over form, because as long as there is some written evidence of
an agreement to arbitrate, the form in which that agreement is recorded is immaterial.656
Moreover, some laws require writing only for evidentiary purposes (ad probationem)657
and others contain no form requirements.658 It has also been pointed out that there is no
justification to submit arbitration agreements to stricter form requirements than other
650 Van den Berg, NYC, p. 177.
651 Ibid.
652 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-09.
653 Ibid.
654 See, e.g. the English Arbitration Act 1996, section 5(3).
655 See, e.g. the English Arbitration Act 1996, section 5(4). The “implied consent” provisions of the
Model Law are also to be found in English Arbitration Act 1996, section 5(5). See Redfern/Hunter/
Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-09, and also Landau, Written Form, pp. 52-55.
656 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-09.
657 See, e.g. the Dutch law.
658 See, e.g. the French law (for international arbitration) and the Swedish law. See for an overview
Poudret/Besson, paras 183 et seq.
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contractual provisions,659 since arbitration is no longer considered a dangerous waiver
of substantial rights.660 Indeed, on the one hand, the selection of arbitration is not an
exclusion of the national forum but rather the natural forum for international disputes661
and, on the other hand, form requirements do not necessarily promote legal certainty,
but they are often the source of additional disputes.662
This all supports the complete abolition of the “in-writing” requirement,663 or at least
the submission of the issue of formal validity to a substantive rule of international
arbitration.664 In any case the writing requirement should be interpreted dynamically in
light of modern means of communication665 and of the growing complexity of modern
economic transactions. A degree of caution on the question on the “in-writing”
requirement is, however, necessary, as:
1. even courts in jurisdictions familiar with international arbitration still sometimes
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements that are not in a written document signed by
the parties or otherwise contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams;666
2. an arbitration agreement that is regarded as valid by an arbitral tribunal or court in
one country may not be so regarded by the courts of the country where the award
falls to be enforced.667
Although courts have decided that a general reference668 to a separate document
containing an arbitration clause was sufficient to constitute an “arbitral clause in a
contract signed by both parties” in the sense of Article II(2) NYC669 and that no specific
reference670 to the arbitration clause is required,671 the main differences relate to the
659 See, e.g. the critic of Kaplan, pp. 30 et seq.
660 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-9.
661 See Lionnet, p. 606.
662 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-9.
663 See, e.g. Herrmann, Freshfields Lecture, p. 216; Herrmann, Arbitration Agreement, pp. 45 et seq.;
Sanders, Quo vadis, pp. 157 et seq.
664 See, e.g. Blessing, Law Applicable, pp. 169 and 172.
665 On the functional equivalence of the written form in arbitration agreements in online business to
business transactions, see Kaufmann-Kohler, Online B2B, pp. 358 et seq. Also the UNCITRAL Working
Group on Arbitration in its 32nd session of March 2000 agreed that Article II(2) NYC should be
interpreted to cover the use of electronic means of communication and that it required no amendment for
this purpose (Report, A/CN.9/468 of 10 April 2000, No. 101).
666 See, e.g. the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc v. Lark
International Ltd 186 F 3d 210 (1999). The Second Circuit’s decision in Kahn Lucas has been applied by
a number of other US courts, who have arrived at varying interpretations (some liberal; some less so) of
an “exchange of letters and telegrams”.
667 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-09.
668 On general reference or global reference, see under IV.3.2.3.3.
669 See for the same ruling in relation to the second alternative, the exchange of documents, Switzerland,
Swiss Federal Tribunal, 12 January 1989, XV YBCA 509 (1990).
670 On specific reference or explicit reference, see under IV.3.2.3.2.
671 France, Cas., 9 November 1993, Bomar Oil NV v. ETAP - l'Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activités
Pétrolières, XX YBCA 660 (1995); Spain, Tribunal Supremo, 30 January 1986, X v. Y, XIII YBCA 512
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interpretation of the second alternative form requirement, i.e. the exchange of
documents.672 Problems do in particular arise where only one party has clearly
consented in writing to arbitration, as is typically the case with purchase orders or letters
of confirmation containing an arbitration clause upon which the other party acts without
sending a written reply.673 Some courts have followed in those cases a restrictive
interpretation approach,674 others have adopted a wider one. A wide interpretation
approach was followed in Sphere Drake Insurance v. Marine Towing675 where the US
Courts did not follow the legislative history or a strict textual interpretation of Article
II(2) NYC,676 but applied intent over form.677 Issues can also arise when a third party
signs a document or engages in written communications, as in such cases it may be
possible to attribute those written communications to the party which has not expressly
consented to arbitration in writing.678
5.3.4. The decreasing importance of the formal requirements shown using
the example of Swiss case-law with regard to non-signatories
5.3.4.1. General
Contrarily to French law, in the case of international arbitration, Swiss law requires a
written arbitration agreement for validity.679 Therefore, in the case of an extension to
third non-signatory parties the issue of the significance of the formal requirement of
having a written arbitration agreement arises.
5.3.4.2. Different scholarly views
Poudret/Besson are of the opinion that, as Article 178(1) Swiss PIL subjects the validity
of the arbitration agreement to requirements of form, the intention of the parties must be
(1988). Specific reference was required in Tryff Hansa v. Equitas [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 439 and in
another case cited by Merkin, Arbitration Act, 30.
672 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 7-21 and 7-22.
673 Ibid.
674 See, e.g. Corte di cassazione, 28 October 1993, no 10704/93, Robobar Ltd v. Finncold sas, XX YBCA
739 (1995). See also: Corte di cassazione, 18 September 1978, No. 4167, Gaetano Butera v. Pietro e
Romano Pagnan, IV YBCA 296 (1979) 299 et seq.; see also the German decision by the Landgericht
München, 20 June 1978, V YBCA 260 (1980) 261; and the Hong Kong case Small v. Goldroyce [1994] 2
HKC 526.
675 Sphere Drake Insurance Plc v. Marine Towing, Inc, 16 F 3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994).
676 Which requires signature or exchange of documents for arbitration agreements and clauses.
677 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-24 et seq.
678 Ibid. See under III.5.4.2.
679 See Article 178(1) Swiss PIL.
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manifested by one or more texts and therefore tacit acceptance based on non-written
acts is insufficient.680
Blessing, on the other hand, has always maintained that the issue of the extension of the
arbitration clause to non-signatories is not an issue under sub-paragraph 1, but rather
under sub-paragraph 2 of Article 178 Swiss PIL. Indeed, according to him, it is a
problem as to the scope of an existing (validly signed or even exchanged arbitration
agreement) ratione personae: once an arbitration clause exists its scope and reach have to
be determined according to Article 178(2) Swiss PIL.681 Therefore, the issue will be one
of consensus and interpretation as to whether the contract (containing an arbitration
clause) was meant to also include a non-signatory party.682
5.3.4.3. The position of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the decision 129 III 727 (of 16
October 2003)
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, with regard to the relation between sub-paragraphs 1 and 2
of Article 178 Swiss PIL—while recognising the necessity of the form requirements for
arbitration clauses—has, however, in 2003 held that:
“Toutefois, cette exigence de forme ne s'applique qu'à la convention d'arbitrage elle-
même, c'est-à-dire à l'accord (clause compromissoire ou compromis) par lequel les
parties initiales ont manifesté réciproquement leur volonté concordante de
compromettre. Quant à la question de la portée subjective d'une convention
d'arbitrage formellement valable au regard de l'art. 178 al. 1 LDIP—il s'agit de
déterminer quelles sont les parties liées par la convention et de rechercher, le cas
échéant, si un ou des tiers qui n'y sont pas désignés entrent néanmoins dans son champ
d'application ratione personae -, elle relève du fond et doit, en conséquence, être
résolue à la lumière de l'art. 178 al. 2 LDIP (dans ce sens, cf., parmi d'autres,
BLESSING, ibid.)”.683
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in upholding the majority decision of the arbitral
tribunal,684 has made a distinction between the validity of the arbitration agreement
between the initial parties and the validity of its extension to third non-signatory
680 Poudret/Besson, para. 258. See also Poudret, Note, p. 392.
681 Blessing, Introduction, para. 504.
682 Ibid.
683 DFT 129 III 727, consid. 5.3.1., p. 736.
684 See also Poudret, Note, pp. 393 et seq. It has been observed that the arguments which have been
retained by the arbitral tribunal in order to admit the extension of the arbitration agreement and which
have been reported at the consid. 5.1.1. of DFT 129 III 727 show the influence of the French case law
(see Poudret, Note, pp. 393 et seq.).
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parties.685 While the former is subject to the formal requirements provided for in Article
178(1) Swiss PIL, which exclude an oral agreement, the extension would not have to
comply with these formal requirements. According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal the
determination of the scope ratione personae of the arbitration agreement merely raises
the question of interpretation, i.e. of substance, which must be resolved according to one
of the three national laws referred to in Article 178(2) Swiss PIL.686
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has motivated this jurisprudence with the liberal approach
that the Court had already followed in the past.687 Indeed an arbitration clause has been
seen by the Swiss Supreme Court as binding for persons who have not signed it in many
other cases: assignment, assumption of debt, in the case of procedural behaviour, or
when it is required by the principle of good faith.688
It is exactly the distinction made by the Swiss Federal Tribunal that led to my earlier
observation as to whether, following French case law, there might even be another form
of separability: a sort of personal separability.689
5.3.4.4. Critics of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s decision
Contrarily to the Swiss Federal Tribunal Poudret/Besson maintain that the submission
of the third non-signatory party to the arbitration between the initial parties should, in
order to comply with the formal (already simplified) requirements of Article l78(l)
Swiss PIL, derive from documents manifesting the intent of such a third party to
arbitrate, and, indeed, until the aforementioned new case law, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal always based the extension of the arbitration agreement on documents
manifesting the intent of the third party.690 Poudret/Besson are of the opinion that the
extension of the arbitration clause implies that the third party is also bound by a valid
arbitration agreement, and not only that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the
initial parties. Thus, the submission to arbitration in Switzerland is only valid if it
complies with the conditions of form and substance provided for in Article 178 Swiss
PIL.691
685 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 258.
686 Ibid.
687 Huber, p. 39. See also Poudret, Note, pp. 394 et seq.
688 DFT 129 III 727, consid. 5.3.1., p. 735.
689 See under III.4.3.3.
690 See Poudret/Besson, para. 258.
691 Ibid.
119
In between the positions of Blessing and Poudret/Besson, a third way has been
suggested by Habegger. He supports the finding that no overly strict requirements
should apply to the formal validity of an extension of the arbitration clause to a third
party. Therefore, he argued that for showing compliance with Article 178(1) Swiss PIL
an “exchange of text” between an initial party and the party to which the arbitration
clause is to be extended is not required.692
5.4. Upholding the arbitration agreement in spite of its signature by
only one of the parties or the non-fulfilment of formal
requirements
5.4.1. Expression of consent in more documents
When a contract containing the arbitration clause is signed by only one party it is widely
accepted that the written consent of the other party contained in a different document
does not have to be signed.693 Indeed, the signature requirement merely applies to the
first alternative of Article II(2) NYC but not to the second—the exchange of
documents.694
5.4.2. Three party situations
In bills of lading and other three party situations, in which it frequently transpires that
the third party signs a document or engages in written communications, it may be
possible to attribute those written communications to the party which has not expressly
consented to arbitration in writing.695 The third party may be considered to have acted
as an agent or a broker when consenting in writing.696
692 Habegger, p. 410.
693 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-28.
694 Switzerland, Federal Tribunal, 5 November 1985, Tracomin CA v. Sudan Oil Seeds Co Ltd, XII YBCA
511 (1987); Obergericht Basel, 5 July 1994, DIETF Ltd v. RF AG, XXI YBCA 685 (1996). On the
Tracomin case, see in particolar also Samuel, Arbitration clauses, pp. 508 et seq.
695 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-29.
696 See, e.g. Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 February 1984, Tradax Export SA (Panama) v. Amoco Iran Oil
Company (US), XI YBCA 532 (1986). On the Tradax case, see in particolar also Samuel, Arbitration
clauses, pp. 509 et seq.
696 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-30.
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5.4.3. Good faith and estoppel considerations
Where the consent of both parties to the arbitration clause was clear, in spite of the non-
fulfilment of formal requirements, courts have also resorted to considerations of good
faith and estoppel to uphold the arbitration agreement.697 The Swiss Federal Tribunal in
Compagnie de Navigation et Transport v. MSC held:698
“in particular situations, a certain behaviour can replace compliance with a formal
requirement according to the rules of good faith”.
However, there are also decisions where for reasons of legal certainty it has been
impossible to overcome the lack of form in the arbitration agreements.699
697 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-30.
698 Swiss Federal Tribunal, 16 January 1995, Compagnie de Navigation et Transport SA v. MSC
(Mediterranean Shipping Company), XXI YBCA 690 (1996) 698 para. 13. On the Compagnie de
Navigation case, see in particolar also Samuel, Arbitration clauses, pp. 511 et seq.
699 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-30, footnote 35. See, e.g. ICC Case No. 5832, 115 Clunet 1198 (1988)
1202; Aughton Ltd v. MF Kent Services Ltd, (1991) 31 Con LR 60 (CA).
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SECOND PART
The Second Part of this study will compare—by analysing them separately—three
different areas in which arbitration today plays a significant role in an international
context: commercial arbitration (Chapter IV.), investment arbitration (Chapter V.) and
sport arbitration (Chapter VI.).
IV. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The starting point of the comparison will be the classical field of commercial
arbitration. In international commercial arbitration it is of paramount importance to
characterise the nature of the underlying transaction and determine whether or not the
relevant dispute is commercial. On the other hand, the involvement of commercial
persons may be of relevance, but should not be the guiding principle.700 Indeed, States
and their ministries and agencies may be involved in a commercial activity, although
they do not qualify, strictly speaking, as a commercial person.701 In commercial
arbitration the relationship between the parties is horizontal and consent is expressed in
an arbitration agreement which can take the form of a submission agreement or an
arbitration clause.702
The concept of “commercial” that underlies this thesis is the one followed by the Model
Law—it describes “commercial” in a footnote to Article 1(1) in a comprehensive and
open-ended way.703 The definition includes disputes with State parties and does not
distinguish between civil and commercial arbitration as some national legal systems
do.704
Chapter IV. begins by making some general remarks on the consensual character of
commercial arbitration and looking at the possible exception of arbitration with the
700 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 4-5.
701 Ibid.
702 See under III.1.
703 Some countries which adopted the Model Law incorporated the text of the footnote into a section of
the law; other jurisdictions simply reproduced the text in a schedule (see Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p. 53,
footnotes 15 and 16). For the wording of this footnote in the Model Law, see under the annex containing
the wording of the provisions cited in the main body of the thesis.
704 See, e.g. French domestic arbitration law (Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para 64).
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Chambers of Commerce of (former) communist countries (section 1.). Then it turns to
discuss the content of the arbitration agreement (section 2.). After that the determination
of the existence of parties’ consent and its scope is analysed (section 3.). Agency and
consent (section 4.) and the transfer of the arbitration agreement and consent (section 5.)
are considered. A longer section is then devoted to parties’ consent with regard to the
extension of arbitration agreements, in particular within groups of companies (section
6.). And, finally, the relevance of parties’ consent with regard to procedural mechanisms
is examined (section 7.).
1. GENERAL REMARKS
1.1. The consensual character of commercial arbitration
The agreement to arbitrate is the foundation stone of international commercial
arbitration, as it records the consent of the parties to submit to arbitration—a consent
which is indispensable to any process of dispute resolution outside national courts.705
Indeed, the consent of the parties is the essential basis of a voluntary system of
international commercial arbitration.706 Nevertheless, it has been observed that
compulsory arbitration does exist and that internationally, the most striking example of
compulsory arbitration occurred in the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
where it was employed as the method of settling disputes under the provisions of the
Moscow Convention of 1972.707
1.2. Arbitration with communist countries as an exception?
1.2.1. Former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
1.2.1.1. Overview
The Moscow Convention of 26 May 1972 provided for a referral to arbitration for all
disputes which arose between economic organisations of the former CMEA countries.
705 See, e.g. Born, p. 1.
706 See, e.g. Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01.
707 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-01, footnote 3. Similarly also Rigozzi, para. 475.
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Arbitration was thus the compulsory dispute resolution mechanism within the
COMECON, and the system became widely harmonised throughout the Member States.
Awards were final and binding and enforceable in the same manner as court judgments;
grounds for refusal of enforcement were strictly limited.708
In the past, foreign trade organisations of the Soviet Union and other East European
countries, in negotiating contracts with Western corporations, have proposed, and
occasionally insisted on, arbitration under the rules of the foreign trade arbitration
institution established at the Chamber of Commerce of the East European country in
question.709 While most CMEA countries only had one arbitration court, the former
Soviet Union had the FTAC and the MAC.710 The FTAC and MAC, both attached to the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Moscow, have generally been seen as
representative of such institutions.711
1.2.1.2. With particular regard to consent and the proceeding
It has been observed that both FTAC and MAC displayed features, on a theoretical
level, which made them resemble national courts rather than arbitral tribunals. The most
important aspect of arbitration, namely the voluntary submission to arbitration, was,
however, a condition precedent for FTAC and MAC to try disputes.712 Moreover,
parties engaged in East–West trade had a fairly broad spectrum of choices among
various available arbitration mechanisms,713 and, yet even though there might have
been a sort of pressure to resort to arbitration before the foreign trade arbitration
commissions of Eastern Europe, it has been observed that with the exception of the
award in the Soviet–Israeli Oil Arbitration,714 FTAC and MAC had an unblemished
reputation for fairness,715 and this in spite of the fact that they were attached to the
Chamber of Commerce.
708 Blessing, Introduction, para. 267.
709 Hobér, Moscow, p. 121.
710 Blessing, Introduction, para. 268.
711 Hobér, Moscow, p. 121.
712 See Hobér, Moscow, p. 158.
713 E.g. arbitration in a third country under the rules of the ICC or arbitration in Stockholm under the
auspices of the Arbitration Institute of the SCC (Hobér, Moscow, p. 120).
714 The case is the infamous Soviet-Israeli Oil Arbitration. The award is translated and reproduced in 53
Am. J. Int'l. L 800 (1959). For comments on the award, see, e.g. Berman; Domke; Metzger.
715 See Hobér, Moscow, p. 163.
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1.2.2. People’s Republic of China (PRC)
1.2.2.1. Overview
In the PRC, prior to the enactment of the 1994 Arbitration Law, CIETAC and CMAC
had exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes.716 While this “monopoly” was
challenged when the 1994 Law introduced a rather ambiguous provision stating that
“foreign-related arbitration commissions may be established by the China International
Chamber of Commerce”,717 CIETAC remains the largest arbitration institution of the
country.718 CIETAC, which is regularly insisted upon by Chinese contracting parties, is
organised under the auspices of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT)—a powerful force for trade with China—and to this extent it is
controlled and influenced by the Chinese Government.719
1.2.2.2. CAA requirements: more than only consent to arbitration?
In reading Articles 16 and 18 CAA together, one may find that the designation of an
arbitration institution (the substitute wording for “arbitration institution” in the CAA is
“arbitration commission”) actually constitutes a compulsory requirement for a valid
arbitration agreement under the CAA.720 It has been argued that, due to the fact that
arbitration is contractual in nature, an arbitration agreement should only be invalid if
according to the interpretation of the arbitration agreement and all relevant
circumstances no common consent to arbitrate can be ascertained.721 The CAA
provisions, however, require much more than the parties’ consent to arbitrate, which
could make arbitration agreements very vulnerable to the easy invalidation by courts.722
Indeed, this requirement could disqualify foreign arbitration institutions at the outset
from handling arbitrations in China, when their model arbitration clauses do not
mention the arbitration institution itself723 and therefore do not meet the requirements of
Article 16 CAA.724
716 Zhou, p. 149.
717 Ibid.
718 In recent years, nearly 1,000 cases have been filed with the CIETAC annually on average
(see http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/introduction/intro_1.htm).
719 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 3-30.
720 Manjiao, p. 111.
721 Tao/von Wunschheim, p. 316.
722 See Manjiao, p. 111.
723 For this reason the ICC has a Model arbitration clause for Mainland China which mentions the
arbitration institution. For the wording of the clause, see under the annex containing the wording of the
provisions cited in the main body of the thesis.
724 See Tao/von Wunschheim, p. 324.
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1.2.3. Comments
Arbitration with parties of (former) communist countries is, in my opinion, not really
an exception from the consensual character of commercial arbitration. Indeed, the
parties still had, and respectively still have, a possibility of choice, although perhaps a
more limited one. For instance, in China ad hoc arbitrations are not permitted,725 and
therefore it is not possible to consent to arbitration with own rules. However, parties
still have the possibility to choose, even though only among institutional arbitrations.
The fact that the parties’ choice is restricted to institutional rules is, however, in my
view, primarily an issue about how far reaching party autonomy is, and less one
about the consensual character of arbitration.
What is surely a more difficult aspect to cope with is the one about unequal bargaining
powers between the parties who decide to consent to arbitration. This aspect concerns,
however, more the question of whether the arbitration agreement, as it has been
concluded, is valid or not (validity of the arbitration agreement). On the other hand,
this issue is mitigated when the parties have the possibility of choice among various
available arbitration mechanisms, and, above all, when the arbitration proceedings
before a determinate arbitration institution are conducted in a fair way. The issue with
the requirements of the CAA also shows the importance of the content of the arbitration
agreement.
2. THE CONTENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
2.1. The essential elements for which consent is required
When entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties should strive to express their
consent in an unequivocal manner with regard to the essential elements of such an
agreement, so as to restrict any room for interpretation and ensure the validity of the
arbitration agreement.726 The validity supposes that the essential elements are defined
without ambiguity or contradiction, as otherwise, the clause is defective and might
prove invalid or ineffective.727
725 The Chinese arbitration system has a tradition of prohibiting ad hoc arbitration (see Manjiao, p. 115).
726 Abdulla, p. 19.
727 Poudret/Besson, para. 158.
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2.1.1. The agreement to arbitrate: any dispute between the parties will be
resolved by arbitration
The arbitration agreement must clearly express the parties’ intention to submit their
dispute to arbitration, instead of going to a national court. The agreement should make
clear that arbitration is the exclusive forum in which disputes between the parties are
to be resolved.728 In particular all ambiguity between arbitration in the strict sense,
mediation, expert determination, and other modes of dispute resolution must be
avoided.729 Should the parties intend to subordinate their arbitration to prior conciliation
proceedings, they should mention it in their arbitration agreement since this is a
requirement of their submission to arbitration.730 Indeed, the fulfilment of this
requirement is a prerequisite to be met before consent to arbitration can become
effective.
Although the ambiguity of including an additional choice of forum clause should also
be avoided, occasionally an arbitration agreement may allow one or both parties the
choice as to whether to go to arbitration or have the dispute decided by State courts.731
The possibility of choice increases the consensual character of arbitration, when this
mode of dispute resolution is preferred, because the choice is made once the dispute
has broken out.732 On the other hand, when the route of State courts is preferred, the
consent to arbitration of both parties has vanished. This seems especially unfair in the
case of unilateral arbitration clauses. Indeed, the resulting lack of equality between the
parties raises the issue of the validity of such an arrangement.733 Therefore, where only
one party, in general the one with the greater bargaining power, has the right to choose
between arbitration and litigation, there might be problems with the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement in some systems.734 While in the US this matter is not settled—
although in commercial contracts there seems to be a trend in favour of their
validity735—French law has held such agreements to be valid.736 Moreover, for instance
728 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-10.
729 Poudret/Besson, para. 155.
730 Ibid.
731 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 8-10 et seq.
732 This is at least so from the optic of the party choosing the forum.
733 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 488.
734 In Mexico, for instance, such arbitration clauses are not considered to be valid: see Article 567 Código
Federal de Procedimientos Civiles.
735 Doctor's Assoc v. Distajo, 66 F 3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995). For further references, see Kröll,
Finanzgeschäften, pp. 367 and 378; Niddam, pp. 159 et seq.; Drahozal.
736 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 488.
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in Germany, the Federal Supreme Court has considered this type of clause to be valid
even when contained in standard terms of business.737
2.1.2. Indication of the dispute or legal relationship which will be the subject
matter of arbitration
The agreement must identify what disputes should be referred to arbitration: is it all or
only specific disputes arising out of the specific contractual relationship between the
parties?738 In doing this it is important to ensure that the wording adopted in an
arbitration agreement is adequate to fulfil the intentions of the parties.739 It should also
be made clear that the disputes are in respect of a particular contract or contracts, as an
agreement to submit future disputes between the parties to arbitration without reference
to any contractual relationship between the parties may be void for reasons of
uncertainty.740
The various arbitration institutions recommend model clauses with broad wording by
referring to “all”741 or “any dispute”,742 “all disputes, controversies and differences”743
or just generally “disputes, controversies or claims”.744 Indeed, the reference to “each
dispute” or “a dispute” could be interpreted to mean that each dispute should be the
subject of a separate arbitration.745 Moreover, in identifying the link between the
dispute and the contract clauses are used such as “arising from/arising out of or in
connection with”746 or “arising out of or relating to or in connection with”.747 Clearly
the terms “relating to” and “in connection with” are wider than “arising out of” a
particular contract and this wider language may allow a tribunal to deal with a
peripheral agreement which relates to, but is separate from, the main agreement in
737 BGH, 24 September 1998 ZIP 1998, 2065 with note Kröll, WuB VII A § 1025 1-99. For the same
position under English law, see Pittalis v. Sherefettin [1986] QB 868; Russell on arbitration, para. 2-045.
(Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-12).
738 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-13.
739 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-38.
740 This was not the case in Navigazione Alta Italia SpA v. Concordia Maritime Chartering AB (The
“Stena Pacifica”) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 234 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-16).
741 See ICC recommended arbitration clause.
742 Found in the LCIA, ICSID, SIAC and HKIAC recommended clauses.
743 See, e.g. standard clause of the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association.
744 See similarly “dispute, controversy or claim” in AAA, ICDR, HKIAC, WIPO, SCC Clauses.
745 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-13.
746 See, e.g. standard clause of LCIA, SIAC, HKIAC.
747 See, e.g. standard clause of ICC.
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which the arbitration agreement is contained—even though it is not expressly or directly
covered in that main agreement.748
Language should be used which identifies the generic issues between the parties, e.g.
“disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any question
regarding its existence, validity or termination”749—this may facilitate set-off and
counterclaims being addressed in the same arbitration.750
The model clauses recommended by the various institutions have an expansive effect
on parties’ consent to arbitration. Indeed, with the broad wording parties agree that a
bigger number of disputes fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. However,
as consent is given before disputes break out, there is at the same time a reduction of
the pure consensual character of arbitration. This leads to a phenomenon which I
would call the “paradox of consent”: the expansion of parties’ consent to arbitration
causes a reduction of the pure consensual character of arbitration itself.
On the other hand narrower language will result in certain disputes falling outside the
scope of the arbitration clause, and, accordingly, claims in tort or other non-contractual
claims have been held not to arise under “an agreement” and are not covered by an
arbitration clause.751 In a context where the selection of arbitration is no longer seen as
the exclusion of a national forum, but rather the natural forum for international
disputes,752 this should be avoided, as before the dispute breaks out the parties might
have consented to submit future disputes to arbitration. Indeed, it can also be observed
that the reduction of the pure consensual character of arbitration goes hand in hand
with the growing acceptance of arbitration as a mechanism to solve international
disputes.
Doubt has also been cast on whether arbitration (like court proceedings) needs to be
contentious by pointing out that neither arbitrators nor courts are necessarily called
upon to decide disputes in the strict sense, but to regulate relationships between parties,
notably by adapting a contract or filling gaps therein.753 However, clear and express
748 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-14.
749 LCIA standard clause.
750 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-15.
751 See Working Group on the ICC Standard Arbitration Clause, Final Report of 3 March 1992, Doc.
N1111o 420/318. See also Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v. Aqua-Lift (a firm) [1989] 45 BLR 27; Empresa
Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucaera Nacional SA (The Playa Larga) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171.
752 Lionnet, p. 606. See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-9.
753 Oppetit, Arbitrage, pp. 315-326.
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wording should be used if parties want to entrust the arbitration tribunal with the task of
gap filling and adaptation of the contract—particularly given the creative, as opposed to
judicial, nature of this task.754
2.1.3. Finality of awards
One stop dispute resolution is an advantage of arbitration, as most national laws allow
no or limited rights of appeal against an award.755 Parties do not wish to be tied up in
the national courts on appeal to challenge the arbitrators’ conclusions or to delay the
effect of the tribunal's decision indefinitely where one party wishes to avoid the
determination of the tribunal.756 For this reason, while it should be self evident and
implied in the arbitration agreement, arbitration clauses often contain the words “finally
settled”757 or “resolved”758 by arbitration.759 Where under the law of the place of
arbitration there is an appeal mechanism against the decision of the arbitration
tribunal,760 the parties may wish to exclude this right of appeal.761 The English Court of
Appeal has held that the wording of the standard ICC clause was enough to manifest the
parties’ intention to exclude the right of appeal against the award under section 3(1) of
the English Arbitration Act 1979.762
2.2. Other relevant considerations
2.2.1. In General
Lawyers frequently consider and seek to cover many other relevant issues in the
arbitration agreement. These include: for institutional arbitration, which institution; the
place of arbitration; the number of arbitrators; the method of appointment and
qualification of the arbitrators; the language of the arbitration; the procedure to be
followed; the applicable rules to determine the issues in dispute; timetable for the
754 That applies irrespective of the fact that under some laws standard arbitration agreements may also
empower the courts to fill gaps and adapt contracts; see Kröll, Ergänzung, pp. 104 et seq. and 165 et seq.
755 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-18.
756 Ibid.
757 See, e.g. recommended arbitration clauses of ICC and Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
758 See, e.g. recommended arbitration clauses of LCIA and SIAC.
759 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-18.
760 See, e.g. section 69 English Arbitration Act 1996.
761 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-19.
762 Marine Contractors Inc v. Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 77.
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award; and several other less common issues, such as costs of arbitration or
confidentiality.763 While these various points can sometimes usefully be dealt with in
the arbitration agreement, they are not crucial to its validity.764
2.2.2. The seat of arbitration
Although some authors ignore or consider the seat of arbitration of secondary
importance, for others765 the arbitration agreement must directly or indirectly connect
the arbitration to a legal system which will ensure its effectiveness in the absence of any
contractual mechanism to this effect. There are different forms of connection:
- the direct connection with the designation of a seat;
- the submission to the arbitration rules of an arbitration institution;766 and, finally,
- an indirect connection with the submission to arbitration rules containing a
procedure for appointing arbitrators who can then determine the seat in the absence
of an agreement of the parties.767
A number of national laws768 provide for a subsidiary connecting factor based on the
domicile of one of the parties where no seat has been fixed.769 However, in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration the conditions of such a subsidiary connection
have to be met. On the other hand the Swiss PIL and the UNCITRAL Model Law
contain no subsidiary connecting factors. Therefore, it has been sustained that, despite
all these precautions the determination of the seat by the parties can be an essential
element of the arbitration agreement, and not merely an important or useful one, as
many authors770 submit.771 Nevertheless, the importance of the seat of arbitration has
also been challenged on several grounds:
- the choice of seat is often a matter of convenience;
763 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 8-20 et seq. For an overview of these elements, see Lew/Mistelis/Kröll,
paras 8-21 et seq. or Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, paras 3-42 et seq.
764 Poudret/Besson, para. 158.
765 See, e.g. Poudret/Besson, para. 157.
766 Such an institution is generally competent to appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators in the absence of an
agreement between the parties or in case of obstruction by one of them, and even to determine the seat of
the arbitration. Failing such a determination, the seat can be fixed by the appointed arbitrators. To take the
example of the ICC arbitration, these powers of the ICC Court of Arbitration result from Articles 8(3),
8(4) and 14(1) of the ICC Rules.
767 Article 7(2) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is an example.
768 Namely those of Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Italian and English law also contain
subsidiary connecting factors designed to avoid the invalidity of the arbitration agreement when the seat
has not been indicated.
769 Poudret/Besson, para. 157.
770 See, e.g. Bernardini, Arbitration Clause, p. 51; Craig/Park/Paulsson, p. 93.
771 Poudret/Besson, para. 157.
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- the choice of seat is often determined not by the parties but by the arbitration
institution they have selected;
- the choice of seat is often governed by the desire for neutrality;
- the role of the arbitration tribunal is transitory and the seat has no necessary
connection with the dispute.772
In particular, in light of the emancipation of arbitration from national laws and the
above arguments, there is a school of thought that international arbitration can be
delocalised.773
2.2.3. Ad hoc arbitrations
As there are no clear rules applicable, in the case of ad hoc arbitrations the agreement
should provide for the appointment of the arbitrators and the procedures to follow. If
the arbitration agreement is silent then the rules of the applicable law, which will
invariably be the law of the place of arbitration if one has been agreed, will be applied
to these issues.774
2.2.4. Multiparty arbitrations
Where there are more than two parties to a contract the arbitration agreement should
anticipate a dispute involving more than two parties, as these situations can give rise to
additional complications, especially with respect to the appointment of arbitrators.775
2.3. Implied terms
By consenting to arbitration the parties also consent to the implied terms776 which arise
from an agreement to arbitrate. The issue with implied terms is how far the parties are
conscious of and consent to such terms. A good example of this problem is the
treatment of confidentiality in England.777 However, in 2008 the English Court of
772 See the comprehensive summary in Goode, pp. 32 et seq.
773 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 4-49. On delocalised arbitration, see, e.g. the discussion in Nakamura and
Rubins, Arbitral Seat. An example of delocalised arbitration is sport arbitration, in particular in the context
of Olympic Games (see Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, pp. 3, 22 and 80).
774 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-47.
775 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 8-55.
776 “Dispositives Recht” in Germany, “lois supplétives” in France (see also Zweigert/Kötz, p. 327).
777 See in particular the cases Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The “Eastern Saga”)
[1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 373 et seq., and [1984] 3 All ER 835 et seq.; Dolling-Baker v. Merrett and others,
[1991] 2 All ER 890 et seq.; [1990] 1 WLR 1205 et seq.; Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Stuart J.
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Appeal has restated the position that, as a matter of English law,778 an implied duty of
confidentiality exists in every arbitration agreement.779 Indeed, there are a number of
exceptions to this general rule, albeit that the full extent of these exceptions has yet to
be finally determined.780
It has been observed that such far reaching implied obligations are in most cases not in
the parties’ interest and that many parties are even not aware of their existence and
scope when they conclude the arbitration agreement.781 Generally speaking, the issue
with implied terms is on what parties’ consent to or, in other words, it is about the
content of the arbitration agreement. Recently, it has thus been argued that the parties’
expectations to international commercial arbitration would be better served by enforcing
only express, rather than implied, obligations of confidentiality.782
The approach of the English courts to “confidentiality” has met with little sympathy
elsewhere.783 Nevertheless, also the High Court of Singapore and the Supreme Court of
Bermuda have, in the years 2003 and 2006, followed the English case law.784
2.4. The problem of awareness of national provisions shown by
using the example of the Dutch consolidation provision
With the conclusion of the arbitration agreement the national law provisions of the seat
of arbitration become applicable. Some provisions may be problematic with regard to
the consensual nature of arbitration. The law of the Netherlands provides, for instance,
for the possibility to have a court-ordered consolidation.785 Therefore, the issue arises as
to whether the parties to the arbitration agreement are aware of this provision and the
possibility that a third party may eventually join the proceedings.
Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243 et seq.; Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 643
et seq.; [1998] 2 All ER 136 et seq.; [1997] EWCA Civ 3054.
778 On the differentiation between terms implied in law and terms implied in fact, see Lord Denning M.R.
in Shell v. Lostock Garages [1977] 1 All E.R. 481, 487 et seq. (CA.); Gatehouse J., in Ashmore v.
Corporation of Lloyd's (No. 2), [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 620, 626 et seq. (Q.B.). See also Hadzimanovic.
779 Emmot v. Michael Wilson & Partners [2008] EWCA Civ 184.
780 Young/Chapman, p. 45.
781 See Ritz, p. 17.
782 Young/Chapman, p. 45.
783 Ibid.
784 Singapur: decision of 6 June 2003 in the case Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co. Ltd. v. Win Win Nu and
another, [2003] 2 SLR 547 et seq., 552 para. 17. Bermuda: decision of 2 February 2006, see under:
http://www.legalweek.com/articles/128033/offshore+a+question+of+confidence.html (last accessed in
April 2009).
785 See Article 1046 Netherlands CCP. On this provision, see under IV.7.2.2.2.2.b.
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3. DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PARTIES’
CONSENT AND ITS SCOPE
3.1. Interpreting parties’ consent
3.1.1. In general: applicability of the general principles of contractual
interpretation
Arbitration agreements are, in general, subject to the same type of rules of interpretation
as all other contracts, and all relevant circumstances have to be taken into account.786
Several principles of interpretation might be applied for interpreting parties’ consent.
3.1.1.1. Interpretation in good faith
The first and most widely accepted principle of interpretation applied to arbitration
agreements is the principle of interpretation in good faith; this rule of interpretation
means that a party’s true intention should always prevail over its declared intention—
where the two are not the same.787 Thus, declarations should be interpreted in good faith
and the parties’ conduct, both at the time of contracting and subsequently, considered.788
From this broad rule—that contracts must be interpreted in good faith—more specific
rules of interpretation can be derived, all of which stem from the need to establish the
actual intention of the parties:
- first, the intention of the parties must be examined in context, that is to say, by
taking into account the consequences which the parties reasonably and legitimately
envisaged;
- second, the attitude of the parties after the signature of the contract and up until
the time when the dispute arose should be taken into account, as that attitude will
indicate how the parties themselves actually perceived the agreements in dispute.789
This rule is sometimes referred to as “practical and quasi-authentic interpretation” or
“contemporary practical interpretation” and is usually applied in arbitral case law.790
786 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-60.
787 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 477.
788 See, e.g. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-60.
789 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 477.
790 See, e.g. the 23 August 1958 ad hoc award by Messrs. Sauser-Hall, referee, Hassan and Habachy,
arbitrators, in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 ILR 117, 198 (1963).
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In particular, recognition of the existence of an arbitration agreement will frequently
result from a party initially relying on the existence of that agreement to avoid the
jurisdiction of the courts, but subsequently denying its existence or validity before
an arbitral tribunal;791
- third and finally, the agreement must be interpreted as a whole.792 This need for an
interpretation of the agreement or of its various constituent parts as a whole, bound
together by the true intention of the parties, is one of the factors to be taken into
account in disputes involving the construction of arbitration agreements contained in
related contracts.793
3.1.1.2. Effective interpretation
A second principle of interpretation of arbitration agreements is the principle of
effective interpretation. This common-sense rule whereby, if in doubt, one should
“prefer the interpretation which gives meaning to the words, rather than that which
renders them useless or nonsensical”,794 is widely accepted not only by the courts but by
arbitrators who readily acknowledge it to be a “universally recognised rule of
interpretation”.795
The principle of effective interpretation has, for instance, been applied by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal in decision 130 III 66 where it held that, when it is clear that the
parties wanted to oust State’s courts in favour of arbitration, the arbitration agreement
should be interpreted in accordance to the principle of effective interpretation so as to
uphold the arbitration agreement.796
Another example of the application of this principle can be seen in the following
passage where an arbitral tribunal interpreting a pathological clause held that:
791 For an example of the censure of such conduct (which was held to constitute the recognition of the
arbitration agreement), see, in the United States, In re Petition of Transrol Navegacao S.A. v.
Redirekommanditselskaber Merc Scandia XXIX, 782 F Supp 848 (SDNY 1991); XVIII YBCA 499
(1993). See also the 1995 award on jurisdiction in ICC Cases No. 7604 and 7610, Moroccan company v.
Algerian company, 125 Clunet 1027 (1998), and observations by D. Hascher and 125 Clunet 1053 (1998),
and observations by J.-J. Arnaldez.
792 ICC Award No. 8694 (1996), American company v. Belgian company, 124 Clunet 1056 (1997), and
observations by Y. Derains.
793 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 477.
794 See ICC Award No. 1434 (1975), at 982.
795 See, e.g. ICC Award No. 1434 (1975); ICC Award No. 3380 (1980), Italian enterprise v. Syrian
enterprise, 108 Clunet 927 (1981), and observations by Y. Derains (Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para.
478).
796 See 130 III 72. See also 4P.226/2004, consid. 4.2.
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“when inserting an arbitration clause in their contract the intention of the parties must
be presumed to have been willing to establish an effective machinery for the settlement
of disputes covered by the arbitration clause”.797
3.1.1.3. Interpretation contra proferentem
The third major principle of interpretation, less frequently encountered in arbitral case
law but widely recognised in comparative law, is the principle that the agreement
should be interpreted contra proferentem, or against the party that drafted the clause in
dispute.798 Indeed, it is not unusual to find that one party has simply signed contractual
documents drafted by the other party,799 and that a question has subsequently arisen as
to whether various provisions of that contract constitute an arbitration agreement or,
more commonly, as to the scope of that arbitration agreement.800
If the arbitration agreement is based on the standard conditions of one party the other
party can rely on existing uncertainties as to the scope of the arbitration agreement to
resist applications for referral to arbitration or to resist court proceedings.801 On the
other hand, in such cases, it is perfectly reasonable that the party responsible for drafting
the ambiguous or obscure text should not be entitled to rely on that ambiguity or
obscurity (in claiming, for example, that a particular disputed matter is not covered) and
that, consequently, the agreement should be interpreted contra proferentem.802
3.1.2. Inclinations in interpreting?
3.1.2.1. Restrictive interpretation
In older awards the jurisdictional effect of arbitration agreements sometimes led to a
restrictive interpretation, as they were seen as a renunciation of the constitutional right
797 Preliminary award in ICC Case No. 2321 (1974), Two Israeli companies v. Government of an African
State, I YBCA 133 (1976); for a French translation, see 102 Clunet 938 (1975), and observations by Y.
Derains.
798 See also UNIDROIT Principle 4.6.
799 This is quite often the normal case, as we will see later (under VI.), for arbitration agreements in the
field of sport.
800 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 479.
801 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-60.
802 For a case where this principle was implicitly applied, see the 3 April 1987 award in ICC Case No.
4727, Swiss Oil v. Petrogab, enforced by CA Paris, 16 June 1988, 1989 Rev. arb. 325. See also TGI
Paris, 1 February 1979, Techniques de l'Ingénieur v. Sofel, 1980 Rev. arb. 97 (Fouchard/Gaillard/
Goldman, para. 479).
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to have a dispute decided by the courts.803 The same position has also been adopted in
courts’ judgments.804 A restrictive interpretation is, however, not justified in
international arbitration, given that this mode of dispute resolution in many cases
offers the parties better guarantees of neutrality and efficiency than proceedings before
national courts.805
It has been observed that interpretation must, in any event, not be restrictive where it is
not the valid conclusion, but the subject matter and ambit of arbitration agreement
which is at issue.806 In the Sonatrach case807 the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that while
the existence of an arbitration agreement should not be assumed too lightly, once it has
been established that an arbitration agreement has been concluded, there is no reason
to interpret it restrictively. On the contrary, the court should assume that in deciding to
arbitrate, the parties intended to confer wide powers upon the arbitral tribunal.808
3.1.2.2. Extensive interpretation
In today’s arbitration-friendly climate the opposite view prevails. While, in particular,
the US courts have consistently held that arbitration agreements must be interpreted in
favour of arbitration,809 comparable views can be found in most countries which have
adopted a pro-arbitration policy.810
It has been observed that this rule can apply only once it has been ascertained that the
parties actually agreed on arbitration, whilst, on the other hand, in cases where the
main issue is whether the parties agreed to arbitration at all there is no justification for
such an interpretive rule in favour of arbitration.811 Indeed, although it is the primary
mode of dispute settlement in international business, every party has a legitimate and
constitutional right to choose to have its rights determined by the courts.812
803 See, e.g. ICC Case No. 4392, 110 Clunet 907 (1983) 908 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-61).
804 See, e.g. Paris CA, 11 March 1986, Gaz. Pal. 1986, I, p. 298; or decision of the Italian Corte di
cassazione, 10 March 2000, Krauss Maffei Verfahrenstechnik GmbH et al v. Bristol Myers Squibb, XXVI
YBCA 816 (2001) 821 para. 11.
805 See, e.g. Poudret/Besson, para. 304; and Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 480.
806 Poudret/Besson, para. 304.
807 DFT 116 Ia 56.
808 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 304.
809 See, e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc, 473 US 614, 105 S Ct 3346, 3355 et
seq. (1985); see also Remy Amerique, Inc v. Touzet Distribution, SARL, XIX YBCA 820 (1994) 823
(SDNY, 16 March 1993) or Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 US 1, 24-
25 (1983).
810 See Karrer/Kälin-Nauer, p. 31; Raeschke-Kessler/Berger, paras 282 et seq.
811 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-62.
812 Generally critical to an in interpretation in favour of arbitration Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para.
481; Schlosser, 320 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-62).
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3.1.2.3. Comments
In my opinion arbitration agreements should be interpreted in a neutral way, therefore
neither restrictively nor extensively, not only with regard to their validity, but also with
respect to their scope. Indeed, with regard to consent to arbitration, not only the
question of whether the parties prefer arbitration over State courts as a dispute
resolution mechanism is important, but also the extent of what is covered by the parties’
consent to arbitration. Both these aspects are equally important when considering the
rather jurisdictional side of an arbitration agreement. Furthermore, it can also be
observed that a neutral manner of interpretation is even more appropriate with the
gradually diminishing importance of the formal requirements of arbitration agreements.
Nevertheless, national laws may clearly provide for in favorem validitatis provisions to,
whenever possible, uphold the validity of the arbitration agreement.813
On the other hand, when considering the rather contractual side of an arbitration
agreement, the principles of interpretation used for other types of contracts should
find application, including the one of effective interpretation. The principle of
effective interpretation should therefore possibly be distinguished from an extensive
way of interpreting arbitration agreements. Finally, a rule of “in favour of arbitration”
should only be applied when the goal is to eliminate barriers against parties’ consent
to arbitration, i.e. limitations on the subject matter at issue (objective arbitrability).
3.2. The degree of certainty required on the parties’ consent
3.2.1. Pathological clauses
The expression “pathological clause”814 denotes arbitration agreements, and particularly
arbitration clauses, which contain a defect or defects liable to disrupt the smooth
progress of the arbitration.815 Arbitration agreements can be pathological for a variety of
reasons. Here it will be focused on those with a connection to consent to arbitration.
813 See, e.g. Article 178(2) Swiss PIL or Article 9(6) Spanish Arbitration Act.
814 The expression was first used by Eisenmann in 1974.
815 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para 484.
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Some arbitration clauses use permissive language, for instance only providing the
parties with an option to choose arbitration.816 Moreover, although it is not necessary
that the clause uses the term arbitration or expressly states that the decision rendered
should be final and binding,817 ambiguity can also arise where it is not conclusive from
the arbitration clause whether the parties actually agreed on arbitration or some other
form of dispute resolution, such as expert determination.818
Pathological clauses will need to be interpreted by the arbitrators,819 and by the courts
reviewing the existence of an arbitration agreement and ensuring that the arbitrators
remained within the bounds of their jurisdiction.820 As a general rule courts and
tribunals seek to interpret arbitration clauses positively.821 Indeed, in most cases, the
arbitrators or the courts—relying on the principle of effective interpretation more than
on any rule in favorem validitatis822—will salvage the arbitration clause by restoring
the true intention of the parties.823
3.2.2. Combined clauses
In some cases, parties combine in a single clause the submission of their disputes to
arbitration and the designation of a State court. While, at first glance, this combination
may appear to be contradictory, with the inevitable outcome that the whole agreement
will be held invalid, the courts have not systematically adopted such an approach, and,
generally, distinguish among three situations:
- that where one or more of the parties is granted an option to choose between
arbitration and the courts;824
- that where the parties specify that the courts are to serve as an appeal jurisdiction;
and
816 See, e.g. Canadian National Railway Co v. Lovat Tunnel Equipment Inc, 3 Int. ALR N-5 (2000), 174
DLR (4th) 385 (Ontario Court of Appeal, 8 July 1999); for further examples, see Craig/Park/Paulsson,
para. 9-02 (see also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-72).
817 See, e.g. partial award in ICC Case No. 9759 reported by Grigera Naón, “Choice of Law Problems in
International Arbitration”, 289 RCADI 88 (2001).
818 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-73. See for an English case David Wilson Homes Ltd v. Survey Services
Ltd and Others [2001] 1 All ER 449.
819 On interpreting parties’ consent, see under I.4.2.
820 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para 484.
821 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-71.
822 This rule should rather be one of the provisions contained in the national laws, see, e.g. Article 178(2)
Swiss PIL or Article 9(6) Spanish Arbitration Act.
823 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para 484.
824 This clause is not uncommon, for instance, in banking contracts.
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- that where the contradiction appears more evident, in which the arbitral tribunal, to
assess whether or not there is such a contradiction and subject of course to review
by the courts, must establish the parties' true intention.825
3.2.3. Incorporation by reference826
3.2.3.1. In general
An arbitration agreement by reference means that the arbitration clause is contained in a
separate and pre-existing document (such as general business conditions, standard form
contracts, regulations, sales conditions of a supplier etc.) to which the parties’ contract
refers; such agreements are very common in the practice of international commerce
because it simplifies and accelerates transactions.827 An example is where the provisions
of a subcontract incorporate by reference the “general conditions” of the prime contract
or where, in a bill of lading, reference is made to the terms contained in the
charterparty.828
It has been observed that it is important to separate two issues: formal validity and
consent.829 While authors and courts were initially very wary about the validity of
arbitration agreements by reference under Article II(2) NYC,830 in time even the validity
of a general reference under Article II NYC has been confirmed in a number of
decisions.831 Also, national arbitration laws have expressly addressed the question.832
The fate of an arbitration agreement by reference depends, however, not only on formal
questions, but also on questions of substance. Indeed, the question as to whether the
addressee of an offer, referring to a document containing an arbitration clause,
effectively consented to such a clause is a matter of interpretation of that party’s intent
and of how the agreement was formed.833
825 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 487 and 490.
826 Arbitration clauses by reference are also important in sport arbitration, see under VI.5.1.
827 Poudret/Besson, para. 213.
828 Di Pietro, p. 439.
829 Samuel, Arbitration clauses, p. 506.
830 See Poudret/Besson, paras 215 et seq. See also Di Pietro, pp. 440 et seq.
831 See, e.g. the Swiss cases Tradax Export SA v. Amoco Iran Oil Company, 7 February 1984, 11 YBCA
532 (1986); Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v. Mediterranean Shipping Company, 16 January
1995, 21 YBCA 690 (1996). On these cases, see in particular Samuel, Arbitration clauses, and Di Pietro.
832 See, e.g. Article 7(2) UNCITRAL Model Law, section 6(2) English Arbitration Act 1996, German
ZPO section 1031.
833 Poudret/Besson, para. 213.
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In order to establish whether a party has consented to arbitration in full awareness, a
distinction should be made between explicit and global references.
3.2.3.2. Explicit reference
Where the parties have explicitly referred in their agreement to an external arbitration
clause,834 for example by providing for “arbitration” according to standard form
FOSFA, or according to the general conditions of one of the parties, the arbitration
agreement by reference does not raise any specific problems. In such cases the contract
explicitly manifests the will of the parties to submit to arbitration, and the fact that the
details are contained in a separate document is not decisive. Indeed, the arbitration
agreement itself can be the object of a separate document.835 Difficulties may however
arise when an external arbitration clause is subsequently changed in a substantial way;
in such a case the parties need to agree to the changes.836
3.2.3.3. Global reference
The situation is more delicate where the reference is implicit or global, i.e. merely
mentions the document referred to and not the arbitration clause contained therein.837
In this case, the validity of the arbitration clause will mainly depend on the
circumstances, particularly on the knowledge which the parties had or should have
had of the contents of the document referred to and, in consequence, of the
arbitration clause.838 Their personal qualifications, their ongoing business relationship,
and the relevant trade usages can play an important role in this respect.839 In particular,
according to some case law, general reference may suffice if it is established that the
parties are experienced traders used to entering into contracts governed by certain trade
rules and were aware, in the particular case, of the effect triggered by the
incorporation.840
834 See Huber, p. 80.
835 Poudret/Besson, para. 214.
836 Huber, p. 81.
837 Poudret/Besson, para. 214.
838 Ibid.
839 See also Huber, p. 84.
840 Di Pietro, p. 446.
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The validity of an arbitration agreement by reference should therefore not be determined
in abstracto, but by taking the particular circumstances of the case into account.841 This
is fundamentally a question of general contract law, i.e. the question of the conclusion
of the contract842 (arbitration agreement).
3.2.3.4. The relation between form and consent, in particular tacit acceptance, with
regard to arbitration clauses by reference
In national laws, which require a written form or proof in writing, acceptance will result
from a document and cannot be tacit. However, German law makes an exception: while
requiring the written form, it recognises tacit acceptance of an arbitration clause by
reference in two cases.843 Dutch law recognises the tacit acceptance in all cases.844
Finally, tacit acceptance is admissible where no requirements of form exist whatsoever,
as is the case under French law, pursuant to which proof of the addressee’s knowledge
of the clause even constitutes a presumption of acceptance, or under Swedish law.845
Whilst different views have been expressed,846 it has been observed that French case
law is more liberal than Swiss case law because, in the absence of any requirement of
form, it can content itself with a tacit acceptance which does not result from any
document.847 By contrast, in the absence of any reference to general business conditions
containing an arbitration clause, the mere knowledge of that clause based on an ongoing
business relationship will not be sufficient to constitute acceptance or to make the
clause applicable to a new transaction where no reference to these conditions is made.848
841 Poudret/Besson, para. 214.
842 Reymond, p. 88.
843 See German ZPO section 1031(2), which considers sufficient the transmission of a document
emanating from one of the parties or from a third party, provided there is no objection from the addressee,
and provided that this is in conformity with recognised commercial usage, and section 1031(4) for
charterparty cases.
844 Poudret/Besson, para. 226. Indeed, Dutch law requires writing only for evidentiary purposes (ad
probationem).
845 Ibid.
846 See, e.g. Alvarez G.A., p. 78.
847 Poudret/Besson, para. 219.
848 Cas. Verdol, Dalloz 1992, IR, p. 208; see CA The Hague, YBCA 1985, p. 485, NL 9: the GATFA
clause contained in 25 previous contracts was not applicable to the contract which did not refer thereto;
ICC Award No. 7154, Clunet 1994, p. 1059 = Collection m. pp. 555, 559.
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3.3. Set-off and counterclaims849
Set-off is a complex institution giving rise to several questions of jurisdiction and
applicable law in international relations.850 It has been shown that one of the difficulties
of set-off in private international law is the result of the lack of uniformity of the
national laws governing it, which concerns not only the manner in how it is regulated,
but also its very nature.851 It has also been observed that when claims of money are at
stake, which is usually the case in international economic arbitration, set-off and
counterclaim are “only a hair’s-breadth away”852 from each other.853 Set-off in
international economic arbitration is therefore sometimes regarded as a “counterclaim in
disguise”;854 the reason for this similarity is that both set-off and counterclaim are meant
to avoid circuity of action.855 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, counterclaim and set-off
are closely intertwined.856
However, in spite of these similarities and the diversity of national laws, set-off and
counterclaim have to be distinguished sharply from each other, as a number of general
characteristics differentiate set-off from counterclaim.857 Set-off can be used merely “as
a shield, not as a sword”.858 Conversely a counterclaim is an independent claim raised
by the defending party in judicial proceedings.859
3.3.1. Set-off
The problem of jurisdiction over set-off can arise both before an arbitral tribunal, where
the set-off claim is not covered by the arbitration agreement, and, conversely, before a
national court, where such a claim is validly submitted to arbitration.860 Both cases
concern the scope of the arbitration agreement.861 In determining the procedural
849 On set-off and counterclaims, see also under III.5.2.1.2.2.b.
850 Poudret/Besson, para. 317.
851 For an overview, see Poudret/Besson, para. 317.
852 Wood, para. 1-37 in fine.
853 Berger, Set-Off, p. 58.
854 See, e.g. Habscheid, pp. 70 and 80.
855 Berger, Set-Off, p. 58.
856 This applies, e.g. to the “compensation judiciaire” of French law. This institution is a procedural
means provided for in Article 70 of the French NCPC (Berger, Set-Off, p. 59).
857 See Berger, Set-Off, p. 59 and Poudret/Besson, para. 318.
858 Stooke v. Taylor [1880] 5 QB 569 at 575.
859 See Poudret/Besson, para. 318.
860 Poudret/Besson, para. 319.
861 Poudret, Compensation, p. 379.
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admissibility of a set-off defence international arbitrators may be confronted with two
different situations.862
3.3.1.1. Cross-claim not subject to a jurisdiction or different arbitration clause
3.3.1.1.1. The principle
The basic procedural prerequisite863 of set-off in this scenario—the most commonly
encountered form of set-off in practice864—is derived from the consensual character of
arbitration: the cross-claim has to be within the scope of the arbitration agreement.865
This basic rule prevents the respondent from enlarging the arbitrators’ jurisdiction
unilaterally by simply raising the defence of set-off.866 On the other hand, if the
arbitration agreement does not cover the cross-claim, the parties may agree to extend the
scope of the arbitration agreement.867 Such an agreement may also be effected impliedly
if the claimant does not object to the setting off of a cross-claim that lies outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement.868
3.3.1.1.2. Cross-claims arising out of closely related contracts
There are precedents in international case law where the respondent has based his set-
off defence on a cross-claim that arose out of a contract closely linked to the one in
dispute.869 Although the extremely close connection between the contracts may make it
easy for the tribunal to confirm the admissibility of the set-off, nevertheless, not
infrequently, the question arises in arbitral practice as to whether an arbitration
862 See Berger, Set-Off, p. 64.
863 The question of the procedural admissibility of the set-off is independent of its characterisation as an
institute of procedural (as in Anglo-American law) or substantive law (as in Continental Europe), see
Bucher E., Verrechnung, p. 710.
864 See Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, p. 131.
865 See Lebedev, pp. 41 and 44; Rüede/Hadenfeldt, p. 251; Mustill/Boyd, p. 131; UN Doc. A/CN.9/264,
Article 23, para. 8 in fine. It is for this reason that Article 19(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides
that the respondent may rely on “a claim arising out of the same contract for the purpose of a set-off” (see
Berger, Set-Off, p. 64).
866 See Berger, Set-Off, pp. 64 et seq.
867 This procedure was suggested by the arbitral tribunal but not followed by the parties in a partial award
relating to the famous Sofidif case.
868 Aden, p. 86; see also van Houtte H., pp. 113 and 121.
869 See, e.g. an award rendered under the auspices of the Court of Arbitration at the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in Sofia in 1980 (Award of 1 October 1980 in (1987) YBCA at p. 84) - (Berger,
Set-Off, p. 66).
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agreement contained in one contract extends to related contracts.870 No general solution
can be given for these cases and the answer always depends on the circumstances of the
case, and particularly on the wording of the arbitration agreement in the main contract
and on the attitude of the applicable law towards the interpretation of arbitration
agreements.871
3.3.1.2. Cross-claim subject to a jurisdiction or different arbitration clause
Although there is a growing tendency to assume that, as a rule, an international arbitral
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a set-off defence based on a cross-claim that is subject
to a different arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause, this view applies only to those
set-offs that have a substantive nature.872 Indeed, being a substantive defence which
denies the existence of the claim, the set-off has the same quality as any other
substantive defence.873 The tribunal should therefore be authorised to decide on all
defences which are raised against the claim (“le juge de l'action est le juge de
l'exception”874), and consequently also on the merits of the set-off.875 Referring the
cross-claim to adjudication before the domestic court is regarded as “depriving the set-
off of its efficiency, especially when regarded as an essentially dilatory means”.876
Therefore, conflicting arbitral or forum selection clauses relating to the cross-claim
are not per se a bar to set-off.877
However, while the simultaneous adjudication of claim and cross-claim via the set-off
defence is alleged to be in the presumed interest of the parties to the arbitration,878
taking a purely pragmatic approach to this problem neglects the will of the parties as
expressed in the arbitration or other forum selection clause covering the cross-claim.879
870 See, e.g. the ICSID case SOABI v. La République du Sénégal in (1991) ICSID Review, pp. 124, 144;
Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd v. Kammgam Spinnerei GmbH [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 163; Craig/Park/Paulsson,
pp. 100 et seq.; Berger, Arbitration, p. 123.
871 Berger, Set-Off, p. 66.
872 E.g. the “Aufrechnung” or “Verrechnung” under German or Swiss law, the “compensation légale”
under French law and the equitable or “transaction” set-off under English law.
873 Berger, Set-Off, p. 72.
874 This formula is used by the Swiss Federal Tribunal and the prevailing doctrine in Switzerland, see
DFT 85 II 103; Poudret, Compensation, p. 364.
875 See, e.g. Reiner, Aufrechnung, p. 119; Poudret, Compensation, p. 378; Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 8
ad Article 186 Swiss PIL; Schwab/Walter, pp. 22 et seq.; Rüede/Hadenfeldt, p. 253.
876 Poudret, Compensation, p. 372. This solution is also advocated for equitable or “transaction” set-off
raised in arbitrations having their seat in England (Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, p. 131).
877 Schöll, p. 131.
878 Berger, Set-Off, p. 73.
879 See ICC Award No. 5971 in (1995) 13 ASA Bulletin at pp. 728, 738, stating that refusing to admit the
set-off “would deny justice to the Parties (in particular, here, to Defendants)”.
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Indeed, the arbitrators have to determine the will of the parties at the moment of
conclusion of the arbitration agreement, covering the main claim on the one hand and
the different forum clause covering the cross-claim on the other.880 From this ex ante
perspective both the consensual nature of arbitration and the function and nature of
forum selection clauses put into question the admissibility of set-off in international
arbitrations.881
When concluding the arbitration clause on which the arbitral proceedings are based, the
parties intended to have those and only those claims decided by the arbitral tribunal
which fall under the scope of the arbitration agreement.882 To extend the proceedings
beyond the arbitration agreement without any indication as to the corresponding will of
the parties would be against the parties’ original intentions.883
Moreover, when the cross-claim is not subject to another arbitration agreement but to a
jurisdiction clause and the claimant opposes the tribunal’s competence to hear the set-
off, one has to take account not only of the parties’ intentions that underlie the
arbitration agreement but also of their will as expressed in the other forum selection
clause.884
3.3.1.3. Comments
It has been observed that an easy way to solve that problem is certainly to expand the
parties’ consent to allow the arbitrators to deal with any counterclaim for the purposes
of a set-off.885 That is the option taken by Article 21(5) Swiss Rules. However, as noted
by Schöll, this provision does not mean that a set-off defence should be allowed
regardless of the law applicable to it, but it has to be understood in the sense that, if the
substantive law requirements for set-off are met, the arbitral tribunal can entertain the
defence even if it would normally have no jurisdiction on the defendant’s claim, and
even if the parties agreed, in respect to that claim, on another dispute settlement
mechanism.886
880 See Basler Kommentar-Wenger, Article 186, No. 28; Reiner, Aufrechnung, p. 121 with reference to
Berger, Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit , pp. 325 et seq.
881 See Schlosser, No. 399; Wenger, “Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit” in (1989) BJM, pp. 337,
351; Bucher A., Die neue internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz (1989) No. 192; Bucher
E., in Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz (II) (ed. Böckstiegel), pp. 138 et seq.
882 See Schlosser, No. 399.
883 ZK-IPRG-Vischer, Article 182, No. 13.
884 Berger, Set-Off, pp. 76 et seq.
885 Mourre, Set-Off, p. 393.
886 Schöll, p. 108.
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Some scholars887 also establish a presumption according to which, by entering into an
arbitration agreement, the claimant accepts that the arbitrators’ jurisdiction will be
extended to any claim used by the defendant as a basis for a set-off defence.888 Poudret
submits that the claimant should be considered as having implicitly accepted such an
extension of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction,889 Schöll posits that such a presumption
should be based on an analysis of the contractual situation in the particular case, rather
than on the general assumption that, by entering into arbitration, a party accepts that the
tribunal will deal with any set-off defence that might come onto the table.890
3.3.2. Counterclaims
Despite its practical importance, the question of the admissibility of counterclaims
before an arbitral tribunal is not mentioned in many laws.891 The arbitration rules do not
usually contain restrictions on the admissibility of counterclaims raised in the statement
of defence.892 Nevertheless, in the absence of a particular rule in the lex arbitri, the
arbitration rules or the chosen procedural rules, the arbitral tribunal may freely
determine the admissibility of counterclaims by virtue of its power to determine the
arbitral proceedings.893 The counterclaims must fall under an arbitration agreement
between the parties,894 although not necessarily that upon which the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal over the principal claims is based.895 In the latter case, however, the
admissibility of the counterclaim presupposes that the modalities of arbitration pursuant
to both agreements are compatible.896
3.4. Consent to arbitration because of related agreements
Consent to arbitration may also exist if a contract does not contain an arbitration clause
but forms part of a contractual network which includes an arbitration agreement, as is
887 See, e.g. Poudret or Schöll.
888 Mourre, Set-Off, p. 396.
889 Poudret, Compensation, p. 380.
890 Schöll, pp. 132 et seq.
891 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 574. See, however, section 1046(3) German ZPO, section 23(2)
Swedisch Arbitration Act, Article 23(1) UNCITRAL Model Law.
892 See ICC Rules, Article 5(5); LCIA Rules, Article 2(1)(b) ; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article
19(3) ; Swiss Rules, Article 3(9) ; WIPO Rules, Article 11.
893 Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, para. 1222; Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 7 ad Article 186 Swiss PIL.
894 Raeschke-Kessler/Berger, para. 699.
895 Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, No. 7 ad Article 186 Swiss PIL.
896 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 574.
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the case where parties enter into a framework agreement, containing an arbitration
clause, governing their future relationship within which they conclude a number of
separate contracts.897 Moreover, depending on the facts of the case, an arbitration
agreement may also exist if the contract is part of a series of contracts between the
same parties—the majority of which consistently contain arbitration clauses.898
Whether the arbitration clause in the main contract may also extend to follow up or
repeat contracts concluded in close connection and in support of a main contract is
usually a question of interpretation; this may be the case if the subsequent agreements
amend or complete the main contract899 but not where the additional contracts go
beyond the implementation of the main contract.900 The model arbitration clause of the
NAI referring to arbitration “all disputes arising in connection with the present contract,
or further contracts resulting therefrom” provides a perfect example for an extension of
the arbitration agreement to related contracts even though the question remains when a
contract “results” from the main contract.901 The parties submitting their disputes to the
NAI Rules therefore consent to such extension. On the other hand, as in general no
consent to arbitration can be assumed if third parties are involved, the arbitration
clause contained in a construction contract with the general contractor does not usually
cover the general contractor's contract with the subcontractor.902
3.5. Indirect consent to arbitration by virtue of trade usages
An arbitration agreement may exceptionally exist by virtue of trade usages in a certain
industry; in light of the writing requirement such an option is primarily limited to
countries which do not require any strict form for arbitration agreements.903 In such
cases the parties consent indirectly to arbitration by belonging to a certain industry.
897 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-44.
898 See David, Arbitration, para. 227; Raeschke-Kessler/Berger, para. 277; CA Paris, 25 March 1983,
Société Sorvia v. Weinstein International Disc Corp, Rev. arb. 363 (1984) 365; see also A & B v. C & D
[1982] Lloyd's Rep. 166. For the opposite case where the lack of an arbitration agreement in one contract
led to an interpretation of a connected contract which struck out an arbitration agreement, see MH
Alshaya Company WLL v. RETEK Information Systems (2000) WL 33116470 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para.
7-45) or the ICC Case No. 7154, 121 Clunet 1059 (1994).
899 Maxum Foundation, Inc v. Salus Corp, 779 F 2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985); Hart Enterprises Int, Inc v.
Anhui Provincial Import & Export Corp, 888 F Supp 587-591, XXI YBCA 767 (1996) (SDNY 1995).
900 See ICC Case No. 8420, XXV YBCA 328 (2000) 338-340 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-46).
901 Berger, Set-Off, p. 66.
902 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-47. See under US law the decision in Intertec Contracting A/S et al v.
Turner Steiner International SA, XXVI YBCA 949 (2001) 955, para. 15-21, 34 (SDNY 2000, 2d Cir.
2001).
903 See, e.g. BGH, 3 December 1992, XX YBCA 666 (1995) 668 para 5, with note Berger, DZWiR 466
(1993); see also Chelsea Square Textiles Inc et al v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd,
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4. AGENCY AND CONSENT
4.1. In general
There is great diversity regarding the authority and form requirements necessary to
agree to arbitration on behalf of another person.904 On the other hand, it is generally
agreed that the New York Convention does not pose any requirement of form on this
subject.905
It has been observed that the relaxation of the protective element in the form
requirements brings good reasons to allow oral conferrals of power on an agent,
especially where the agent is authorised to enter into the contract on behalf of the
principal.906 However, this brings with it on the one hand more incertitude and, on the
other hand, a greater importance of the issue of consent to arbitration by the non-
signatory. Indeed, where an agreement containing an arbitration clause has been entered
into by a person who expressly or impliedly did so as a representative of a principal,
that non-signatory principal may be bound to the arbitration agreement.907 While in
agency’s cases, where there is a formal representation or a subsequent ratification by the
principal, the principal normally will have consented to arbitration, issues with non-
signatories arise—in particular in the case of apparent agents.
4.2. Apparent agents
With regard to Swiss cases, it has been observed that because agency relationships in
non-signatory situations are often not explicit, the courts and tribunals are regularly
dealing with undisclosed or apparent agents, i.e. situations where a principal is not
willing to be represented or not aware of a representative, but a third party’s legitimate
189 F 3d 289, XXV YBCA 1035 (2000) (2d Cir. 1999): illegible arbitration clause becomes part of
contract as trade usage; David, Arbitration, para. 226 (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-49).
904 See Poudret/Besson, para. 274.
905 See Alvarez G.A., p. 79 No. 3, and Reiner, Agent’s Power, p. 82.
906 See ICC Case No. 5730 of 1988, 117 Clunet 1029 (1990) 1036; Reiner, Agent’s Power, pp. 88 et seq.
See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-31.
907 Hosking, p. 293. See, e.g. Interbras Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory Shipping Co., SA, 663 F.2d 1, 6–7
(2d Cir. 1981).
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reliance in such representation is protected.908 In these cases there is no consent of the
principals to arbitration. Therefore, to warrant an extension of the arbitration clause,
the “appearance” upon which the counterparty relies must reach a certain
threshold.909
4.3. The position of the agent in the case of arbitration on the side
of the principal
An agent that executes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal normally will not be
compelled to arbitrate against its wishes;910 however, in some US circuits,911 a non-
signatory agent may be permitted to compel arbitration based on an arbitration
agreement contained in the contract the agent signed in his capacity as a corporate
director, officer or employee where he would otherwise be required to defend the claim
in court.912 It has been remarked that this highly pragmatic approach to agency theory
sometimes also becomes expressed in terms of other theories, e.g. that the signatory is
estopped from denying that the arbitration provision applies to the non-signatory
agent913 or that the agent has by his behaviour assumed the duty to arbitrate.914
5. TRANSFER OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND
CONSENT
5.1. Assignment915
Also at the heart of the problems which can arise in cases of assignments is that
arbitration is a consensual process.916 Moreover, issues come up because of the “in
908 Zuberbühler, p. 20.
909 See Zuberbühler, p. 21, footnote 12. See, e.g. G S.p.A. v. Mr. Z, unpublished interim award of 4
August 1994, confirmed by DFT of 16 May 1995, ASA Bulletin 4/1996, 667; Habegger, Groups of
Companies, No. 50.
910 Lerner v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 938 F.2d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1991).
911 See, e.g. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993); Roby v.
Corporation of Llyoyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993). However, this general proposition has been
rejected in other circuits. See, e.g. Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 2002); McCarthy
v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 357–61 (1st Cir. 1994).
912 Hosking, p. 293.
913 See, e.g. Usina Costa Pinto SA Azucar e Alcool v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Co., Inc., 933 F Supp 1170,
1179 (SDNY 1996).
914 See, e.g. AHTNA Gov’t Servs Corp. v. 52 Rausch, LLC, No. C 03-00130 SI, 2003 US Dist. LEXIS
2460, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2003). See Hosking, p. 293.
915 On Assignment and Arbitration, see in particular Landrove, Assignment.
916 See also Jagusch/Sinclair, para. 15-4.
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writing” requirement requested by the New York Convention and most national
arbitration laws.
5.1.1. In general: practice in different countries
Parties are in general free to assign their contractual rights to a third party. Where those
rights are covered by an arbitration agreement the prevailing view in international
arbitration is that the assignee automatically becomes a party to the arbitration
agreement; indeed courts in various countries,917 such as France, England, Sweden,
Switzerland and Germany, have consistently held that the assignee can sue and be sued
under the arbitration agreement.918 The Cour d’appel of Paris went as far as
considering it a general principle of arbitration law.919 On the other hand, there have
been cases where tribunals and courts have rejected the idea of an automatic transfer of
the arbitration agreement,920 and required an express approval by the assignee or the
original debtor as a precondition for the transfer of the right to arbitrate.921 In particular,
Italy is an exception to the general consensus favouring transfer in the event of the
assignments of rights.922
5.1.2. With regard to the necessity to comply with the written form
requirement
The New York Convention requires an arbitration agreement to be “in writing” and
“signed” by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”, but it does
not explicitly answer the question of whether an assignment of an agreement
917 For an overview of the situation in different countries, see also Girsberger/Hausmaninger.
918 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-52, with references to cases in the footnotes. For further cases, see also
Girsberger/Hausmaninger, pp. 123-136.
919 CA Paris, 25 November 1999, SA Burkinabe des ciments et matériaux v. société des ciments d'Abidjan,
Rev. arb. 165 (2001) 168; see also Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas v. Amoco Oil Company, 573 F Supp
1464 (SDNY 1983) 1469 which considered it to be a basic principle of case law.
920 The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, award
in Case No. 109/1980, 9 July 1984, All-Union Foreign Trade Association “Sojuznefteexport” (USSR) v.
Joc Oil Ltd (Bermuda), XVIII YBCA 92 (1993) para 17. For further US cases, see Girsberger/
Hausmaninger referring to Kaufman v. William Iselin & Co, Inc 143 NE 780 and Lachmar v. Trunkline
LNG Co, 753 F 2d 8 (CA 2d Cir., 1985).
921 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-54.
922 See the leading case decided in 1998 by the Italian Corte di Cassazione (N. 12616, Foro italiano 1999,
I/2, p. 2979, c. 4). However, the Italian arbitral practice recognises that a transfer of the contract, and not
just that of a claim resulting from it, entails the transfer of the arbitration clause (Riv. dell’arb. 2000, pp.
167-168).
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automatically includes assignment of the arbitration clause.923 While most national
arbitration laws also require that the arbitration agreement be in writing,924 courts have
generally held that an automatic transfer of the arbitration clause does not violate the in
writing requirement by arguing that the requirement addresses merely the initial
conclusion of the arbitration agreement, but not subsequent transfers.925 Such an
approach, which has also been criticised,926 would have the advantage in that there is
no possibility of conflict in this respect with the substantive validity of the arbitration
agreement (consent). On the other hand, with regard to consent other issues arise.
5.1.3. With regard to consent, considering in particular the situation in
France
The transfer of the arbitration agreement in the event of assignment of rights raises, in
particular, two questions with regard to consent:
5.1.3.1. First, is the agreement fully binding on the assignee, even without the latter’s
consent?
Although one might object to such automatic transfer by invoking the principle of
autonomy, according to which the fate of the main contract and of the arbitration clause
are not bound,927 it has been observed that autonomy, which concerns the respective
validity of the two agreements, is not an obstacle to the second contract being a
functional accessory to the first, and that this fact justifies its transfer.928 French courts
have long since held that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the transfer of
rights and duties resulting from a contract includes the transfer of the arbitration
clause, which is a part of the terms and conditions of such contract, so that the assignee
is bound by the arbitration clause.929 They justify this solution either by the accessory
923 Jagusch/Sinclair, para. 15-4.
924 See in particular under III.5.1.2.
925 Girsberger/Hausmaninger, pp. 142 et seq.
926 See, e.g. Girsberger/Hausmaninger, p. 144.
927 Poudret/Besson, para. 284.
928 Mayer, Note ad Rev. arb. 1990, pp. 675, 686,
929 Notably Paris, Rev. arb. 1966, p. 100; Rev. arb. 1988, p. 565 (transfer of the contract) and 570
(assignment of a claim); Rev. arb. 1993, p. 624 (idem)/Lyon, Rev. arb. 1997, p. 402 (assignment of an
undertaking to sell shares); Cas., Rev. arb. 2000, p. 85, with a note by Cohen = Clunet 1999, p. 787, with a
note by Poillot Peruzzetto (assignment of Claims), and Rev. arb. 2000, p. 280, with a note by Gautier:
application to a substituted agent; Paris, Rev. arb. 2001, p. 165, with a note by Cohen: assignment of a
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character of the arbitration clause, or by the presumed will of the parties to the
assignment, or again by interpretation of such will.930
Conversely, it has also been argued that the presence in arbitration agreements not only
of rights but of duties (e.g. to refrain form instituting ordinary court proceedings)
precludes any valid transfer of an arbitration clause to the assignee unless the latter
expressly agrees to be bound by those duties.931
5.1.3.2. Secondly, is such transfer binding on the obligor, even without his consent?
The obligor had agreed to arbitrate with the assignor, but not with the unknown
assignee. While in practice it is not possible to force a party to the arbitration clause to
arbitrate with a third party, French authors and courts have overcome this difficulty by
either a presumption of consent or considering that the arbitration clause is firmly
bound to the contract and thus should follow it.932
On the other hand, no automatic transfer takes place when the parties have excluded
an assignment of the arbitration agreement,933 or if it results from the circumstances
that the clause was concluded intuitu personae.934 Moreover, non-assignment clauses
in relation to the substantive right are often considered to exclude any assignment of the
arbitration agreement.935 While these cases are obstacles to the transfer of the arbitration
agreement, this will, however, be the case only exceptionally in international trade
where arbitration is viewed favourably, and constitutes a common mode of dispute
resolution.936 Nevertheless, the assignment should not lead to a deterioration of the
original debtor’s position.937
claim. On the distinction between the assignment of a claim and the transfer of a contract, see ICC Award
No. 7154, Collection III, p. 555, with a note by Derains, No. IV.
930 Poudret/Besson, para. 284.
931 Girsberger/Hausmaninger, p. 141, referring to Lachmar v. Trunkline LNG Co, 753 F 2d 8 (CA 2d Cir.,
1985).
932 See notably Paris, Rev. arb. 1988, p. 565; de Boisséson, Arbitrage, p. 546 para. 624; Fouchard/
Gaillard/Goldman, paras 716-718; Li, pp. 48-52 paras 64-69.
933 See Jagusch/Sinclair, para. 15-14; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-55.
934 Clunet 2002, p. 1084 (ICC award 7983), with a note by S. Jarvin: the contract containing a clause of
confidentiality would be deemed concluded intuitu personae and so not transferable without the consent
of the parties.
935 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-55.
936 Paris, Rev. arb. 2001, p. 165, with a note by Cohen.
937 See Law/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-55.
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5.1.4. Personal vs. non-personal nature of the right to arbitrate
The reason for the automatic assignment is that arbitration agreements are not
personal covenants938 but form part of the economic value of the assigned substantive
right.939 Indeed, the prevailing view today is that they are entered into because of non-
personal reasons, such as expediency, cost-efficiency and other perceived advantages of
the arbitration process.940 Moreover, as the Court of Appeal of New York stated in
Hosiery Mfg Corp v. Goldston, arbitration contracts would be of no value if either party
could escape by assigning a claim subject to arbitration between the original parties to a
third party.941 Otherwise, it would be possible for a party to circumvent the arbitration
agreement by assigning the main claim.942 An exclusion of the possibility of assignment
may, however, exist where the agreement to arbitrate is entered into on the basis of a
special personal relationship.943 Indeed, in such a case there should be a presumption
that there is no consent to arbitrate with a third party on the part of the obligor.
Moreover, an award rendered in application of Swiss law944 also considered that an
arbitration agreement combined with a confidentiality clause was concluded intuitu
personae and, therefore, could not be assigned without the agreement of the other
contractual party.945
5.2. Subrogation by operation of law, third party beneficiaries and
universal succession
5.2.1. Overview
5.2.1.1. Subrogation by operation of law
Subrogation by operation of law apparently does not lead to the same difficulties as
contractual assignment. It has been generally recognised, particularly in France,946 that
938 Shayler v. Woolf [1946] Ch 320, 324; Swedish Supreme Court, 15 October 1997, MS Emja Braack
Schiffahrts KG v. Wärtsila Diesel Aktiebolag, XXIV YBCA 317 (1999). For a different view, see,
however, the early English decision Cottage Club Estates v. Woodside Estates Co. (1928) 2 KB 463, 466;
97 LJKB 72, 74.
939 See, e.g. France, CA Paris, 28 January 1998, CCC v. Filmkunst, Rev. arb. 567 (1988); Germany, BGH,
2 March 1978, NJW 1585 (1978) 1586.
940 Girsberger/Hausmaninger, p. 141.
941 (1924) 143 NE 779, 780; 238 NY 2d 22.
942 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-53.
943 See Jagusch/Sinclair, para. 15-14; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-55.
944 Clunet 2002, p. 1084 (partial award, ICC No. 7983), with a note of Jarvin.
945 Poudret/Besson, para. 285.
946 ICC Award No. 1704 = Collection I, p. 312. On the French conflict of law rules applicable to statutory
transfers, see de Boisseson, para. 625 and Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 701-703.
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it extends to the arbitration agreement so that the subrogated party is subject to it and
benefits from it.947 The same is also true according, for instance, to the practice of the
Swiss948 and English949 courts.950
5.2.1.2. Universal succession
It is commonly recognised that the universal successor is bound by the arbitration
clause concluded by the person whom he succeeds, under the reservation of an
agreement to the contrary, in particular where such a clause had a strictly personal
character.951 Other cases of universal succession such as takeovers, merger of
companies, or the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of a company cause the
transfer of the arbitration agreement to the new owner or the new combined company in
the case of a merger.952
5.2.1.3. Third party beneficiaries
Furthermore, the third party beneficiary doctrine has to be considered. Broadly
speaking, the third party beneficiary doctrine provides that in certain circumstances a
non-signatory who has received benefits under the main contract is entitled to request
performance of those benefits.953 It has been observed954 that while the US case law on
“third party beneficiary” is surprisingly inconsistent, in general “the mere status of the
third party beneficiary imposes no duty to arbitrate … [however] doing so is a condition
to the third party beneficiary’s enforcing its rights” under that contract,955 i.e. the third
party beneficiary is only bound to arbitrate where it is the claimant in a claim relying
947 Poudret/Besson, para. 289.
948 See, e.g. CJ GE, SJ 1987, p. 650 = ASA Bulletin 1987, p. 269, consid. 5.
949 See, e.g. QB and CA, Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen v. Voest Alpine Intertrading and
Others [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 179 and 2 Lloyd's Rep. 279: the subrogated insurer is subject to the arbitration
clause, and restrained by an anti-suit injunction; Mustill/Boyd, p. 137, speak of “novation”, but as Goutal
observes (Rev. arb. 1988, p. 447), novation gives rise to a new right so that no transfer takes place.
950 See Poudret/Besson, para. 289.
951 Poudret/Besson, para. 290.
952 Swiss Federal Tribunal, ASA Bulletin 1998, p. 653 = RSDIE 1999, p. 593, with an approving note by
Knoepfler; for Sweden, see SAR 2004/1, p. 98, with notes by Zikin and Landrov, and Hobér, Party
substitution, p. 46, Collection III, p. 543: ICC Award No. 3281 applying this case law (Poudret/Besson,
para. 290).
953 Hosking, p. 292.
954 Ibid.
955 Macneil/Speidel/Stipanowich, § 18.7.214.
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on the main agreement.956 In keeping with the general US contract approach, the third
party must be an intended beneficiary, although evidence of this may be drawn from
the writing itself and the surrounding circumstances.957
In England, section 8 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 extended the
arbitration clause contained in the contract to the third party beneficiary of a
substantive term of that contract, so that the third party can enforce the term against the
promisor through arbitration.958 The latter can reciprocally invoke the agreement to
obtain a stay of proceedings brought against him before the courts.959 Interestingly, the
drafters moved from an initial position of considering it inappropriate for the statute to
apply to arbitration provisions as this would impose “duties and burdens”960 on a third
party, to instead viewing the arbitration agreement as a “condition” to enforcing the
“benefit” conferred by the doctrine.961
By contrast, the French Cour de cassation denied the transfer of the arbitration
agreement in favour of a third party beneficiary for the reason that such a clause can
merely create rights and not duties.962 Without contesting this result, Goutal infers that
the beneficiary could opt for arbitration without being thereby bound.963
5.2.2. Comments
These situations may at first look seem quite similar for the third party to mandatory
arbitration, as the third party is subject to and benefits from the arbitration agreement
because of an operation of law and not because of its direct consent. Therefore, the
discussion on whether the arbitration clause has to be seen as a burden or not is
understandable. However, I share the view of Jarrosson who observed that an arbitration
clause is not strictly speaking a burden, but rather a part of the rights stipulated in
956 See also Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen Inc. and American Dairy Queen Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1465 (M.D.
Ga. 1998).
957 In fact this requirement has been very loosely applied. See, e.g. Spear Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life
Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
958 In November 2003, the Commercial Court issued a judgment addressing, apparently for the first time,
this provision and the impact of The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on arbitration clauses,
Nisshin Shipping Co. Ltd v Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm), summarised by S. Nappert and J.
Pires Ferreira, [2004] Int. ALR, para.17.
959 Halisbury's Statutes, 4th ed. 2000, 11, p. 318, and Mustill/Boyd, p. 147 (Poudret/Besson, para. 289).
960 Hansard, House of Lords, col. 1059 (27 May 1999) (per Lord Wilberforce).
961 UK Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, Explanatory Note, § 34 (Hosking, p. 292).
962 Cas., Bisutti, Rev. arb. 1987, p. 139, with a note by Goutal, and 1988, p. 559; de Boisséson, p. 109 para.
l32 et seq., does not exclude it; Li, p. 61 para. 81, is rightly critical.
963 Rev. arb. 1987, pp. 145-146.
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favour of the beneficiary and binding on the latter once he has accepted them.964
Therefore, in this indirect way the third party gives its consent to arbitration. On the
other hand, while the other party has consented to arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism, its consent was to arbitrate with the original party and not with the third
party. Nevertheless, when concluding the arbitration agreement the other party should
have been aware of the possibility that the arbitration agreement could pass to a
successor because of an operation of law.
6. PARTIES’ CONSENT WITH REGARD TO THE EXTENSION OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
6.1. In general
6.1.1. The problem of “extension”
The widely used concept of “extension” of the arbitration clause to non-signatories is a
misleading concept, since in most cases, courts and arbitral tribunals still base their
determination of the issue on the existence of a common intent of the parties and,
therefore, on consent.965 Indeed, in the majority of cases, the status as party of a non-
signatory does not result from the text of the agreement containing the arbitration
clause, but from tacit acceptance, as is particularly the case for the extension to
companies belonging to the same group.966 However, while this approach does not
encounter any major difficulties under French law, which has no formal requirements,
this is not the case under other laws which do not content themselves with either tacit
acceptance or acceptance by conduct, but require that the will to submit to arbitration
result from written documents.967
6.1.2. Different inclination in presuming parties’ intention to the extension
Whilst most authors have recognised that such an extension should not take place
unless it corresponds to the mutual intention of the parties, they are more or less
964 See Jarrosson, Agreement, pp. 222-223.
965 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-5.
966 Poudret/Besson, paras 251 et seq.
967 Ibid.
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inclined to presume such intention; they will accept “extension” to a greater or lesser
extent depending on:
- whether they attach more or less weight to economic criteria and the efficiency of
arbitration;
- whether they consider arbitration the usual mode of dispute resolution in
international commerce;
- whether they give weight to the respect of contractual texts or on the principle of
good faith in business matters; and, finally,
- whether or not they permit international commercial usage to prevail over national
laws.968
6.2. The “group of companies” doctrine
6.2.1. Issues
In international arbitration groups of companies raise a number of different issues; some
of them concern mainly the substance of the dispute, others seem to be of a more
procedural nature.969 It has been observed that the existence of a group of companies
gives a special dimension to the issue of conduct or consent.970 Whether an arbitration
agreement signed by a company member of a group of companies is also binding upon
and entitles other members of that group non-signatories of the agreement remains an
open question in State court’s case law and in international arbitration practice.971 In the
doctrine, the answer to this issue is as controversial as in the dicta of arbitral tribunals
and State courts.972
6.2.2. A brief characterisation of the doctrine
The theory of “group of companies”, more an economic concept than a legal one,973 has
prospered in arbitration case law and, under the influence of the latter, before the French
courts.974 The considerations of the arbitral tribunal in Dow Chemical v. Isover975 are
968 Poudret/Besson, para. 253.
969 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-1.
970 See Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-6.
971 Sandrock, Groups of companies, pp. 625 et seq.
972 Ibid.
973 On the definition of this notion, see Berger, pp. 161-162; Derains/Schaf, p. 234; Fadlallah, p. 106 para.
6; Jarrosson., Agreement, p. 210.
974 Poudret/Besson, para. 265.
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generally viewed as forming its cornerstone, although this award was not the first of this
sort.976 While it is often said that the “group of companies” doctrine has particularly
prospered in ICC arbitrations, it was not as widely followed by arbitration case law as
its notoriety might lead to believe.977
Under the doctrine, a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic
reality—despite the legal independence of the individual entities from one another—
where the circumstances of the contract’s conclusion, its performance, its (possible)
subsequent termination, and the degree of control executed among the group companies
warrants such an inference.978 On the other hand, in all “group of companies” decisions,
the finding of an (implied) consensus of the parties often remains key in binding non-
signatories to an arbitration clause.979 The theory of “group of companies” is distinct
from agency980 because its aim is binding other members of the group to the arbitration
agreement, and not replacing some members with others.981
6.2.3. Countries’ different approaches
6.2.3.1. France
In France, it was the ICC award No. 4131, Dow Chemical v. Isover982 which began the
case law based on the “group of companies” doctrine. Two of the four claimants were
not mentioned as parties in the disputed contracts, but had participated in the
negotiations and the performance of the contracts; they therefore claimed to benefit
from the arbitration clauses contained therein. The arbitrators, by invoking Articles 8(3)
and 8(4) ICC Rules then in force, first confirmed the autonomy of the arbitration
agreement with regard to all national laws,983 which is in accordance with the French
conception of the separability of the arbitration agreement. The arbitrators inferred
therefrom that they should decide “based on the mutual will of the parties” and “usage
975 Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, ICC Case No. 4131 (1982), ICC Awards 1974-1985, 146-153
and 464-473 with observations by Yves Derains.
976 See notably ICC Award No. 1434, Collection I, p. 262; ICC Award No. 2138, Clunet 1975, p. 934; ICC
Award No. 2375, Clunet 1976, p. 973 = Collection I, p. 257.
977 See Poudret/Besson, para. 254, who observe that among some 30 published awards concerning this
question, only a quarter recognised the extension of the clause to companies.
978 Zuberbühler, p. 25.
979 Ibid.
980 On agency, see under IV.4.
981 Poudret/Besson, para. 265.
982 ICC Award No. 4131 (Dow Chemical), Clunet 1983, p. 899 = Rev. arb. 1984, p. 137.
983 See also under III.3.3.3.
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conforming to the needs of international commerce, notably where a group of
companies is concerned”. They concluded that “the arbitration agreement expressly
accepted by certain companies of the group must bind the other companies which, by
virtue of the role they played in the conclusion, the performance of the termination of
the contracts containing such clauses, appear, according to the mutual intention of all
the parties involved in the proceedings, to have been true parties to these contracts, or
to have been primarily affected by these and by the disputes arising therefrom”.984
Later, a series of judgments of the Paris Court of Appeal, beginning with those rendered
in the cases Korsnas Marina v. Durand Auzias and Ofer Brothers v. Tokyo Marine,
justified extension on the basis of an even more general and audacious formula pursuant
to which “an arbitration clause contained in an international contract has its own
validity and effectiveness which require its extension to all parties directly involved in
the performance of the contract and in the disputes which may arise therefrom, once it
has been established that their situation and their activities enable to presume that they
were aware of the existence and the scope of the arbitration clause, even if they were
not signatories of the contract containing it”.985 This formula is based on two
presumptions: the presumption of awareness of the clause, which is allegedly sufficient
to presume acceptance thereof.986
The final step was taken in a third judgment where the court considered the carrier
Cotunav bound by the arbitration clause contained in an agreement made between two
public agencies, in which Cotunav had no part, for the sole reason that “by accepting
to intervene in the performance of the contract as carrier appointed by one of the
parties in the framework of the contract, Cotunav necessarily assumed the obligations
defined by the contract with regard to the carrier and accepted its modalities, including
the arbitration agreement”.987 It has been observed that participation in the performance
of the agreement, bereft of any other link with the parties, led to an apparently
irrefutable presumption988 of acceptance of the arbitration clause. Thus, this is an
enlargement of its previous case law, since it recognised such tacit acceptance outside of
a group of companies; tacit acceptance results solely from the performance of a
984 Poudret/Besson, para. 255.
985 Rev. arb. 1989, p. 691, criticised by Tschanz p. 707, by Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, paras 440 and
505, and Poudret, Extension, pp. 900-901; Jarrosson, Agreement, pp. 216-217, contents himself with
recalling the criticism levelled against the judgment.
986 Poudret/Besson, para. 256.
987 Rev. arb. 1990, p. 675 (1 case), with a critical note by Mayer.
988 The judgment speaks of “necessarily”.
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contract concluded by other parties.989 Indeed, a subjective criterion, i.e. membership
of a group, has thus been abandoned in favour of an objective criterion, i.e. a
connection with the object of the contract, of which arbitration is merely a “component
of its performance”.990
The prediction “to take the formula too literally … could lead to an extension of the
effects of the arbitration agreement to persons who have not even consented to it
implicitly”991 was therefore confirmed. However, as the Paris Court of Appeal then
repeated its formula in a number of subsequent judgments,992 it has been observed that
the presumption of awareness and, by virtue thereof, of acceptance resulting from the
performance of the contract, can now be considered a material rule applicable before
French courts to international arbitration agreements.993
6.2.3.2. Switzerland
Switzerland has produced comparably few arbitral awards and court decisions explicitly
dealing with the “group of companies” doctrine. The Swiss Federal Tribunal discussed,
in particular, the “group of companies” doctrine in dicta in Butec.994 It cautioned that
one should only reluctantly bind non-signatory respondents to an arbitration clause on
the basis of the “group of companies” doctrine. Applying the principle of
Konzernvertrauenshaftung to the facts in Butec, the Swiss Supreme Court denied an
extension of the arbitration agreement, since the claimants had been aware of their
exclusive contractual relationship with the subcontracting signatory, and the non-
signatory had simply intervened into the performance of the contract to the extent
required by its role as the main contractor.995 This judgment strongly illustrates the gap
which exists between Swiss and French case law.996
Under these conditions it is understandable that arbitrators sitting in Switzerland have
mostly refused to extend arbitration agreements, not just for formal reasons, but by
considering that the notion of “group of companies” and the piercing of the corporate
989 Poudret/Besson, para. 256.
990 Ibid.
991 Tschanz, in Rev. arb. 1989, p. 707.
992 Notably Orri, Rev. arb. 1992. p. 95, and V2000, Rev. arb. 1996, p. 245.
993 Poudret/Besson, para. 256.
994 Saudi Butec Ltd et AI Fouzan Trading v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd, unpublished ICC interim awards
of 25 October 1994, confirmed by DFT of 29 January 1996, ASA Bulletin 3/1996, 496-507.
995 Zuberbühler, p. 26.
996 See also Poudret/Besson, para. 258.
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veil are instruments which should only be used with extreme reluctance.997 In summary,
the present state of Swiss law is that the extension of an arbitration agreement to a party
which does not appear therein can be seriously envisaged only if it can be established (by
any means) that such a party was validly represented by one of the other parties—which
does not result solely from membership in a group of companies—or if there was
subsequent ratification or, finally, if the attempt to evade arbitration constitutes an abuse
of rights allowing a piercing of the corporate veil (Durchgriff).998
6.2.3.3. England
English courts strongly respect the contractual nature of arbitration. Indeed, the
doctrine of “group of companies” is said to be inconsistent with the principle of privity
of contract, the principle of the corporate veil and the treatment of derivative actions.999
In Peterson Farms, the Commercial Court held that “the [group of companies] doctrine
… forms no part of English law”.1000 Therefore, the High Court confirmed the
restrictive approach of English case law1001 with regard to a presumption of the
extension of an arbitration agreement to the other members of the group.1002 It has been
argued that Peterson Farms1003 represents a set-back to the efforts of incorporating the
“group of companies” doctrine into transnational law or the lex mercatoria.1004 On the
other hand, it has also been observed that the decision of the Commercial Court does
not inevitably command the conclusion of the end of any possibility of extension of the
arbitration clause to a non-signatory company when the underlying contract is governed
by English law.1005 Indeed, while the existence of a group of companies is not the
ground on which courts and arbitral tribunals usually extend arbitral clauses to non-
signatories, they generally base their decision on consent or on conduct as an
expression of implied consent or as a substitute for consent.1006 Extension may
therefore be achieved by recourse to such theories as agency, trust or piercing the
corporate veil.
997 See in particular the awards ICC Nos. 4402, 4504, 5281, 5721 and ASA Bulletin 1990, p. 270.
998 Poudret/Besson, para. 260.
999 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-16.
1000 Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M Farming Limited, [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm), 62. For a discussion of
the case, see, e.g. Gaffney.
1001 Adams v. Cape Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929, CA.
1002 Poudret/Besson, para. 262.
1003 Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M Farming [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 603, QB = SAR 2004/1, p. 282.
1004 Leadley/Williams, pp. 112-113.
1005 See, e.g. Woolhouse, p. 443; Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-31.
1006 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-31.
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6.2.3.4. United States
The same theories are also applied in the United States. However, it appears that in
relation to the issue of extension of the clause to non-signatories, American law is much
more liberal1007 than any in Europe. At least in some Circuits, the paramount concern of
the courts is the “federal policy favouring arbitration”.1008 On the other hand, the
Sarhank case,1009 where the Second Court of Appeals declined to enforce an arbitral
award against a corporate parent where there was no “clear and unmistakable intent by
[it]. .. to arbitrate”, may indicate a shift from a rather liberal view, as expressed, for
example, in the J.J. Ryan case,1010 back to a greater emphasis on the parties’ intent to
arbitrate.1011
6.2.4. The theoretical foundation of the doctrine and its rejection
Some authors suggest that the principles on which the “group of companies” doctrine is
founded are based on the lex mercatoria or on usages of international trade; others, on
the other hand, submit that the law governing the arbitration agreement should be
applied.1012 While the advocates of the “group of companies” doctrine purport that the
exceptions to the notion of the separate entity of each juristic person and the privity of
contract can be derived from the so-called lex mercatoria, the opponents of the “group of
companies” doctrine also recognise the existence of exceptions, but they do not derive
these exceptions from the lex mercatoria, but from the respective rules of the national
proper laws of contract.1013
Not surprisingly the majority of the authors who favour “extension” are French,1014 as
they do not have to take any formal or substantive conditions into account, with the
exception of such substantive rules that might result from international public policy.1015
On the other hand, German and English authors are rather critical towards the “group of
1007 See, e.g. Thompson CSF v. American Arbitration Association, 64 F. 3rd 773, 776 (2nd Cir. 1995); Bel-
Ray Co. v. Cbemrite (PTY) Ltd., 181 F.3rd 435 (3rd Cir.1999).
1008 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-25.
1009 Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corporation, 404 F.3d 657 (2nd Cir. 2005). For case notes, see Wilske/Shore
and Salomon/Sterken.
1010 JJ. Ryan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile SA, 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988); see Hosking, pp. 294-
295, citing further decisions of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.
1011 Zuberbühler, p. 27.
1012 Poudret/Besson, para. 264.
1013 See Sandrock, Extending, pp. 167 et seq.
1014 See, e.g. de Boisséson, p. 522 para. 603 No. l.; Derains, p. 242; Derains/Schaf., in particular p. 233,
recognising a “presumed tacit acceptance”; and Jarrosson, Agreement.
1015 Poudret/Besson, para. 253.
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companies” doctrine and reject it only admitting very restrictively a piercing of the
corporate veil (Durchgriff).1016
6.3. Comments on extension on grounds linked to consent
In the majority of cases, the status as party of a non-signatory does not result from the
text of the agreement containing the arbitration clause, but from tacit acceptance.1017
This is particularly so for the “group of companies” doctrine which is based on tacit or
even presumed acceptance of the arbitration clause.1018 Such acceptance would result
either from conduct at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, in particular
participation in its negotiation but without the intention of signing it,1019 or from
subsequent acts, particularly supervision of the operations or an active role in their
performance, from which tacit acceptance may be inferred.1020 However, while
originally participation in the negotiation or performance of the contract was only an
indication of such acceptance, a presumption has since been established, by virtue of an
alleged usage of international commerce, that knowledge of the clause constitutes
acceptance thereof.1021
Some cases even suggest that a party’s conduct should not necessarily be regarded as
an expression of a party’s implied consent, but rather the party’s substantial
involvement in the negotiation and performance of the contract and the knowledge of
the existence of the arbitration clause have a standing of their own, as a substitute for
consent, just as reliance is substitute for consideration.1022 In any case, it has been
observed that, whatever the factual scheme, the issue of extension of the arbitration
clause to the other companies of the group should be analysed in terms of consent,
rather than by determining whether the so called “group of companies” doctrine is
known or unknown in the relevant legal system.1023
1016 See, e.g. Sandrock, Extending, pp. 627-630 and 646-647, and Group of companies, pp. 166-168;
Schlosser, pp. 322-325; Mustill/Boyd, Arbitration, pp. 148 et seq.; Samuel, pp. 104 et seq.
1017 Poudret/Besson, para. 251.
1018 Derains/Schaf, p. 233.
1019 Derains, Extension, p. 242.
1020 Blessing, Introduction, para. 498. See also de Boisséson, pp. 522 et seq.; Derains, Extension, p. 242.
1021 Poudret/Besson, para. 256.
1022 Hanotiau, Groups of companies, para. 14-6.
1023 Ibid.
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6.4. Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel in its traditional sense reflects the general legal
principle of non venire contra factum proprium, found in Roman law and also known in
many contemporary civil law jurisdictions.1024 In arbitration the doctrine has developed
a specific meaning applicable to non-signatories in the context of jurisdictionally
fragmented multiparty situations.1025
6.4.1. The doctrine with respect to arbitration agreements
In general, this doctrine applies where a party by its own conduct is prevented from
denying that the other party in question is entitled to rely on an arbitration
agreement.1026 Or, in other words, estoppel denies a party who has accepted the benefits
of a contract containing an arbitration clause the defence that such an arbitration clause
is not applicable to that party.1027 While in the majority of cases the doctrine has been
employed by the US courts to estop the signatory party “from avoiding arbitration with
a non-signatory”, on various occasions the doctrine has equally been applied to estop
the non-signatory party from avoiding arbitration with the signatory party.1028 US courts
have recognised at least two different versions of it:1029
1. First, courts have compelled a non-signatory to arbitrate where the non-signatory
knowingly exploits or directly receives a “benefit” from the agreement containing
the arbitration clause.1030 In such instances, courts have allowed estoppel to be used
as a proverbial “sword” rather than “shield”, i.e., empowering the signatory to
request arbitration of a claim.1031
1024 Gaillard, Contredire, p. 241.
1025 See Brekoulakis, Third Parties, p. 68.
1026 Hosking, p. 293.
1027 See, e.g. Intergen N. V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145 (Ist Cir. 2003). See also, e.g. Sentner, 58-66 (with
an overview of US case law); Hosking, pp. 293-294. Certain estoppel applications have been the subject
of intense academic debate. See, e.g. Uloth/Rial, Equitable Estoppel, pp. 604-624 (tracing the development
of what is referred to as “intertwined claims estoppel”).
1028 Brekoulakis, Third Parties, p. 69.
1029 Apart from these two variants of estoppel, courts have also applied a similar analysis to require a non-
signatory to arbitrate based on so-called “assumption” of the obligation. See, e.g. Gvozdenovic v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991).
1030 See, e.g. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin Intermediates, SAS, 269
F.3d 187, 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
1031 See, e.g. American Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard, SPA, 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen and Anlagen GmBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000).
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2. Second, courts have compelled arbitration based on an analysis of:1032
a. the relationship between the claim and the contract containing the arbitration
clause; and
b. the existence of a “nexus between the parties”.1033
6.4.2. Issues with consent
Although the broad language of the second version has been fertile ground for
arguments that in effect use only the close relationship of the signatory and the non-
signatory as the basis for implied consent to arbitration,1034 the concern with these
variations of the estoppel doctrine is that they frequently result in highly fact-specific
decisions and sometimes appear to be used as an “easy option” rather than applying a
more rigorous legal analysis using traditional principles of contract and agency law.1035
This has been the case in Choctaw Generation v. American Home Assurance.1036
Indeed, whereas in relation to bank guarantees1037 or letters of credit issued on the basis
of a contract containing an arbitration clause it cannot be assumed that the bank has
consented to arbitration on the basis of the underlying contract if the guarantee or the
letter of credit does not provide for arbitration,1038 in Choctaw the US Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit held that a signatory to an arbitration clause may be bound under
the doctrine of estoppel to arbitrate claims against the bank, where the issues “the non-
signatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement the
estopped party has signed”.1039
The differentiation seems, however, in my view less to have its reason in the existence
of a “nexus between the parties”. Indeed, the “nexus between the parties” is the same
under both circumstances. However, while in the case of bank guarantees or letters of
credit issued on the basis of a contract containing an arbitration clause the bank (in the
1032 See, e.g. Sunkist Softdrinks, Inc. and Del Monte Corp. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th
Cir. 1993).
1033 Hosking, p. 294.
1034 See, e.g. Sam Reisfeld & Son Imp. Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976); McBro Planning
and Development Co. v. Triangle Electronic Construction Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984).
1035 Hosking, p. 294.
1036 Choctaw Generation Ltd Partnership v. American Home Assurance Company, 17(1) Mealey’s IAR
C-1 (2002) C-2 (2d Cir. 2001); see also JA Jones, Inc et al v. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd et al,
XXV YBCA 902 (2000) 904 (EDNC 1999); for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in
other cases, see International Paper Company v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GmbH, XXV
YBCA 1146 (2000) 1149-1150.
1037 On the issue of consent in relation to bank guarantees, see also Hanotiau, Bank Guarantees.
1038 Grundstatt v. Ritt, 106 F 3d 201 (7 th Cir. 1997).
1039 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 7-48.
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position of a respondent) gives no consent to arbitrate, in the Choctaw case the bank (in
the position of a claimant) gave its consent to arbitrate by beginning the arbitration
(claiming). On the other hand, it must also be observed that in the Choctaw case the
respondent had only consented to the use of arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism with the other signatory party to the arbitration agreement, but not to
arbitrate with the bank. Therefore, the differentiation made in treating the two situations
can only be justified when in the Choctaw case one enlarges the consent of the
respondent from a consent to arbitration with a determined party to a consent to
arbitration without having regard with whom the arbitration shall take place (as far as
there is a relationship between the claim and the contract containing the arbitration
clause).
6.5. Extension on grounds unrelated to consent
6.5.1. Extension by piercing the corporate veil
The principle of “piercing the corporate veil” is applicable in a whole series of different
factual situations which have one characteristic feature in common: that a company is
used by another company, by a natural person or by a State as a trustee for certain
purposes.1040 If either the trustor or the trustee have then signed an arbitration
agreement, the effects of this agreement may be extended to the respective partner in the
trust relationship.1041
It has been observed that given the very extensive case law in connection with groups of
companies, and the assumption of tacit or even presumed acceptance, the French courts
have rarely had to rely on the notion of fraud in order to pierce the corporate veil.1042
The situation is, however, different in other countries—for instance Switzerland.1043
1040 Sandrock, Extending, p. 172. See the description of three different kinds of cases at pp. 174 et seq.
1041 See Sandrock, Extending, pp. 172 et seq.
1042 Poudret/Besson, para. 257.
1043 See, e.g. Saudi Butec Ltd et AI Fouzan Trading v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd. The unpublished ICC
interim awards of 25 October 1994, confirmed by DFT of 29 January 1996, ASA Bulletin 3/1996, 496-
507; Habegger, Groups of Companies, No. 51; Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, No. 121. On the Saudi
Butec case, see also earlier under IV.6.2.3.2. See also Zuberbühler, pp. 28 et seq.
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6.5.2. Extension without consent
6.5.2.1. Extension based on the economic unity of the group
Case law does not offer any significant examples of the extension of an arbitration
agreement on the sole basis of the economic unity of a group. Indeed, the fact that a
company belongs to a group that constitutes an economic unity would seem to be a sign
or factor conducive to extending the arbitration agreement, but is not sufficient in
itself.1044
6.5.2.2. Extension in the interest of the administration of justice
It has been observed that, although this ground may sound somewhat vague, it is fully
justified in view of the jurisdictional nature of arbitration and the legitimate
expectations of the parties.1045 An example is the reference to the indivisibility of the
dispute in the decision of a US court,1046 which held that when the claims made against
a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are
fundamentally indivisible, a tribunal may decide that the claims made against the parent
company should be decided by arbitration even though that company was not formally a
party to the arbitration clause.1047 Moreover, there is also insistence in some cases on
the need for the arbitrators to be presented with all the legal and economic aspects of
the dispute.1048 Considerations about the effect of arbitral awards on third parties
might also be important.1049
7. RELEVANCE OF PARTIES’ CONSENT WITH REGARD TO
PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS
In this section the needs which may arise during arbitral proceedings will be detailed
showing how they can potentially conflict with the consensual nature of commercial
arbitration. Different institutional arbitration rules and laws will be compared. This
1044 Vidal, p. 73. See, e.g. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, 9 September 2003, Bridas SAPIC v. Government
of Turkmenistan, [2004] Int. ALR 55; (2004) 19:10 Mealey’s IAR 6 at 8.
1045 See Vidal, p. 73.
1046 Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 863 F.2d 315, 1988, Ryan.
1047 Vidal, p. 73.
1048 Paris, 7 December 1994, Jaguar, Rev. arb. 1996.245 (Annot. Ch. Jarrosson), upheld by Cass. Civ. Ire,
21 May 1997, Rev. arb. 1997.537 (Annot. E. Gaillard).
1049 See Brekoulakis, Third Parties, pp. 215 et seq.
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comparative scrutiny also has a temporal dimension, in particular because the arbitration
rules of the different Swiss Chambers of Commerce (two of which—Geneva and
Zurich—will be discussed) were substituted in 2004, in respect of international
arbitration, by the Swiss Rules.1050 Bearing in mind that the goal of arbitration is to have
an enforceable award, some considerations about enforceability will be made. However,
the main objective of section 7. is to suggest which questions should be considered and
which solutions appear to be the most respectful of parties’ consent in situations of
joinder and intervention of third parties in arbitral proceedings, or in the case of
consolidation of parallel proceedings.
7.1. Joinder and intervention of third parties in arbitral
proceedings
7.1.1. In general
Joinder of third parties or their intervention in the proceedings is well known in State
courts. In State courts for reasons of efficient administration of justice procedural laws
contain provisions allowing the joinder or intervention of third parties, irrespective of
whether all parties concerned agree.1051 The same needs may arise in arbitral
proceedings. However, joinder or intervention in arbitrations is generally only possible
if all parties involved (including, therefore, the joining third party) and the arbitral
tribunal consent.1052 The consent of all parties is necessary, because of the contractual
nature of arbitration and its confidentiality.1053
7.1.2. Institutional arbitration
7.1.2.1. ICC Rules
7.1.2.1.1. General
The ICC Rules do not address many of the issues that may arise in a multiparty context,
1050 The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (“Swiss Rules”), which came into force on 1 January
2004, govern international arbitrations. For domestic cases, the arbitration rules of the different Swiss
Chambers of Commerce and Industry continue to be relevant (see also Kellerhals/Berger, Swiss Rules, p.
1). On the Swiss Rules, see also Meyer-Hauser and The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, (May
2004), ASA Special Series No. 22.
1051 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-39.
1052 See Berger, Arbitration, pp. 311-312.
1053 See Hanotiau, Multicontract, p. 384.
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such as, for example, the joinder of parties not named in the request for arbitration.1054
Indeed, by referring only to “claimants” and “respondents”, the new rules, like the old
ones, are based on the assumption of a bipolar conception of the process (even though
there may be a number of parties on each side).1055 It has been observed that one of the
most controversial topics concerning multiparty scenarios in ICC arbitration is the
possibility for a respondent to request successfully from the ICC Court that a new party
join the arbitral proceedings.1056
7.1.2.1.2. Traditional view
The ICC Court has generally considered that only the claimant is entitled to identify the
parties to the arbitration.1057 This was also the position of the arbitral tribunal in case
56251058 where it was decided that only those who name themselves as such in the
request for arbitration, or are identified as defendants in the claimants’ request for
arbitration, can become parties in an ICC arbitration.1059 Although the award was
rendered under the 1975 ICC Rules, it could have been made under the present version
mutatis mutandis, if literally applied.1060
However, a claimant wishing to amend a request for arbitration in order to introduce a
new party may have no alternative but to begin a new arbitration if the original
arbitration is already so advanced as to preclude the joinder of an additional party
without the consent of the others.1061
7.1.2.1.3. Moderation of the traditional view
The traditional view of the ICC Court, which is consistent with Article 4(3)(a), has been
moderated. It would appear that the ICC Court may now allow a new party to be joined
in the arbitration at the respondent’s request if, and only if, two sine qua non conditions
are met:
1054 Derains/Schwartz, p. 36.
1055 See Derains, Limits, p. 31, and Derains/Schwartz, pp. 36 and 73.
1056 See Whitesell/Silva-Romero, p. 10.
1057 Ibid.
1058 For the procedural situation in the ICC Case No. 5625, see Jarvin, Comment, p. 484.
1059 Ibid.
1060 Derains, Limits, p. 29.
1061 Derains/Schwartz, p. 58, who, however, also observed that there is nothing in the Rules that mandates
such a strict position.
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1. the third party must have signed the arbitration agreement on the basis of which
the request for arbitration has been filed. Hence, by deciding to join the new party,
the ICC Court is simply following the parties’ intention and will, as expressed in
their arbitration agreement;
2. the respondent must have introduced claims against the new party.1062
Nevertheless, to ensure that all parties have an equal opportunity to participate in the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the request for the joinder of a new party must be
made before the arbitrators have been appointed or confirmed, unless all parties agree
to such joinder.1063
7.1.2.1.4. Criticism and proposal of Derains
Failing any special agreement by the parties, be it in the arbitration clause or later on,
neither addition of parties1064 nor consolidation of proceedings is possible under the ICC
Rules.1065 Derains expressed the opinion that this traditional approach of the ICC
Court, which requires parties to the same arbitration agreement to participate in
separate arbitration proceedings dealing with closely interrelated matters, is too
strict.1066 Indeed, with the adoption of the 1998 Rules and, in particular, its Articles
10(2) and 19, the situation has changed. Nowadays, the terms of reference no longer
constitute an impassable hurdle. In his proposal Derains differentiates between whether
the arbitral tribunal has been constituted or not, and whether the terms of reference have
already been signed.1067
7.1.2.2. Geneva Rules1068
Article 18 only allowed for a joinder of a third party on the request of the respondent.
The ratio of this provision was that the claimant initiated the proceedings and could
have named any party he wanted as respondent from the beginning.1069 The defendant
had to give notice of its wish to call a third party upon being served with the request of
1062 Whitesell/Silva-Romero, pp. 10 et seq.
1063 Ibid.
1064 Whether voluntary or under compulsion.
1065 Derains, Limits, p. 30.
1066 See Derains, Limits, pp. 30 et seq.
1067 Ibid.
1068 With the coming into force on 1 January 2004 of the Swiss Rules, the relevance of the Geneva
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Arbitration Rules is now limited to domestic arbitration.
1069 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-46.
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arbitration, but only up to the time when he filed the answer to the request of
arbitration.1070 It was the institution1071 which first had to rule on the joinder, taking
into account the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement as well as the
practical and legal advisability of conducting joint proceedings.1072 If the institution
accepted the joinder, the third party was involved in setting up the tribunal in the same
manner as in a multiparty arbitration.1073 However, it was the tribunal which had the
final say on a joinder or intervention.1074 If the arbitrators decided against a joinder,
the arbitrations proceeded without the third party but with the same tribunal.1075
7.1.2.3. LCIA Rules
Article 22(1)(h) expressly requires the consent of the third person to be joined as well
as of the party1076 applying for a joinder.1077 The decision of whether to permit a
joinder is taken by the arbitral tribunal which has discretion in this respect.1078 The
effect of this provision is that the second party to the arbitration agreement does not
have to consent expressly to the joinder, as it has done so by agreeing to the LCIA
Rules.1079 The LCIA solution can be problematic with regard to confidentiality as an
unwished third person might be joined. Therefore, even though the arbitral tribunal’s
decision acts as a “barrier”,1080 a party which does not want to have third persons in the
proceeding, should insist on the exclusion of the applicability of Article 22(1)(h) in
writing.1081
7.1.2.4. NAI Rules
Article 41.4 provides that the arbitral tribunal may allow the joinder or intervention of a
third party, after having heard it and the other parties, if the third party accedes in
writing to the initial arbitration agreement. Therefore, the consent of all parties is
necessary.
1070 Imhoos, p. 132.
1071 The CCIG.
1072 See Kaufmann, p. 75.
1073 In accordance with Article 17 Geneva Rules (see Article 18.3 Geneva Rules).
1074 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-46.
1075 See Article 18.4 Geneva Rules. See also Kaufmann, p. 75.
1076 Claimant or respondent.
1077 This does not, however, cover the possibility of joining a third party in relation to a counterclaim (see
Lew/Mistelis/ Kröll, p. 390 at footnote 33).
1078 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-44.
1079 Ibid. See also Melnyk, p. 63, and Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-85.
1080 And this provision has been used very sparingly and very rarely granted (Bamforth/Maidment, p. 12).
1081 The beginning of Article 22(1) LCIA Rules states: “Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in
writing”.
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7.1.2.5. Swiss Rules
Article 4(2) Swiss Rules first allows for a third party to intervene in pending arbitral
proceedings. Parties electing the Swiss Rules are therefore considered to have given
their consent for the intervention of third parties.1082 As a consequence, none of the
parties can object if a third party is willing to join the proceedings. It has been observed
that a third party requesting to participate in a pending arbitration is thereby deemed to
have fulfilled the formal and substantive conditions to become a party to the
arbitration.1083 However, this of course does not mean that any third party wishing to
intervene in pending arbitration proceedings under the Swiss Rules shall eo ipso
become a party, as the only effect of this assumption is that the initial parties to the
arbitration agreement do not have to consent expressly to the joinder, and it remains at
the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to allow the intervention.1084
Moreover, Article 4(2) Swiss Rules also authorises the arbitral tribunal to cause a
third party to participate in the arbitration upon a request made by a party to pending
arbitral proceedings. It has been observed that this solution, which has its basis in
Article 18 CCIG, is however less limiting, as either the claimant or the respondent can
request the joinder of a third party.1085 The field of application of the Swiss Rules is also
broader than the one of Article 22(1)(h) LCIA Rules which only provides for the second
type of joinder.1086
While in the first situation the consent of the third party to the joinder can be implied
by his request to join in the proceedings, in the second situation the consent of the third
party is necessary. This, in my opinion, even applies when the third party is party to the
same arbitration agreement as the initial parties to the proceeding, for the case that the
third party has not expressly waived in the common arbitration agreement his right to
designate an arbitrator (which is quite unlikely). In fact, the Swiss Rules themselves do
not provide, in case of third parties’ participation, for a provision regarding waiver of
the right to designate an arbitrator on the part of the joining third party (a waiver of
the right to designate an arbitrator is only foreseen in the case of the consolidation of
1082 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16.42.
1083 See Gilliéron/Pittet in Zuberbühler/Müller/Habegger (eds.), para. 12 to Article 4 Swiss Rules.
1084 Ibid.
1085 Gilliéron/Pittet in Zuberbühler/Müller/Habegger (eds.), para. 13 to Article 4 Swiss Rules.
1086 Blessing, Comparison, p. 31.
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proceedings).1087 On the other hand, the consent of the initial parties to the proceedings
is given by the fact that they have submitted their dispute under the Swiss Rules.
Therefore, afterwards their agreement to a specific joinder is no longer necessary.
Nevertheless, the provision of conferring some “discretionary power” to the arbitral
tribunal increases its jurisdictional power.
7.1.3. Ad hoc arbitration
As a general rule, it has been observed that bringing into the proceedings a party to the
arbitration agreement which was not initially named as a party to the arbitral
proceedings raises more difficulties where the arbitration is institutional rather than ad
hoc.1088 On the other hand, an entity which is not party to the arbitration agreement
should only be joined with the consent of all parties and the arbitral tribunal.1089
7.1.4. Lex arbitri
Because of the inherent conflict between the consensual nature of arbitration and a
statutory joinder not based on consent, the different arbitration laws in general do not
contain provisions dealing with the joinder of third parties or their intervention.1090
Nevertheless, Article 1696bis Belgian Judicial Code and Article 1045 Netherlands CCP
confirm the possibility for third parties to intervene or be joined as parties in arbitral
proceedings. However, the participation of a third party remains subject to an
agreement with the parties in dispute and to the consent of the arbitral tribunal.1091
7.1.5. Comments
In order to decide whether the participation of a new party is possible or not, the consent
of all parties involved is important. Therefore, it is useful to distinguish, in a first step, if
1087 See Article 4(1) Swiss Rules
1088 Hanotiau, Problems, p. 336. Different seems, however, to be the view of Derains, Limits, p. 33. For an
ad hoc case, see Marine Drive Complex v. Ghana, Awards of 27 October 1989 and 30 June 1990, XIX
YBCA (1994), pp. 11 et seq. where the joinder was accepted by making reference to Article 20
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
1089 See Article 20 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: “…However, a claim may not be amended in such a
manner that the amended claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or separate arbitration
agreement”. See also Berger, Arbitration, pp. 311-312.
1090 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-47.
1091 The two mentioned law articles are therefore not comparable to the provisions allowing for a joinder
in State courts (see Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-49, for Article 1045 Netherlands CCP).
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the new party to the arbitral proceeding is also a party to the arbitration agreement or
not.
7.1.5.1. New party to the arbitral proceeding is also a party to the arbitration agreement
In this case the consent of the parties, that are already involved in the arbitral
proceeding, to a new party participating in the proceeding, is included in their common
arbitration agreement. The traditional view of the ICC is too strict, but the moderate
view is still not sufficiently liberal. The criticism of Derains is justified.
The consent of the new party to the proceeding is necessary where a three-person
arbitral tribunal (with two-party appointed arbitrators) is already constituted. However,
strictly this consent does not concern the “joining” of the arbitral proceeding itself,
because such consent is already existent on the ground of the arbitration agreement, but
rather the acceptance of the arbitral tribunal (consent to the arbitral proceeding with the
existing composition of the arbitral tribunal). Therefore, this consent is not necessary
where the institutional rules provide that an all-neutral three-person arbitral tribunal
has to be constituted in multiparty arbitrations, as was the case in international
arbitrations under the Zurich Rules (an all-neutral tribunal is also possible in ICC
arbitrations when the initial parties to the proceedings number more than two and each
member of the arbitral tribunal was appointed by the ICC Court in accordance to Article
10(2) ICC Rules). The consent of the new party to the proceeding is also not necessary
in countries where the principle of the equality of the parties in the appointment of
arbitrators can be waived before the dispute has arisen, and the new party to the
proceeding has done so. This possibility is not given when the seat of arbitration is in
France. Indeed, in the Dutco case the French Cour de cassation reversed a judgement of
the Paris Cour d’appel and found that “the principle of the equality of the parties in the
appointment of arbitrators is a matter of public policy (ordre public) which can be
waived only after a dispute has arisen”.1092 Therefore it was considered to be irrelevant
whether the parties when entering into the arbitration agreement could anticipate such
an appointment procedure or even agreed to it.1093
1092 See Cour de cassation, 7 January 1992, Siemens AG/BKMI Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Dutco
Construction Company, XVIII YBCA 140 (1993). For a discussion of the Dutco case, see, e.g. Bellet;
Delvolvé, Dutco.
1093 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-15.
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It should also be noted that important issues may arise in determining who is party to
the arbitration agreement,1094 and whether the request of joinder has been made on time
(not only with regard to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal but in general).1095
7.1.5.2. New party to the arbitral proceeding is not a party to the arbitration agreement
Whether or not a new party, which is not a party to the arbitration agreement, can
participate in the arbitral proceeding depends on the consent of all parties, if the initial
parties have not chosen arbitration rules which facilitate joinder.1096 That the consent of
1094 In particular, see the problematic concerning the extension of the scope of arbitration agreements to
“non-signatories”. On this issue, see, e.g. The Arbitration Agreement—Its Multifold Critical Aspects
(December 1994), ASA Special Series No. 8.
1095 See, e.g. Article 20 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules “unless the arbitral tribunal considers it
inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay in making it or prejudice to the other
party or any other circumstances”.
1096 See, e.g. the LCIA Rules or the Swiss Rules. Here the consent of the initial parties is given, because
they submitted their dispute under the said arbitration rules. Thus, afterwards only the consent of the new
joining third party is necessary. See also Melnyk, p. 63. On this aspect, see, e.g. the decision by the Privy
Council in The Bay Hotel and Resort Ltd v. Cavalier Construction Co Ltd, 2001 UKPC 34, 17(1)
Mealey’s IAR B-1 (2002), B-7 et seq.
Arbitral tribunal with 3 arbitrators
constituted
2 party-appointed
arbitrators
all-neutral three-person
arbitral tribunal
not constituted
consent of the new party to the
proceeding is necessary
consent of the new party to the proceeding is
not necessary
equality of the party in the
appointment of arbitrators
cannot be waived before
the dispute has arisen
can not be waived before
can be waived before
the dispute has arisen,
and it was done so
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all parties is necessary can also be inferred from the arbitration acts of Belgium and the
Netherlands. The only impact of these laws is therefore that they underline this
necessity.
7.2. Consolidation of different arbitrations
7.2.1. In general
Consolidation denotes the act or process of uniting several arbitrations which are
pending or initiated into a single set of proceedings before the same arbitral tribunal.1097
The need for consolidation is often said to be most acute in maritime and construction
arbitration.1098 Nevertheless, while consolidation has several advantages,1099 like
prevention of inconsistent awards,1100 procedural efficiency as well as saving of time
and money,1101 it also presents disadvantages,1102 such as the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal,1103 the distribution of costs1104 and issues of confidentiality.1105
However, probably the strongest criticism is that compelling consolidation without the
consent of the parties involved directly undermines the freedom of contract that forms
the basis of an arbitration agreement.1106 This aspect is, along with confidentiality, the
main reason most countries have not adopted provisions on the consolidation of related
arbitral proceedings. In fact, it is believed that this constitutes an infringement of the
rights of the parties to have their disputes settled in private according to their will.1107
For the same reason, arbitration institutions are rather reluctant to consolidate
proceedings.1108
1097 See Platte, p. 68; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-38.
1098 See, e.g. Van Haersolte-van Hof, p. 427.
1099 For a detailed analysis of the advantages of consolidation generally, see Chiu.
1100 See, e.g. Gaillard, Consolidation, p. 36; see also Chiu, pp. 55-56, or Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, pp.
62-64.
1101 Ibid.
1102 For a detailed analysis of the disadvantages of consolidation generally, see Chiu.
1103 See, e.g. Chiu, p. 58.
1104 See, e.g. Gaillard, Consolidation, p. 37. See also Chiu, p. 61.
1105 See, e.g. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, 16-75. See also Diamond and in particular Collins discussing the case
Oxford Shipping Company Limited v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (“The Eastern Saga”) 1984 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
373 (QB).
1106 Chiu, p. 57.
1107 See Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 64.
1108 Ibid.
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7.2.2. Consolidation of different arbitrations between different parties
Basically, consolidation is possible in two ways:
1. with the parties’ consent in the arbitration agreement: the parties may have expressly
agreed to consolidation by inserting a relevant provision in their agreement,
implicitly, or by reference to arbitration rules;
2. without the parties’ consent in the arbitration agreement: the lex arbitri1109 might
allow ordered consolidation.1110
7.2.2.1. With the parties’ consent in the arbitration agreement
7.2.2.1.1. In general
While the simplest way to facilitate consolidation is an agreement by the parties or a
special provision in the arbitration clause, such agreements are rare in practice.1111
Drafting multiparty arbitration clauses is not easy. It requires a close understanding of
the nature of the relationship between the different parties, and of the type of disputes
that could arise in the future.1112 Therefore, it is not surprising that none of the leading
arbitration institutions has officially recommended a multiparty arbitration clause which
provides for consolidation.1113
The clauses discussed are usually based on broad notions such as “related disputes”
which are complicated in practice, because they lead to the question of what constitutes
the necessary connection.1114 Moreover, the clauses of all contracts involved must
allow for a consolidation, as only then can the consent of all parties be considered as
given.1115 The question of whether consolidation is possible depends ultimately on an
interpretation of the various arbitration agreements and it is therefore up to the arbitral
1109 State legislation or case law.
1110 See Platte, p. 69.
1111 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-51. One example where the parties agreed on consolidation after the
dispute has arisen is ICC Case No. 6719 (on ICC Case No. 6719, see Arnaldez/Derains/Harscher,
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1991-1995, pp. 567 et seq.).
1112 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-84.
1113 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-51. In fact, most recommended institutional arbitration clauses are based
upon the traditional two-party model. Attempts to propose multiparty arbitration clauses were, however,
undertaken by scholars. See, e.g. Bartels; Wetter, Multi-party.
1114 Has the connection to be a legal or economic one, direct or indirect, strong or weak? (see
Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-52).
1115 Ibid.
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tribunal to decide whether or not to consolidate—this issue falls within the competence-
competence of the arbitral tribunal.1116
7.2.2.1.2. Express agreement
An example of the problems encountered in drafting arbitration clauses which allow
separate arbitration proceedings between different parties to be consolidated is given in
the House of Lords’ decision in Lafarge Redland v. Shepard Hill, where a contractor
engaged a subcontractor under a subcontract incorporating, with amendments, the
FCEC Standard Form of Subcontract.1117 Few standard forms contain agreements to
consolidate arbitration proceedings with proceedings arising under other contracts: the
FCEC Standard Form of Subcontract for use with the ICE Conditions with its clause
18(2) is an exception.1118
7.2.2.1.3. Implied agreement
As express contractual provisions for multiparty arbitration are relatively rare, the
question arises as to in which situations an arbitration clause can be interpreted as
encompassing an agreement to multiparty arbitration, i.e. in which cases can an implied
agreement be said to exist?1119 It may be possible to interpret less explicit arbitration
clauses as permissive of consolidation of proceedings:
- if all contracts concluded in connection with a single economic venture between the
different parties involved contain identically worded arbitrations clauses; or
- if the heads of agreement of a specific project contains an arbitration clause to which
the different contracts concluded in the execution of this heads of agreement
refer.1120
Both situations may be an indication of consent for consolidation. However, the mere
fact of identical wording is not itself conclusive for permission for consolidation.1121
The question of multiparty arbitration on the basis of different arbitration clauses arose
in the Andersen arbitration where, in spite of different versions of arbitration
1116 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 16-52 and 16-61.
1117 Lafarge Redland Aggregates Ltd v. Shepard Hill Civil Engineering Ltd, 2000 1 WLR 1621 (see
Lew/Mistelis/ Kröll, para. 16-53.).
1118 Mimms, p. 2.
1119 Nicklisch, p. 59.
1120 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-56.
1121 Ibid; see also Mimms, p. 1.
179
agreements, the arbitral tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction in an interim award1122 by
ruling that all the parties were bound by the most recent arbitration clause.1123 This
conclusion was upheld by the Swiss Federal Tribunal on an application to set the award
aside.1124 However, the Andersen case was peculiar insofar as the arbitration clauses
were different because many of the parties had not updated their contracts so as to
include the most recently approved arbitration clause.1125
Generally, differences in such substantial matters as the chosen seat or the applicable
law should exclude consolidation.1126 Even where all contracts involved are concluded
within the framework of the same venture between the various parties involved, the
arbitral tribunal cannot assume a global jurisdiction for all contracts concluded for that
venture, but has to verify its jurisdiction in relation to each party and to each issue.1127
This was clearly held by the French Cour d’Appel de Versailles in the Sofidif case.1128
7.2.2.1.4. Reference to arbitration rules
a. General
Recourse to administered arbitration appears to be the most suitable means to reach a
dual goal:
1. consolidation, whenever opportune and/or necessary, of separate proceedings;
2. harmonisation of the said proceedings, when consolidation is to be discouraged.1129
By inserting careful provisions into the respective rules, the arbitration institutions can
put into operation a true “contractual system of consolidation and/or harmonisation”,
therefore filling the gap created by the contractual foundation of arbitration, as opposed
to the coercive measures available at the level of procedural law.1130 Consolidation in
1122 Rendered on 29 April 1999.
1123 See Final award in Case No. 9797 of 28 July 2000, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 18 – No. 3 (2000), pp. 514-
540, Summary of the proceedings. As a consequence, also the appointing authorities were not the same.
1124 Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of 8 December 1999, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 18 – No. 3 (2000), pp.
546-557.
1125 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-57.
1126 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-59.
1127 Ibid.
1128 On the Sofidif case, see CA de Versailles (Chambres réunies) 7 mars 1990 – OIAETI et Sofidif v.
COGEMA, SERU, Eurodif, CEA, Note E. Loquin, Rev. arb., 1991 No. 2, pp. 326-344).
1129 Bernini, p. 299.
1130 Ibid.
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institutional arbitration presupposes that the different proceedings are administered
by the same institution, and it is possible in two ways:
1. the parties may agree to the joinder of proceedings;
2. consolidation may be ordered, in certain cases, by the arbitration institution to
whose rules the parties have adhered in their arbitration agreement or by the arbitral
tribunal appointed in accordance with those rules.1131
b. ICC Rules / LCIA Rules
The ICC and LCIA Rules make no reference to the possibility of consolidation of
arbitration between different parties.1132
c. CEPANI Rules
According to Article 12 consolidation can be ordered by the institution. The request of
consolidation can come from the arbitral tribunal, from the parties or the most diligent
party, or CEPANI itself. Within the framework of the CEPANI rules, consolidation is
possible, even though the parties to the different disputes are not the same in whole or in
part.1133 CEPANI’s approach requires only some link of connection or indivisibility of
the disputes.1134
d. Zurich Rules1135
Under the Zurich Rules consolidation was possible in multiparty situations, where an
identical three-men arbitral tribunal was appointed,1136 and in cases of further
arbitrations between parties which already had an arbitration pending under these
rules.1137 The decision as to whether to conduct the arbitrations separately, or to
consolidate them, partly or altogether, was taken by the arbitral tribunal.
1131 See Hanotiau, Problems, p. 330.
1132 See also Mimms, p. 4; and Derains, Limits, p. 30, with regard to the ICC Rules.
1133 Hanotiau, Problems, pp. 332-333.
1134 Ibid.
1135 With the coming into force on 1 January 2004 of the Swiss Rules, the relevance of the Zurich
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules is now limited to domestic arbitration.
1136 See Article 13 Zurich Rules (Multi-Party Arbitration).
1137 See Article 14 Zurich Rules (Assignment of further Arbitrations). In cases of further arbitrations
between parties which already had an arbitration pending under the Zurich Rules, it was the institution
which could assign a new dispute to the existing arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal decided
afterwards whether both arbitrations were to be conducted separately, or consolidated them, partly or
altogether.
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e. Swiss Rules
Article 4(1) Swiss Rules provides that the Chambers may decide that a new case shall
be referred to the arbitral tribunal already constituted for the existing proceedings. By
choosing the Swiss Rules and, in particular, Article 4(1), the parties are deemed to have
given their consent to consolidation in advance.1138 It is not a condition for the
consolidation of different proceedings under the Swiss Rules that the proceedings to be
consolidated are between the same parties,1139 as the consolidation can also be ordered
when the new case involves different parties than those in the existing arbitral
proceedings.1140 Therefore, there is an expansion of the scope of arbitration ratione
personae, as the initial parties give their consent in advance to arbitration as the
mechanism used to solve disputes in general, and not only for solving those with
regard to a particular party.1141
It has been observed that consolidation can be ordered despite the objection of one
party.1142 Thus, with this provision some “discretionary power” is conferred upon the
institution and a strengthening of the jurisdictional side of arbitration.
f. CIMAR
The CIMAR reflect the terms of the English Arbitration Act 1996. They require in rule
3.9 the express consent of all the parties.1143 Moreover, consolidation can only take
place when the same arbitrator is already appointed in two or more arbitral proceedings
which involve some common issues.1144
7.2.2.2. Lex arbitri
If no agreement exists between the parties, consolidation can be based on the law
governing the arbitration.1145 Statutory regulation of consolidation started to be adopted
1138 See also Gilliéron/Pittet in Zuberbühler/Müller/Habegger (eds.), para. 4 to Article 4 Swiss Rules.
1139 Gilliéron/Pittet in Zuberbühler/Müller/Habegger (eds.), para. 5 to Article 4 Swiss Rules.
1140 Peter W., p. 5.
1141 Provided that the joining parties have also agreed on the Swiss Rules.
1142 Blessing, Comparison, p. 31.
1143 Mimms, p. 4.
1144 Ibid.
1145 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-66.
182
after the appearance of the Model Law;1146 before this, consolidation was only really
known in the US.1147 The solutions in the few countries which have enacted legislative
provisions can basically be divided into two categories: the “false” and the “real”
legislative solutions.1148
7.2.2.2.1. “False” legislative solutions
a. In general
The “false” legislative solutions are closer to consensual rather than to legislative
consolidation, because they require as a condition for consolidation the consent of all
the parties.1149 An example of such a solution is section 35 English Arbitration Act
1996.
b. Section 35 English Arbitration Act 1996
Section 35 states the position at common law: consolidation is only possible with the
consent of all the parties involved, but not otherwise. This section only recognises that
arbitration is a voluntary process and the parties may agree that the proceedings can be
“consolidated” or be the subject of concurrent hearings.1150 However, in the absence of
an agreement, the arbitral tribunal has no power to order consolidation against the will
of a party, and the Act contains no power for the court to order consolidation.1151
Despite a strong body of opinion that some form of consolidation should be permitted,
even without the consent of all concerned,1152 the DAC concluded that such a provision
should not be included in the Act, because it was felt that neither consolidation nor
concurrent hearings could be reconciled with party autonomy and the right of any party
to have its dispute resolved by the tribunal of its choice.1153 Furthermore, compulsory
1146 In 1985.
1147 Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 213. The Model Law itself does not contain provisions on consolidation (see
Binder, para. 9-017).
1148 Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 58, citing Gaillard.
1149 Ibid.
1150 Mustill/Boyd, Companion Volume, p. 43.
1151 See also Mustill/Boyd, Companion Volume, p. 309.
1152 The DAC received many submissions—the majority of them coming from the construction
industry—which called for a provision that would empower either a tribunal and/or the court to order
consolidation or concurrent hearings.
1153 Landau, English Arbitration Act, p. 117; DAC Report of February 1996, para. 180.
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consolidation would involve an infringement of the principle of confidentiality inherent
in a choice of arbitration.1154
7.2.2.2.2. “Real” legislative solutions
a. In general
The “real” legislative solutions allow the courts to compel consolidation as they are
based on the intervention of the lawmaker and not only the will of the parties.1155
Examples of “real” legislative solutions are Article 1046 Netherlands CCP and section
6B Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.
b. Article 1046 Netherlands CCP
Article 1046 provides that any party of two or more connected arbitral proceedings
which are pending before different arbitral tribunals1156 in the Netherlands1157 may
request a court-ordered consolidation of the proceedings, unless the parties have
agreed otherwise. In the Dutch provision the consent of the parties is therefore
presumed, but they have the possibility to opt-out.1158 According to Sanders, this has
been criticised, and indeed, an opt-in solution would have been more in line with the
requirement of consent of the parties.1159 However, it is enough that one of the
arbitration agreements excludes consolidation to prevent consolidation.1160 Must such
a clause necessarily be explicit, or can it be implicit, for instance in that the rules of the
concerned arbitration institutions do not provide for consolidation? In the case of the
Netherlands it seems that implied terms are not enough to justify an exclusion of
consolidation.1161 In fact, the standard arbitration clause of the NAI Arbitration Rules,
which do not contain provisions with regard to consolidation, provide for an optional
1154 Mustill/Boyd, Companion Volume, p. 309; see also DAC Report of February 1996, para. 180.
1155 Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 58.
1156 The provision does not regulate consolidation of connected arbitral proceedings before the same
arbitral tribunal (Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 219).
1157 As consolidation under Article 1046 Netherlands CCP is only possible between arbitral proceedings
taking place in the Netherlands, it will be rare that international arbitrations will be subject to consolidation
under this provision. (Introduction to NAI Arbitration Rules, 5 Additional clauses).
1158 Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 219. See also Miller, p. 90; and Sanders, The New Dutch Arbitration Act, p.
201, who indicated that the parties may in practice opt-out of the possibility of consolidation by reference
to the rules of an arbitration institute.
1159 Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 219.
1160 See Schultsz, p. 214.
1161 Ibid.
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clause to exclude consolidation. The President of the District Court of Amsterdam1162
has discretionary power, and he may order full1163 or partial1164 consolidation.
c. Section 6B Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
Section 6B gives the High Court wide powers to order related arbitration proceedings
to be consolidated, albeit only in relation to domestic arbitrations.1165 Therefore,
consolidation by the court is not available where one contract provides for domestic
arbitration while a related contract provides for international arbitration conducted
under the Model Law.1166 However, although there is a different system for
international cases, the Ordinance permits the parties to an international arbitration to
opt-into the domestic regime in writing.1167 While the court has considered the
provisions of section 6B in a number of cases, section 6B is relatively infrequently
used,1168 and in many cases where this power is applied, a formal order to consolidate is
not made, but both arbitrations are ordered to be heard at the same time.1169 Cases in
which section 6B was applied were, e.g. the Shui On cases,1170 and Hong Kong Institute
of Education v. Aoki Corp.1171
7.2.2.2.3. Australia/New Zealand
The Australian International Arbitration Act provides in section 24 (an optional
provision) in conjunction with section 22 that parties may agree in writing that one of
them may apply to an arbitral tribunal for an order to consolidate. In Australia1172 we
therefore find, exceptionally, tribunal-ordered instead of court-ordered
1162 Where arbitrations in the building industry take place (Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 219; see also Sanders,
The New Dutch Arbitration Act, p. 201).
1163 See Article 1046(3) Netherlands CCP.
1164 See Article 1046(4) Netherlands CCP.
1165 See De Speville, p. 110 and Kaplan/Morgan, p. 19.
1166 Kaplan/Morgan, p. 20.
1167 See Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 221 and Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-82 at footnote 226.
1168 Orders for consolidation or concurrent hearings tend to be prevalently made in relation to construction
arbitrations.
1169 Kaplan/Morgan, p. 19.
1170 On the first Shui On case (1986 HKLR 1177), see Miller and Veeder, Consolidation. On the second
Shui On case (1987 HKLR 1224), see Veeder, Consolidation.
1171 In the case Hong Kong Institute of Education v. Aoki Corp Burrell J endorsed and adopted with minor
elaboration a three stage test described by Ma J in the case Linfield Limited v. Brooke Hillier Parker and
others. In the Hong Kong Institute of Education case there was a multitude of factors weighing in favour
of consolidation (see Arbitration Decisions 2003, pp. 3-4).
1172 For Australia, see also Croft.
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consolidation.1173 In this kind of consolidation, a distinction is drawn between related
proceedings before the same arbitral tribunal and the case where two or more arbitral
tribunals are involved.1174 Section 24, an opt-in provision, regulates both cases1175 in
detail.1176 The difference between an opt-in provision and the regulation of the English
Arbitration Act 19961177 is that in the English Arbitration Act the consent of all parties
concerned by a specific consolidation is necessary, while in the first type of provision,
all parties of a particular arbitration agreement give their consent in advance by opting-
in to the possibility that any consolidation can be ordered when the consolidation
requisites are fulfilled. However, in the Australian solution, consolidation is not
possible, where the parties of the related arbitration have not given their consent to
consolidation.
The Arbitration Act of New Zealand1178 follows the Australian approach, but falls back
on court-ordered consolidation if the same arbitral tribunal refuses or fails to make
an order of consolidation, or two or more arbitral tribunals cannot reach an
agreement.1179
7.2.2.2.4. United States of America
The FAA does not contain any provision regarding consolidation.1180 Furthermore, the
US Supreme Court has not addressed the question of consolidation,1181 so the highest
Federal Courts that have decided this issue are the US Courts of Appeal.1182 However,
the case-law has not been uniform among the different Circuits.1183
1173 See Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 215.
1174 Ibid.
1175 For the case of related proceedings before the same arbitral tribunal, see section 24(4) of the
Australian International Arbitration Act. For the case of related proceedings before 2 or more arbitral
tribunals, see paragraphs (5)-(7) of section 24 of the Australian International Arbitration Act.
1176 Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 215.
1177 On the English Arbitration Act 1996, see under IV.7.2.2.2.1.b.
1178 See section 2 (Second Schedule) of the New Zealand Arbitration Act (Consolidation of arbitral
proceedings).
1179 See also Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 222.
1180 See Wallace, pp. 5-6. See also Born, p. 679; Coe, p. 195; Dore, p. 3.
1181 To the contrary, the US Supreme Court has rejected petitions to do so (see Wallace, p. 6).
1182 Wallace, p. 6. The US Courts of Appeal are just one level below the Supreme Court and are divided
among geographic areas called Circuits (see Wallace, p. 6).
1183 See, e.g. Compania Espanola de Petroleos SA v. Nereus Shipping SA, 527 F.2d 966 (CA 2d Cir.,
1975); Cable Belt Conveyors Inc. v. Alumina Partners of Jamaica, 669 F. Supp. 577 (SDNY), aff d, 857
F.2d 1461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 US 855 (1987)—(the case is described in some detail in
Branson/Wallace); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co, 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984);
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co, 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The uncertainty that exists under the FAA is exacerbated when US State laws are
considered.1184 In fact, several states1185 have enacted statutes that deal expressly with
the consolidation of arbitrations, and which allow court-ordered consolidation even
without the parties’ consent.1186 The relationship between such state laws and the FAA
is unclear; some courts have held that the FAA pre-empts such laws, while others have
reached a contrary result.1187
Moreover, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 2000, which is intended to apply to
arbitrations of both international and domestic disputes held in each State that enacts the
new law, introduced in its section 10 a provision concerning court-ordered
consolidation.1188 The parties may deprive the courts of this power by agreeing that
arbitrations under a particular agreement may not be consolidated with other
arbitrations1189 (possibility to opt-out). Moreover, a further restriction on the possibility
of consolidation is given in section 10(a)(4) RUAA.1190
7.2.2.3. Comments
Without doubt, the question of parties’ consent is essential to the issue of consolidation
of arbitral proceedings between different parties. However, often the discussion and the
proposed or implemented solutions reflect quite opposite views. In the Netherlands, the
consent of the parties to court-ordered consolidation is presumed when they have
chosen the seat of arbitration in that country, whereas in England, the Arbitration Act
1996 provides that no consolidation is possible without the express consent of the
parties, and this position is, as well reflected in the CIMAR. The contrasting views also
emerge from the evolution in the US.
The issue of consolidation should be solved primarily in institutional arbitration rules,
as it is in the CEPANI and Swiss Rules. Under both sets of rules, the consolidation of
related disputes is ordered by the respective institution. In contrast, the Zurich Rules
provided that the decision was taken by the arbitral tribunal (this was possible, because
1184 Born, p. 679.
1185 See, e.g. California, Georgia, Massachusetts (see Born, p. 679 and Comment of section 10 of the
Uniform Arbitration Act, p. 36).
1186 Born, p. 679.
1187 Ibid.
1188 Ball, pp. 56-57.
1189 Ibid. See also section 10(c) Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 2000.
1190 In fact, even in the absence of express prohibitions on consolidation, the legitimate expectations of
contracting parties may limit the ability of courts to consolidate arbitration proceedings (Comment on
section 10 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, p. 38).
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in multiparty situations an identical arbitral tribunal was appointed for the first and all
other arbitrations1191). The parties’ consent to consolidate proceedings is given by
submitting the disputes to these arbitration rules. The possibility for the parties to
choose ad hoc arbitration or another set of rules not providing for consolidation, or to
opt-out of the provisions of the chosen arbitration rules which provide for ordered
consolidation, is enough to respect the requirements of consent. Ideally, the arbitration
institutions whose rules contain consolidation provisions should, however, provide for
standard arbitration clauses in which the possibility to opt-out is contained.
Subsidiarily, the lex arbitri should address consolidation. The necessity of provisions
in the lex arbitri is in particular given in cases where the arbitration agreements refer to
different institutional rules providing for consolidation, or where one of the arbitrations
is an ad hoc arbitration. Opt-in provisions are to be preferred to opt-out ones, because
they better correspond with the requirement of parties’ consent.1192 The requirement
of consent is important, because when different proceedings are consolidated by
applying a provision contained in a lex arbitri, not only the composition of the arbitral
tribunal can change, but also the relevant arbitration rules applicable to the proceedings.
Opt-in provisions also have the advantage of the parties’ consciously selecting the same
lex arbitri in different related arbitration agreements. Indeed, a provision like Article
1046 Netherlands CCP is not helpful when a consolidation of two arbitrations would be
suitable, but one of them has its seat outside the Netherlands.
The presumption of consent of the parties for consolidation, as contained in the
Dutch arbitration act, goes too far. Where the lex arbitri contains an opt-out provision,
it is suggested that the provision allowing ordered consolidation should at least make
the following distinctions:
- where the institutional arbitration rules chosen by the parties do not provide for
ordered consolidation,1193 consolidation without the express consent of the parties
should not be possible;1194
1191 See Article 13 Zurich Rules.
1192 See also the same conclusion of Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 219, with regard to Article 1046 Netherlands
CCP.
1193 These institutional arbitration rules can be the same for each dispute (e.g. for both arbitrations the ICC
Rules), or also different sets of rules for each dispute (e.g. for the one arbitration the ICC Rules and for
the other the LCIA Rules).
1194 In contrast, it seems that in the Netherlands the fact that the parties choose arbitration rules which do
not provide for consolidation (e.g. the NAI Rules) is not enough to exclude consolidation based on Article
1046 Netherlands CCP (see under IV.7.2.2.2.2.b.).
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- where the different institutional arbitration rules chosen by the parties all provide for
ordered consolidation, consolidation should be possible without further consent
requirements; 1195
- where the different institutional arbitration rules chosen by the parties provide some
for ordered consolidation and some not (this would also be the case for ad hoc
arbitrations), consolidation should only be possible when the parties of the
arbitration agreements in which arbitration rules have been chosen that do not
provide for ordered consolidation expressly consent to consolidation.1196
Court-ordered consolidation, or a solution like the one in New Zealand, should be
preferred to tribunal-ordered consolidation. In fact, a mere tribunal-ordered
consolidation, as provided for in the Australian legislation risks ineffectiveness if
different arbitral tribunals cannot agree on consolidation. Although this could be a
possible “barrier” where the lex arbitri contains an opt-out legislative provision, such an
additional “obstacle” is in my view not necessary in the case of an opt-in provision.
7.2.3. Consolidation of different arbitrations between the same parties
Most of the objections raised against consolidation of arbitrations arising out of separate
contracts involving different parties are not relevant to the consolidation of
multicontract arbitrations in a two-party context.1197 In particular, in bi-party
arbitrations no confidentiality issues arise, because no third party is involved.1198 Also
the problems regarding the appointment of arbitrators are significantly reduced, because
the parties do not generally lose their right to appoint a different arbitrator
themselves.1199 Finally, difficulties concerning unjust apportionment of fees do not
occur either.1200 When arbitrations between the same parties are to be consolidated,
parties’ consent appears therefore to be less imperative.
1195 Where the arbitrations are submitted to the same arbitration rules which provide for consolidation,
consolidation occurs in conformity of these rules. The lex arbitri is in such a case not necessary to
consolidate.
1196 If a party, e.g. a main-contractor, is, on the one hand, party to an arbitration agreement referring to
arbitration rules which provide for consolidation, and, on the other hand, party to an arbitration agreement
referring to arbitration rules which do not provide for consolidation, the consent of that party for
consolidation should be considered as implicitly given.
1197 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para 16-87.
1198 Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 65.
1199 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para 16-87. Both parties are only restricted in so far as they cannot
appoint different arbitrators for each arbitration—though there are situations where parties do not wish to
appoint the same arbitrator for the two arbitrations.
1200 See Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 67.
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Agreeing with Leboulanger, where there are different arbitrations between the same
parties the principle of “autonomie de la volonté” should be soothed by mandatory
principles such as the proper administration of justice, the equal treatment of parties,
adversarial proceedings and the rights of defence—all of which are part of international
public policy as conceived by most national legal systems and by the law of
international arbitration.1201 Joinder of parallel proceedings between two parties bound
by interrelated agreements should therefore be seriously considered by arbitrations
institutions and introduced into their rules so that complex arbitrations dealing with
multi-contracts become more efficient and meet the parties’ legitimate expectations.1202
Currently, the conditions vary from one arbitration institution to another. The ICC Rules
adopt a stricter approach in providing for clear-cut requirements to be applied by the
institution.1203 While the consent of all of the parties is not required, the ICC Court has
generally been reluctant in recent years to order the joinder of two arbitrations against
the objection of a party.1204 The Swiss Rules,1205 as well as the CEPANI Rules,1206 have
wide latitude in this respect as was the case in the past in the Geneva Rules1207 for
international cases.1208 On the other hand, the Zurich Rules left wide discretion to the
arbitrators.1209
7.2.4. Consolidation of arbitral proceedings and court proceedings in a
single arbitration
7.2.4.1. General
Normally, it is impossible to consolidate multi-fora disputes when some of the parties
have concluded arbitration clauses and others have not—unless all the parties agree.1210
1201 Leboulanger, Multi-Contract, p. 97.
1202 Ibid.
1203 See Article 4(6) ICC Rules.
1204 See Derains/Schwartz, pp. 63-64; see also Hanotiau, Problems, p. 332, and Whitesell/Silva-Romero,
p. 16. However, in most related cases brought before ICC, the parties themselves reach an agreement on
consolidation.
1205 See Article 4(1) Swiss Rules.
1206 See Article 12 CEPANI Rules.
1207 See Article 16 Geneva Rules.
1208 So for the Geneva Rules Imhoos, p. 131.
1209 See Article 14 Zurich Rules (Assignment of further Arbitrations).
1210 Schneider, p. 110. An interesting solution to this issue was found by an American court in the case
Dale Metals Corp. and Overseas Development Corp. v. KIWA Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. et al. (IV
YBCA (1979), pp. 333 et seq.). On this case, see also Schneider.
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7.2.4.2. Parties’ agreement to arbitrate
In spite of a jurisdiction clause, the parties to court proceedings can agree to resolve
their dispute by arbitration, even after the dispute has arisen. This can be done
expressly, in the form of a submission agreement, or implicitly.1211
7.2.4.3. Parties’ consent to consolidate arbitral proceedings
According to Gaillard, in addition to the agreement of the parties to court proceedings
that their disputes should be solved through arbitration, all the parties involved must
agree to consolidate the related arbitral proceedings in a single arbitration.1212 Such an
agreement can be made by the parties expressly or implicitly.1213
7.2.4.4. Comments
In the consolidation of arbitral proceedings and court proceedings two levels of
examination have to be distinguished:
1. the first level regards the decision of the parties to court proceedings about the
method by which the dispute has to be solved (before a court, or before an arbitral
tribunal);
2. the second level concerns the consolidation of the arbitral proceedings.
In the first level the consent of the parties to court proceedings, and whose method for
the resolution of the dispute will change, is indispensable. However, in the second level,
one should differentiate between the parties that decide that their dispute is now to be
solved through arbitration instead of in court proceedings (group A), and the parties of
the related arbitration (group B). While for group B the consent to consolidate the
arbitral proceedings is necessary, for group A the answer to the question of consent is
less obvious. Indeed, since for consolidation of court proceedings parties’ consent is
normally not necessary, the fact that group A’s parties had initially chosen that State
courts should solve their dispute, could at least be seen as an implicit agreement to
consolidate the arbitral proceedings. Moreover, consent has also to be seen as given
when the parties of group A decide to submit their dispute to arbitration under
institutional rules which provide for ordered consolidation, or to arbitration having seat
1211 See Gaillard, Consolidation, p. 41.
1212 Ibid.
1213 Gaillard, Consolidation, p. 42.
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in a country whose lex arbitri provides for ordered consolidation, instead of the initially
chosen court proceeding.
7.2.5. Practical consolidation1214
In light of the difficulties raised by consolidation of proceedings, the practice has
searched for other solutions to the problems of multiparty arbitration. These solutions
seek to synchronise the different arbitrations:1215
- Appointment of the same arbitrators.1216 However, in the first Shui On case,1217
Hong Kong’s High Court expressed concern about the possibility of inconsistent
decisions, even from the same sole arbitrator, if the proceedings are tried
separately.1218
- Concurrent hearings. This is, for instance, expressly provided for by section 6B
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance. Moreover, some arbitration rules provide for
concurrent hearings too.1219 The Supreme Court of New South Wales in
Aerospatiale v. Elspan et al.1220 even considered extending concurrent hearings to
cases where the arbitration proceedings were parallel to court proceedings.
- Staying one proceeding.1221
- String arbitration is well known in commodity arbitration1222 where all contracts are
identical except for the parties and the price, and they all refer to the same set of
arbitration rules.1223 A similar approach can also be found in certain maritime
arbitrations.1224
1214 Or de facto consolidation.
1215 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 16-79 and 16-85.
1216 Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co Ltd v. Eastern Bechtel Corp 1982 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 425.
1217 Shui On Construction Company Limited v. Moon Yik Company Limited, et al., and Schindler Lifts
(Hong Kong) Limited v. Shui On Construction Company Limited, Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High
Court, Docket 1985 No. MP2114, judgment dated 12 September 1986 (Rhind, J.); or Shui On
Construction Company Limited v. Moon Yik Company Limited, et al, (1989) XIV YBCA 215.
1218 Miller, p. 88.
1219 See, e.g. paragraph 14 LMAA Terms.
1220 Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd et al v. Elspan International Pty Ltd (Hong Kong), XIX
YBCA 635 (1994), No. 55053/92 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 14 August 1992).
1221 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-83. See, e.g. the decision of the US Supreme Court in Volt Information
Sciences, Inc v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 109 S Ct 1248 (1989), in XV
YBCA 131 (1990), where, however, the parties had agreed to arbitrate in accordance with Californian law
and such a possibility was expressly provided for in the applicable Californian statute (Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code Ann. s. 1281.2(c)).
1222 See Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides, para. 3-80.
1223 Sanders, Quo vadis, p. 212.
1224 Concerning the charter and the different sub-charters of a vessel which is allegedly not fit for purpose.
See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-84.
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The advantage of practical consolidation is that it is more respectful with regard to
parties’ consent.
7.3. Problems of enforcing awards in multiparty arbitration
The most obvious basis for a refusal to enforce an award of an arbitration to which a
third party was joined or in which two or more disputes were consolidated is the
absence of an appropriate arbitration agreement between the parties.1225 However, the
New York Convention also allows a court to refuse enforcement of an award if a party
was unable to present its case,1226 or if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the
procedures were not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.1227
Normally, if all parties have agreed on joinder or consolidation, the award should be
enforceable.1228 In particular consent is, in my view, given when the parties submit their
disputes to institutional rules which allow for consolidation and/or for joinder.
Nevertheless, in the case of joinder the third party clearly has to agree to be joined in the
arbitral proceeding, if he is not already a party to the arbitration agreement.
While in my opinion ordered consolidation based on opt-in legislative provisions should
not pose problems in request of the awards’ enforcement, the legal standing in the case
of ordered consolidation based on opt-out legislative provisions is less clear.1229 Indeed,
a provision like Article 1046 Netherlands CCP is more difficult to reconcile with the
New York Convention than an opt-in statutory provision in the lex arbitri. Therefore, as
in the case of an opt-out provision like the Dutch one the situation regarding the
enforceability under the New York Convention is not clear, the parties should be
encouraged whenever possible to record their agreement to consolidation or joinder.1230
1225 See Article V(1)(a) NYC.
1226 See Article V(1)(b) NYC.
1227 See Article V(1)(d) NYC. See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 16-97 and 16-98, and also Chiu, pp. 61-62.
1228 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-96.
1229 See the discussion between Van den Berg, Consolidated and Replique, and Jarvin, Critique.
1230 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 16-98.
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V. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Developed countries have long sought to protect their nationals’ investments in other
countries, in particular in developing countries.1231 However, while there have been
cases since the early 1990s, it is only in the last few years that there has been a dramatic
rise in a new type of international arbitration: international investment arbitration.1232
The main purpose of investor-to-State arbitration is to avoid resorting to the local
courts; indeed, as stated in the third preamble of the ICSID Convention, the Contracting
States have solemnly “recognised” that:1233
“while such [investment] disputes would usually be subject to national legal
processes, international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases”.
Although investment disputes differ in several respects from ordinary commercial
disputes,1234 one of the key differences between investment arbitration and commercial
arbitration is the source of the tribunal’s power.1235 While commercial arbitrations
require an arbitration agreement between the parties, investment arbitration is possible
without such an arbitration agreement in the ordinary sense.1236 Indeed, national
legislation or treaties (bilateral or multilateral) may give investors the right to initiate
arbitration proceedings against the host State.1237 There may even be no contractual
relationship between the parties (investor and host State) at all which has led authors to
speak about “arbitration without contractual relationship”,1238 “arbitration without
privity”1239 or to the observation that “jurisdiction in international law depends solely
upon consent”.1240
Chapter V. will begin with a brief overview of the different legal instruments employed
for the encouragement of investments (sections 1. to 4.) and then the requirement of
consenting “in writing” will be discussed (section 5.). Afterwards, an important part of
Chapter V. will be dedicated to the number of ways of expressing consent to investment
arbitrations (section 6.). The latter are often based on provisions in national investment
1231 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 24.
1232 Blackaby, Tale, para. 11-1.
1233 Crivellaro, p. 119.
1234 See for an overview of differences Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-8.
1235 See Blackaby, Tale, paras 11-7 et seq. For further differences, see Blackaby, Tale, paras 11-12 et seq.
1236 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-11.
1237 Ibid.
1238 See Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6.
1239 See Paulsson, Privity, p. 234.
1240 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
194
protection laws or international treaties by which the State generally agrees to arbitrate
investment disputes.1241 These provisions constitute a unilateral standing offer to the
public to submit to arbitration with any party fulfilling the requirements; the offer is
then accepted by the investor when they initiate arbitration proceedings against the
State.1242 Until that time the investor is not bound to arbitrate and the State cannot begin
proceedings against the investor.1243
After discussing the temporal sequence of consent to arbitration (section 7.) as well as
the relevance of the time of consent and the amicable negotiation period as a
precondition to be met before consent can be perfected (section 8.), another important
part of Chapter V. will be devoted to the interpretation of consent (section 9.). Disputes
on jurisdiction in investment arbitrations are often not about interpreting a contract
between the parties, but interpreting statutes, treaties and conventions to see whether the
dispute falls within the ambit of the State’s obligation to arbitrate in these
instruments.1244
A brief overview on the differentiation between treaty and contract claims will be given
(section 10.), and the essential criteria for arbitrations under ICSID will be discussed by
considering in particular the role of consent to arbitrate and its expansion (section 11.).
Indeed, these criteria are of the utmost importance for the definition of ICSID’s
jurisdiction. Then, after considering the scope of consent and its limitations (section 12.)
the question as to irrevocability of consent (section 13.), the expansion of consent due to
the most-favoured-nation clauses and the umbrella clauses will be examined (section
14.). And, finally, the relevance of parties’ consent with regard to the procedural
mechanism of consolidation will be analysed (section 15.).
1. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE
USE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES INCLUDED IN STATES’
CONTRACTS
The use of arbitration clauses included in States’ contracts1245 has undergone an
important evolution in the last years leading to a questioning of the effects which have
1241 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-12.
1242 See Cremades, pp. 156 et seq.
1243 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-12.
1244 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-13.
1245 On investments contracts, see, e.g. Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 72 et seq.
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traditionally been attributed to these clauses.1246 Giardina has distinguished three
different stages in this evolution:
1. the first stage was the Pyramid case1247 where an ICSID tribunal founded its
competence on an Egyptian national law concerning foreign investments and on the
consent given by the investor with his demand of arbitration;
2. the second stage consisted of establishing the State’s consent to ICSID arbitration
on the provisions of BITs stipulated with the investor’s State.1248 The case Asian
Agricultural Products (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka1249 in 1990 was its first
application and it was based on Sri Lanka’s consent expressed in the treaty Sri
Lanka-United Kingdom which was extended to Hong Kong through an exchange of
notes;
3. the third stage is represented by reference to ICSID arbitration, or to other forms of
arbitration, contained in multilateral treaties, i.e. primarily the NAFTA and the
Energy Charter.1250 However, while the ICSID Convention does not offer consent to
arbitration, NAFTA1251 and the Energy Charter1252 do so.1253
2. NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAWS
Many countries have adopted investment laws. Developing countries typically have
special legislation designed to encourage foreign investment and, at the same time,
make sure that such investment fits into the overall economic development objectives of
the country.1254 Investment legislation, as a rule, contains provisions guaranteeing
certain minimum protective standards, including most-favoured-nation treatment1255 or
national treatment of foreign investors (non-discrimination), as well as a promise of fair
compensation in the case of expropriation.1256
1246 See Giardina, p. 661.
1247 Pyramides (SPP (Middle East) Ltd v. Arab Rep. of Egypt) YBCA, 1991.28. Southern Pacific
Properties Ltd. (Middle East) et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 2 awards on jurisdiction, 27.11.1985 and
14.04.1988, XVI YBCA 16 (1991).
1248 Giardina, p. 662.
1249 Asian Agricultural Products Limited (AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Case No.
ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990), 15 ICSID Review-FILJ 169 (2000) [6 ICSID Review-FILJ 526
(1991)—Salacuse] and 5 ICSID Reports 245 (1990) [4 ICSID Reports 245 (1997)—Lew] and 30 ILM
577 (1991).
1250 See Giardina, p. 662.
1251 See Article 1122 NAFTA.
1252 See Article 26(3)(a) ECT.
1253 Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 243 et seq.
1254 Horn, p. 10.
1255 On the most-favoured-nation treatment, see under V.14.1.
1256 See Horn, p. 10.
196
Investment laws frequently provide for arbitration as a means to settle investment
disputes.1257 As national investment protection laws generally extend to all foreign
investors irrespective of whether or not they are protected by BITs or multilateral
treaties, a foreign investor can initiate arbitration relying on the arbitration provision in
the national investment protection law.1258
3. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITs)
The modern type of bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between capital exporting and
importing countries evolved and partially superseded or amended the traditional treaties
on friendship, commerce and navigation.1259 Although the usual BIT is between a
capital-exporting State and a developing country, occasionally two developing
countries1260 or two industrialised countries1261 have concluded them.1262
The large number of treaty arbitrations in recent years has been a product of an
exponential growth in the number of BITs: after Germany started the post-War BIT
program in 1959 by signing a BIT with Pakistan,1263 by 1970 there were 72 BITs, by
1980 165, by 1990 385, and then the numbers have grown even faster reaching at the
end of 2006, 2,573.1264 BITs tend to resemble each other in their purpose and
content.1265 This similarity is due to their derivation from a limited number of common
sources.1266 Many Western States have adopted model form BITs1267 which they use as
a starting point in their treaty negotiations.1268
Normally, BITs provide a wide ambit of protection, including a wide concept of
investment, and they typically also contain a broad concept of expropriation.1269
1257 See Parra, Settlement, p. 314.
1258 Horn, p. 10. This was for example the case in the SPP-Egypt arbitration.
1259 Ibid.
1260 See, e.g. BITs between Thailand and China of 12 March 1985 and between Egypt and Morocco of 3
June 1976.
1261 See, e.g. the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 2 January 1988.
1262 Salacuse, p. 57.
1263 See, e.g. Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, pp. 25 et seq.
1264 See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (2000) 1, and UNCTAD, Recent
developments in international investment agreements (2006-June 2007), IIA Monitor No. 3 (2007),
available under: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Startpage.asp?intItemID=2310 (last accessed 22 July
2008).
1265 On the topics encompassed by a typical BIT, see Salacuse, pp. 61 et seq. See also McLachlan/Shore/
Weiniger, paras 2.09 et seq.
1266 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 2.05.
1267 See, e.g. France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
1268 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 2.06.
1269 Horn, p. 11.
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Moreover, in addition to substantive rules, BITs usually contain dispute resolution
provisions for certain defined categories of investments, invariably providing for
arbitration; the scope and the content of these clauses differ considerably, depending on
the States involved and their respective bargaining power.1270 By providing investors
with direct access to impartial dispute settlement—international arbitration—the BITs
have depoliticised investment disputes.1271
4. REFERENCE TO ICSID ARBITRATION OR TO OTHER FORMS
OF ARBITRATION CONTAINED IN MULTILATERAL
TREATIES
4.1. ICSID
4.1.1. Brief historical overview and goals of the ICSID
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was
established under the 1965 ICSID Convention, which came into force on October 14,
1966.1272 The goal of the Convention, prepared under the auspices of the World Bank,
was to provide a special forum for the settlement of investment disputes in order to
encourage foreign investment and world development.1273 In 1978 ICSID then created
the “Additional Facility” to cover cases which fall outside the ambit of the ICSID
Convention, in particular where one of the parties is not from a Contracting State.1274
4.1.2. ICSID arbitration
The characteristic of ICSID arbitration is the mixed nature of the dispute with its
limitation to cases arising between a State and a foreign national.1275 While legal
disputes between individuals or corporations are normally settled before domestic
courts and States may settle their legal disputes before the International Court of Justice,
in mixed disputes, especially arising from international investment relationships, no
1270 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-22.
1271 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 26.
1272 See Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, p. 1, and Schreuer, Convention, p. 318.
1273 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-38.
1274 Ibid. See also Cremades, pp. 154 et seq.
1275 Schreuer, Convention, para. 4.
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appropriate forum was seen to exist.1276 ICSID arbitration is an example of delocalised
arbitration proceedings governed only by international rules and not submitted to the
provisions of any one national arbitration law.1277 In particular, ICSID awards are not
submitted to the scrutiny of national courts for annulment or enforcement.1278
Although during the first 30 years of its existence, ICSID was a somewhat “Sleeping
Beauty”, with an average of one or two cases being registered each year, it is with the
widespread development of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties that the
activities of ICSID have fully awakened.1279 To date over 130 States have ratified the
ICSID Convention and over 100 disputes1280 have been referred to ICSID
arbitration.1281 Not only some thousands of BITs1282 offer dispute settlement under the
ICSID Convention to investors from the respective countries, but also a number of
multilateral treaties have been concluded that also offer ICSID settlement to
investors.1283 In this way a significant number of world-wide private foreign
investments are protected through the Convention’s mechanisms.1284
4.2. The NAFTA
4.2.1. Brief overview of the NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a comprehensive multilateral
trade agreement which was entered into in 1993 by the United States, Canada and
Mexico to provide for a widely liberalised common market between the three
countries.1285 Indeed, encouraging investment is only one goal of NAFTA, as the
Agreement covers a diverse range of topics.1286 With respect to private commercial
disputes within the Free Trade Area, in addition to a general encouragement to settle
disputes by arbitration or other means of alternative dispute resolution, NAFTA
1276 Schreuer, Convention, para. 4.
1277 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-40.
1278 Ibid.
1279 Obadia, ICSID, p. 67.
1280 A list of the cases filed can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm.
1281 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-39.
1282 At the end of 2006 2,573 (see under V.3.).
1283 Schreuer, Convention, p. 318.
1284 Ibid.
1285 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-26.
1286 See Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 23.
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contains dispute settlement mechanisms in three different chapters,1287 the most relevant
of which is Chapter 11.1288
4.2.2. NAFTA Chapter 11
4.2.2.1. In general
NAFTA Chapter 11 is generally concerned with ensuring fair treatment of investors of a
Contracting Party by the other Contracting Parties. It does not confer new rights on
investors vis-à-vis non-governments. Chapter 11 contains three sections:
- section A establishes the substantive obligations of the Contracting Parties with
respect to investors and their investments;1289
- section B contains the dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes arising out of the
obligations contained in section A;
- section C provides for important definitions which govern the scope of application
of the Chapter.1290
Yet it is important to place NAFTA Chapter 11 in context: although Chapter 11 is only
one of over 2,500 investment treaties that form a complex web of overlapping
protections for foreign investors,1291 it is, however, one of the few plurilateral
investment instruments,1292 and one of the few agreements between countries with fully
developed economies.1293
4.2.2.2. Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11
NAFTA Chapter 11 embodies a pre-commitment to the arbitration of investor-State
disputes and thereby transfers control over the incidence and conduct of investment
1287 Chapters 11, 19 (which contains neither a wholly State-to-State nor a wholly investor-State procedure,
but a procedure which might best be described as sui generis) and 20 (a State-to-State dispute settlement
chapter). Chapter 14, which covers financial services, incorporates by reference the dispute-settlement
mechanism of Chapter 11 (Section B). Moreover, the obligations of Chapter 14 are also subject to dispute
settlement under Chapter 20 (see Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, pp. 36 et seq.).
1288 See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-26.
1289 For an overview of the major obligations imposed by Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, see Eklund, pp. 137-
140.
1290 Alvarez H.C., p. 394.
1291 There were 2,573 BITs at the end of 2006. See UNCTAD, Recent developments in international
investment agreements (2006-June 2007), IIA Monitor No. 3 (2007), available under
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Startpage.asp?intItemID=2310 (last accessed 22 July 2008).
1292 Another multilateral investment instrument with obligations flowing between developed countries is
the Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 360 (1995).
1293 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 23.
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disputes from the State parties to private persons.1294 Indeed, one of the great
opportunities Chapter 11B offers to investors is the possibility to submit a claim to
binding arbitration without the need for an arbitration agreement in the ordinary sense
or even a contract with the State or State enterprise involved.1295
This private right to direct action eliminates recourse to traditional State-to-State
negotiations in which a foreign investor asked for his country’s intervention (diplomatic
protection) against the host State.1296 It provides for guaranteed access to international
arbitration, which, despite a number of modifications and exceptions to harmonise
procedures and protect certain interests of the State parties, offers many advantages to
investors and enhances the security of their investments.1297 Indeed, the Chapter
represents a remarkable step towards managing a series of public international law
standards of protection (against expropriation, national treatment, minimum standard of
treatment, etc.) with binding arbitral processes invocable at the instance of the private
investor.1298
4.2.3. Limiting the scope of investment arbitration
NAFTA’s drafters were aware that they were combining a trade agreement with an
investment treaty and that arbitration of investment disputes might have a disruptive
effect on other NAFTA commitments including trade in goods and procurement.1299
The compromises made to reconcile NAFTA’s competing goals implicated a
multiplicity of concerns, which embraced, for instance, that:
- inconsistencies between Chapter 11 and other NAFTA chapters are resolved in
favour of the latter; or that
- investment was limited by a definition numerus clausus, indicating what
“investment means” rather than what “investment includes”.1300
1294 Eklund, p. 135.
1295 See also Alvarez H.C., p. 408.
1296 Park, NAFTA, p. 13.
1297 See Eklund, pp. 393 et seq.
1298 Eklund, p. 135.
1299 Park, NAFTA, p. 35. Furthermore, there was recognition that investment arbitration posed special
problems with respect to vital national prerogatives in tax and financial services.
1300 Ibid.
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4.3. The Energy Charter Treaty
4.3.1. Brief historical overview and goals of the Energy Charter
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral investment treaty which was entered
into in 1994 by 49 countries from Western, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan and
Australia.1301 Its objective is to provide a legal framework for continuing cooperation
between the Contracting States in the energy sector, particularly to create a level playing
field for investment in the eastern European energy sector.1302 Indeed, the primary
purpose of the ECT is to enhance investment, trade and transit in the energy sector by
providing investment security, by facilitating transit and helping to introduce
liberalising market-economy features into the post-Soviet economies.1303 However,
there are also more programmatic sections of the ECT concerning environment and
competition law.1304
Part III of the ECT sets out the provisions for the promotion, protection and treatment of
investments in the energy sector which include a non discriminatory and national or
most- favoured-nation treatment of investments, the removal of barriers and restrictions
such as domestic content requirements, compensation for harm to the investment
through State actions and prompt, adequate and effective compensation in the event of
expropriation.1305
4.3.2. Arbitration
While the ECT also includes State-to-State methods of dispute settlement governing
measures affecting energy sector, transit, trade, tax and inter-State arbitration (Article
27 ECT), the focus here will be on Article 26 ECT, which exclusively concerns
investor-State arbitration.1306 Article 26 ECT (Part V) contains the rather innovative
regime for dispute settlement, creating a direct investor/State obligation of compulsory
1301 The ECT came into force in April 1998. The Treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-one States
plus the European Communities; the total number of its Signatories is therefore fifty-two (see
www.encharter.org).
1302 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-34.
1303 Wälde/Weiler, p. 169.
1304 Ibid.
1305 See Paulsson, Privity, pp. 251 et seq.; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-34.
1306 Wälde/Weiler, p. 169.
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arbitration,1307 and may be invoked in relation to any alleged breach of Part III of the
Treaty.1308 Investors from one Member State with investments in the territory of another
Member State can sue that second State when measures affecting their investment(s)
breach one of the key disciplines listed in Article 26 ECT and they suffer a loss as a
result.1309
Under Article 26(3) ECT the States give their unconditional consent to the submission
of a dispute to international arbitration. Indeed, the investor is not bound by earlier
contractual commitments when making its choice and it may opt for arbitration even
though the contract with the State included a forum selection clause in favour of the
host State’s court or a different type of arbitration.1310 If the investor opts to submit the
dispute to arbitration, the investor then has the further choice between arbitration under
the ICSID Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the SCC Rules or ad hoc under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.1311 The choice of venue to which an investor chooses to
submit the dispute depends on both practical and tactical factors.1312
5. THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENTING “IN WRITING” IN
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
The most conspicuous peculiarity in investment arbitration is that consent agreements
need not be based on a document that is signed by both parties, but rather the host State
may make a general offer, contained in legislation or in a treaty to which the host State
is party, to foreign investors or to certain categories of foreign investors to submit to
arbitration.1313
In the first ICSID case where an advance offer of jurisdiction was invoked, SPP v.
Egypt,1314 the respondent State argued that the “offer” contained in its investment
legislation could not amount to consent in writing for the purposes of Article 25 ICSID
1307 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-35.
1308 See Paulsson, Privity, p. 251.
1309 Wälde/Weiler, p. 170.
1310 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-35.
1311 See Article 26(4) ECT.
1312 Amkhan, p. 70. For instance, an investor will not be in a position to refer the dispute to ICSID if both
the host State and home State are not party to the ICSID Convention; also, it would be futile to submit a
claim to ICSID if the respondent Contracting Party to the ECT is the European Communities (Amkhan, p.
70).
1313 For ICSID arbitration, see UNCTAD, p. 1.
1314 Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. (Middle East) (SPP) et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Awards on
Jurisdiction (27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988), XVI YBCA 16 (1991).
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Convention. The tribunal analysed the issue at length before concluding that the
relevant article of the Egyptian Foreign Investment Law constituted an express
consent in writing to ICSID’s jurisdiction and that no further ad hoc expression of
consent on the part of the State was required.1315
Whereas the point remained controversial prior to the birth of BIT arbitration,1316
nowadays it is no longer disputed.1317 In 2000 Stern’s conclusion was that we were
walking with giant steps towards a general system of compulsory arbitration against
States for all matters relating to international investments, at the initiative of the private
actors of international economic relations.1318 Indeed, while, to perfect a consent
agreement, the investor has to accept the host State’s offer in writing, this acceptance
can be quite informal and may even be expressed through the act of instituting
proceedings.1319
Although the fact that the State’s written consent (in the treaty) and the investor’s
written consent (in the request for arbitration) are not contained in the same
document has not given rise to difficulties either under the requirement of Article 25
ICSID Convention for “consenting in writing” or the requirement in Article II NYC for
an “agreement in writing”, the 2004 US model BIT,1320 for instance, specifically
provides that the State’s consent and the investor’s submission of a claim to arbitration
shall satisfy the requirements of the ICSID Convention for written consent and (where
the claim is not brought under ICSID) the requirements of the New York Convention
for an agreement in writing.1321
6. WAYS OF EXPRESSING CONSENT TO ARBITRATION
The greatest difference between investment arbitration and commercial arbitration is the
source of the tribunal’s power: while commercial arbitration requires an arbitration
agreement between the parties, investment arbitration may also be possible without such
1315 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.23.
1316 See, however, American Manufacturing and Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire (Award) 5 ICSID
Reports 11 (ICSID, 1997); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v. Slovak Republic, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID Reports 330, pp. 343-350 (ICSID, 1999).
1317 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, paras 3.24 et seq.
1318 See Schreuer, Convention, p. xii. See also McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.27.
1319 UNCTAD, p. 1.
1320 See 2004 US model BIT, Article 25(2).
1321 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, paras 3.28 et seq.
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an arbitration agreement in the ordinary sense.1322 Indeed, the consent to arbitration
can have three origins: an investor-State contract, an investment code or law and the
dispute-settlement clause of a bilateral or multilateral treaty.1323
Although, according to ICSID, until the mid-1980s, jurisdiction in all the cases brought
before ICSID was founded upon an agreement entered into by the parties to the dispute,
such as the investment contract, the subject matter of more recent ICSID disputes where
jurisdiction has been based on a BIT typically concerned claims based on breaches by
the State of the investor’s rights under international law.1324 Investor-State arbitration
under BITs, or under plurilateral treaties such as the NAFTA, does not usually involve a
specific agreement to arbitrate, but rather, the agreement to arbitrate stems from an offer
made by the State in the relevant treaty or in national investment laws, and the
acceptance by the investor of that offer.1325 The ICSID Convention itself does not
contain such an offer to arbitrate;1326 the consent of the parties to ICSID Convention
arbitration has to be found elsewhere, whether in a specific contract or in an investment
treaty.1327
The fact that national legislation or bi- or multilateral treaties may give each investor the
right to initiate arbitration proceedings against the host State and that there may even be
no contractual relationship between the parties at all has led to labelling investment
arbitration: “arbitration without privity”.1328 However, the established understanding is
that an offer to arbitrate is contained in a BIT and is accepted by the investor’s notice
of arbitration or by such other consent as the treaty may require.1329 At that point, and
not before, there is thus a perfected agreement to arbitrate between a qualified investor
and the host State.1330 As the English Court of Appeal said in Republic of Ecuador v.
Occidental Exploration and Production Co.:
“The treaty involves … a deliberate attempt to ensure for private investors the benefits
and protection of consensual arbitration; … the agreement to arbitrate which results
by following the treaty route is not itself a treaty. It is an agreement between a private
investor on the one side and the relevant state on the other”.1331
1322 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-11.
1323 Obadia, ICSID, p. 69.
1324 Gill/Gearing/Birt, pp. 397 et seq.
1325 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 1122-3.
1326 See, e.g. Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 243.
1327 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 1122-3.
1328 See Paulsson, Privity. Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-11.
1329 Crawford, p. 360.
1330 Ibid.
1331 Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Co. [2005] EWCA Civ. 1116, paras
32–33 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, Clarke, Mance LJJ).
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6.1. Consent through direct agreement between the parties
An agreement between the parties recording consent to arbitration may be reached
through a compromissory clause in an investment agreement between the host State and
the investor submitting future disputes arising from the investment operation to
arbitration.1332 This is the classic arbitration clause, included in contracts entered into by
a Contracting State or any subdivision or agency thereof and an investor of another
Contracting State.1333 On the other hand, it is also possible to submit a dispute that has
already arisen between the parties through consent expressed in a compromis.1334
However, notwithstanding the fact that consent may be given with respect to existing or
future disputes, the majority of cases brought to ICSID arbitration are based on
agreements between the parties containing a consent clause for future disputes, as
obviously consent by both parties is much easier to obtain before the outbreak of a
disagreement.1335
While an agreement between the parties recorded in a single instrument is the most
common form of consent, the agreement on consent between the parties need not
necessarily be recorded in a single instrument.1336 Indeed, in Amco v. Indonesia the
tribunal held:
“while a consent in writing to ICSID arbitration is indispensable, since it is required by
Article 25(1) of the Convention, such consent in writing is not to be expressed in a
solemn, ritual and unique formulation”.1337
Moreover, an agreement between the parties can record their consent to ICSID
jurisdiction by reference to another legal instrument,1338 as was the case in CSOB v.
Slovakia where the tribunal concluded that the parties, by referring to the BIT between
the Czech and the Slovak Republics, intended to incorporate the ICSID clause in the
BIT into their agreement.1339
1332 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 239; with reference to ICSID, see also UNCTAD, p. 7.
1333 Cremades, p. 157.
1334 Schreuer, Convention, para. 249.
1335 UNCTAD, p. 7.
1336 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 239.
1337 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 392.
1338 UNCTAD, p. 9.
1339 CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, 14 ICSID Review-FILJ 251, pp.
268-271 (1999).
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In Duke Energy v. Peru, where the investor had concluded several successive contracts
with Peru connected to the same investment and where only one of them contained a
clause whereby the parties consented to ICSID arbitration, the tribunal applied the
principle of the “unity of the investment”.1340 The tribunal held that: “The reality of the
overall investment, which is clear from the record, overcomes Respondent’s objection
that it could never have consented to arbitration of a dispute related to the broader
investment”.1341
Notwithstanding the fact that the ICSID has published a series of model clauses that
envisage different eventualities and can be included in contracts to be concluded
between host States and investors,1342 the ICC standard arbitration clause is the most
common dispute settlement mechanism included in international contracts.1343
6.2. Consent through host State (national) legislation
6.2.1. In general
The host State may offer consent to arbitration in general terms to foreign investors or
to certain categories of foreign investors in its legislation; such an offer, in order to
become operative, has to be accepted by the foreign investor.1344 When ICSID
arbitration is foreseen, a connection is formed between the requirement of consent
stipulated by the ICSID Convention and the internal legislation of that State.1345
Unlike bilateral or multilateral treaties, the provisions contained in national investment
protection laws generally extend to all foreign investors, as they may in effect contain
an open offer to arbitrate disputes with the foreign investor.1346 Nonetheless, States
have in several cases1347 challenged the jurisdiction of tribunals in arbitration
proceedings initiated on the basis of investment protection laws.1348
1340 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 239.
1341 Duke Energy v. Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 February 2006, paras 119-134, 131.
1342 An updated list of such clauses my be found at:
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ModelClauses
(last accessed 22 July 2008).
1343 Cremades, p. 157.
1344 UNCTAD, p. 11.
1345 See Hirsch, p. 51.
1346 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-15.
1347 See, e.g. the two awards on jurisdiction, 27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988, Southern Pacific
Properties Ltd (Middle East) et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, XVI YBCA 16 (1991). Comparable
objections were raised in Gaith Pharaon v. Republic of Tunisia; see Paulsson, Privity, p. 235. See also
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6.2.2. With particular reference to ICSID arbitration
6.2.2.1. Offer to consent by the host State
References to dispute settlement by the Centre in national investment legislation show a
considerable measure of diversity and not all of them amount to consent to jurisdiction
or an offer to the investor to accept ICSID’s jurisdiction.1349 However, when an offer is
made by the host State to the foreign investors, this offer is a standing offer. The
provisions constituting offers of consent in national laws are of different types:
- some national investment laws provide unequivocally and exclusively for dispute
settlement by ICSID.1350 These statutes constitute a unilateral offer, which may
acquire force of an agreement once the investor has given its consent;1351
- a more common method to provide for settlement by the Centre is to include a
reference to the Convention as one of several possible means of dispute settlement;
- other provisions1352 are not so clear, but it may still be inferred from them that they
express the State’s consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction.1353
6.2.2.2. Investor acceptance
While a host State may express its consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction through legislation,
the investor has to perform some reciprocal act to perfect consent.1354 Indeed, even
where consent is based on the host State’s legislation, it can only come into existence
through an agreement between the parties, because the provision in the host State’s
legislation can amount to no more than an offer that may be accepted by the investor.1355
ICSID, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 1996, Tradex Hellas SA v. Republic of Albania, 14 ICSID
Review-FILJ 161 (1999) where the main issue was the retroactive application of law.
1348 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-15.
1349 Schreuer, Convention, para. 259.
1350 See, e.g. Article 8(2) of the Albanian Law on Foreign Investment of 1993. This was the law
applicable in Tradex Hellas SA v. Republic of Albania, 14 ICSID Review-FILJ 161 (1999).
1351 Hirsch, p. 52.
1352 See, e.g. Article 45(1) of the Cameroon Investment Code, 1990, or Article 27(2) of the Kazakhstan
Law on Foreign Investments, 1995.
1353 UNCTAD, p. 11.
1354 Schreuer, Convention, para. 276.
1355 UNCTAD, p. 13.
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In other words, consent given by the host State must be combined with that given by the
investor.1356
6.2.2.2.1. Acceptance of offer through instituting proceeding
The investor may accept the host State’s offer by introducing a request for arbitration to
the Centre.1357 It has been said of this technique—of accepting the offer through
instituting proceedings—that it implies consent more than it requires an express and
specific manifestation of it.1358
While it is possible to perfect consent through the institution of proceedings, it has been
observed that it is questionable whether it is wise for the investor to rely on the host
State’s offer contained in its legislation without accepting it at an earlier stage.1359
Indeed, generally the State will be permitted to withdraw its consent if it was given
through legislation, as long as the investor has not yet communicated its consent to the
Centre’s jurisdiction.1360 The acceptance of the offer is therefore of paramount
importance, as it triggers the irrevocability of the reached consent.1361 Or, in other
words, once the investor has accepted consent based on legislation, the agreement on
consent will stay in effect even if the legislation is repealed.1362
6.2.2.2.2. Acceptance of offer prior to instituting proceedings
The investor may express its acceptance of the State’s offer in a variety of ways other
than instituting proceedings, including:
- an investment agreement with the host State;
- a simple communication to the host State that consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction in
accordance with the legislation is accepted;1363
- a statement contained in an application for an investment licence; or
- a mere application if under the law in question the successful applicant
automatically gets specified benefits including access to ICSID.1364
1356 Cremades, p. 157.
1357 UNCTAD, p. 14.
1358 Stern, Consentement, p. 241.
1359 Schreuer, Convention, para. 277.
1360 Hirsch, p. 53.
1361 UNCTAD, p. 14.
1362 Schreuer, Convention, para. 277.
1363 See Cremades, p. 157.
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Although the investor’s acceptance of consent can be given only to the extent of the
offer made in the legislation, it is entirely possible for the investor’s acceptance to be
narrower than the offer and to extend only to certain matters or only to particular
investment operations.1365
6.3. Consent through treaties
The host State may also give its consent to investment arbitration under international
treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral.1366 In those cases the consent of the host State
is granted on the level of public international law.1367
While some treaties only contain declarations of intent to make such offers in the future,
in the majority of cases they constitute a unilateral offer by the State involved to all
investors from the other State party to settle disputes by arbitration.1368 However,
treaties do not contain an open offer to arbitrate disputes which is extended to all
foreign investors irrespective of their nationality, but only a unilateral offer to arbitrate,
from a State, in respect to the investors that are nationals of the other Contracting Party
(in the case of BITs)—or Contracting Parties (in the case of multilateral treaties)—to
the treaty. It is exactly because of the unilateral character of the standing offers
contained in treaties that the issue of the investors’ nationality1369 is of paramount
importance in treaty-based arbitration.
6.3.1. Bilateral Investments Treaties (BITs)
Most investment arbitration disputes in recent years have been based on jurisdiction
established through BITs.1370 Owing to the great number of BITs and the reference to
ICSID arbitration made in the same,1371 it may be asserted with a still greater degree of
1364 Schreuer, Convention, para. 278.
1365 UNCTAD, p. 14.
1366 See Cremades, p. 157.
1367 Hirsch, p. 54.
1368 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-22, for BITs.
1369 See under V.11.1.
1370 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 242.
1371 Dolzer/Stevens, p. 129.
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certainty that the ICSID is the natural form for resolution of investor-State
disputes.1372 This is particularly true thanks to Model BITs.1373
6.3.1.1. In general
The vast majority of BITs contain clauses which make reference to investment
arbitration.1374 Numerous dispute settlement clauses in BITs offer several alternative
forms of arbitration.1375 Therefore, only those that contain clear and unequivocal
consent by Contracting Parties to ICSID dispute-settlement mechanism will
automatically determine the existence of an ICSID arbitration clause and, by the same
token, of ICSID jurisdiction, subject always to the proviso that consent in writing be
given by the investor of a Contracting State in such a way as to amount to “the act or
result of coming into harmony or accord”.1376
The clauses contained in the BITs—known as unequivocal consent, automatic consent
or advanced consent clauses—are characterised by containing an offer to arbitrate
that is:
- public in nature (i.e. contained in an instrument of public international law);
- unilateral in character (i.e. in respect of all investors that are national of the other
Contracting Party);
- binding on the issuing party (in that the State receiving foreign investment is
internationally bound vis-à-vis the State of which the investor is a national);
- only revocable by means of an instrument of equal rank; and
- subject to a set term during which it will remain in force.1377
It has been observed that arbitral jurisdiction is no longer premised on the privity of
contracts, i.e. on reciprocity of negotiated consent, as under this new concept
reciprocity is renounced and replaced by a sort of compulsory jurisdiction against the
host State.1378 Nevertheless, the separate agreement to arbitrate an investment claim
under a BIT is a contract and not a treaty.1379
1372 Cremades, p. 158.
1373 See, e.g. the Chinese Model BIT (2003), the German Model BIT (2005), the UK Model BIT (2005) or
the US Model BIT (2004).
1374 See Dolzer/Stevens, pp. 129 et seq.
1375 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 242.
1376 Cremades, p. 162.
1377 Ibid.
1378 Blessing, Law Applicable, p. 185.
1379 Crawford, p. 361.
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6.3.1.2. Offer by the host State
6.3.1.2.1. Offers of consent in BITs
Although the majority of ICSID clauses in modern BITs express consent on the part of
the two Contracting States to submit to ICSID’s jurisdiction, for the benefit of
nationals of the other State party to the treaty, some BITs do not specifically mention
consent.1380 On the other hand, formulations to the effect that each Contracting Party
“hereby consents”, that a dispute “shall be submitted” to the Centre or that the parties
have the right to initiate proceedings leave no doubt as to the binding character of these
clauses.1381 Since the case of AAPL v. Republic of Sri Lanka,1382 it has been understood
that this type of BIT clause may constitute necessary and sufficient consent on the part of
the host State for the purposes of Article 25(1) ICSID Convention.1383
6.3.1.2.2. ICSID as one of several alternatives
In BITs it is frequent for clauses to be included that provide for several alternative
forms of arbitration (multiple clauses).1384 These most commonly include ICSID, with a
reference to the ICSID Additional Facility if one of the State parties to the BIT is not an
ICSID signatory, ad hoc arbitration, often under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
references to the ICC or the Arbitration Institute of the SCC.1385 Another alternative
considered may include the domestic courts of the host State.1386
In such a case, the choice of one form of arbitration or another may be mutually agreed
by the disputing parties or, alternatively, left for the investor to decide,1387 with the State
in the latter instance thus giving its advanced consent to any of the respective
mechanisms of arbitration.1388
1380 Schreuer, Convention, paras 289 et seq.
1381 See Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 242; UNCTAD, p. 17.
1382 Asian Agricultural Products Limited (AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Case No.
ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990), 15 ICSID Review-FILJ 169 (2000) [6 ICSID Review-FILJ 526
(1991)—Salacuse] and 5 ICSID Reports 245 (1990) [4 ICSID Reports 245 (1997)—Lew] and 30 ILM
577 (1991).
1383 See Cremades, p. 158.
1384 Cremades, p. 159.
1385 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.21.
1386 Schreuer, Convention, para. 293.
1387 See, e.g. Switzerland-Paraguay BIT (1993), Article 9; Lithuania-Poland BIT (1992), Article 7.
1388 See Cremades, p. 159.
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6.3.1.2.3. BITs referring to future consent
Not all references to the ICSID Convention in BITs constitute binding offers of consent by
the host State:1389
- some clauses only contain promises of future consent;
- others hold out a general prospect of sympathetic consideration; or
- others simply state that consent may be given by way of agreements with the
investor.1390
a. Promise of future consent
Although provisions of this sort commit the host State to consent to the jurisdiction of
the Centre, either in the investment agreement or in another form, they do not constitute
actual consent for the purposes of the Centre’s jurisdiction.1391 The investor’s home
State can nevertheless request that the host State give its consent and, if necessary,
resort to such procedures as are available between the States parties to the BIT.1392
Thus, any remedy must, in the first place, lie with the treaty partner to the BIT.1393 In
such a case, several remedies for breach of treaty on the level of public international law
may be available to the investor’s home State.1394
b. General prospect of sympathetic consideration
An even weaker reference to consent is contained in some BITs that provide for the host
State’s sympathetic consideration to a request for dispute settlement through
arbitration.1395 It is evident that a clause of this kind does not amount to consent by the
host State.1396 Indeed, the most that can be read into it is that consent may not be
withheld arbitrarily and that the States parties to the BIT must consider arbitration in good
faith.1397
1389 See also Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 242.
1390 UNCTAD, p. 18.
1391 Hirsch, p. 56.
1392 Broches, BIT, p. 63.
1393 Schreuer, Convention, para. 297.
1394 See Hirsch, p. 56.
1395 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 242; see also UNCTAD, p. 19.
1396 Schreuer, Convention, para. 299.
1397 See UNCTAD, p. 19, for ICSID.
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c. Consent by way of agreement
Some BITs only foresee a future agreement between the host State and the investor
containing consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction.1398 And, on occasion, host States commit
themselves to granting favourable consideration to a request of this nature submitted by
the investor.1399 Such treaty provisions, however, do not bind the host State to give its
consent to the Centre’s jurisdiction, and they certainly do not constitute consent for the
purposes of establishing jurisdiction in accordance with Article 25 ICSID
Convention.1400 Nevertheless, some scholars hold that the effect of provisions of this
type is that the host State is not permitted to refuse to settle the dispute at the Centre, in
the absence of reasonable justification given in good faith.1401
6.3.1.3. Acceptance by the investor
A provision on consent to arbitration in a BIT is merely an offer by the respective States
that requires acceptance by a national of the other State party to the BIT.1402 The
national investors of the other Contracting Party, by taking up the unilateral and binding
offer of the host State, give their consent to arbitration, and, in so doing, thereby
conclude an arbitration agreement that is valid and binding on both parties.1403
Once the arbitration agreement is perfected through the acceptance of the offer
contained in the treaty, it remains in existence even though the States parties to the BIT
agree to amend or terminate the treaty.1404
6.3.1.3.1. Acceptance by instituting proceedings
It is recognised practice that an investor may accept an offer of consent contained in a
BIT by instituting ICSID proceedings,1405 when “there is nothing in the BIT to suggest
that the investor must communicate its consent in a different form to the State ”.1406
1398 See, e.g. Article 6 of the Sweden-Yugoslavia BIT of 1978 (Schreuer, Convention, para. 300).
1399 Delaume, BIT, p. 14. Broches, BIT, p. 65.
1400 Hirsch, p. 57.
1401 Delaume, BIT, p. 14.
1402 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 243.
1403 See Cremades, p. 158, for ICSID.
1404 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 243.
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6.3.1.3.2. Acceptance of offer prior to instituting proceedings
Withdrawal of an offer of consent before its acceptance would appear to be less of a
problem in the case of ICSID clauses provided for in treaties than in the case of national
legislation.1407 Indeed, withdrawal of the host State’s consent contained in a BIT would
be a breach of the treaty and would presumably trigger some adverse reaction on the part
of the other party to the treaty.1408 Also, an ICSID clause in a treaty remains valid
notwithstanding an attempt to end it, unless there is a basis for termination under the
law of treaties.1409 Nevertheless, it has been observed that in order to avoid
complications early acceptance is also advisable in the case of offers of consent
contained in treaties.1410
6.3.1.3.3. Some BITs require early acceptance
The clauses of some BITs1411 specifically provide for the giving of consent by the investor,
and, once the investor has accepted the offer contained in the BIT itself, either party may
start proceedings.1412 However, consent by the investor must be expressed in some
positive way and cannot be substituted by the BIT or simply assumed.1413 There are also
ways in which an investor may be induced to give consent:
- submission to ICSID or other methods of settlement may be made a condition for
admission of investments in the host State and may form part of the licensing process;
- BITs may specifically provide that their benefits will extend only to investors that
have consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction.1414
1405 See, e.g. American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No.
ARB/93/1, Award (21 February 1997), 36 ILM 1534 (1997) and XXII YBCA 60 (1997). On this award,
see Chatterjee. See also Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 243.
1406 See Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 240, paras 12.2,
12.3.
1407 Schreuer, Convention, para. 303.
1408 UNCTAD, p. 20.
1409 Schreuer, Convention, para. 303.
1410 Broches, BIT, p. 63.
1411 See, e.g. Article 8 (first alternative) of the United Kingdom Model Agreement; or the United States
Model Agreement Article VI.
1412 UNCTAD, p. 20.
1413 Schreuer, Convention, para. 308.
1414 UNCTAD, p. 21.
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6.3.1.3.4. Some BITs ignore the investor’s consent
Some BITs containing binding consent clauses ignore the fact that consent by the
investor is a necessary requirement to complete consent.1415 It has been observed that a
consent clause so formulated is flawed.1416 Indeed, while the investor may institute
proceedings against the host State on the basis of the BIT, thereby signifying his
consent, the host State cannot do so without a prior expression of consent on the part of
the investor.1417 Some BITs1418 recognise this situation by stating that only the investor
is entitled to institute proceedings.1419
6.3.2. Consent through multilateral treaties
Since the early 1990s a number of multilateral treaties that provide for ICSID’s
jurisdiction have come into existence: the NAFTA, the ECT, MERCOSUR and the
Cartagena Free Trade Agreement.1420 In the following, however, only the NAFTA and
the ECT will be discussed. The underlying mechanism is similar to the one in BITs.
Multilateral treaties also contain offers by party States to consent to ICSID
jurisdiction,1421 and such offers may be taken up by investors of any other party States
to the treaty.1422
6.3.2.1. The NAFTA
The NAFTA on the one hand expressly provides that “each Party consents to the
submission of a claim to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this
Agreement” (Article 1122), and, on the other hand, that the investor must also consent
to arbitration (Article 1121), thereby emphasising the reciprocal nature of consent to
arbitration. Moreover, under the NAFTA, submission of a claim to arbitration is only
open to an investor and not to a host State.1423
1415 See, e.g. France/Nigeria BIT (1990) Article 8 (Dolzer/Stevens, pp. 134 et seq.). Schreuer, Convention,
para. 304.
1416 See Schreuer, Convention, para. 305.
1417 Ibid.
1418 See, e.g. German Model Agreement Article 11 (Model I).
1419 Schreuer, Convention, para. 305.
1420 See UNCTAD, pp. 23-24.
1421 The ICSID Convention itself does not offer consent to arbitration (see, e.g. Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 243).
1422 Cremades, p. 160.
1423 Schreuer, Convention, para. 312.
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6.3.2.1.1. Pre-commitment to arbitration: consent of the State parties (standing offer of
the States)
Article 1122 provides that the parties consent to the submission of a claim to arbitration.
Indeed, Canada, the United States and Mexico have consented to arbitrate all future
claims made under NAFTA Chapter 11 provided such claims are submitted in
accordance with the procedures set out in section B of the Chapter.1424 This pre-
commitment to arbitration by the parties represents one of the most innovative aspects
of NAFTA and shows a strong commitment to the efficient resolution of investor-State
disputes.1425 Article 1122(2) confirms that this consent will satisfy the requirements of
the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention and the Inter-American Convention
with respect to consent in the case of the former and the requirement for an arbitration
agreement in the latter two.1426
6.3.2.1.2. Limits on State parties’ consent
Article 1122(1) places a limit on parties’ consent—it extends to the submission of a
claim to arbitration “in accordance with the procedures set forth in this agreement”.
Because consent is a precondition to the process of arbitration, the parties have argued
that the procedural requirements set forth in section B of Chapter 11, in addition to the
scope provisions set forth in Article 1101, should be read as limiting the jurisdiction of
the tribunals.1427 It has been observed that tribunals have varied in how strictly they
have construed the limitations of Article 1122, but it is fair to say that most have
construed the consent required by the provision relatively broadly.1428
6.3.2.1.3. Who can submit a claim to arbitration (acceptance by the investors)
A private investor who believes that a party, or a State or provincial government
thereof, (other than its own) has violated any of the provisions under section A of
1424 Eklund, p. 140.
1425 Ibid.
1426 Alvarez H.C., p. 403. See Article 1122 para. 2 NAFTA. See also Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p.
1122-4.
1427 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 1122-3.
1428 Ibid.
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NAFTA Chapter 11,1429 may resort to binding international arbitration.1430 More
specifically, an investor of a party may submit a claim on its own behalf, or on behalf of
an enterprise incorporated in the jurisdiction of a party where the investor owns or
controls directly or indirectly that enterprise, where:
- the investor believes that a party has breached an obligation under section A, Article
1503(2),1431 or Article 1502(3)(a)1432 where the monopoly has acted in a way
inconsistent with the party’s obligations under section A; and
- the investor or enterprise has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of,
that breach.1433
Article 1121 requires that an investor consent to arbitration, and that the consent be
accompanied by the appropriate waiver(s).1434 Indeed, before an investor may submit a
claim, it must consent, in writing, to arbitration and waive the right to begin or continue
administrative or judicial proceedings under the law of any party, or other dispute
settlement procedures, except for applications for interim relief not involving the
payment of damages before a tribunal or court under the law of the disputing party.1435
Therefore, the NAFTA, by requiring as a condition for jurisdiction that the claimant
submit a waiver of the right to initiate or continue before domestic judiciaries any
proceedings with respect to the measures taken by the respondent that are alleged to be
in breach of the NAFTA, contains another approach to the ne bis in idem principle in
the relationship between international tribunals and domestic courts.1436
Between them Articles 1121 and 1122 ensure that the disputing parties have consented
to arbitration.1437 The giving of consent by the disputing investor completes the pre-
existing consent of each party to arbitration pursuant to Article 1122, and, in this
manner, a form of privity or consent to arbitration is created between the disputing
investor and the disputing party.1438
1429 There are also certain exceptional circumstances in which a Chapter 11 NAFTA claim cannot be
brought to arbitration, as for instance, a dispute arising out of a decision by a Party to prohibit or restrict
the acquisition of an investment pursuant to Article 2102 NAFTA (National Security), or, similarly, a
decision made under the Investment Canada Act.
1430 Eklund, pp. 140 et seq.
1431 State Enterprises.
1432 Monopolies and State Enterprises.
1433 Eklund, pp. 140 et seq.
1434 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 1122-4.
1435 Alvarez H.C., p. 403.
1436 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 308.
1437 Kinnaer/Bjorklund/Hannaford, p. 1122-4.
1438 Alvarez H.C., p. 403.
218
6.3.2.1.4. Choice of the ICSID or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by the investor
Provided the preconditions to submission of a claim to arbitration and all preliminary
steps have been met, a disputing investor may choose to submit the claim to arbitration
pursuant to one of three sets of rules:
a. the ICSID Convention (and its Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings),
provided that both the disputing party and the party of the investor are parties to the
Convention;
b. the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing party or
the party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or
c. the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
In the event a disputing investor selects arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Convention or
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, a second level of this type of “virtual” consent is
created by Article 1125 which provides that the disputing party “agrees” to the
appointment of the members of the arbitral tribunal as required by Article 39 of the
Convention and Article 7 of Schedule C to the Additional Facility Rules.1439 However,
as long as Canada and Mexico are not parties to the ICSID Convention, the NAFTA
will not operate to confer jurisdiction under the Convention. Indeed, while ICSID
Additional Facility arbitration is available between United States investors and Canada
or Mexico and between Canadian or Mexican investors and the United States, in the
disputes between Canadian investors and Mexico or Mexican investors and Canada not
even the ICSID Additional Facility may be used.1440 Thus, in the disputes of the latter
kind only arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is available.1441
The rules selected by the disputing investor will apply except to the extent they are
modified by the provisions of Chapter 11B. The latter occurs in several areas, which
include the number of arbitrators and their method of appointment; consolidation,1442
notice to, and participation by, other parties; the law applicable to the merits of the
dispute; the role of the Free Trade Commission; available remedies; enforcement of
awards; and publication of awards.1443
1439 Alvarez H.C., p. 403.
1440 UNCTAD, p. 23.
1441 Ibid.
1442 See under V.15.
1443 Alvarez H.C., p. 404. See also Eklund, pp. 141 et seq.
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6.3.2.2. The Energy Charter Treaty
6.3.2.2.1. Unconditional irrevocable consent (offer by the State)
Article 26(3) ECT explicitly details that each of the ECT Contracting Parties has given
its prior unconditional consent to submit to international arbitration or conciliation a
dispute which falls within the remits of paragraph (1).1444 This consent, given by
signature to the treaty, is considered to satisfy the requirements of four arbitral
options,1445 but also of the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.1446 As the State’s consent is contained within the
provision and is unconditional and irrevocable, no further arbitration agreement is
necessary; the treaty bestows the arbitration right directly upon foreign treaty
investors.1447 However, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph (3) list the two
permissible exceptions to “unconditional consent”:
- The first exception is where the investor has submitted the dispute to domestic
courts or administrative tribunals, or previously agreed dispute settlement
mechanisms.1448
- The second exception is where a dispute arises regarding an alleged breach of the
obligation, as set out in the last sentence of Article 10(1) ECT, which reads as
follows: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into
with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party”.1449
6.3.2.2.2. Acceptance by the investor
On the other hand, the investor is not bound by earlier contractual commitments when
making its choice and it may opt for arbitration even though the contract with the
State included a forum selection clause in favour of the host State’s court or a different
1444 Amkhan, p. 69. The reference to the New York Convention and the option to choose a place in a State
which is member of the New York Convention (Article 25(5)(b) ECT) are meant to increase the
likelihood of recognition and enforcement (Wälde, ECT, pp. 450-451).
1445 Arbitration under the ICSID Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the SCC Rules or ad hoc
under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
1446 Wälde, ECT, p. 450.
1447 Wälde/Weiler, p. 170.
1448 Amkhan, p. 69. The Contracting Parties that have availed themselves of this exception are listed in
ECT Annexe ID and are under obligation to provide the Secretariat with a written statement of their
“policies, practices and conditions” concerning this exception (ibid.).
1449 Ibid. Contracting Parties that have availed themselves of this exception were to be listed in Annexe
IA; Hungary is the only Contracting Party that has opted to make use of this exception (ibid.).
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type of arbitration.1450 Indeed, an investor may, at its choice and following a cooling-off
period of 3 months, submit the dispute to resolution:
a. to the courts or administrative tribunals of the host State party to the dispute;
b. in accordance with a previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or
c. to international arbitration.1451
If the investor opts to submit the dispute to arbitration, the investor then has the further
choice between arbitration under the ICSID Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules,
the SCC Rules or ad hoc under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.1452
6.3.2.2.3. Comments
It has been observed that the unmistakable thrust of Article 26 ECT is to eliminate
procedural or jurisdictional wrangling by creating a regime that strongly favours the use
of neutral arbitration to sanction violation of the treaty to the detriment of investors, as
can be seen in the wide range of options granted to the claimant, where, for instance,
reference to a previously agreed forum is only a possibility, but not a requirement.1453
This also means that a defendant minded to be obstreperous will find no comfort in the
fact that a dispute is only partially covered by a contract containing an arbitration
clause; a claimant apprehensive of the limited authority of arbitrators operating under
such a clause may wipe the slate clean and opt for one of the three types of arbitration
defined in Article 26 ECT without regard to what had been agreed before, and any
defect in an arbitration clause might thus be cured by relying on Article 26 ECT.1454
6.3.2.3. Non-binding-references to ICSID
Some multilateral instruments1455 also contain reference to ICSID dispute settlement
mechanism without offering consent on the part of the participating States.1456
1450 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-35.
1451 See Article 26(2) ECT.
1452 See Article 26(4) ECT. On possible criteria in the choice of venue, see in particular Amkhan, p. 70.
1453 Paulsson, Privity, pp. 249 et seq.
1454 Ibid.
1455 See, e.g. Article X of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments.
1456 Schreuer, Convention, para. 316.
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7. TEMPORAL SEQUENCE OF CONSENT TO ARBITRATION
7.1. Formation of consent from a temporal perspective
Consent by both parties must exist at the time of the institution of the proceedings.1457
The possibility that the parties did not act on the same time covers two situations:
1. a single instrument may be signed on different days; or
2. the consent may be expressed in more than one instrument.1458
7.1.1. Consent through direct agreement between the parties
In arbitration clauses contained in investment agreements both the host State and the
investor give their consent to arbitration before a dispute has broken out. On the other
hand, when the host State and the investor give their consent to arbitration in a
compromis they express it after a dispute has broken out. In both cases, however, there
is symmetry.
7.1.2. State’s offer in its legislation or in a treaty
In an investor-to-State dispute based on a State’s public offer of consent to ICSID
arbitration, the State is clearly the first party who gives its consent.1459 This consent is
given either in a BIT, in a multilateral treaty or in an internal law concerning the
protection and promotion of foreign investments before a dispute has broken out.1460
On the other hand, the investor gives his consent only after a dispute has arisen, when
he elects to file a request for arbitration to ICSID.1461
The drafters of the ICSID Convention envisaged the possibility of a State giving its
consent in advance to ICSID arbitrations, albeit they envisaged this happening through
investment legislation rather than BITs: “Nor does the Convention require that the
consent of both parties be expressed in a single instrument. Thus a host State might in
its investment promotion legislation offer to submit disputes arising out of certain
1457 See UNCTAD, p. 26.
1458 Schreuer, Convention, para. 320.
1459 Crivellaro, p. 87.
1460 See Crivellaro, pp. 87-88.
1461 Ibid.
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classes of investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor might give his
consent by accepting the offer in writing”.1462
Here there is asymmetry. This form of “asymmetric” and not reciprocal arbitration
distances the treaty’s investment arbitration method very conspicuously from the
arbitration clauses usually found in investment agreements.1463 In treaty’s investment
arbitration it is only the investor—motivated by his self-interest and complaint, but also
acting as agent of implementation of the treaty—that can raise complaints and litigate
against the allegedly non-complying government.1464 This asymmetry between the
consent of investors and the advance consent of host States has been described as
“arbitration without privity”:
“This new world of arbitration is one where the claimant need not have a contractual
relationship with the defendant and where the tables could not be turned: the defendant
could not have initiated the arbitration, nor is it certain of being able to bring a
counterclaim. … What is already clear is that this is not a subgenre of an existing
discipline. It is dramatically different from anything previously known in the
international sphere”.1465
7.2. Time of consent
The time of consent is determined by the date at which both parties have agreed to
ICSID’s jurisdiction:
- if the consent clause is contained in an offer by one party (State or investor), its
acceptance by the other party will determine the time of consent;
- if the host State makes a general offer to accept ICSID’s jurisdiction in its
legislation or in a treaty, the time of consent is determined by the investor’s
acceptance of the offer.1466
While the investor is under no time constraints to accept the offer and thus to complete
the consent unless the offer, by its own terms, provides for acceptance within a certain
period of time, it should be borne in mind that consent, once completed, has a number
of legal consequences; consequently, care should be taken to perfect consent at the
appropriate time and not to rely on a standing offer without actually taking it up.1467
1462 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.22.
1463 See Wälde, ECT, p. 452, referring to petroleum, mineral development investment agreements.
1464 Wälde, ECT, p. 452.
1465 Paulsson, Privity, pp. 234 et seq.
1466 UNCTAD, p. 25.
1467 Ibid.
223
7.3. From retrospective to prospective consent
7.3.1. Retrospective consent
In the past, individuals have been at times authorised to bring international claims
against States before tribunals created in the aftermath of war or revolution. States have,
therefore, occasionally allowed investor claims under international law prior to the
innovation of the general consent in investment treaties.1468 However, these tribunals1469
did not involve generalised arbitration, based on comprehensive jurisdiction, because
their authority was retrospective. Furthermore, authority was given to them only after
the fact, and was limited to disputes arising from a distinct period, series of events, or
subject-matter.1470
7.3.2. Prospective consent
Bilateral and multilateral treaties provide that in the event of a dispute with the State,
the investor concerned may resort to the appropriate form of arbitration on the strength
of the State’s consent in the treaty.1471 The phrase “on the strength of the State’s
consent” denotes the concept of “advance consent”,1472 or “prospective consent”,1473
contained in the thousands of BITs by which States offer their consent to investors to
refer future investment disputes to arbitration. The asymmetry between the consent of
investors and the advance consent of host States has been described as “arbitration
without privity”.1474 While the question of whether this advance consent is inherently
unfair is subject to debate, what is clear is that it leaves host States open to having
arbitration claims brought by investors with whom they have no contractual
relationship.1475 Therefore, authors have also spoken of “arbitration without
contractual relationship”.1476
1468 Van Harten, pp. 99 et seq.
1469 See, e.g. the Iran-US Claims Commission after the Islamic Revolution in Iran or the UN
Compensation Commission after the Gulf War of 1990-91.
1470 Van Harten, p. 100.
1471 Teitelbaum, p. 226 citing Parra.
1472 See Dolzer/Stevens, p. 132.
1473 See Van Harten, pp. 99 et seq.
1474 See Paulsson, Privity. Teitelbaum, p. 226.
1475 Teitelbaum, p. 226.
1476 See Werner, Trade Explosion, p. 6.
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On the other hand, with regard to the arbitration agreement it has been observed that the
contractual arrangement must be understood broadly in the sense that the parties’
consent can be given in different ways and subsequently.1477 Moreover, the contractual
nature of arbitration does not entail that the arbitration agreement must be “mutual”, i.e.
give the parties the same right to refer disputes to arbitration.1478 Indeed, it is possible to
confer upon one party the unilateral1479 right to initiate an arbitration proceeding.1480
Nevertheless, while most of the time there will be no arbitration agreement in the
traditional sense, in investment arbitration—like in commercial arbitration—the
attempt to emancipate arbitration from a State justice system is clear und
unavoidable.1481
7.3.3. Differences between retrospective consent and prospective consent
It has been observed that retrospective consent differs from a general consent to the
arbitration of future disputes, because:
- in the case of a retrospective consent, a State is more able to anticipate the
significance of its acceptance of compulsory arbitration as the consent is given after
the events in question have taken place and it is limited to disputes arising from a
distinct period, series of events, or subject-matter; and,
- on the other hand, by giving a prospective consent in an investment treaty, the State
exposes itself in principle to claims by any investor with economic interests that are
subject to regulation by the State; consequently, investment treaty arbitration
encompasses future disputes involving an indeterminate class of claimants in
relation to a very broad range of governmental activity.1482
7.3.4. Comments
Retrospective consent, permitting investors to bring international claims against States
before tribunals, has been given by States for solving disputes arising because of unique
1477 Poudret/Besson, para. 4.
1478 Ibid.
1479 On unilateral arbitration, see, e.g. Prujiner.
1480 Poudret/Besson, para. 4.
1481 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
1482 Van Harten, p. 100.
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and to some extent unforeseeable historical events like wars and revolutions.1483 On the
other hand, prospective consent in investment treaties is given by the States for events
occurring in the global “economic playfield” where the States and the investors, are
both “economic players”, albeit with (most of the time1484) different roles.
Retrospective consent differs from a general consent to the arbitration of future
disputes. Indeed, in the case of retrospective consent a State is more able to anticipate
the significance of its acceptance of compulsory arbitration because the consent is given
after the events in question have taken place.1485 However, while it is true that in
investment arbitration the State by giving a prospective consent in an investment treaty
exposes itself to claims by any investor, one has to consider that, contrarily to disputes
in the field of commercial arbitration where both parties to the arbitration agreement can
breach the main contract, in investment arbitration the disputes giving rise to the
investors’ claims against the State are caused by an action of the State itself.1486 In other
words, the exposure of the State has to be relativised, as it is the State itself who gives
rise by its behaviour to this exposure. Rather prospective and general consent is the
price which the State has to pay for ensuring a certain security and foreseeability to
the investors.
8. THE AMICABLE NEGOTIATION PERIOD: PRECONDITION TO
BE MET BEFORE CONSENT CAN BE PERFECTED
Often before consent can be perfected through a request of arbitration, investment
treaties include other preconditions that are usually absent from commercial
arbitrations.1487 The cooling-off period differs from treaty to treaty.1488 In order to
minimise the number of cases which advance to arbitration, the offer of most States to
arbitrate investment disputes is conditioned on the conclusion of an amicable
1483 From the Jay Treaty of 1794 to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, States authorised international tribunals
to resolve regulatory disputes arising from one State’s treatment of the nationals of another and, in some
cases, claims could be brought directly by investors; notwithstandig these historical tribunals did not
involve generalised arbitration, based on comprehensive jurisdiction, because their authority was
retrospective (Van Harten, pp. 99 et seq.).
1484 An exception is when the State is acting iure gestionis.
1485 Van Harten, p. 100.
1486 E.g. expropriation.
1487 Blackaby, Tale, para. 11-12.
1488 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.17.
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negotiation period of between three1489 to six1490 months,1491 and sometimes even a
twelve-month period.1492
In practice, however, the majority of tribunals have not penalised claimants for failing
to observe these cooling-off periods.1493 Indeed, some tribunals have categorised this
requirement as procedural rather than jurisdictional1494 in order to break free from an
excessive formalism that it might otherwise impose at a time when action needed to be
taken.1495 On the basis of this approach, if and when it is clear that the State does not
intend to engage in discussions with the disgruntled investor, the failure to observe the
waiting period does not operate as a jurisdictional bar.1496 Two cases which decided
the point differently are Goetz v. Burundi1497 and Enron and Ponderosa Assets v.
Argentine Republic,1498 where the tribunals found that the cooling-off period was a
jurisdictional, and not merely a procedural, requirement.1499
The view that periods foreseen for negotiations are not of a jurisdictional nature is
preferable, as by the time the tribunal makes a decision on this issue, any waiting period
is likely to have elapsed and, therefore, insistence on compliance with the waiting
period before the institution of proceedings would make little sense and would merely
compel the claimant to start proceedings anew.1500
It has been observed that the amicable negotiation period is perhaps the other side of
the coin of an open offer to arbitrate.1501 Indeed, before being drawn into a long and
expensive international procedure with potentially adverse political consequences,
States have insisted on a prior notification and a cooling-off period within which they
could seek to resolve the dispute amicably.1502 A cooling-off period of six months
1489 See, e.g. UK Model BIT.
1490 See, e.g. German Model BIT.
1491 Blackaby, Tale, para. 11-12.
1492 See, e.g. the Spain-Indonesia BIT.
1493 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.18.
1494 See, e.g. Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Final Award (3 September 2001), 14 WTAM 35
(2002), para. 187; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, para. 100.
1495 Blackaby, Tale, para. 11-13.
1496 Ibid.
1497 Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, Award embodying the parties’ settlement agreement
of 10 February 1999, 15 ICSID Review-FILJ 457 (2000).
1498 Enron Corporation y Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3),
Decision on Jurisdiction (additional claim) of 2 August 2004.
1499 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.19.
1500 Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 248 et seq.
1501 See Blackaby, Tale, para. 11-12.
1502 Ibid.
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before a disputing investor may submit a claim to arbitration is also provided for in
Article 1120 NAFTA.1503
9. THE INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT
Jurisdiction in international law depends solely upon consent.1504 This makes the
question of interpretation so important. Moreover, the question of the interpretation of
investment treaties, and, thus, of the dispute settlement provisions contained therein, is
relevant for a combination of reasons:
- first, because all investment treaties protect investments by granting investors
certain rights which are materially identical or comparable; and
- second, because there is no doctrine of precedent.1505
Although in international commercial arbitration there is no doctrine of precedent and
no hierarchy of tribunals, the absence of a doctrine of precedent raises no difficulty
because each decision involves a single contract or a series of contracts particularly
negotiated between business partners.1506 On the other hand, the position is different in
treaty arbitration where a multiplicity of treaties often grants materially identical rights,
and, even though their wording differs, the purpose of protecting and promoting
investment is common to all of them.1507 However, not only are the legal relationships
to which the dispute resolution provisions refer and the processes of reaching consent
different between international commercial arbitration and treaty arbitration, but so are
the objects of interpretation themselves. Indeed, disputes on jurisdiction in investment
arbitration are often not about interpreting a contract (arbitration agreement in the
classical sense) between the parties, but rather the tribunal will interpret the statutes,
treaties and conventions, to see whether the dispute falls within the ambit of the State’s
obligation to arbitrate in these instruments.1508
1503 See Alvarez H.C., pp. 403 et seq.
1504 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
1505 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, paras 13-3 and 13-14. On the absence of the doctrine of
precedent in international law, see also SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ARB/02/6 (29 January 2004), para. 97. In the literature
see, however, Gaillard/Banifatemi, Precedent.
1506 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-4.
1507 Ibid.
1508 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-13.
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While this section specifically deals with the interpretation of consent, it has to be
observed that questions of interpretation will also be discussed in later sections of
Chapter V., particularly with regard to most-favoured-nation clauses or umbrella clauses
(under section 14.).
9.1. Approaches to investment arbitration and interpretation
In the literature a differentiation is made between interpretation in private law and
interpretation in public international law.1509 The approaches based on this
differentiation emphasise a reciprocal legal framework in their conceptualisation of
investment treaty arbitration:
- the first by treating it as a form of commercial arbitration;
- the second as public international law.1510
However, two more approaches have been pointed out which recognise and focus on
the regulatory character of the underlying relationship between investors and State:
- the first does so by comparing investor protection to the protection of human rights;
- the second by applying a more prudential public law framework which moderates
State liability in order to preserve governmental discretion.1511
In the case of these latter two approaches the emphasis with regard to interpretation is
more on the question about inclination in interpreting. In the first approach the
inclination leans more towards an extensive interpretation in view of protecting the
investor, whilst in the second approach the inclination leans more towards a restrictive
interpretation in view of moderating the State’s liability.
9.2. Interpretation under international or domestic law?
When the exact reach and scope of consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction is unclear, the
question arises as to how an expression of consent has to be interpreted:
- one possible approach is to treat the agreement between the parties on consent in
analogy to treaties and to apply the established tenets of treaty interpretation,1512 in
particular Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT);
1509 See, e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, paras 13-10 et seq.; Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, pp. 369
et seq.; moreover, see also Van Harten, pp. 124 et seq.
1510 See Van Harten, p. 121.
1511 Ibid.
1512 On treaty interpretation, see, e.g. Gardiner.
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- another approach would consist of interpreting consent agreements in the framework
of the law applicable to the dispute between the parties.1513
This issue arose in particular in SPP(ME) Ltd. and SPP Ltd. v. Egypt1514 where
jurisdiction was based on a provision in Egyptian legislation and not on a treaty. While
Egypt maintained that the jurisdictional issues in the case were governed by Egyptian
law either by virtue of an agreement between the parties or under the second sentence of
Article 42(1) ICSID Convention, the claimants argued that the jurisdictional issues must
be resolved by the application of international law.1515 The ICSID clause in the
Egyptian law should therefore be construed with the help of the rules of interpretation
of treaties as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.1516
9.2.1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
It has been observed that the approach to treat the agreement between the parties on
consent by analogy with treaties and, thus, to apply the established tenets of treaty
interpretation, in particular Articles 31-33 VCLT, would appear particularly suitable
where the original clause providing for settlement under the ICSID Convention is
contained in a bilateral investment treaty or a multilateral convention.1517 Indeed, the
aforementioned articles have been widely accepted:
- as stating rules of customary international law on treaty interpretation; and,
- by investment arbitration tribunals, as constituting rules of interpretation which are
binding on them in the interpretation of investment treaties, whether by virtue of
being directly binding on the parties to the BIT as treaty rules, or as customary
international law.1518
9.2.1.1. Article 31 VCLT
Most tribunals start by invoking Article 31 VCLT when interpreting treaties.1519 The
VCLT’s approach to the interpretation of Article 31 VCLT was summarised by the
1513 Schreuer, Convention, para. 374.
1514 See the two awards on jurisdiction, 27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988, Southern Pacific
Properties Ltd (Middle East) et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, XVI YBCA 16 (1991).
1515 Schreuer, Convention, para. 376.
1516 Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 140/1.
1517 Schreuer, Convention, para. 374.
1518 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.64.
1519 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 31. See, e.g. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 44 ILM 138 (2005).
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tribunal in AdT v. Bolivia1520 as follows: “Interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention is a process of progressive encirclement where the interpreter starts under
the general rule with:
1. the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty,
2. in their context, and
3. in light of the treaty’s object and purpose, and by cycling through this three steps
inquiry iteratively closes in upon the proper interpretation”.1521
Tribunals have often interpreted investment treaties in light of their object and purpose,
frequently by looking at their preambles.1522 This development, which has typically led
to an interpretation that is favourable to the investor,1523 has also come under criticism,
and one tribunal has warned against overextending the method of looking at object and
purpose.1524
9.2.1.2. Article 32 VCLT
Occasionally, tribunals will refer to the supplementary means of interpretation
contained in Article 32 VCTL.1525 Indeed, if the primary means of interpretation of
Article 31 VCLT lead to an obscure, or manifestly absurd result or to one that needs
confirmation, the tribunals may rely on supplementary means under Article 32 VCLT,
i.e. on the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion of the
treaty.1526
However, while it is rare for bilateral negotiations to produce the kind of explanatory
reports,1527 or official records of plenary debates, which are characteristic of multilateral
negotiation, when the confidential working papers on the negotiation of NAFTA were
1520 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October
2005.
1521 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.68.
1522 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 32.
1523 The Amco v. Indonesia tribunal in interpreting the ICSID Convention pointed out that investment
protection was also in the longer term interest of host States (see Amco Asia Corp. and others v. Republic
of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389, para. 23).
1524 See Plama Consortium Ltd et al. v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005,
44 ILM 721 (2005), para. 193 (see Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 32).
1525 See, e.g. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005 (see
Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 32).
1526 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-9.
1527 The negotiating history of BITs is typically not documented (Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 33).
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produced in Pope&Talbot v. Canada,1528 they did little to illuminate the matters in
dispute.1529 Indeed, references to travaux préparatoires in investment arbitration have
not proved fruitful:
- in AdT v. Bolivia1530 where the tribunal requested evidence of the negotiation history
of the Netherlands/Bolivia BIT, but it received very limited information of little use;
- in Pope&Talbot v. Canada1531 where the tribunal received a substantial amount of
information but it did little to illuminate the matters in dispute.1532
Conversely, the drafting history of the ICSID Convention is documented in detail,
readily available, and easily accessible through analytical index.1533
9.2.1.3. Comments
It has been argued that in practice the VCLT is only of limited use in giving guidance to
a tribunal in its interpretive task—problems arise because the VCLT’s rules of
construction are capable of supporting a wide range of potential interpretations. Indeed,
the fact that both parties to a dispute usually rely on its provisions is a good indication
of its inherent flexibility.1534
9.2.2. Law applicable to the dispute
In the absence of an agreement between the parties on choice of law, the law applicable
to the dispute between the parties would be the law of the host State and applicable
rules of international law.1535 A method whereby expressions of consent are interpreted
in the framework of domestic law appears particularly attractive if the original consent
clause is contained in domestic legislation.1536
1528 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Interim Award (26 June 2000) and Final Award
(10 April 2001). Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNITRAL Tribunal, Damages Award (31 May
2002).
1529 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.72.
1530 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October
2005.
1531 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Interim Award (26 June 2000) and Final Award
(10 April 2001). Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNITRAL Tribunal, Damages Award (31 May
2002).
1532 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.70.
1533 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 33.
1534 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 3.71.
1535 See Article 42(1) ICSID Convention.
1536 Schreuer, Convention, para. 374.
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9.2.3. Comments
9.2.3.1. In general
It has been observed that both these approaches, though tempting at first sight, are not
convincing, as:
- an ICSID clause in a treaty is only the first step towards consent between the parties
(the perfected consent is an agreement between the host State and the investor), as
the host State’s offer must be accepted in writing by the investor;
- in the same vein a provision in the host State’s domestic legislation referring to
dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention is transformed into consent between
the parties merely upon its acceptance by the investor; and
- an investment agreement between the host State and the investor containing a
consent clause is neither a treaty nor simply a contract under domestic law.1537
Therefore, the SPP Ltd. v. Egypt tribunal,1538 dealing with Egyptian national investment
law, refused to accept the contentions of either party and chose to adopt a middle route:
the fact that the ICSID clause was based on Egyptian legislation did not mean that this
made other provisions of Egyptian law applicable to the jurisdictional issues, nor did the
tribunal accept that the ICSID clause should be interpreted by the application of rules of
treaty interpretation.1539
9.2.3.2. In the case of consent clauses contained in contracts or investment agreements
In the case of contracts or investment agreements the same law governing the
substantive validity of arbitration agreements in commercial arbitration should be
applicable.1540 Indeed, in such a situation the consent clause is an arbitration agreement
specific by its very nature and shaped to meet the needs of a given transaction. Also, the
interpretation should be based on that law.
9.2.3.3. In the case of treaties
It has been observed that while an arbitration agreement in a contract is specific by its
very nature, as it is shaped to meet the needs of a given transaction, dispute resolution
1537 Schreuer, Convention, para. 375.
1538 SPP(ME) Ltd. and SPP Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988.
1539 Schreuer, Convention, para. 377.
1540 See under III.3.3.
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provisions in treaties define jurisdiction in the abstract for an unlimited number of
future investments.1541 Moreover, it has also been argued that the conditions that attach
to the investor’s consent flow not from an agreement to which the investor is a party but
from an inter-State bargain, being therefore a consent of privilege rather than reciprocal
obligation.1542 Indeed, the conditions of access to the system are stipulated by the States
parties to the relevant investment treaty as part of their agreement to establish the
investment treaty as a governing arrangement.1543
However, perhaps already at the time when the investor makes his investment, or, at
least, at the time when the investor introduces a request for arbitration (instituting
proceeding), a transformation process takes place. In fact, while it is true that in treaty
arbitration proceedings only one of the drafters of the BIT is present, i.e. the respondent
State, and that for the claimant the dispute resolution provision is res inter alios
acta,1544 it has nevertheless to be considered that the investment, and the possible
dispute arising out of it, is an individual and concrete (specific) one. Therefore, in treaty
arbitration the dispute is ultimately not between the drafters of the BIT but between an
investor and a State. Indeed, the (host) State gives double consent:1545
- a consent which is general and abstract, to another State—in the BITs—or to
various other States—in multilateral treaties—to use arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism in investment disputes with investors of its counterpart/s (the
other/s State/s); and
- a consent to the investor of its counterpart/s (the other State in the case of BITs or
the others States in the case of a multilateral treaty) to resolve an individual and
concrete investment dispute through arbitration. This consent arises from a standing
offer (general and abstract consent) contained in a BIT or a multilateral treaty which
is then transformed with the acceptance of the investor (individual and concrete
consent) in a consent which relates to an individual and concrete dispute.1546
1541 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
1542 Van Harten, p. 70.
1543 Ibid.
1544 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
1545 The expression “double consent” has also been used, however in a slightly different way, to express
the consent given by the State on the one hand to the ICSID Convention and on the other hand in the
arbitration agreement (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-46, footnote 53). Cremades, p. 153, speaks in this
context of dual or two-phase consent.
1546 See also Article 25(1) ICSID Convention: “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision
or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally”.
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Under investment treaties the investor’s consent is always specific, just as the State’s
consent is always general,1547 even though the latter then gets transformed into a
consent which relates to an individual and concrete dispute. Due to the particularity of
this transformation process of the State’s consent, a two-stage interpretation process
seems to be appropriate:
- in the first stage, the general and abstract BIT/multilateral treaty in which the
respondent State has given its general and abstract consent (standing offer) has to be
interpreted; and, then,
- in the second stage, the interpretation of the individual and concrete consent of the
investor takes place as well as the consent given by the State in light of the
individual and concrete dispute which has arisen.1548
The view that has been expressed that in treaty arbitration more objective criteria will
by essence prevail and the subjective element will play a lesser role, because for the
claimant the dispute resolution provision is res inter alios acta,1549 should in my opinion
be differentiated. In fact, while in the first stage of the interpretation process there is not
a meeting of the minds of individuals or corporations, there is a meeting of the minds
between two (in the case of BITs) or more (in the case of multilateral treaties) States.
Therefore, subjective elements may play a role. Moreover, also in the second stage,
where there is a concrete investment, or where a concrete dispute has arisen, subjective
elements may play a role, particularly in the interpretation of the investor’s consent.
9.2.3.4. In the case of unilaterally enacted national legislation
As with treaty arbitration, dispute resolution provisions contained in national
legislations define jurisdiction in the abstract for an unlimited number of future
investments. However, contrary to treaty arbitration, the conditions that attach to the
investor’s consent flow neither from an agreement to which the investor is a party nor
from an inter-State bargain. Indeed, the standing offer of the State (consent) derives
from unilaterally enacted legislation.
In SPP Ltd. v. Egypt the issue was, therefore, whether certain unilaterally enacted
legislation had created an international obligation under a multilateral treaty (ICSID).
1547 Van Harten, p. 69.
1548 The standard arbitration clauses in BITs make a clear distinction between investment disputes arising
between investors and host States, and disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the BIT
arising between the States parties to the BIT (Crawford, p. 362).
1549 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-12.
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This involved statutory and treaty interpretation as well as certain aspects of
international law governing unilateral juridical acts.1550 In dealing generally with the
interpretation of dispute settlement provisions in national investment laws the tribunal
held that it was not bound by the interpretation of the provisions submitted by the State
party which drafted them. These provisions are governed by the principles of statutory
interpretation which may be influenced by the rules of interpretation of treaty law; this
is particularly true where the provisions of the national laws relate to obligations under
international treaties.1551 Also of relevance are the principles of international law
applicable to unilateral declarations.1552
The SPP tribunal proceeded to interpret the jurisdictional clause with the help of general
principles of statutory interpretation, by relying on a decree implementing the original
legislation, by reference to historical considerations and in the light of its object and
purpose. On the other hand, the dissenting opinion, while agreeing that the question of
interpretation of the jurisdictional clause was not governed by Article 42 ICSID
Convention which only deals with the substance of the dispute, argued that the
jurisdictional clause in the Egyptian legislation had only to be construed in its context as
national law and that, consequently, rules of treaty interpretation and the principles of
international law were inapplicable.1553
9.3. Inclinations in interpreting?
Closely related to a treaty’s object and purpose is the issue of a restrictive or effective
interpretation of treaties.1554 The question of whether consent should be construed in a
restrictive or effective way primarily affects the relationship between host State and
investor. Indeed, the fact that the State, in giving prospective consent in an investment
treaty, exposes itself to claims by any investor with economic interests that are subject
to regulation by the State may lead to arguments that the State’s general consent should
be interpreted restrictively. Moreover, the fact that arbitral proceedings constitute a
derogation from the right to have recourse to national courts may also lead to the same
conclusion. On the other hand, the need for security and foreseeability for investors
could result in the opposite conclusion (extensive interpretation).
1550 Schreuer, Convention, para. 377.
1551 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-20.
1552 SPP Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 143.
1553 Schreuer, Convention, para. 377.
1554 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 32.
236
While some tribunals seem to have favoured a restrictive interpretation of treaty
provisions that led to a limitation of the State’s sovereignty,1555 others have rejected a
restrictive interpretation, at times favouring an interpretation that gives full effect to the
rights of investors.1556 Yet other tribunals have distanced themselves from either
approach and have followed a balanced approach to interpretation.1557
9.3.1. Restrictive interpretation
It has been observed that a recurrent theme in the pleadings before ICSID tribunals is
the argument that consent by the host State to the Centre’s jurisdiction should be
construed restrictively.1558 This argument is normally brought forward by the State party
interested in moderating State liability in order to preserve governmental discretion.
Thus, in Holiday Inns v. Morocco, the respondent Government insisted on the need for a
restrictive interpretation of a State’s consent to arbitrate—which has to be seen as a
derogation from its sovereignty.1559 Also in Amco v. Indonesia the tribunal, which was
confronted with the argument that consent given by a sovereign State to an arbitration
convention amounted to a limitation of its sovereignty and should be construed
restrictively,1560 rejected this contention categorically.1561
In SOABI v. Senegal,1562 the Government argued that Article 25 ICSID Convention had
to be interpreted strictly “as with any provision derogating from general rules of
municipal law”.1563 The tribunal noted that consent to arbitral proceedings constituted a
derogation from the right to have recourse to national courts. Such consent should not
be presumed. But it refused to accept the consequence that the interpretation of an
1555 SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406, para. 171; Noble
Ventures v. Romania, Award, 12 October 2005, para. 55.
1556 Methanex v. United States, Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction, 7 August 2002, paras 103-105; Aguas
del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 91; SGS v. Philippines,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518, para. 116; Eureko v. Poland, Partial
Award, 19 August 2005, 12 ICSID Reports 335, para. 248; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction,
16 May 2006, paras 59 and 64.
1557 Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 32 et seq.
1558 Schreuer, Convention, para. 380. See also UNCTAD, p. 33.
1559 Lalive, World Bank, pp. 153 and 158.
1560 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 393, 397.
1561 Ibid., p. 394.
1562 SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 August 1984.
1563 SOABI v. Senegal, Award, 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports 185, 205.
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expression of consent should be stricter with regard to the consent of a State than with
regard to that of an investor.1564
In SPP v. Egypt1565 the argument of the restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional
instruments was raised once again, this time in relation to an ICSID clause in national
legislation. The tribunal found that there was no presumption of jurisdiction,
particularly where a sovereign State was involved, and that jurisdiction only existed
insofar as consent thereto had been given by the parties; equally, there was no
presumption against the conferment of jurisdiction with respect to a sovereign State.1566
Therefore, “jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor
expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith”.1567
It has been observed that in investment arbitration, due to the circumstances that
consent has to be constructed from the standing consent given by the host State through
the treaty and the subsequent consent given by the investor at the time the claim is
submitted to arbitration, it is particularly important to construe the ambit of the host
State’s consent strictly.1568 I do not agree with this view which stems from the
assumption that there is no meeting of the minds between investor and host State.1569
Indeed also in treaty arbitration there is a meeting of the minds, even though of a
different type than the one in commercial arbitration. A meeting of the minds only
presupposes that there is a valid offer which can be accepted, whilst the temporal
sequence or the fact that the outcome is not written down in a single document do not
really matter.
One could even argue that the consent between the host State and investor should,
following the principle of “in dubio contra stipulatorem” (or interpretation contra
proferentem), be interpreted in an extensive way when the wording of the BIT is not
clear. Indeed, the investor has no influence with regard to the wording used for dispute
resolution provisions contained in BITs, even though the standing offer is not the result
of a unique drafter (host State) but of an agreement (international treaty) between two
States. However, it has also to be asked whether this principle should be applied to a
State-investor relationship. In my opinion the latter question has to be answered in the
1564 Schreuer, Convention, para. 383.
1565 SPP(ME) Ltd. and SPP Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988.
1566 Schreuer, Convention, para. 384.
1567 SPP v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 143/4.
1568 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
1569 Ibid.
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affirmative. Indeed, with the BIT the host State not only concludes an international
treaty with the investor’s State, but in the meantime it also makes a standing offer to
potential investors of the latter State. Nevertheless, the use of the principle “in dubio
contra stipulatorem” should not lead to an inclination in interpreting, but should be a
rule when the wording of the standing offer is unclear.
9.3.2. Effective/extensive interpretation
While the respondent governments have insisted on the need for a restrictive
interpretation of a State’s undertakings to arbitrate which had to be seen as a derogation
from its sovereignty, the claimants have at times attempted to invoke an alleged
principle of interpretation in the opposite sense:1570 that of effective interpretation
epitomised in the Latin phrase ut res magis valeat quam pereat.1571 That said, even
where tribunals do not boldly declare their colours for the investor rights position, they
advance it none the less by the common practice of resolving doubts arising from
ambiguity in the treaty in favour of investor protection. A clear statement of this
presumption was enunciated by the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines:
“The object and purpose of the BIT supports an effective Interpretation of Article X(2). The
BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. According to
the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions for Investments
by Investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other’. It is legitimate to resolve
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered
investments”.1572
The same presumption has been adopted by other tribunals,1573 usually to support a
finding in favour of jurisdiction.1574 The adoption of these interpretive presumptions in
favour of investor protection evokes the rights-based school of interpretation that
deems it appropriate to resolve legal uncertainty in favour of the protection of
individuals from the State.1575
1570 See, e.g. in Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco (see Lalive, World Bank, p. 153).
1571 Schreuer, Convention, para. 380. See also UNCTAD, p. 33.
1572 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Case No. ARB/02/6 (29 January 2004), para. 116.
1573 For a listing of cases, see Van Harten, p. 138, footnote 78.
1574 Van Harten, p. 138.
1575 Ibid.
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9.3.3. Objective interpretation
It has been observed that neither of the two presumptions or alleged principles of
interpretations carry much weight when applied to expressions of consent to the
jurisdiction of ICSID, because neither a principle of restrictive interpretation nor a
doctrine of “effet utile” will do justice to a consent clause.1576
In Amco v. Indonesia,1577 the tribunal was confronted with the argument that the consent
given by a sovereign State to an arbitration convention amounting to a limitation of its
sovereignty should be construed restrictively and stated that an arbitration agreement “is
not to be construed restrictively, nor as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It is to be
construed in a way which leads to find out and respect the common will of the
parties”.1578 Also, in SPP v. Egypt the tribunal held that “jurisdictional instruments are
to be interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good
faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if—but only if—the force of the arguments
militating in favour of it is preponderant”.1579 Therefore, expressions of consent to
ICSID’s jurisdiction will rather have to be read on their own merits and with the help of
the usual methods of interpretation both national and international.1580
9.4. Principles of interpretation
9.4.1. Pacta sunt servanda
The Amco tribunal not only held that a convention to arbitrate is not to be construed
restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact broadly or liberally, but also that it is to be
construed in a way which leads to finding and respecting the common will of the
parties: such a method of interpretation is but the application of the fundamental
principle pacta sunt servanda, a principle common to all systems of internal law and to
international law.1581 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is considered to be a
principle forming part of the lex mercatoria.1582
1576 UNCTAD, p. 34.
1577 Amco Asia Corp and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983,
89 ILR 379 (1992), 1 ICSID Reports 389 (1993).
1578 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, p. 394. See also Weiniger, para. 12-8.
1579 SPP v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 143/4.
1580 Schreuer, Convention, para. 385.
1581 ICSID Award in Case No. ARB/81/1, Amco Asia Corp v. Republic of Indonesia, 21 ILM 1022 (1985),
134, p. 398.
1582 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, paras 18-56 et seq.
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It has been critically observed that the reasoning of the Amco tribunal, in rejecting
Indonesia’s argument that the tribunal should adopt a restrictive interpretive approach in
favour of the sovereign, by applying instead the principle of pacta sunt servanda
between investor and State (i.e. party autonomy), may be appropriate in contract-based
arbitration because, when interpreting an agreement to arbitrate between private parties
to a contract or between States parties to a treaty, the underlying reciprocity of the
private law framework is maintained.1583 However, a problem arises when this analysis
is transferred into the realm of treaty arbitration—as has been the case in numerous
awards1584—and more broadly when the specific consent of an investor and the general
consent of the State are equated to construct artificially an agreement to arbitrate, as if
in a commercial arbitration.1585
9.4.2. Interpretation in good faith
In Amco v. Indonesia1586 the tribunal held that as a general principle of law “any
convention, including conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in good faith, that is
to say by taking into account the consequences of their commitments the parties may be
considered as having reasonably and legitimately envisaged”.1587 Moreover, it has to be
observed that the theoretical foundation underlying the concept of estoppel1588 is that of
good faith.1589
9.4.3. According the spirit of ICSID: teleological approach
The Amco tribunal also expressed the view that the proper method for interpretation of
the consent agreement is to read it in the spirit of the ICSID Convention and in light of
1583 Van Harten, p. 125.
1584 See, e.g. AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/17, para. 60; CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para.
34; Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998, 38 ILM 708,
para. 55. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, Decision on Merits, 11 October 2002, 42
ILM 85, 6 ICSID Rep. 192, 15(3) WTAM 273, para. 43.
1585 See, e.g. Ethyl v. Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998, paras 59-60; SGS Société Générale
de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, (2004), 8
ICSID Rep. 518, 16(3) WTAM 91, para. 145 (Van Harten, p. 125).
1586 Amco Asia Corp and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983,
89 ILR 379 (1992), 1 ICSID Reports 389 (1993), para. 14.
1587 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, p. 394.
1588 On “estoppel” in international law, see Brownlie, pp. 643 et seq.
1589 See Hirsch, p. 54; Brownlie, p. 644.
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its objectives.1590 ICSID arbitration is in the interest of both parties, as expressed in
the first paragraph of the Convention’s Preamble. Indeed, the investor’s interest in
submitting investment disputes to international arbitration is matched by a parallel
interest of the host State: to protect investments is to protect the general interests of
development and of developing countries.1591
9.5. Applicability of consent clauses to successive legal instruments
As investment operations frequently involve complex arrangements expressed in a
number of successive agreements, a special problem of interpretation is the applicability
of consent clauses to successive legal instruments.1592 These agreements may be
concluded in stages and over a period of time, and, although economically interrelated,
they are legally distinct and often have different features.1593 Sometimes, ICSID clauses
are included in some of these agreements but not in others.1594 If ICSID clauses are
neither repeated nor incorporated by reference in related agreements, the issue arises as
to whether the parties’ consent to ICSID’s jurisdictions extends to matters regulated by
these related agreements.1595
ICSID tribunals have dealt with this question in a number of cases.1596 These cases
suggest that ICSID tribunals are inclined to take a broad view of consent clauses
where the agreement between the parties is reflected in several successive
instruments, and, thus, expressions of consent are not applied narrowly to the specific
document in which they appear but are read in the context of the parties’ overall
relationship.1597 It has been observed that while the need to settle an investment dispute
finally and comprehensively would make any other solution impracticable, on the other
hand, this approach can be maintained only to the extent that it reflects the parties’
presumed intentions.1598
1590 UNCTAD, p. 33.
1591 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, p. 400. This teleological approach
to interpretation has been to some extent also followed in SPP(ME) Ltd. and SPP Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 158. Schreuer, Convention, para. 382.
1592 UNCTAD, p. 34.
1593 Schreuer, Convention, para. 361.
1594 See UNCTAD, p. 34.
1595 Delaume, How to Draft, pp. 171 et seq. Schreuer, Convention, para. 361.
1596 Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 May 1979; Lalive, World
Bank, pp. 123, 156-159; Klöckner v. Cameroon, Award, 21 October 1983, Decision on Annulment, 3 May
1985, 2 ICSID Reports 13-18, 65-69, 89-93, 97-117; SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 August 1984,
Award, 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports 185-188, 204-208, 293-322.
1597 See UNCTAD, pp. 34 et seq.
1598 Ibid.
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9.6. Comments
Increasingly counsel and arbitrators who have a commercial or private law background,
and are used to construing arbitration agreements by application of the rules of contract
interpretation, also act in investment arbitrations.1599 It has been observed that, even
though it may be too early to make an assessment, there are signs pointing in the
direction that the increasing presence on international tribunals of arbitrators trained in
commercial arbitration will influence interpretation methods.1600
It should also be underlined that, similarly to commercial arbitration, there are different
schools of thought for interpretation in public international law: according to the
subjective school, the goal of the interpretation is to ascertain the intent; pursuant to the
objective school, the goal of interpretation must be to ascertain the meaning of the text,
there being a presumption that the parties’ intent is reflected in this text; and in the
teleological school, the focus is primarily placed on the object and purpose of the
treaty.1601
Moreover, the borders between what is classically considered to be public
international law, on the one hand, and private international law respectively
commercial/private law, on the other hand, are getting more and more diffuse. This
phenomenon is supported by the fact that in the globalised economic arena the State is
often an economic player1602 as is the investor. Thus, it may nowadays be questioned if,
for instance, the relationship between a State and a multinational (or transnational)
corporation is really a “vertical” one. Indeed, while with a view to the State’s
sovereignty and of the “law-making” process this may be true, from an optic of
bargaining powers and allocation of economic resources the relationship would rather
seem to be a “horizontal” one.
While, on the one hand, there are structural differences between commercial and
investment arbitration, on the other hand, it should also be clearly differentiated in the
case of the latter type of arbitration between:
1599 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-10.
1600 See, e.g. a reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration in the context of the
interpretation of the MFN-clause in Plama v. Bulgaria (Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-13).
1601 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-11; Sinclair I., pp. 114 et seq.; Brownlie, p. 602 et seq.
1602 See, e.g. the phenomenon of State funds.
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- situations where the host State gives its standing offer—as is often, but not
always,1603 the case—on the basis of an international treaty with another or other
State/s (BITs or multilateral treaty); and
- situations where there is an agreement to arbitrate between the host State and the
investors.
Indeed, the situation in investment arbitration, where the conditions that attach to the
investor’s consent do not flow from an agreement to which the investor is a party but
from an inter-State bargain,1604 is to a certain extent comparable to that of arbitration
clauses contained in standard form contracts where the conditions are not really
bargained and there is a sort of general consent (open offer to arbitrate) from which has
drafted the standard form contracts. As the consumer accepts the arbitration clause
contained in standard form contracts, the investor accepts the conditions made by a
standing offer of the host State. Nevertheless, both consumer and investor have a
possibility of choice, albeit, possibly, only a limited one. Indeed, although this will not
be the primary criterion when deciding to invest in a particular country, the investor is
able to decide whether to invest in one country or another, therefore accepting
arbitration, when this form of dispute resolution method is provided for in the BIT
between his home country and the host State. Furthermore, the fact that the investor
may also not accept arbitration as a dispute resolution form is even truer when “fork in
the road” provisions are contained in BITs. Indeed, in those cases the investor may also
choose the State courts as dispute resolution fora.
Moreover, in investment arbitration the standing offer of arbitration as a neutral forum
for solving disputes is provided for in a treaty between the host State and the investor’s
State. In other words, the standing offer of the host State stems from a bargained
international treaty with the investor’s State which is often a strong capital-exporting
State. Therefore, the issue encountered in consumer arbitration—of an abuse of the
bargaining power and, thus, of the validity of the arbitration agreement—is in
investment arbitration, with regard to the relation between investor and host State,
attenuated by the fact that the standing offer stems from a bargained international treaty.
It can also be observed that, with the expanding network of BITs, arbitration becomes,
increasingly, not only the neutral forum but also the natural forum for solving
international investment disputes, and that, furthermore, there are harmonisation
1603 See national investment laws.
1604 See Van Harten, p. 68.
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tendencies going on.1605 These tendencies also lead to the question about precedents in
investment arbitration. In fact, while a coherent case law strengthens the predictability
of decisions and enhances their authority, in investment arbitration each tribunal is
constituted ad hoc for the particular case, and it is therefore more difficult to develop a
consistent case law than in international courts such as the ICJ or the ECHR.1606 Thus,
although discussion of previous cases and of interpretations adopted in them is a regular
feature in almost every decision, at the same time it is also well-established that
tribunals in investment arbitration are not bound by previous decisions of other
tribunals.1607 Nevertheless, in AES Corp. v. Argentina1608 the tribunal entered into an
extensive discussion of the value of previous decisions as “precedents” and held that:
“each decision or award delivered by an ICSID Tribunal is only binding on the parties
to the dispute settled by this decision or award. There is so far no rule of precedent in
general international law; nor is there any within the specific ICSID system”.1609
Finally, with regard to the inclination in interpreting, the structure of investment
arbitration, as well as its development, and the interests at stake, do not really make it
appear as necessary to interpret consent with a particular inclination (neither
restrictive nor expansive). This is even truer considering that, as was held by the Amco
tribunal, the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda is common to all systems of
internal law and to international law.1610
10. TREATY v. CONTRACT CLAIMS
The distinction between contract claims and treaty claims has emerged in many
investment arbitrations.1611 It has been observed that no issue in the field of investment
arbitration is more fundamental, or more disputed, than the distinction between treaty
1605 The tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 March 2007, para. 67, saw it as its
duty to contribute to a harmonious development of law.
1606 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 35 et seq.
1607 Tribunals have pointed out repeatedly that they are not bound by previous cases. See Amco v.
Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 395; Amco v. Indonesia,
Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 521, para. 44; LETCO v. Liberia, Award, 31
March 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 346, para. 352; Feldman v. Mexico, Award, 16 December 2002, 7 ICSID
Reports 341, para. 107; Enron v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), 2 August 2004,
11 ICSID Reports 295, para. 25; Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June
2005, paras 36-52.
1608 AES Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005, 12 ICSID Reports 312.
1609 Ibid., at para. 23. Footnote omitted.
1610 See ICSID Award in Case No. ARB/81/1, Amco Asia Corp v. Republic of Indonesia, 21 ILM 1022
(1985), 134, p. 398.
1611 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 220.
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and contract.1612 Indeed, the jurisdictional issues in treaty arbitration are particularly
complex because of the difficult co-existence of treaty and contract dispute resolution
mechanisms.1613 The respondent’s objection that the case merely involves contract
claims, and the claimant’s insistence that treaty rights are involved have become routine
features of many recent cases.1614
While the general notion is that the BIT tribunal has been created in order to arbitrate
so-called treaty claims, i.e. claims based on a breach of rights granted to the investor by
the host State, on the other hand, mere contract-based claims where the investor alleges
nothing else than a breach of the commercial contract by the State party to this contract
should principally not be brought before the BIT stipulated panel.1615 However, things
are not that easy and there are exceptions:
- parties can agree to submit a contractual dispute to ICSID, provided that the
jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention are met.1616 Indeed, in
particular, a BIT may also define the jurisdiction of the tribunal such that it
comprises all claims in relation to an investment regardless of the nature of the
claim;1617
- alternatively, the breach of the contract by the State may be such that it amounts to a
breach of international law;
- finally, a so-called umbrella clause in a BIT may elevate the contract breach to a
treaty claim.1618
10.1. Distinction between BIT claims and contract claims
The need to make such a distinction arises in a particularly acute form where the parties
are also in contractual relations with each other—typically by means of a concession
contract.1619 Indeed, most treaty arbitrations involve an investment that gave rise to a
contract.1620 The well accepted distinction between treaty and contract claims was
described in Vivendi in the following way:
1612 Crawford, p. 351.
1613 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-15.
1614 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 220.
1615 Zeiler, p. 5.
1616 Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 398.
1617 See also Crawford, p. 361.
1618 Zeiler, p. 5. See also McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.34. This point is, however, not undisputed
(see Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 220).
1619 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.33.
1620 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-15.
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“A State may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa, and this is
certainly true of these provisions of the BIT ... Whether there has been a breach of the
BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different questions. Each of
these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law—in
the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the
proper law of the contract”.1621
Therefore, where the contract itself contains a dispute resolution clause, it will be
essential to distinguish between disputes covered by that clause and those amenable to
treaty arbitration.1622 This distinction found emphasis in Lanco v. Argentina1623 and
Salini v. Morocco,1624 as well as in the annulment decision rendered in Vivendi v.
Argentina1625 and, later on, in the decision on jurisdiction in Azurix v. Argentina.1626 The
evidence resulting from these cases, although on the basis of somewhat diverging
rationales, is that the investor has a right to seek the international responsibility of the
host State on the basis of the applicable investment treaty notwithstanding the forum
selection clause contained in the investment agreement.1627 This reasoning was also
adopted by the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan:
“As a matter of general principle, the same set of facts can give rise to different claims
grounded on differing legal orders; the municipal and the international legal orders”.1628
10.2. Contractual claims
The constant conclusion of the tribunals has been that a valid and effective contractual
dispute resolution clause deprives the ICSID tribunal of its jurisdiction, and that even
the fact that the investor has accepted the host States offer to ICSID arbitration cannot
1621 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Decision on
annulment, 3 July 2002, 19(1) ICSID Review-FILJ, paras 95-96 (2004). A distinction between treaty
claims and contract claims was also made by other ICSID tribunals, e.g. SGS Société Générale de
Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, (2003) 18
ICSID Review-FILJ 301 paras 146 et seq. (2003); Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision of 8 December
2003, (2004) 43 ILM 262, paras 75 et seq. and 88 et seq.; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic
of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ARB/01/8 (17 July 2003), 42 ILM 788 (2003), para. 80.
1622 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.33.
1623 Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on
Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, 40 ILM 457 (2001).
1624 Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case
No. ARB/00/4 (23 July 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003) or 1 Clunet 196 (2002).
1625 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale des
Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 41 ILM 1135
(2002).
1626 Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision of 8 December 2003, (2004) 43 ILM 262 (Gaillard, SGS, p. 328).
1627 Gaillard, SGS, p. 328 et seq.
1628 SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 147.
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affect this proposition; in other words, when the investor agrees with a contractual
dispute resolution clause, it waives its right to bring its contractual claims before an
ICSID tribunal.1629
The SGS v. Philippines tribunal1630 declined its jurisdiction for such contract claims
which became treaty claims by virtue of an umbrella agreement, “where the essential
basis of a claim” is “a breach of contract”.1631 In such a case, “any valid choice of forum
clause in the contract” prevails.1632
10.3. Referring contractual disputes to an ICSID tribunal
An investor could seek to include in its contract with a State an arbitration clause that
refers contractual disputes to ICSID, as opposed to the traditional private international
arbitration institutions such as the ICC or the LCIA, provided that the jurisdictional
requirements of the ICSID Convention are met.1633 Indeed, ICSID has published a set of
model clauses to guide those wishing to submit either existing or future disputes to
ICSID arbitration. There are a small minority of cases before ICISD where jurisdiction
is conferred under an investment contract and where the dispute is wholly contractual in
nature.1634
10.4. Usefulness of the distinction with regard to consent to
arbitration
10.4.1. When the investment contract contains a jurisdiction clause
The distinction between treaty and contract claims is especially useful when the
investment contract contains an exclusive choice of court or an arbitration clause.1635
1629 Zeiler, p. 6.
1630 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29
January 2004.
1631 Zeiler, p. 6.
1632 SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 153.
1633 See Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 398.
1634 See, e.g. CDC Group plc v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14. The parties
expressly submitted disputes to ICSID in the loan contract, which became the subject of the dispute that
led to arbitration (Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 398).
1635 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-16.
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The issue is whether an investor, by agreeing to the choice of domestic forum in a
contract, waives its right, granted by a BIT, to go to international arbitration.1636
10.4.1.1. Priority of ICSID arbitration over domestic courts
In Lanco v. Argentina,1637 jurisdiction was based on an offer of ICSID arbitration,
accepted by the investor, in the BIT between Argentina and the United States. While the
concession contract contained a contractual choice of forum clause, the ICSID tribunal
rejected the respondent’s objection to ICSID’s jurisdiction first on the ground that the
clause did not constitute a “previously agreed dispute settlement procedure” under the
terms of the BIT; moreover, the Lanco tribunal also upheld the ICSID’s jurisdiction on
the additional ground that an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract did not defeat
ICSID’s jurisdiction.1638 Indeed, the Lanco tribunal found that:
“when the parties give their consent to ICSID arbitration, they lose their right to seek to
settle the dispute in any other forum”.1639
Thus, in Lanco the BIT procedure referring the dispute to ICSID prevailed over the
purported contractual forum selection clause not so much on the basis of a distinction
between contract claims and BIT claims but more on a general concept of priority of
ICSID arbitration over domestic courts.1640 Indeed, the tribunal relied on the wording of
Article 26 ICSID Convention, namely that consent to ICSID arbitration is “to the
exclusion of any other remedy”.1641
10.4.1.2. Distinction between BIT claims and contract claims
In Salini v. Morocco,1642 on the one hand ICSID jurisdiction was based on an offer of
consent, accepted by the investor, in the BIT between Italy and Morocco, and, on the
other hand, a contract between the investors and ADM, a State entity that contained a
clause referring disputes to the administrative courts of Rabat.1643 While the respondent
objected to ICSID’s jurisdiction on the basis of that clause, the claimants argued that the
1636 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 289.
1637 Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on
Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, 40 ILM 457 (2001).
1638 See Schreuer, Vivendi, pp. 289 et seq.
1639 Lanco v. Argentina, para. 36.
1640 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 290.
1641 Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 400.
1642 Salini Costruttori and Italstrade v. Morocco, Decision of 23 July 2001, (2003) 42 ILM 609.
1643 Schreuer, Vivendi, pp. 290 et seq.
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consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction, contained in the BIT, should prevail over the
contractual acceptance of another forum.1644 The tribunal found that the competence of
the administrative courts was not subject to the parties’ agreement, and that, therefore,
there was no true choice of forum.1645 It followed that the contractual forum selection
clause did not oust ICSID’s jurisdiction.1646 The Salini tribunal clearly adopted the
distinction between BIT claims and contract claims which has since found unequivocal
acceptance in subsequent cases.1647
The Vivendi I tribunal, in distinguishing between claims based on the BIT between
Argentina and France and claims based on a Concession Contract held that the forum
selection clause in the Concession Contract did not affect the claimant’s right to go
to international arbitration to pursue violations of the BIT.1648 The central point in
Vivendi I was the decision that the forum selection clause in the Concession Contract
did not oust the ICSID’s jurisdiction based on the BIT, the decisive reason for this
finding being that contract claims and BIT claims have to be distinguished because
they have different legal bases. Therefore, even though the two types of claims are
intimately linked and appear indistinguishable, an ICSID tribunal may not decline
jurisdiction over BIT claims on the ground that there is a selection of another forum
with respect to contract disputes.1649 The tribunals have since followed the distinction
between contract claims, which are subject to contractual forum selection clauses, and
treaty claims, which are not affected by such clauses.1650
However, in the presence of a jurisdiction clause, the investor can resort to
investment arbitration for treaty claims, but not for contract claims, as was found in,
among other cases, CMS v. Argentina:1651
“As contractual claims are different from treaty claims, even if there had been or there
currently was a recourse to the local courts for breach of contract, this would not have
prevented submission of the treaty claims to arbitration”.1652
1644 Salini Costruttori and Italstrade v. Morocco, paras 25 and 26.
1645 Ibid., para. 27.
1646 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 291.
1647 Ibid.
1648 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 218. See Vivendi v. Argentina, Award, 21 November 2000 (“Vivendi I”), paras
53-54.
1649 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 288.
1650 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 219.
1651 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No.
ARB/01/8 (17 July 2003), 42 ILM 788 (2003).
1652 CMS v. Argentina, para. 80.
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Indeed, “where ‘the fundamental basis of the claim’ is a treaty laying down an
independent standard by which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence
of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent
state or one of its subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty
standard”.1653
10.4.1.3. Comments
Under this consistent practice the treaty-based jurisdiction of international arbitral
tribunals, to decide on violations of BITs, is not affected by domestic forum selection
clauses in contracts.1654 Indeed, this coherent line of decisions demonstrates that a
forum selection clause contained in a contract between the investor and the host State
does not affect the competence of a tribunal, based on a BIT, because the two
proceedings are based on different causes of action even though they may arise from the
same set of facts.1655 The contractual selection of domestic courts is only restricted to
violations of the respective contract.1656 Therefore, while dispute settlement clauses in
contracts are only designed to deal with contract claims, ICSID tribunals based on BITs
are competent to hear claims arising from the terms of the BIT.1657
10.4.2. In presence of a “fork in the road” provision in the investment treaty
The question of the effect of a choice of court clause in a contract is sometimes linked
to a so-called “fork in the road” provision contained in the investment treaty providing
for the investor’s right to start arbitration under specified rules, most often under the
ICSID Convention or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, provided that it has not
submitted the dispute to the local courts or to a previously agreed dispute settlement
procedure.1658 Here again, the distinction between treaty claim and contract claim is
useful, because if no treaty claim has been brought before the local courts or in a
previously agreed procedure, the treaty arbitration option remains available;
nevertheless, difficulties arise because treaty and contract claims often overlap in terms
of the actual losses they seek to recover.1659
1653 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Decision on
annulment, 3 July 2002, 19(1) ICSID Review–FILJ, para. 101.
1654 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 219.
1655 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 293.
1656 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 219.
1657 See Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 293.
1658 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, paras 13-19 et seq.
1659 Ibid.
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A number of awards in Argentinean cases1660 hold that the claims are distinct whenever
they do not involve the same parties, “cause of action”, and “instrument”, as was, for
instance, expressed in CMS v. Argentina:
“even if TGN had done so [i.e., applied to local courts],—which is not the case—, this
would not result in triggering the “fork in the road” provision against CMS. Both the
parties and the causes of action under separate instruments are different”.1661
While this approach appears to restate the traditional requirements set to the application
of the principles of res iudicata or lis alibi pendens, i.e. identity of parties, object or
petitum, and ground or causa petendi,1662 as opposed to this line of cases, an obiter
dictum in the Vivendi annulment decision1663 seems to imply that treaty and contract
claims are not distinct as soon as they involve the same facts:
“In the Committee’s view, a claim by CAA against the Province of Tucumán for
breach of the Concession Contract, brought before the contentious administrative
courts of Tucumán would prima facie ... constitute a “final” choice of forum and
jurisdiction, if that claim was coextensive with a dispute relating to investments made
under the BIT”.1664
Considering that the test applied in Vivendi is different from the one applied in CMS, it
has been observed that although the principle is well-established, its implementation
varies.1665
10.5. Competence of international tribunals to deal with contract
claims
The distinction between claims under domestic law (contract claims) and claims under
international law (treaty claims) does not mean that an international tribunal never has
jurisdiction to deal with claims arising under a contract; indeed, there are several
situations in which the tribunal may also deal with claims arising from an alleged
breach of contract.1666
1660 See, e.g. Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision of 8 December 2003, 43 ILM 262 (2004); Enron Corp.
and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004.
1661 CMS v. Argentina, para. 80. See also Azurix v. Argentina, para. 89; Enron v. Argentina, para. 97.
1662 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-21. For a discussion of these principles, see Reinisch.
1663 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale des
Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, Case No. ARB/97/3 (3 July 2002).
1664 Ibid., para. 55.
1665 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-23.
1666 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 295.
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10.5.1. Breach of contract amounting to breach of international law
One such situation involves a breach of contract that, at the same time, amounts to a
breach of international law, specifically an applicable BIT. While not every breach of
contract by a State automatically amounts to a violation of international law, it does not
follow that because a breach of contract is involved there cannot be a breach of
international law: indeed, the standards are simply different.1667 For instance, it is
generally accepted that an indirect expropriation may occur in the form of a material
breach or cancellation of a contract.1668
10.5.2. Competence of the tribunal extending to all investments disputes
Another situation in which an international tribunal is competent for contract claims
arises where the jurisdiction conferred upon the tribunal is defined broadly and relates
to all disputes regarding investments.1669 In such a situation, where the issue is
connected to the scope of the dispute settlement option offered,1670 the tribunal is also
competent for contract claims not necessarily amounting to a claim for violation of a
treaty or other provision of international law.1671 For instance, where a BIT provides for
investors/State arbitration in respect of all investment disputes rather than disputes
concerning violations of the BIT, the tribunal is competent even for pure contract
claims,1672 as was the case in:
- Salini v. Morocco,1673 where Article 8 of the applicable BIT defined ICSID
jurisdiction in terms of “[t]ous les différends ou divergences … concernant un
investissement”; or
- Vivendi I,1674 where Article 8 of the BIT between France and Argentina, applicable
in that case, referred to “[a]ny dispute relating to investments”.
1667 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 295.
1668 See, e.g. Amco v. Indonesia, Award, 20 November 1984, 1 ICSID Reports 454 et seq.; LETCO v.
Liberia, Award, 31 March 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 366 (Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 296).
1669 Ibid.
1670 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-24.
1671 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 296.
1672 Ibid.
1673 Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case
No. ARB/00/4 (23 July 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003).
1674 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale des
Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, Case No. ARB/97/3 (3 July 2002).
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Indeed, there is no reason why contract claims cannot be submitted to an international
tribunal under the terms of a consent clause.1675 On the other hand, despite the presence
of similar clauses which provided for settlement of “disputes with respect to
investments”, diverging approaches were adopted in the SGS cases.1676 While in SGS v.
Pakistan the tribunal concluded that it had no jurisdiction with respect to contract
claims which did not constitute breaches of the substantive standards of the BIT,1677 in
SGS v. Philippines the tribunal held an opposite view.1678
It has been observed that the distinction between contract claims and BIT claims does
not mean that these claims must be presented in different forums—an arrangement that
leads to the adjudication of all claims arising from an investment dispute in one forum is
clearly the preferable solution.1679
10.5.3. Umbrella clauses
Another situation in which a tribunal may deal with contract claims is where there is an
umbrella clause. This issue will be dealt with later on.1680
11. THE ESSENTIAL CRITERIA FOR ARBITRATIONS UNDER
ICSID, THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN DEFINING THEM AND ITS
EXPANSION
In traditional international commercial arbitration, administered by private institutions
and even more so in ad hoc proceedings, the jurisdictional power of an arbitral tribunal
stands entirely on the consent of the parties, who can freely choose to submit their
disputes to arbitrators, subject to some residual rules of public policy relating to
arbitrability.1681 Conversely, in arbitration proceedings conducted under ICSID one
cannot ignore the fact that “ICSID jurisdiction is limited by the nature of the operation
1675 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 296.
1676 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, paras 13-26 et seq.
1677 SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, paras 161 and 162.
1678 SGS v. Philippines, Decision on jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, paras 130 et seq. and para. 155.
1679 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 299.
1680 See under V.14.2.
1681 Yala, p. 108.
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at hand”.1682 Article 25 ICSID Convention sets forth three cumulative conditions for
the establishment of the Centre’s jurisdiction:
1. jurisdiction rationae personae—one of the parties to the dispute must be a State
which has acceded to the Convention, and the other party must be a national of
another Contracting State;
2. jurisdiction ratione materiae—the dispute must be a legal dispute arising directly
out of an investment; and
3. the consent of the parties to submit certain disputes to the Centre.1683
The importance of consent in relation to the essential criteria for arbitration under
ICSID may be twofold. On the one hand, the question as to whether and how far the
parties may define the objective criteria (jurisdiction rationae personae and jurisdiction
ratione materiae) has to be answered. Indeed, to a limited extent, fulfilment of the other
two jurisdictional requirements, jurisdiction rationae personae and jurisdiction ratione
materiae, may be influenced by the terms of the parties’ mutual consent.1684 On the
other hand, the issue of the expansive effect of interpretation of the two objective
criteria by the tribunals arises, while not forgetting that consent itself is a criteria to be
fulfilled for arbitration under ICSID and that between the objective and subjective sides
of jurisdiction there is an interplay.
11.1. Dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another
Contracting State (ratione personae)
11.1.1. In general
Investment arbitration is mixed in the sense that it involves a sovereign State (the host
State), on the one side, and a private foreign investor, on the other.1685 Indeed, for the
ICSID Convention to be applicable, one of the parties to the dispute must be a
Contracting State or a “constituent subdivision or agency” which has been registered
with the Centre, and the other party must be an investor national of another Contracting
State.1686
1682 See Kahn, Investissment, p. 114.
1683 Hirsch, pp. 21 and 41-42. See also Horn, p. 24.
1684 See Lamm, p. 464. See also Szasz, Guide.
1685 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 233.
1686 See Article 25(1) ICSID Convention.
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The concept of a Contracting State is clearly defined by the Convention: Contracting
States are States that have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or
approval.1687 However, as the registration is primarily evidentiary in purpose and in
order to avoid doubts as to whether a State entity can be a party to ICSID arbitration,
the lack of formal registration will not prevent an entity becoming an eligible party if it
has been made clear that it is a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State.1688 Participation in the Convention of the State party to proceedings is an
absolute requirement, which is not subject to waiver by agreement between the
parties, and, since the critical date for the status of Contracting State is the institution of
ICSID proceedings and not the time of consent to jurisdiction, it is possible for a host
State to consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction before it becomes a Contracting State.1689
Investors are either individuals (natural persons) or companies (juridical persons) and
the foreignness of the investment is determined by the investor’s nationality.1690 On the
other hand, the origin of the investment, particularly of the capital, is not decisive for
the question of the existence of foreign investment.1691 The investor’s nationality1692
decides from which treaties it may benefit; if the investor wishes to rely on a BIT, it
must show that it has the nationality of one of the two States parties.1693
11.1.2. Definition of “nationality” in case of silence of the treaty
In applying the nationality requirement under Article 25 ICSID Convention, the tribunal
of Autopista v. Venezuela1694—composed of arbitrators with a commercial
background—determined that, when the treaty was silent, the parties to the investment
1687 Schreuer, Convention, para. 125.
1688 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-50. A list of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention
is available on the Centre’s website under http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp.
1689 Schreuer, Convention, paras 127 et seq.
1690 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 46. On the “nationality requirements”, see Sinclair A., “The Substance of
Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2005) 20 ICSID Review-FILJ 357; Wisner
R. and Gallus R., “Nationality Requirements in Investor-State Arbitration” (2004) 5 JWIT 927.
1691 Tradex v. Albania, Award, 29 April 1999, 5 ICSID Reports 70, paras 108-111; Olguín v. Paraguay,
Award, 26 July 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 164 (2004), para. 66, footnote 9; Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Award, 8
December 2000, 6 ICSID Reports 89, para. 126, Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Decision on Annulment, 5
February 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 129, paras 54, 55; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction,
29 April 2004, 20 ICSID Review-FILJ 205 (2005), paras 74-82. But see: Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar,
Award, 31 March 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 463, paras 43-45.
1692 For an overview about the “Nationality of Individuals”, see Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 47 et seq.; and about
the “Nationality of Corporations”, see Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 49 et seq.
1693 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 46.
1694 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No.
ARB/00/5, Award on Jurisdiction (27 September 2001), 16 ICSID Review-FILJ 469 (2001), para. 64.
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agreement were free to define nationality as long as the definition was reasonable.1695
This means that parties to the investment agreement may define the ambit of consent to
arbitration with regard to rationae personae in the case of silence of the treaty.
11.1.3. Expansion of consent ratione personae
11.1.3.1. Consent to extension because of foreign control in the case of legal entities with
the nationality of the host State
11.1.3.1.1. In general
Host States frequently require that investments be made through locally incorporated
companies. While, normally, these local companies will not qualify as foreign investors
and will not enjoy the ICSID Convention’s protection, the ICSID Convention contains a
specific provision to address the phenomenon of investments made through
corporations that are registered in the host State.1696 Indeed, the relevant part of Article
25(2)(b) ICSID Convention provides that:
“National of another Contracting State’ means: … any judicial person which had the
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because
of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention”.
Article 25(2)(b) ICSID Convention deals with the juridical persons that are incorporated
in the host State but are controlled by nationals of another State.1697 This takes into
account the fact that foreign investors are frequently required to channel an investment
through locally incorporated companies.1698 However, the agreement under Article
25(2)(b) ICSID Convention is not enough, and must be supported by actual foreign
control.1699 The notion of control is also of relevance in assisting a finding that a
juridical person has the nationality of a Contracting State other than the host State
where there are competing nationalities, including those of non-Contracting States.1700
1695 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-13.
1696 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 52.
1697 Ibid.
1698 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-52.
1699 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 53.
1700 Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, p. 220.
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11.1.3.1.2. Ways of giving consent
The agreement under Article 25(2)(b) ICSID Convention may be expressed in different
ways:
- by express agreement;
- by provisions in the treaties;1701
- by implied agreement.1702
11.1.3.1.3. The status as a “national of another Contracting State” in a pyramid of
control
Due to the fact that the local company is often not directly controlled by the foreign
investor but is at the end of a pyramid of control, questions as to the nationality of the
controlling party may arise if certain parts of the pyramid are not nationals of
Contracting States.1703 Therefore, depending on how the expression “national of
another Contracting State” in a pyramid of control is interpreted, consent to
arbitration may be given or not. Of importance here are questions:
- about the relevant party for the control: whether the direct parent company1704 or the
entity at the top of the pyramid of control;1705 and
- on how much control is necessary. The tribunal in Vacuum Salt v. Ghana1706 held
that foreign control within the context of Article 25(2)(b) ICSID Convention does
not require or infer a particular percentage of share ownership and that each case
must be looked at on the facts of the particular dispute.1707 However, in Tokios
Tokelés v. Ukraine1708 the issue arose as to whether the economic reality beyond
the legal structure should be considered, because the ultimate shareholders of the
investor/claimant were nationals themselves of the same State in which the
investment and respondent were located.1709
1701 See, e.g. Article 26(7) ECT.
1702 See, e.g. ICSID, Amco Asia Corp and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23
ILM 351 (1984) 359 et seq. or Klöckner v. Cameroon, Award, 21 October 1983, 2 ICSID Reports 16;
LETCO v Liberia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 1984, 2 ICSID Reports 349-353.
1703 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-53.
1704 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, pp. 362 et seq.
1705 ICSID, Decision on Jurisdiction, Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Republic of
Senegal, 6 ICSID Review-FILJ 217 (1991) 225, paras 35 et seq. (SOABI).
1706 Vacuum Salt Production Limited v. Government of the Republic of Ghana, 4 ICSID Reports 320
(1997) 346 (Vacum Salt).
1707 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-54.
1708 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004.
1709 Laird, p. 92.
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11.1.3.1.4. Interpretation of the concept of “control”
Control over a juridical person is not a simple concept. Participation in the company’s
capital stock or share ownership is not necessarily the only indicator of control. Indeed,
the existence of foreign control is a complex question requiring the examination of
several factors such as equity participation, voting rights, and management.1710 The
development of international law in relation to corporate claims has largely focused on
two basic tests to determine which country has jurisdiction to assert a claim on behalf of
a company:
- the place of incorporation, or the siège social, and
- the nationality of the controlling shareholders.1711
While the Barcelona Traction case is an example of the adoption of the first test, later
NAFTA1712 and BITs1713 cases are a repudiation of the Barcelona Traction case and
have clearly adopted the second test1714 which relates to the nationality of the
shareholders who wish to bring a claim on their own behalf, or on the behalf of their
investment.1715
11.1.3.2. “Nationality planning”/“treaty shopping”1716
A prudent investor may organise its investment in a way that affords maximum
protection under existing treaties. While “nationality planning” or “treaty shopping” is
not illegal or unethical as such,1717 States may regard such practices as undesirable and
take appropriate measures against them.1718 However, not every attempt at nationality
planning will succeed.1719 In particular, it is not possible to bring a claim within the
ambit of the Convention by assigning it to a party from a Contracting State which would
1710 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 53.
1711 Laird, pp. 86 et seq.
1712 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award (13 November 2000).
1713 See in particular CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003 (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8). But
also Azurix, para. 73 ; LG&E, paras 60-63 ; Enron 1, para. 49; Enron 2, paras 27-29.
1714 Involving concepts of ownership and control, direct or indirect.
1715 See Laird, p. 87.
1716 On “nationality planning”, see, e.g. Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 54 et seq.
1717 For a case where the tribunal accepted the “migration” of the controlling company from one country
to another, see Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21
October 2005, at paras 330, 332.
1718 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 54.
1719 See, e.g. Banro v. Congo, Award, 1 September 2000 excerpts in 17 ICSID Review-FILJ 380 (2000),
paras 330, 332.
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fulfil the requirements of Article 25 ICSID Convention.1720 Indeed, this would violate
the basic principle that arbitration requires the consent of both parties and would defeat
the carefully structured system of jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention.1721
11.1.4. Conclusion
The determination by the tribunal of Autopista v. Venezuela1722—composed of
arbitrators with a commercial background—that, in the silence of the treaty, the parties
to the investment agreement were free to define nationality as long as the definition was
reasonable has been criticised by a renowned specialist of public international law.1723
Although these critics may be pertinent when taking an optic based on public
international law, one should also consider that the ICSID Convention itself permits, in
the case where foreign investors channel their investments through companies
incorporated in the host State, agreement that these companies are treated as nationals of
another Contracting State when there is foreign control.1724 Indeed, the ICSID
Convention follows a strong contractual approach and it does not define the terms
“nationality” or “foreign control”, because the drafters wished to provide parties with
maximum flexibility.1725
Moreover, another aspect to be considered is that the determination of “foreign control”
is not an easy task. The difficulties are mainly due to the fact that, on the one hand,
different criteria may be applied to interpret the concept of “foreign control”, and, on
the other hand, there is an area of conflict between economic reality and legal structure.
Nevertheless, it has been observed that while the question of how much control is
enough is not always easy to answer, it is of paramount importance for a large company
seeking to commence a claim through one or more of its subsidiaries against a host
State.1726
1720 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-55.
1721 ICSID, 15 March 2002, Case No. ARB/00/02, Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 17(7) Mealey's IAR A1 (2002) A2. See also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para.
28-55.
1722 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No.
ARB/00/5, Award on Jurisdiction (27 September 2001), 16 ICSID Review-FILJ 469 (2001), para. 64.
1723 See Prosper Weil in his dissenting opinion (29 April 2004) in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine (Kaufmann-
Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-13).
1724 See Article 25(2)(b) ICSID Convention.
1725 See Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, p. 17.
1726 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-54.
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11.2. Legal dispute arising directly out of an investment (ratione
materiae)
11.2.1. The existence of a dispute
Although it has been stated that the mere assertion by the claimant that a dispute
exists1727 or the mere denial by the respondent party that a dispute exists1728 is not
conclusive of either fact, a dispute has been defined in the Mavrommatis Case1729 as a
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between
two parties.1730
11.2.2. The legal nature of the dispute
Assuming there is a dispute, the next question to be raised is whether the dispute is a
legal one. While no clear decision was taken on the meaning of the qualification “legal”,
a reasonable interpretation might be that it must be concerned with a breach or violation
of law in the fundamental sense—that what is basically in dispute is the violation of
legal rights and obligations.1731
11.2.3. Arising directly
An investment operation involves a number of ancillary transactions and legal contracts
which include financing,1732 the lease of property, purchase of various goods, marketing
of produced goods and tax liabilities. While in economic terms these transactions and
contracts are all more or less linked to the investment, the question of whether these
peripheral activities arise directly out of an investment for the purposes of ICSID’s
jurisdiction may be subject to doubt.1733
1727 The South West Africa Cases (P.O.), 1962, ICJ Reports, p. 328.
1728 The Peace Treaties Case (1), 1950 ICJ Reports, p. 74.
1729 PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
1730 Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, p. 169. For further aspects, see in particular Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction,
pp. 169 et seq.
1731 See Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, p. 173. See also Delaume, How to Draft, p. 181, and Schreuer,
Convention, para. 42.
1732 See, e.g. Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco, where the agreement for the establishment and
operation of hotels had also provided for financing by the Government. This was done by means of
separate loan contracts.
1733 Schreuer, Convention, para. 63.
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The requirement of directness is one of the objective criteria for jurisdiction and is, thus,
independent of the parties’ consent. This means that, no matter what the parties have
agreed, the dispute must not only be connected to an investment but must also be
reasonably closely connected.1734 Nevertheless, in practical terms, the objective and the
subjective elements may be related, as disputes arising from ancillary or peripheral
aspects of the investment operation are likely to give rise to the objection that they do
not arise directly from the investment and that they are not covered by the consent
agreement.1735
A number of cases1736 suggest that ICSID tribunals are inclined to follow a broad view
of consent clauses where the agreement between the parties is reflected in several
successive instruments.1737 Expressions of consent are not applied narrowly to the
specific document in which they appear but are read in the context of the parties’ overall
relationship:
- a series of interrelated contracts may be regarded, in functional terms, as
representative of the legal framework for one investment operation; and
- ICSID clauses contained in some, though not all, of the different contracts may be
interpreted as applicable to the entire operation.1738
It has been observed that the need to settle an investment dispute finally and
comprehensively would make any other solution impracticable.1739 Therefore, here the
jurisdictional aspect of arbitration tends to prevail over the contractual one.
11.2.4. Investment
The existence of an investment is a keystone of ICSID’s jurisdiction.1740 However,
despite the fact that the term “investment” appears at the heart of both the name of the
ICSID as well as in the title of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States, no definition of this term is provided in
1734 Schreuer, Convention, para. 66.
1735 Ibid.
1736 See, e.g. Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 May 1979, Case No.
ARB/72/1 (an unpublished ICSID award discussed in Lalive, Holiday Inns and World Bank); Klöckner v.
Cameroon, Award, 21 October 1983, Decision on Annulment, 3 May 1985, 2 ICSID Reports 13-18, 65-69, 89-93,
97-117; SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 August 1984, Award, 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports
185-188, 204-208, 293-322.
1737 UNCTAD, p. 34.
1738 Schreuer, Convention, para. 372.
1739 UNCTAD, p. 34.
1740 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 233.
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the text of the treaty.1741 Definitions provided by treaties and national investment laws
are often of little use as well. For the purpose of Article 25 ICSID Convention, tribunals
have adopted a list of descriptors that they find typical for investments.1742 The
descriptors include:
- a substantial commitment;
- a certain duration;
- an element of risk, and
- importance for the host State’s development.1743
11.2.4.1. In general
The importance of Article 25 ICSID Convention in ICSID arbitrations is that it places a
limit upon the parties’ ability to consent to ICSID arbitration.1744 In Fedax v. Republic
of Venezuela1745 the tribunal held that Article 25(1) ICSID Convention covers direct and
indirect foreign investments and that promissory notes as such were not excluded from
the Convention, so that the definition given to the term “investment” by the parties
was of relevance.1746 The tribunal thus considered the BIT between the Netherlands and
Venezuela.
11.2.4.2. The importance of parties’ consent in defining “investment”
The ICSID Convention links its jurisdiction in Article 25 to “disputes arising directly
out of an investment” but leaves the definition of “investment” to the parties’ autonomy.
Therefore, while, according to the ICSID Convention, ordinary financial transactions
are not investments for objective reasons, any investment can be defined by the parties
1741 Yala, p. 105.
1742 Salini Costruttori SpA et Italstrade SpA v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, Clunet
196 (2002), 42 ILM (2003) 609, para. 53; SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 8
ICSID Reports 406, para. 133, footnote 113; Joy Mining Machinery Ltd. v. Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction,
6 August 2004, paras 53, 57, 62; AES Corporation v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005,
para. 88; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14
November 2005, paras 130-138; Jan de Nul et al. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006, paras
90-96.
1743 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 233. The four criteria are considered to be embodied in Article 25 ICSID
Convention. After having been clearly restated in Salini v. Morocco and having also been applied in
subsequent decisions, the application of these criteria is now generally referred to as the Salini test
(Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 68). On the notion of “investment”, see also Rubins, Investment.
1744 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 6.06.
1745 ICSID, Decision, 11 July 1997, on Objections to Jurisdiction and award, 9 March 1998, Case No.
ARB/96/3, Fedax NV v. Republic of Venezuela, 37 ILM 1378 (1998), XXIVa YBCA 23 (1999).
1746 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-61.
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as “investment” in the meaning of Article 25 ICSID Convention as far as it respects
the objective limits of investments.1747
Bilateral investment treaties providing for ICSID jurisdiction do not refer to Article 25
ICSID Convention for the purposes of defining “investment”, but instead typically
contain their own definitions of “investment”, mostly at the beginning of the
agreement.1748 This dual approach to the expression “investment” in the ICSID
Convention and in investment treaties has led to distinct questions of application and
interpretation.1749
It has been observed that an arbitration clause providing for ICSID arbitration is an
implied agreement that their “investment” falls under Article 25.1750 Moreover, the
same applies to the unilateral offers to arbitrate contained in the various investment
protection laws and investment treaties which extend the ICSID arbitration option to all
types of investment covered by the relevant legal instrument.1751 Indeed, the draftsmen
wanted to leave it primarily to the parties to decide what constitutes an investment.1752
The practice of the tribunals has been inclined to interpret the expression “investment”
in Article 25 ICSID Convention autonomously, i.e. independently of the investment
clause in the applicable BIT.1753 However, while it was always obvious that ordinary
commercial transactions would not be covered by the Centre’s jurisdiction no matter
how far-reaching the parties’ consent might be,1754 it is clear that the parties have
nevertheless much freedom in describing their transaction as an investment.1755
Therefore, in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS (Czech Republic) v. The Slovak
Republic1756 the tribunal stated that whilst the consent given by the parties is an
important element in determining whether a dispute qualifies as an investment under
the Convention it is not conclusive.1757 The tribunal considered that:
1747 Kühn, p. 49.
1748 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 61.
1749 Ibid.
1750 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-56.
1751 Ibid.
1752 See Shihata, p. 5.
1753 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 61.
1754 The parties can, however, agree to submit a contractual dispute to ICSID, provided that the
jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention are met (Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 398).
1755 Schreuer, Convention, paras 89 and 91.
1756 ICSID, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS
(Czech Republic) v. The Slovak Republic, XXIVa YBCA 44 (1999), 14 ICSID Review-FILJ 250 (1999).
1757 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-57.
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“The concept of an investment as spelled out in … [Article 25] is objective in nature in
that the parties may agree on a more precise or restrictive definition of their acceptance
of the Centre’s jurisdiction, but they may not choose to submit disputes to the Centre
that are not related to an investment”.1758
In determining whether an ICSID tribunal has the competence to consider the merits of
the claim, a two-fold test of the notion of investment, sometimes called the “double
keyhole approach”,1759 must therefore be applied:
- whether the dispute arises out of an investment within the meaning of the
Convention; and, if so,
- whether the dispute relates to an investment as defined in the parties’ consent to
ICSID arbitration, in their reference to the BIT and the pertinent definitions
contained in the BIT.1760
While the tribunals have, therefore, to ask whether the case falls within the scope of
consent given by the host State in the light of the definition of “investment” in the BIT,
the distinction gets, however, somewhat blurred if both parties consent to submit the
case to ICSID, as this would imply a strong (but rebuttable) presumption that the case
involved an investment.1761
11.2.4.3. The growing importance of the parties’ will in defining “investment”
Among scholars there is a lack of consensus as to the definition of the term
“investment” and they can be divided into two main camps: the “subjectivist
movement” which attaches greater importance to the will of the parties in defining an
economic operation as an investment and the “objectivist movement” for which the
notion of investment entails a core of elements which include a contribution from the
foreign investor, a certain duration for the project and risk borne by the investor.1762
ICSID tribunals have for a long time followed an approach that combines the
objectivist and subjectivist perspectives, taking into account that the foreign investors
have made certain capital contributions in the territory of the host States and that parties
have agreed to consider their dispute as arising directly from an investment within the
1758 CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para. 53.
1759 See Dolzer/Schreuer, pp. 61 et seq.
1760 See CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para. 68. See also Salini
Costruttori v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2003, 42 ILM 609 (2003), paras 44, 52.
1761 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 62.
1762 There is also a broad spectrum of alternative perspectives between these two main trends of thought.
The most notable of these favours taking into account the criteria of the contribution to economic
development of the host State or the growth of its patrimony (Yala, p. 106).
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meaning of Article 25(1) ICSID Convention.1763 However, at the end of the 1990s, in
two decisions, Fedax1764 and CSOB v. Slovak Republic,1765 ICSID tribunals accepted
jurisdiction over claims for breaches of loan contracts and initiated a “liberal” trend in
the Centre’s case law on this issue.1766
The decisions in Salini,1767 SGS v. Pakistan,1768 and SGS v. Philippines1769 are in
keeping with this liberal movement, even though they can be distinguished by their
different methodological approaches and the weight the arbitrators respectively attached
to the objective or subjective elements of the investment; on the other hand the liberal
movement does know some limits as illustrated in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka1770—in which
the arbitrators refused to include pre-investment expenditures within the scope of their
jurisdiction.1771
The practice of the tribunals has been inclined to interpret the expression “investment”
in Article 25 ICSID Convention autonomously, i.e. independently of the investment
clause in the applicable BIT.1772 In particular, the Salini tribunal was of the opinion that
its jurisdiction depended upon the existence of an investment within the meaning of the
bilateral treaty as well as that of the ICSID Convention, in accordance with the case
law.1773
On the other hand, in both SGS cases the arbitral tribunals limited themselves to the
qualification of the claimant's rights under the BIT, without seeking to analyse the
operation using the objective criteria established in previous cases.1774 By abandoning
the autonomous conditions for an “investment” within the meaning of Article 25(1)
ICSID Convention, and by giving precedence to the very broad definitions provided in
the BITs upon which the claims were based, the SGS decisions implicitly rejected the
1763 Yala, p. 106.
1764 Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, 11 July 1997, 37 ILM 1531 (1997); 126 Clunet 278 (1999).
1765 CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, 14 ICSID Rev. 251 (No. 1, 1999);
5 ICSID Reports 329 (2003).
1766 Yala, p. 106.
1767 Salini and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 1 Clunet 196 (2002).
1768 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6
August 2003, (2003) 18 ICSID Review-FILJ 301; (2003) 42 ILM 1290, para. 163.
1769 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29
January 2004, (2004) 19 Mealey’s IAR 15.
1770 ICSID, 15 March 2002, Case No. ARB/00/02, Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 17(7) Mealey’s IAR A1 (2002).
1771 Yala, p. 106.
1772 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 61.
1773 Salini, para. 44.
1774 See Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, 11 July 1997, 37 ILM 1531 (1997); 126 Clunet 278 (1999); CSOB v.
Slovak Republic, 24 May 1999, 14 ICSID Rev. 251 (No. 1, 1999); 5 ICSID Reports 329 (2003); Salini
and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 1 Clunet 196 (2002).
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method for differentiating the qualification of the claimant's rights and established the
arbitrators’ preference for the subjective view of the notion of investment, according to
which the will of the parties is the controlling criterion for purposes of ICSID
jurisdiction.1775
11.2.4.4. Expansion of consent because of broad interpretation of the concept of
“investment”
In dealing with the objective notion of “investment” under the ICSID Convention, the
tribunal in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS (Czech Republic) v. The Slovak
Republic1776 held:
“that investment as a concept should be interpreted broadly because the drafters of the
Convention did not impose any restrictions on its meaning”.1777
Two circumstances where the question of whether the concept of “investment” should
be interpreted broadly or not have in particular arisen are:
- in the case of minority shareholding;1778
- in the case of pre-investment expenditures.1779
11.2.4.5. Conclusion
The fact that the concept of “investment” is not defined by the ICSID Convention
permits an enlargement of the limits upon the parties’ ability to consent to ICSID
arbitration. Through the broad interpretation of the concept of “investment”, on the one
hand, and the “subjectivist movement,” which attaches greater importance to the will of
the parties in defining an economic operation as an investment, on the other hand,
consent to arbitration experiences an expansion. However, while a broad interpretation
stresses rather the jurisdictional side of arbitration and normally advantages one of the
1775 Yala, p. 116.
1776 ICSID, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS
(Czech Republic) v. The Slovak Republic, XXIVa YBCA 44 (1999), 14 ICSID Review-FILJ 250 (1999).
1777 CSOB v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para. 49.
1778 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No.
ARB/01/8 (17 July 2003), 42 ILM 788 (2003). On this case, see also Weiniger.
1779 ICSID, 15 March 2002, Case No. ARB/00/02, Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 17(7) Mealey's IAR A1 (2002). On this case, see also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll,
para. 28-63.
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parties, the “subjectivist movement” underlines the contractual side of arbitration by
taking into account the will of both parties.
11.3. Consent
Like any form of arbitration, investment arbitration is always based on an agreement
and consent to arbitration is an indispensable requirement for a tribunal’s
jurisdiction.1780
11.3.1. In general
Under Article 25 ICSID Convention, the parties’ consent to submit a dispute to an
ICSID arbitration proceeding is a threshold requirement to establish an ICSID
tribunal’s jurisdiction over the matter.1781 This requirement is so critical that the
executive directors of the World Bank, in their 1965 Report on the ICSID Convention,
observed: “Consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the
Centre”.1782 Consent is the explicit expression of both parties’ acceptance of ICSID
arbitration, where:
- the investor generally consents to arbitrate disputes under a specific investment;
and
- the host State may consent to arbitration of a specific dispute or anticipated classes
of disputes.1783
While ICSID arbitrations require that all parties concerned have agreed to submit to
ICSID arbitration, the mere ratification of the ICSID Convention is not in itself consent
to arbitration by a State.1784 As was made clear in the Preamble to the ICSID
Convention, the State never consents by simply ratifying the ICSID Convention.1785
Indeed, ratification serves only to make the State party to the ICSID Convention—it
does not grant jurisdiction to an ICSID tribunal.1786 Therefore, although participation in
1780 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 238.
1781 Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, p. 21.
1782 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (18
March 1965), in 1 ICSID Reports 23-33 (1993), p. 28. See also Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, pp. 21 et seq.
1783 Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, p. 22. Here the asymmetry existing in investment arbitration between
investor and host State comes at light.
1784 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-46.
1785 Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, p. 22.
1786 For the required “double consent” to the ICSID Convention and the arbitration agreement, see
Cremades, pp. 152 et seq. (Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-46).
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treaties plays an important role for the jurisdiction of tribunals, it cannot, by itself,
establish jurisdiction, but both parties must have expressed their consent.1787
11.3.2. Consent to arbitration or conciliation? (the problem of the choice of
the method of settlement)
The practice of ICSID shows a variety of consent clauses dealing with this question
with different degrees of precision.1788 Clauses in BITs and provisions in national
investment legislation referring to the jurisdiction of ICSID are similarly diverse.1789
The clauses can be grouped into four:
- clauses specifying that consent refers to arbitration only;1790
- clauses providing for conciliation, failing which the dispute is to be settled by
arbitration;1791
- clauses providing for “conciliation and arbitration” or “conciliation or
arbitration”;1792
- clauses providing for submission to the Centre without any reference to conciliation
or arbitration.1793
A case where the issue arose as to whether consent to arbitration was meant was SPP v.
Egypt, where the relevant Egyptian law provided for the settlement of disputes “within
the framework of the Convention”.1794
11.3.3. The issue of counterclaims
The ICSID Convention contains two provisions which are of direct relevance to the
question of counterclaims: Article 25 which deals with the jurisdiction of the Centre and
Article 46 which deals with incidental or additional claims and counterclaims. The
1787 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 238.
1788 See Schreuer, Convention, para. 22.
1789 Schreuer, Convention, paras 23 and 25.
1790 See, e.g. Denmark-Turkey BIT (1990) Article 8; Germany Model Agreement Article 11.
1791 See, e.g. the clause in MINE v. Guinea, Award, 6 January 1988, 4 ICSID Reports 67.
1792 See, e.g. Netherlands Model Article 9; Austria Model Agreement Article 8.
1793 See, e.g. Lithuania-Poland BIT (1992) Article 7; Denmark Model Agreement Article 9.
1794 Decision on Jurisdiction I, 27 November 1985, 3 ICSID Reports 126. See then also Decision on
Jurisdiction II, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 156; and 3 ICSID Reports 172.
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question of counterclaims is further dealt with in Rule 40 ICSID Arbitration Rules—the
ICSID Arbitration Rules are incorporated by reference in Article 44 ICSID Convention.
This series of provisions requires that for a matter to be admissible as a counterclaim it
must arise directly out of an investment and fall within the State party’s consent and
must as well arise directly out of the original claim filed by the investor.1795 It has been
remarked that a claim may be within the Centre’s jurisdiction but not arise directly from
the subject matter of a particular dispute before the tribunal and, conversely, that a claim
may arise directly from the subject matter of the dispute but may not be subject to
ICSID's jurisdiction.1796
Moreover, Article 46 ICSID Convention and Rule 40 ICSID Arbitration Rules directly
raise the issue of the scope of consent of the parties. Indeed, since the investor’s
consent will usually be given only after the dispute has arisen, the scope of its consent
can be expected to be quite narrow, thus limiting the possibility of counterclaims by
the disputing State party.1797
11.4. Relationship between the objective and consensual sides of
jurisdiction
In contrast to commercial arbitration, where the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is
based exclusively on a valid arbitration clause contained in the contract between the
parties or concluded ad hoc, the power of the tribunal in an investment dispute
frequently emanates from an interplay of parties’ consent and objective legal rules
contained either in the investment protection law of the host State or in bilateral or
multilateral investment treaties.1798
Although the requirements, as described above, are in part regulated by the
Convention—the nature of the dispute and of the parties—and in part left to the parties’
disposition in framing their consent, the relationship between the objective and
consensual sides of jurisdiction has given rise to some debate.1799 Indeed, while in the
course of the Convention’s drafting, a number of delegates felt that the parties’ consent
1795 Alvarez H.C., p. 411.
1796 Schreuer, Convention II, at 202.
1797 Alvarez H.C., p. 411.
1798 Horn, p. 23.
1799 Schreuer, Convention, para. 5.
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in a particular case implied their recognition that the objective criteria had been met,1800
on the other hand, another group of delegates objected to an imprecise or open-ended
description of the Centre’s scope of activities, because they feared that the mere
participation in a convention which opens the door to a far-reaching jurisdiction would
create expectations that would make it difficult for host States to resist pressure to give
their consent.1801
It has been observed that it would be inaccurate to assume that the general phrasing of
the objective criteria in Article 25 ICISID Convention gives the parties complete
freedom to determine, by the terms of their consent, which disputes they wish to submit
to the Centre.1802 This fact has been borne out by the Report of the Executive Directors:
“While consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the
Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring a dispute within its jurisdiction. In
keeping with the purpose of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre is further
limited by reference to the nature of the dispute and the parties thereto”.1803
On the other hand, parties can agree to submit a contractual dispute to ICSID, provided
that the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention are met.1804
12. THE SCOPE OF CONSENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS
12.1. Scope of consent
The scope of consent to arbitration offered in treaties may vary.1805 Indeed, while
Article 25 ICSID Convention defines the outer limits of the consent that the parties
may give, there is nothing to stop them from circumscribing it in a narrower way.1806
The parties are therefore free to delimit their consent by defining it in abstract terms, by
excluding certain types of disputes or by listing the questions they are submitting to
ICSID’s jurisdiction.1807
1800 In other words, it should be the terms of consent that ultimately defined the Centre’s jurisdiction.
1801 Schreuer, Convention, para. 5.
1802 See Schreuer, Convention, para. 6.
1803 1 ICSID Reports 28.
1804 Gill/Gearing/Birt, p. 398.
1805 See also Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 244.
1806 Schreuer, Convention, para. 348.
1807 UNCTAD, p. 29.
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Many BITs in their consent clauses contain phrases such as “all disputes concerning
investments” or “any legal dispute concerning an investment”.1808 These provisions do
not restrict a tribunal’s jurisdiction to claims arising from the BITs’ substantive
standards, and by their own terms, these consent clauses encompass disputes that go
beyond the interpretation and application of the BIT itself and would include disputes
that arise from a contract in connection with the investment.1809 In practice, broad
inclusive consent clauses1810 are the norm and are generally to be preferred.1811 In fact,
narrow clauses, listing only certain questions or excluding some other questions, are
liable to lead to difficulties in determining the tribunal’s precise competence, and may
also, inadvertently, exclude essential aspects of the dispute.1812
Nevertheless, ICSID Centre’s services are not available for just any dispute that the
parties may wish to submit. In particular, it has always been clear that ordinary
commercial transactions would not be covered by the Centre’s jurisdiction, no matter
how far-reaching the parties’ consent may be.1813
12.2. Limitations on consent
12.2.1. Limitations in the offer of the host State
12.2.1.1. In national investment legislations
References to ICSID provided for in national investment legislation typically relate to
the application and interpretation of the piece of legislation in question.1814 While some
national laws are more sweeping and simply refer to disputes “concerning foreign
investment”,1815 others describe the questions covered by consent clauses in narrower
terms which may include the requirement that “the dispute is fundamental to the
1808 See, e.g. Article 8 UK Model BIT (2005), preferred version; Dolzer/Stevens, 244.
1809 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 244. On the differentiation between treaty and contract claims, see under V.10.
1810 Consent clauses contained in investment agreements typically make reference to “any dispute” or “all
disputes” under the respective agreements (Schreuer, Convention, para. 350).
1811 UNCTAD, p. 29.
1812 Schreuer, Convention, para. 349.
1813 See Schreuer, Convention, para. 89.
1814 UNCTAD, p. 29.
1815 See, e.g. Albania Law on Foreign Investments, 1993, Article 8(2); El Salvador Foreign Investment
Law 1988, Article 21; Botswana Settlement of Investment Disputes (Convention) Act 1970, section 11.
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investment itself”1816 or that the dispute must be “in respect of any approved
enterprise”.1817 Some national laws clearly circumscribe the issues that are subject to
ICSID’s jurisdiction. This is, for instance, the case with the Albanian Law on Foreign
Investment of 1993 which offers consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction but limits it, however,
to the disputes which arise “out of or relates to expropriation, compensation for
expropriation, or discrimination and also for the transfers in accordance with Article
7”.1818
12.2.1.2. In the BITs
Although clauses contained in BITs are generally quite broad, there are BIT clauses
offering consent to arbitration which do not refer to investment disputes in general
terms but circumscribe the types of disputes that are submitted to arbitration.1819
A narrower offer of consent to arbitration in BITs merely covers violations of the BIT’s
substantive standards.1820 Moreover, some expressions of consent to arbitration are
narrowly confined as to their subject matter.1821 Indeed, there are also genuinely limiting
clauses in some BITs such as those requiring that the investment has been specifically
approved by the competent authority of the host State, or restricting jurisdiction to the
amount of compensation due after an expropriation.1822
12.2.2. Limitations in the acceptance by the investor
Where ICSID’s jurisdiction is based on an offer made by one party, subsequently
accepted by the other, the parties’ consent exists merely to the extent that offer and
acceptance coincide.1823 While the host State’s investment legislation or its BIT with the
investor’s home State may, for instance, provide for the Centre’s jurisdiction in broad
1816 See, e.g. Papua New Guinea Investment Disputes Convention Act 1978, section 2.
1817 Schreuer, Convention, para. 354.
1818 See Tradex v. Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 1996, 14 ICSID Review-FILJ 161, 174
(1999). UNCTAD, p. 29.
1819 See Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 246. A provision that is typical for United States BITs is, e.g. contained in
Article VII of the Argentina-US BIT of 1991.
1820 See, e.g. Article 9 of the BIT between El Salvador and the Netherlands: “disputes which arise within
the scope of this agreement between one Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting Party
concerning an investment”.
1821 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 246.
1822 Schreuer, Convention, para. 355.
1823 UNCTAD, p. 30.
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terms,1824 if the investor accepts ICSID jurisdiction only with regard to a particular
dispute or in respect of certain investment operations, the consent between the parties
will be limited.1825 On the other hand, it is clear that the investor’s acceptance may not
validly go beyond the limits of the host State’s offer.1826 Thus, any limitations contained
in the legislation or treaty would apply irrespective of the terms of the investor’s
acceptance, and, if the terms of acceptance do not correspond with the terms of the
offer, there is no perfected consent.1827
13. IRREVOCABILITY OF CONSENT
The issue of the “irrevocability of consent” shows the strong contractual approach
followed by the ICSID Convention. Indeed, here it is primarily the relationship between
host State and investor which is of importance. Once an arbitration agreement is
concluded, no party can unilaterally revoke its effect. While this follows from general
contract law and is clearly provided for in Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, the issue
arose in Alcoa v. Jamaica.1828
13.1. Irrevocability after perfection of consent
Consent to the Centre’s jurisdiction cannot be unilaterally revoked when both parties
have given their consent to the submission of their disputes to the Centre.1829 The
irrevocability of consent operates only after the consent has been perfected.1830 Indeed,
Article 25(1), last sentence, of the ICSID Convention provides that:
“When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally”.1831
On the other hand, a mere offer of consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction may be withdrawn at
any time unless, of course, it is irrevocable by its own terms. However, in the case of
1824 Schreuer, Convention, para. 356.
1825 Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, pp. 224 et seq.
1826 UNCTAD, p. 30.
1827 Schreuer, Convention, para. 356.
1828 Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica v. Government of Jamaica, IV YBCA 206 (1979) 207 et seq.
1829 Hirsch, p. 50.
1830 See UNCTAD, p. 37. About the perfection of consent, see under V.6.
1831 Emphasis added.
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national legislation and treaty clauses providing for ICSID jurisdiction, the investor
must have accepted the consent in writing to make it irrevocable.1832 Moreover, while
the parties are free to subject their consent to limitations and conditions, once consent
has been given, its irrevocability also extends to the introduction of new limitations and
conditions.1833
13.2. The binding and irrevocable nature of consent as manifestation
of “pacta sunt servanda”
It has been observed that the binding and irrevocable nature of consent to the
jurisdiction of ICSID is a manifestation of the maxim “pacta sunt servanda” and applies
to undertakings to arbitrate in general.1834 While the applicability of this maxim is
obvious where the consent is expressed in a compromissory clause contained in an
agreement, it should apply equally where an offer of consent is contained in national
legislation or in a treaty which has been accepted by the investor.1835
13.3. Insulation-process through the acceptance by the investor of
legislative or treaty-based offers
Even though a host State is free to change its investment legislation, including the
provision concerning consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction, the situation is different if the
investor has accepted the offer in writing while the legislation was still in force, as the
consent agreed to by the parties then becomes insulated from the validity of the
legislation containing the offer and it assumes a contractual existence independent of the
legislative instrument that helped to bring it about.1836
Although BITs and MITs that provide consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction are more difficult
to terminate than national legislation, the fact remains that consent based on treaties is
only perfected once it is accepted by the investor. Indeed, it is only after its acceptance
by the investor that an offer of consent contained in a BIT or other international
instrument becomes irrevocable and hence insulated from attempts by the host State to
terminate the treaty.1837
1832 UNCTAD, p. 37.
1833 Ibid. On limitations on consent, see under V.12.2.
1834 See Delaume, Finality, pp. 24 et seq.
1835 UNCTAD, pp. 37 et seq.
1836 Ibid.
1837 Ibid.
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13.4. No withdrawal of host State’s legislative consent
Another question that may arise is whether there are cases in which the State will not be
permitted to withdraw its legislative consent, even though the investor has not yet given
its consent; such a situation is likely to arise when the laws of the host State declare that
the legislative consent is irrevocable.1838
On the one hand, following the rule of interpretation of treaties “in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”,1839 literal effect may be given
to the provision contained at the end of Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, permitting the
host State to withdraw its unilateral consent as long as the foreign investor has not
agreed in writing to the jurisdiction of the Centre.1840 For this reason it has been
observed that it is it is inadvisable for an investor, to rely on an ICSID consent clause
contained in the host State’s domestic law or in a treaty without making a reciprocal
declaration of consent.1841
On the other hand, it has also been argued that in accordance with accepted doctrines of
public international law—which also apply to the internal legislation of States—a host
State may not unilaterally withdraw consent given through legislation, and such consent
is therefore irrevocable.1842 It is possible to base such an argument on the rule of
“unilateral declarations”, which is well-founded in international law, and according to
which—upon the fulfilment of certain conditions—a State may not retract a unilateral
commitment.1843 Moreover, the doctrine of estoppel, which was discussed in Amco v.
Indonesia1844—where it was confirmed that the doctrine is also applicable to
international economic relations in which private parties are involved—is likely to be of
assistance in arriving at such a determination. In accordance with these norms, a party is
therefore precluded from acting contrary to its own declaration, when the declaration
was made by an authorised person in unequivocal terms, and the other party relied on
the declaration and prejudiced its own position because of the declaration.1845
1838 Hirsch, p. 53.
1839 See Article 31(1) VCLT.
1840 Hirsch, p. 53.
1841 See UNCTAD, p. 37.
1842 See Hirsch, pp. 53 et seq.
1843 Ibid.
1844 Amco Asia Corp and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983,
89 ILR 379 (1992), 1 ICSID Reports 389 (1993).
1845 Hirsch, p. 54.
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14. EXPANSION OF CONSENT BECAUSE OF TREATIES’
PROVISIONS
14.1. Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clauses
An MFN-clause contained in a treaty will extend the better treatment granted to a third
State or its nationals to a beneficiary of the treaty.1846 Most BITs and some other
treaties1847 for the protection of investment include MFN-clauses.1848 As many
investment treaties provide that neither contracting State shall submit the investors of
the other State to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to investors of any
third country, the question in our context is whether such “no less favourable treatment”
also applies to the dispute settlement options: can one incorporate into a treaty a dispute
resolution provision of another treaty in whole or in part?1849
14.1.1. General
14.1.1.1. Definition and goal of MFN-clauses
The MFN-clause has been defined as “a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes an
obligation towards another State to accord most-favoured treatment in an agreed sphere
of relationships”.1850 Indeed, in its usual guise, the standard obliges a host State to treat
investors from one foreign country no less favourably than investors from other foreign
countries.1851 The basic goal of MFN-clauses is to guarantee equality of competitive
opportunities for foreign investors in the host State.1852
While the MFN standard is a typical substantive commitment of most modern
investment treaties, an important question is whether the MFN-clause included in most
BITs can be applied to the procedural arrangements embodied in that particular treaty
for the settlement of disputes that may arise under it.1853 Although the MFN-clause may
specify that it includes or that it excludes dispute settlement, most MFN-clauses are
worded in a general way and typically just refer to the treatment of investments.1854
1846 See also Dolzer/Myers, p. 49. See also Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 253.
1847 See Article 1103 NAFTA; Article 10(7) ECT.
1848 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 253.
1849 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, pp. 269 et seq.
1850 Following the 1978 Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, prepared by the International
Law Commission. See Faya Rodriguez, p. 90.
1851 Kurtz, p. 523.
1852 Ibid.
1853 See Orrego Vicuña, p. 133.
1854 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 253.
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14.1.1.2. BITs: emphasis on dispute settlement mechanisms
On the other hand, it has also been observed that under most BITs, and some
multilateral treaties as well, the key to the protection of the investor lies not so much in
the substantive provisions of the treatment accorded, which are rather scant and basic,
but in the arrangements allowing for the submission of the disputes to arbitration.1855
However, while some BITs have provided expressly that the MFN treatment extends to
the provisions on settlement of disputes—and in these cases it is beyond doubt that the
parties intended the MFN-clause to include dispute settlement in its scope—in most
treaties the question is not addressed explicitly.1856 Therefore, it follows that it must be
established whether the parties intended to apply the clause to dispute settlement
arrangements or if this can be reasonably inferred from the practice followed by the
parties in their treatment of foreign investors and their own investors.1857
14.1.2. Substantive v. procedural rights
While the application of an MFN-clause to substantive rights is relatively
straightforward, the question of whether MFN rights apply to procedural matters is
more controversial, as in particular there is conflicting authority on whether an MFN-
clause will enable an investor to obtain the benefit of a direct right of arbitration
contained in other investment treaties.1858
In the Maffezini case1859 the tribunal decided the question of whether more favourable
provisions on dispute settlement contained in the basic treaty could be extended to the
beneficiary of another treaty by operation of the MFN-clause in the affirmative on the
ground that procedural and substantive rights were intimately connected.1860 Indeed
the tribunal considered “that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute
settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors”.
On the other hand, in two cases rendered in 2005 and 2006, namely Plama1861 and
Telenor,1862 other ICSID arbitral tribunals considered that the MFN-clause cannot
1855 See Orrego Vicuña, p. 138.
1856 Ibid.
1857 Ibid.
1858 Turner/Mangan/Baykitch, p. 116.
1859 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000), 16
ICSID Review-FILJ 248 (2001) and XXVII YBCA (2002) 13.
1860 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, p. 270.
1861 Plama Consortium Ltd et al. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005.
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prevail on the fundamental arbitration requirement which is the meeting of the
parties’ consents to arbitrate.1863 Therefore, arbitral tribunals constituted in these two
recent cases were reluctant to set up a procedural bridge between two bilateral
instruments and to consider possible the application of a specific dispute settlement
clause provided for in a given BIT to disputes raised under the realm of another BIT,
and, consistently with this opinion, they held that an MFN-clause must apply merely to
the “treatment of investments” understood as “substantial” not “procedural” rights
applicable thereto.1864
Other tribunals again,1865 when dealing with the application of MFN-clauses to the
requirement to seek a settlement in domestic courts for 18 months, confirmed that the
claimants were entitled to rely on the MFN-clause in the applicable treaty to invoke the
more favourable dispute settlement clause of another treaty that did not contain the 18
months’ rule.1866 The tribunals underlined the role of arbitration. In Gas Natural,1867 for
instance, the tribunal focused on the importance to be attached to the assurance of an
independent international arbitration and concluded that, “unless it appears clearly that
the State parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular investment agreement settled
on a different method for resolution of disputes that may arise most-favoured-nation
provisions in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute settlement”.1868
14.1.3. Interpretation
14.1.3.1. Identifying the basic treaty
The first question that needs to be discussed is that of the basic treaty governing the
rights of the beneficiary of the clause because it is this treaty that will determine
whether the MFN-clause can be rightly invoked.1869
1862 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award,
13 September 2006.
1863 Poulain, p. 301.
1864 Ibid.
1865 Siemens v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, paras 32-110; Gas Natural SDG, S.A.
v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, paras 24-31 and 41-49; Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006, paras 52-66; National Grid PCL v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 20
June 2006, paras 53-94; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.
v. Argentina and AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2006, paras 52-68.
1866 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 254.
1867 As in Gas Natural the underlying IIA was Spain-Argentina, the MFN-clause is the same as in
Maffezini.
1868 Gas Natural, para. 49.
1869 Orrego Vicuña, p. 134.
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14.1.3.2. The scope of the MFN-clause
Most MFN-clauses are highly generic and follow the very same purpose, even though
the wording may differ; such generic wording cannot be otherwise, or cannot become
too specific, given the nature of the MFN-clause itself.1870 Unless there is a specific note
or otherwise a clear reference to the intent of the parties, most MFN-clauses should be
interpreted the same way.1871
14.1.3.3. Establishing the intent of the parties
If there is specific guidance in the text regarding whether or not the MFN-clause
applies to procedural or substantive provisions, of course the arbitrators have to abide
by that as the State parties to the treaty left no doubt as to their intent.1872 However, due
to the fact that in most of the cases arbitrators are confronted with a very abstract and
general clause, such a clause has to be interpreted.1873 The specific circumstances of
each case will have a decisive influence on the finding and it cannot be assumed that
provisions contained in other treaties will apply mechanically to the basic treaty.1874
Among other elements, it is here that the ejusdem generis principle has a controlling
role to play.1875
14.1.3.4. Ejusdem generis principle
Already in the Ambatielos case1876 the Commission of Arbitration confirmed the
importance of the ejusdem generis rule and it affirmed that “the most-favoured-nation
clause can only attract matters belonging to the same category of subject as that to
which the clause itself relates”.1877 However, while the public international law
principle of ejusdem generis has been regularly applied by investment treaty tribunals,
1870 Faya Rodriguez, p. 92.
1871 Ibid.
1872 See Faya Rodriguez, pp. 97 et seq.
1873 Ibid.
1874 Orrego Vicuña, p. 142.
1875 Ibid.
1876 Ambatielos Case, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 1952.
1877 Orrego Vicuña, p. 136.
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other tribunals1878 have found that the particular MFN-clause under consideration did
not extend to the procedure for settling disputes.1879
14.1.3.5. Specification of categories of disputes
When there are BITs entered into by a State which provide for reference to arbitration
of all disputes, and others entered into by the same State that limit consent to
arbitration to specified categories of dispute, such as expropriation, it must be obvious
that such a State, when reaching agreement on the latter form of dispute resolution
clause, intends that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is to be limited to the
specified categories and is not to be inferentially extended by an MFN-clause.1880
Where both parties to a BIT which restricts the reference to arbitration to specified
categories have entered into other BITs which refer all disputes to arbitration or
where they have concluded other BITs, some of which refer all disputes to arbitration
while others limit such a reference to specified categories of dispute, then it can fairly
be assumed that in the BIT in question the two parties share a common intention to
limit the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to the categories so specified.1881
14.1.3.6. Perspective when interpreting a MFN-clause
The Telenor tribunal observed that “those who advocate a wide interpretation of the
MFN-clause have almost always examined the issue from the perspective of the
investor”.1882 However, according to the Telenor tribunal, “what has to be applied is not
some abstract principle of investment protection in favour of a putative investor who is
not a party to the BIT and who at the time of its conclusion is not even known, but the
intention of the States who are the Contracting Parties”.1883 This was, however, done
by the Maffezini tribunal which examined the treaty practice of both Argentina and
Spain in great detail and devoted particular attention to the Spanish treaty practice and
policies on protection of foreign investments, as it was there that the intent of Spain
could be established.1884
1878 See the Plama v. Bulgaria and the Salini v. Jordan tribunals.
1879 Turner/Mangan/Baykitch, pp. 116-117.
1880 Telenor, § 95.
1881 Ibid.
1882 See Telenor, § 95.
1883 Ibid.
1884 Orrego Vicuña, p. 142.
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Another aspect of particular interest is that by definition treaties operate both ways, and
therefore, the treatment accorded to the foreign investor in the host country also applies
to the treatment that its investors are entitled to receive from the other party.1885
14.1.4. Different treatment of MFN-clauses depending on the type of
procedural requirement in discussion
In light of the foregoing, there seems to be great inconsistency with respect to MFN-
clause jurisprudence: while Maffezini,1886 Siemens,1887 Gas Natural1888 and Suez1889
interpreted silence or ambiguity as indicative that the MFN-clause included, with certain
limits, procedural provisions, Salini,1890 Plama1891 and Telenor1892 concluded just the
opposite.1893 However, it has been observed that this view is too simplistic, as the
following has to be taken into account:
- Maffezini, Siemens, Gas Natural and Suez were about a less fundamental procedural
requirement: a mere preliminary step for accessing arbitration;
- by contrast, Salini, Plama and Telenor Mobile dealt with core matters1894—basically
an extension of jurisdiction—which could easily have been categorised as “public
policy provisions” following Maffezini. In all these cases a radical effect was
intended by the claimant: in the words of Plama, to replace the dispute resolution
clause in the basic treaty in toto by a dispute resolution mechanism from a third
treaty.1895
With regard to the MFN-clause at least three different issues of both a procedural and
substantive nature can be distinguished:
1885 Orrego Vicuña, p. 142.
1886 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000), 16
ICSID Review-FILJ 248 (2001) and XXVII YBCA (2002) 13.
1887 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August
2004.
1888 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal
on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005.
1889 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006.
1890 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 2a, 29 November 2004.
1891 Plama Consortium Ltd et al. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005.
1892 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 13 September 2006.
1893 Faya Rodriguez, p. 95.
1894 Basically an extension of jurisdiction.
1895 Faya Rodriguez, pp. 95-96.
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1. the ability to use MFN to avoid a local remedies procedural requirement;
2. the ability to use MFN to “shop” for a wholly different dispute resolution
mechanism and forum; and
3. the ability to use MFN to seek arbitration of claims for compensation arguably
broader than was originally provided in the BIT itself.1896
These issues will now be analysed in the following sections (under 14.1.4.1.–14.1.4.3.).
Then the limits to be observed in using the MFN-clause will be discussed (under
14.1.4.4.).
14.1.4.1. Preliminary steps for accessing arbitration
14.1.4.1.1. Shortening of waiting period
The Siemens tribunal,1897 whilst relying on Maffezini, articulated a standard that appears
to qualify Maffezini by emphasising the notion that a procedural inconsistency between
similar treaties will be deemed arbitrary and subject to MFN invocation in the absence
of evidence that such inconsistency derives from a “sensitive” policy objective.1898
However, the extent to which the treaties must be similar, and the scope of a “sensitive”
policy issue is not entirely clear. In Gas Natural1899 the tribunal also focused on the
importance to be attached to the assurance of independent international arbitration.1900 A
similar approach was also taken in the Suez case.1901
It has been observed that the shortening of a seemingly arbitrary waiting period for the
submission of a dispute affects the timing of a host State’s consent to arbitration of
investment disputes, but does not necessarily undermine the host State’s consent as a
whole.1902
1896 Kreindler, p. 49.
1897 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August
2004.
1898 Teitelbaum, p. 231.
1899 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal
on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005.
1900 See Faya Rodriguez, p. 95.
1901 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006.
1902 See Teitelbaum, p. 232.
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14.1.4.1.2. Retroactive application of the BIT: as a special case of change of dispute
resolution mechanism
Although the Tecmed1903 tribunal did not entertain the MFN claim, it did not completely
reject the Maffezini approach, as it found that the limit on retroactive application of the
BIT, unlike other procedural matters, was at the core of the parties’ negotiations, or
formed part of the parties’ specific will.1904 It also suggested that other procedural
requirements would not go to the core of matters specifically negotiated, or would not
expand the consent to arbitration beyond the limits clearly set forth in the relevant
treaty.1905
14.1.4.2. Substitution of the dispute resolution system
14.1.4.2.1. Invoking other types of arbitration/invoking arbitration where there is no
arbitration clause in the investment treaty
In Plama v. Bulgaria1906 the tribunal did not extend the MFN-clause to arbitration.
While the claimant argued that it was entitled to select the ICSID dispute resolution
mechanism provided in another treaty instead of the ad hoc arbitration offered in the
“basic” treaty, the tribunal did not accept this substitution of dispute resolution systems
because it was not free from doubt that such an extension or incorporation of language
from a third treaty reflected the intent of the contracting States:1907
“An MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN
provisions in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Party intended to
incorporate them”.1908
1903 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
available at http://www.worldbank.org//icsid/cases/laudo-051903%20-English.pdf.
1904 Teitelbaum, p. 230.
1905 Ibid.
1906 Plama Consortium Ltd et al. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005. The MFN-clause in question provides for that: “Each Contracting Party
shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment which
is not less favourable than that accorded to investments by investors of third States”.
1907 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-40. See also Faya Rodriguez, p. 94.
1908 Plama, para. 223.
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Hence, according to the Plama tribunal, there is a sort of presumption that an MFN-
clause does not extend to dispute resolution matters, except when the Contracting
Parties have expressed a contrary interest.1909
It has been observed that what is more threatening to the scope of consent to
arbitration is the use of an MFN-clause to invoke ICSID or other types of arbitration
when there is no arbitration clause in the investment treaty.1910 This happened in
Plama v. Bulgaria as a secondary argument in the event that the tribunal would have
decided that Bulgaria had not consented to jurisdiction under the ECT.1911
14.1.4.2.2. Referring contractual disputes to arbitration
In Salini v. Jordan1912 the claimants argued that other BITs between Jordan and
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States clearly allowed investors to
refer contractual disputes to ICSID, and thus invoked the MFN-clause of the Italy-
Jordan BIT to bypass the provision in the BIT that excluded contractual disputes from
ICSID arbitration.1913 The tribunal distinguished the MFN-clause in the Italy-Jordan
BIT, finding that it was not as broad and did not refer to “all matters subject to this
agreement”. The tribunal therefore concluded that in this case the claimants had failed
to establish that it was the common intention of the parties to have the MFN-clause
applied to dispute settlement, and it found that the BIT clearly excluded from ICSID
jurisdiction contractual disputes between an investor and an entity of a State party.1914
14.1.4.3. Expanding the scope of host States’ consent to arbitration by using the MFN-
clauses to bypass substantive treatment
Another way of expanding the scope of host States’ consent to arbitration is the use of
MFN-clauses to bypass substantive treatment, such as the minimum standard of
treatment of investment, or fair and equitable treatment, as was the case in MTD Equity
Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile.1915
1909 See also Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, p. 371.
1910 See Teitelbaum, pp. 232 et seq.
1911 Ibid.
1912 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 2a, 29 November 2004.
1913 Teitelbaum, pp. 229 et seq.
1914 Ibid.
1915 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award,
25 May 2004, 44 ILM 91 (2005). On this case, see Teitelbaum, pp. 233 et seq.
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14.1.4.4. The limits to be observed
14.1.4.4.1. Against disruptive “treaty-shopping”
Regarding the limits to be observed when deciding on the extension of the MFN-clause,
the arbitral tribunal in Maffezini stated that:
“[a] distinction has to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits
by means of the operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-
shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty
provisions, on the other hand”.1916
Later the Plama and Telenor tribunals also underlined the risk of exposure to treaty-
shopping.1917
14.1.4.4.2. Public policy exceptions
The Maffezini tribunal provided examples of some “public policy” provisions that could
not be overridden by an MFN-clause, namely:
- the agreement of a particular forum such as the ICSID;
- when the parties have defined a highly institutionalised and very precise procedural
mechanism to conduct arbitration, as happens under NAFTA and other specialised
arrangements;
- the “fork in the road” clause; and
- when one party has conditioned the consent to arbitration to the prior exhaustion of
local remedies.1918
14.1.5. Views expressed in the literature
McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger submitted that the reasoning of the tribunal in Plama is to
be strongly preferred over that in Maffezini, because as the ICJ pointed out in East
1916 Maffezini, para. 63.
1917 See Telenor, § 93.
1918 See Faya Rodriguez, p. 93; see also Orrego Vicuña, pp. 143 et seq. and Kurtz, pp. 547 et seq.
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Timor (Portugal v. Australia),1919 the scope of application of a substantive obligation is
an entirely separate question to the conferral of jurisdiction upon an international
tribunal. Indeed, according to this view, in investment arbitration, where consent has to
be constructed from the standing consent given by the State by treaty, and the
subsequent consent given by the investor at the time the claim is submitted to
arbitration, it is particularly important to interpret the ambit of the State’s consent
strictly.1920 Moreover, as the balance struck in investment treaties between the various
dispute settlement options is often the subject of careful negotiation between the State
parties, selecting from a range of different techniques, it is not to be presumed that this
can be disrupted by an investor selecting at will from an assorted menu of other options
provided in other treaties,1921 and, finally, it is in any event not possible to imply a
hierarchy of favour to dispute settlement provisions.1922 Therefore, the result, following
the approach in Plama, should be that the MFN-clause will not apply to investment
treaties’ dispute settlement provisions, save where the States expressly provide so. In
other words, the domain of application of an MFN-clause will be as to the substantive
rights vouchsafed to investors from third States to which special preferences have been
granted.1923
On the other hand, Kaufmann-Kohler observed that, even though, at first sight, they
seem to conflict (Maffezini being for the application of the MFN-clause to dispute
resolution rights and Plama against it) upon closer examination they appear, however,
to supplement rather than contradict each other.1924 Indeed, while Maffezini concerned
MFN-clauses in the presence of an ICSID dispute resolution provision and sought to
avoid a waiting period or similar requirement, Plama dealt with attempts to import, in
whole or in part, the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism into a treaty that either
provided for another dispute settlement method or limited the scope of the ICSID
arbitration clause.1925 Nevertheless, the Maffezini tribunal expressly limited the potential
impact of the MFN-clause in such cases.1926 Hence, while in theory there appears to be a
clear distinction between the two schools, in practice, it has been submitted that they
can easily be reconciled, as, in actual application, they can be combined without
conflicting, and the rule that appears to emerge from this combination is the following:
1919 Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (1995) ICJ Reports 90.
1920 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
1921 Negotiated with other State parties and in other circumstances.
1922 Ibid. For a critical view on a hierarchy of favour to dispute settlement provisions in commercial
arbitration, see, e.g. Brekoulakis, Notion.
1923 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.169.
1924 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, pp. 370 et seq.
1925 Ibid.
1926 See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, para. 63.
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MFN-clauses can be used to overcome waiting periods and comparable admissibility
requirements, but not to replace, in whole or in part, the dispute resolution mechanism
provided in the treaty upon which jurisdiction is based.1927
In between the views of McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger and Kaufmann-Kohler,
Dolzer/Schreuer observed that while the two sets of cases may be distinguishable on
factual grounds, there is, however, a substantial contradiction in the reasoning of the
tribunals. Indeed, both groups of tribunals made, in particular, broad statements as to the
applicability, or otherwise, of MFN-clauses to dispute settlement in general, which are
impossible to reconcile.1928
14.1.6. Comments
Precisely because of the fact that a hierarchy of favour in dispute settlements provisions
should be avoided, I do not agree with the view1929 that it is important to construe the
ambit of the State’s consent strictly. On the other hand, the differentiation created by the
different arbitral tribunals dealing with MFN-clauses and pointed out by Kaufmann-
Kohler’s analysis1930 seems to me to be of importance. This leads me to the proposal for
the interpretation of MFN-clauses explained below, in which for determining the
consent of the parties to solve disputes through arbitration based on a MFN-clause, a
more-stage interpretation process should take place.
14.1.6.1. Interpretation of the BIT: consent of the State
To establish whether the host State has consented to use arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism or not, the following process of interpretation is suggested:
1. dispute settlement matters are expressly excluded from the field of application of the
MFN-clause: in this case it is not possible to request the application of the MFN-
clause;
2. dispute settlement matters are not expressly excluded from the field of application
of the MFN-clause. In this case a further distinction should be drawn between:
1927 Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, p. 371.
1928 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 256.
1929 See McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 7.168.
1930 See, in particular, Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, pp. 370 et seq.
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 the ability to use MFN-clauses to avoid a local remedies procedural requirement
(less fundamental procedural requirements, i.e. preliminary step for accessing
arbitration/waiving a preliminary step in accessing a mechanism): in this case
there should be a presumption that the MFN-clause applies;
 the ability to use an MFN-clause to “shop” for a wholly different dispute
resolution mechanism and forum. In this situation a careful analysis of all the
BITs concluded with other States by the host State in dispute with the investor
should be undertaken:
- if the BITs, in particular those which are more recent than the BIT whose
MFN-clause is invoked, all contain a similar dispute resolution mechanism,
then there should be a presumption that this kind of dispute resolution
mechanism applies;
- if none of the BITs, in particular none of those which are more recent than
the BIT whose MFN-clause is invoked, contain a similar dispute resolution
mechanism, then there should be a presumption that this kind of dispute
resolution mechanism does not necessarily apply;
- in the other cases a careful analysis of the BITs should be undertaken, in
particular considering the BITs concluded with those countries whose
economies present structural similarities with the economy of the investor’s
State in question.
3. with regard to the specification of categories of disputes the differentiation made by
the Teleonor tribunal should be used (see under V.14.1.3.5.); and
4. the interpretation of MFN-clauses should be done without inclination, i.e. be neither
wide nor restrictive.
14.1.6.2. Consent of the investor
The investor gives his consent for solving disputes through the dispute resolution
mechanism contained in another BIT in doing the investment or, at the latest, with the
filing of the claim. His consent is evidently less problematic than the one of the host
State, as the investor will be the party who will invoke the dispute resolution provision
contained in another BIT based on an MFN-clause in the basic BIT.
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14.2. Umbrella clauses: expansion of treaty’s consent by elevating
contractual disputes to treaty’s disputes
A technique found in investment treaties, which may extend the scope of their
protection, is the so-called “umbrella clause”.1931 An umbrella clause is a provision in
an investment protection treaty that guarantees the observation of obligations assumed
by the host State vis-à-vis the investor; the most contentious issue with regard to clauses
of this kind is whether, and under what circumstances, they place investment
agreements, i.e. contracts between the host State and the investor, under the treaty’s
protection.1932
14.2.1. The concept
The host State guarantees by treaty the specific undertakings which it has entered into
by contract or otherwise with investors of the other contracting State, bringing those
undertakings under the umbrella of protection of the treaty,1933 and therefore, possibly,
also under its dispute resolution provisions. The tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina1934
characterised the umbrella clause as one which
“creates a requirement by the host State to meet its obligations towards foreign
investors, including those that derive from a contract; hence such obligations receive
extra protection by virtue of their consideration under the bilateral treaty”.1935
Umbrella clauses, thus, create a reciprocal international obligation owed by the
Contracting States to each other that requires them, as host States, to observe
obligations they have entered into with investors of the other Contracting State or with
regard to their investments.1936
1931 Weiniger, para. 4-40.
1932 Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 153.
1933 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4-40.
1934 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 169-175.
1935 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 21.
1936 Sinclair A., p. 411.
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14.2.2. Current practice
14.2.2.1. Emergence of the umbrella clause in modern investment treaties
Although an umbrella clause is already to be found in the very first known BIT,1937 the
protection of contractual rights by treaty under an umbrella clause does not find
universal application in modern investment treaties, but, on the contrary is notably
absent from the model forms of many, in particular non-Western, States.1938 On the
other hand, the practice of Western States has been to seek to include such a protection
as a distinct obligation.1939
Of the major multilateral investment conventions today, the umbrella clause is not
found in NAFTA Chapter 11 but it did make its way into the ECT.1940 Until recently, it
had retained only the attention of scholars, who in their majority considered it a clause
elevating contractual obligations to treaty obligations. No arbitral tribunal had
considered the issue until the ones arbitrating the SGS v. Pakistan1941 and SGS v.
Philippines1942 cases. Since then, it has attracted considerable discussions both by
arbitral tribunals and scholars.1943 Indeed, the proper construction of the umbrella clause
has become a matter of contention in a number of cases.1944 While in recent years,
Noble Ventures,1945 MTD Equity,1946 CMS1947 and the majority in Eureko1948 essentially
1937 The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments of 25 November 1959 (see also Sinclair A., p. 433).
1938 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4-45.
1939 Ibid. It has been said that one may estimate that about 1,000 treaties in force include umbrella clauses
(Dolzer/Schreuer, p. 153).
1940 Sinclair A., p. 434. See Article 10(1) ECT.
1941 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6
August 2003, (2003) 18 ICSID Review-FILJ 301; (2003) 42 ILM 1290, para. 163.
1942 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29
January 2004, (2004) 19 Mealey’s IAR 15.
1943 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 22.
1944 The first ICSID case that addressed the umbrella clause was Fedax NV v. Republic of Venezuela,
Award, 9 March 1998, (1998) 37 ILM 1391; (2002) 5 ICSID Reports 186. However, in this case the
tribunal made not an explicit reference to an umbrella clause (see OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 15).
1945 Noble Ventures Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, available
inter alia at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
1946 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004,
see (2005) 20(2) ICSID Review-FILJ 615.
1947 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, available inter alia at
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Decision_ english.pdf.
1948 Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Ad Hoc Proceedings, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, details of
award available inter alia at www.asil.org/ilib/2005/09/ILIB050913.htm#j3.
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allowed for such use of umbrella clauses, more recently, however, BP-Pan American1949
and El Paso1950 have rejected such use adopting a restrictive approach.1951 In the latter
case the tribunal stated that:
“an umbrella clause cannot transform any contract claim into a treaty claim, as this
would necessarily imply that any commitments of the State in respect to investments,
even the most minor ones, would be transformed into treaty claims”.
14.2.2.2. The SGS cases
Much attention has been paid to the award in SGS v. Pakistan, and the contrasting one
in SGS v. Philippines. Much of the interest generated by these awards arises from the
two tribunals’ different approaches to the umbrella clauses contained in the respective
BITs upon which the arbitrations were based.1952
In SGS v. Pakistan, Pakistan objected to the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction on a number
of grounds, including the fact that the dispute between the parties arose out of a contract
rather than under the BIT. SGS however contended that, as a result of the “umbrella
clause” in the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, contractual disputes between the parties could
be elevated to treaty disputes.1953 The tribunal rejected SGS’s contention that this clause
elevated breaches of a contract to breaches of the treaty.1954 The SGS v. Pakistan
tribunal held that the text fell considerably short of the alleged “elevator effect”, that
the legal consequences of the elevator effect were so far reaching that it could merely be
accepted on the basis of clear and convincing evidence of the shared intent of the
contracting States—such evidence was not adduced.1955
In SGS v. Philippines the tribunal, considering an “umbrella clause” in the Switzerland-
Philippines BIT, which provided that the Contracting States “shall observe any
obligation it has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by investors
of the other Contracting Party”,1956 accepted SGS’s argument that this clause could
1949 Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006, available inter alia at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf.
1950 El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, available inter alia at www.world-bank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0315-DOJ-E.pdf.
1951 Kreindler, p. 51. See also Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, p. 369.
1952 See Weiniger, para. 12-25.
1953 Weiniger, para. 12-28.
1954 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 15.
1955 Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-32.
1956 SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 34.
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elevate the State’s alleged breach of its contract with SGS to a treaty breach. The
Philippines tribunal accepted that contract claims fell within the umbrella clause and
that it therefore had jurisdiction over the contract claims. Its jurisdiction was, however,
limited to the performance of contract obligations and did not extend to the scope of the
obligation, as the scope1957 remained within the jurisdiction of the local courts chosen in
the contract.1958 It has been observed that this reservation substantially mitigates the
difference in outcome of the two cases.1959
14.2.3. Interpretation of umbrella clauses
14.2.3.1. Placement of the umbrella clause within the BITs framework
The placement of the umbrella clause within the framework of the BIT is a point of
variance in treaty practice:
- a number of BITs place the umbrella clause within an article detailing the
substantive protections provided under the treaty;1960
- the Swiss BITs usually place the umbrella clause in a provision entitled “other
commitments”;1961
- a third variant is to place the umbrella clause in a separate provision from the
substantive protections but before the dispute resolution clauses.1962
The effect of the placement of the umbrella clause within the overall framework of the
BIT is uncertain:
- the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan was of the opinion that the placement of the clause
near the end of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT, in the same manner as the Swiss Model
BIT, was indicative of an intention on the part of the Contracting Parties not to
provide a substantive obligation;
- by contrast, the SGS v. Philippines tribunal opined that while the placement of the
clause may be “entitled to some weight,” it did not consider this factor as
decisive.1963
1957 The amount of the debt due.
1958 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretation, para. 13-36.
1959 Ibid.
1960 See the Netherlands Model BIT and a number of BITs including those concluded by the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Japan, Sweden and the US.
1961 An exception is the Switzerland-Kuwait BIT 1998. The Swiss BIT format is also to be found in the
Finnish and Greek Model BITs and the BITs concluded by Mexico.
1962 See German Model BIT (OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 10).
1963 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 10.
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14.2.3.2. Scope and nature of the obligations undertaken
A crucial issue in respect of umbrella clauses is the scope and nature of the
obligations undertaken, as textual differences can be seen between umbrella clauses
that refer to “commitments”,1964 “any obligation”1965 and “any other obligation”.1966
Moreover, while some umbrella clauses refer to obligations “entered into”1967 by a
State, others refer to obligations “assumed”1968 by the State, and the Finnish Model
BIT, for instance, refers to obligations which the State may “have” with regard to a
specific investment.1969 These variations raise the question of whether the obligation
referred to is a contractual obligation between the State and the investor or whether it
could extend to unilateral obligations undertaken by the State through, inter alia,
promises, legislative acts or administrative measures:
- it has been suggested that the words “obligations entered into” may be interpreted
as confining the obligations in question to those undertaken vis-à-vis the other
Contracting Party;1970
- on the other hand, the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan found the language “commitments
entered into” broad enough to encompass unilateral obligations, including
municipal acts and administrative measures.1971
While some tribunals have noted that their decisions were dependent on the terms of the
BIT involved, this explanation, however, does not provide a satisfactory justification for
all of the discrepancies.1972
14.2.3.3. Restrictive v. expansive interpretation
It is true, though, that there is no inconsistency in the interpretation of the same treaty
provisions so far. Indeed, the umbrella clause contained in the United States-Argentina
BIT, which has been put to the test on a number of occasions, has, for instance, been
1964 See, e.g. Article 7(2) Belgium and Luxembourg-Saudi Arabia BIT 2002.
1965 See, e.g. Article 11(2) Greek Model BIT 2001.
1966 See, e.g. Article 2(3) Greece-Argentina BIT 1999 [not in force]. OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 10.
1967 UK Model BIT, Article 2 “Promotion and protection of investment”.
1968 UK-Lebanon BIT 1999, Article 10 “Other obligations”.
1969 Finland Model BIT, Article 12 “Application of other rules”.
1970 Ben Hamida, at 21.
1971 SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, paras 163-166.
1972 Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, footnote 76.
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subject to quite consistent restrictive interpretation.1973 Conversely, the approach of
tribunals in interpreting umbrella clauses contained in different BITs has been different.
The SGS v. Pakistan tribunal, while accepting that a literal reading of the umbrella
clause would support SGS in elevating contract claims into BIT claims, refused to
adopt a literal meaning which would have given rise to such a broad effect.1974
Indeed, the tribunal avoided being confined to a literal reading by stating that any literal
reading that would provide far-reaching consequences would have to be supported by
evidence of the treaty’s drafting history and that such evidence would need to indicate
clearly that such wide-reaching consequences were intended.1975 One of the three extra-
textual reasons noted by the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan was that if an investor were
able to use an umbrella clause to elevate contract claims into BIT claims, the investor
would be able to choose at will to nullify any freely negotiated dispute resolution
provisions in State contracts.1976 Consequently, the tribunal emphasised the importance
of neutrality in pointing out how allowing the investor to choose at will to nullify
domestic dispute resolution provisions would create a situation where the benefit
“would flow only to the investor”.1977
On the other hand, in SGS v. Philippines the tribunal signalled its intent to keep to a
literal interpretation by stating that one must begin with the actual text of the BIT
provision.1978 Nevertheless, despite their statements of intent to keep to the “actual text”
in their conclusion the majority of the tribunal decided not to follow the literal meaning
of the clause to its full extent.1979 The SGS v. Philippines tribunal also used policy
considerations to support the award and held:
“The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments.
According to the preamble it is intended to create and maintain favourable conditions
for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other. It is
legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of
covered investments”.1980
Taken together the two SGS awards are an illustration of the limitation inherent in
relying upon policy considerations in interpreting treaties as the policy considerations
1973 Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, p. 369.
1974 Weiniger, paras 12-29 et seq.
1975 Ibid.
1976 See SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 168.
1977 Ibid. See also Weiniger, para. 12-32.
1978 Weiniger, para. 12-38.
1979 Weiniger, para. 12-42.
1980 SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 116.
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taken into account by the SGS v. Philippines tribunal were directly opposite to the
policy considerations relied upon in SGS v. Pakistan and led to the opposite result.1981
In SGS v. Philippines the tribunal’s attempt “to give effect to the parties’ contracts
while respecting the general language of BIT dispute settlement provisions,”1982
resulted in practice in an impossible situation to the extent that it attempts to render
compatible two contradictory intentions: the parties to the investment contract seek an
exclusive forum, whereas the intention of the Contracting Parties to the BIT is to accord
to the investors a choice of forum.1983 Moreover, to the extent this solution recognises,
“in principle”, an investor’s right to choose an international arbitral tribunal for the
settlement of its investment disputes and, in the same breath, requires that the selected
tribunal stay the proceedings on the basis of an exclusive forum selection clause
contained in the investment contract, it results in the BIT tribunal having jurisdiction
over an empty shell and depriving the BIT dispute resolution provision of any
meaning.1984
While the SGS v. Philippines tribunal, for instance, answered the question of whether
interpretative doubts should be resolved in favour of the investor in the affirmative, the
El Paso arbitrators favoured a balanced interpretation.1985
14.2.4. Comments
14.2.4.1. The issue
The difficulties in relation to umbrella clauses are essentially due to the fact that the
host State gives, on the one hand, in the BIT, a double consent with regard to the
dispute resolution mechanism (to the investor’s State, as party to the treaty, and to the
investor himself) and, above all, on the other hand, a parallel consent. The latter
(parallel consent) arises because between the host State and the investor there are two
relationships: one based on a BIT and the other on an investment contract.
1981 Weiniger, para. 12-35.
1982 SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 134.
1983 Gaillard, SGS, p. 334.
1984 Ibid.
1985 Kaufmann-Kohler, Precedent, p. 370.
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In such circumstances the problems clearly arise when there are different fora which are
provided for in the BIT and in the investment contract. This can lead, for instance, to
situations like the one in SGS v. Philippines, where the tribunal’s attempt “to give effect
to the parties’ contracts while respecting the general language of BIT dispute settlement
provisions”, resulted in practice in an impossible situation to the extent that it tried to
render compatible two contradictory intentions: the parties to the investment contract
sought an exclusive forum, whereas the intention of the Contracting Parties to the BIT
was to accord to the investors a choice of forum.1986
The main issue in such situations is whether there is an overlap of the consent given in
the investment contract through the consent expressed in the BIT, or, in other words,
whether the umbrella clause, by elevating a contractual claim to a treaty claim, leads to
a change of fora. Now it is clear that the question of whether there is such an overlap or
not has to be interpreted.
The starting point of the interpretation process should be the umbrella clause contained
in the BIT. Because of the diversity in the way an umbrella clause is formulated in
investment agreements, the proper interpretation of the clause depends on the specific
wording of the particular treaty, its ordinary meaning, the context, the object and
purpose of the treaty as well as the negotiating history or other indications of the
parties’ intent.1987 The time of concluding the BIT between the host State and the
investor’s State may also be of importance.
14.2.4.2. The language in BITs
The review of the language of umbrella clauses included in a number of treaties indicate
that, although there are some disparities,
- the ordinary meaning of “shall observe”,1988 “any commitments/obligations”1989
would seem to point towards an inclusive, wide interpretation which would cover
all obligations assumed/entered into by the contracting States, including contracts,
unless otherwise stated;
1986 See Gaillard, SGS, p. 334.
1987 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 22.
1988 See, e.g. Article 8(2) German Model BIT 1991(2).
1989 See, e.g. Article 7(2) Belgium and Luxembourg-Saudi Arabia BIT 2002; Artile 11(2) Greek Model
BIT 2001.
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- wording such as “shall guarantee the observance”1990 or “shall maintain a legal
framework apt to guarantee the continuity of legal treatment”1991 might lead to a
narrower interpretation.1992
There are also clauses which specifically exclude the jurisdiction of the treaty-based
arbitral tribunal in favour of an administrative tribunal or a court, by preserving the
distinctive jurisdictional order for the existing contracts.1993
14.2.4.3. The interpretation by the arbitral tribunals
Although arbitral tribunals, in their majority, when faced with a “proper” umbrella
clause1994 seem to be adopting a fairly consistent interpretation which covers all State
obligations, including contractual ones,1995 the question of a BIT tribunal’s jurisdiction
over contractual claims on the sole basis of a broadly drafted BIT dispute resolution
clause remains unsettled in ICSID case law:
1. a first approach, adopted in Salini v. Morocco, Vivendi v. Argentina, and
subsequently in SGS v. Philippines, consists of giving effect to the broad language
of the dispute resolution clause;
2. under a second approach, espoused in SGS v. Pakistan, the broad wording of the
dispute resolution clause found in the BIT is not sufficient justification for the
jurisdiction of the BIT tribunal over purely contractual claims.1996
It has been observed that a delicate balance must be struck between two conflicting
considerations:
- on the one hand, it seems only reasonable to assume that the intention regarding the
scope of the BIT dispute resolution provision will vary according to the language
used; the fact that some treaties expressly restrict the BIT tribunal’s jurisdiction to
treaty violations suggests that broader language is intended to encompass other
types of disputes such as contractual ones;
- on the other hand, it may seem odd to interpret a treaty as creating a jurisdictional
basis for the BIT tribunal in cases where it is not called upon to rule on an alleged
violation of that treaty, as there is always a danger in separating the jurisdictional
1990 See, e.g. the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT (the basis for the SGS v. Pakistan case).
1991 See, e.g. the Italy-Jordan BIT (the basis for the Salini v. Jordan case).
1992 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 22.
1993 Ibid.
1994 I.e. one drafted in broad and inclusive terms.
1995 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 22.
1996 Gaillard, SGS, p. 331.
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provisions from the substantive terms of the same treaty—it may suggest that the
arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction but is invited to rule in a vacuum.1997
This tension does not exist, however, when the treaty contains an observance of
undertakings clause according to which the breach of a contract entered into by the State
party can also be characterised as a treaty violation. 1998
The El Paso tribunal called for a balanced approach to investment treaty interpretation,
one which takes into account “both State sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to
create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic
activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow”.1999
This rejection of the view that interpretive doubts should be resolved in favour of
foreign investor interests would guide the interpretation of the tribunal with respect to
the “umbrella clause” of the treaty.2000
While the tribunal in CMS v. Argentina found Argentina internationally responsible
pursuant to the umbrella clause contained in Article II(2)(c) of the US-Argentina BIT, it
expressed the view that the application of this “proper” umbrella clause was restricted
to contracts concluded between an investor and the State acting as sovereign:2001
“Purely commercial aspects of a contract might not be protected by the treaty in some
situations, but the protection is likely to be available when there is significant
interference by governments or public agencies with the rights of the investors”.
14.2.4.4. Unclear wording of the umbrella clause
It could be argued that when the wording of the umbrella clause is unclear a certain
expansive effect should be derived from the interpretation principle in dubio contra
stipulatorem. However, it should also be observed that while in the case of the consent
contained in the investment contract the intents of both parties can be interpreted in a
direct way, in the case of a standing offer contained in a BIT, the intent of the host
State has to be interpreted starting from the interpretation of the consent of the BIT’s
parties, i.e. in an indirect way.
1997 See Gaillard, SGS, p. 336.
1998 Ibid.
1999 El Paso v. Argentine, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para. 70.
2000 See OECD Working Paper 2006/3, pp. 17 et seq.
2001 Ibid.
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A certain attenuation of this indirect interpretation could be reached in the SGS v.
Pakistan case where the Swiss authorities explained in a letter their intention when
entering into the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT. However, the problem here is that the
investor’s State could at least give an appearance of bias in favour of the investor who
wants to claim against the host State. Nevertheless, further interpretations by
governments, which are parties to investment agreements including an umbrella clause,
as to their intention regarding this clause, as well as the insertion of clear language in
new treaties, would be a welcome and much needed development.2002
14.2.4.5. The drafting of BITs
It has been observed that the clear message for the future drafting of BITs is to use
greater precision in scoping out the obligations to which treaty arbitration is meant and
not meant to apply and that likewise, it may make sense to undertake drafting which
clarifies whether a contract with a State entity having a distinct legal personality will
fall within the ambit of an umbrella clause, as was upheld in the Eureko2003 and Noble
Ventures2004 cases but declined in the Impregilo2005 case.2006
15. RELEVANCE OF PARTIES’ CONSENT WITH REGARD TO
PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS: CONSOLIDATION IN
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
The same dispute or two closely related disputes may result in parallel proceedings
before different arbitral tribunals (or between a national court and an arbitral tribunal),
with a resulting risk of conflicting decisions and awards.2007 While there is no
unanimous solution to this problem, different procedural mechanisms have been
developed to avoid or mitigate the undesirable effects of parallel proceedings:
2002 OECD Working Paper 2006/3, p. 22.
2003 Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Ad Hoc Proceedings, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, details of
award available inter alia at www.asil.org/ilib/2005/09/ILIB050913.htm#j3.
2004 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, available
inter alia at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
2005 Impregilo SpA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction,
22 April 2005, available inter alia at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/impregilo-decision.pdf.
2006 Kreindler, p. 51.
2007 Cremades/Madalena, p. 507.
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- the doctrines of lis pendens and res judicata, which apply to arbitration if certain
identity requirements are met;
- the so-called “fork in the road” clauses and waivers.2008
The possibility of consolidation of proceedings has become a necessary feature to
achieve legal certainty, but it usually requires consent of all parties.2009 Indeed, the
consolidation of related investment arbitral proceedings will only be available if either:
- all parties consent; or
- there is an express provision in the treaty for the consolidation of claims, as is the
case in Article 1126 NAFTA.2010
If there is no such provision, but related claims are submitted to arbitration under the
supervision of the same arbitration institution,2011 then it may be possible to reduce
duplicative litigation by appointing the same tribunal to hear all of the claims, either
together or seriatim.2012
15.1. The ICSID Convention
Although it is commonly held that “the Convention does not contain any rules regarding
possible parallel proceedings”, Article 26 ICSID Convention seems to achieve
consolidation at least temporarily as it provides that only one procedure may be pending
in relation to a certain dispute.2013 Indeed, if consolidation is a means of avoiding
competing proceedings, then Article 26 ICSID Convention achieves that scope (at least
until ICSID jurisdiction is decided).2014 On the other hand, contrarily to some other
institutional rules,2015 the ICSID Arbitration Rules do not contain provisions allowing
for the consolidation of parallel or related proceedings.2016
However, this does not prevent the ICSID Secretariat from making efforts to harmonise
parallel proceedings when this is possible, as was for instance the case at the
2008 These techniques call for prudence and particular attention to the language of the treaty (see
Cremades/Madalena, p. 507).
2009 Ibid.
2010 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, paras 4.144 and 4.146.
2011 Such as ICSID.
2012 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.145.
2013 See Crivellaro, pp. 88 et seq.
2014 Ibid.
2015 See, e.g. CEPANI Rules or Swiss Rules.
2016 Crivellaro, p. 89.
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commencement of the Salini v. Morocco arbitration,2017 where the ICSID Secretariat
was aware of the fact that another parallel arbitration had been initiated by other Italian
investors against Morocco based on the same BIT and on factual and legal backgrounds
similar to those of the Salini case.2018 The de facto consolidation suggested by the
ICSID Secretariat, with the recommendation to appoint the same arbitrators, proved to
be a very reasonable solution, as it had the effect of avoiding inconsistent decisions.2019
Indeed, the arbitrator’s decisions as to the scope and limits of their jurisdiction were the
same in both cases.2020 The advantage of a de facto consolidation is that it is respectful
of parties’ consent with regard to the method of dispute resolution, and their choice
as to who they want to arbitrate with.
15.2. Investment treaties
15.2.1. The provisions aimed at avoiding the duplication of proceedings
Investment treaties also contain provisions aimed at avoiding the duplication of
proceedings. These provisions are of different types and require the claimant to either:
- irrevocably choose between pursuing its claim in domestic courts or in international
arbitration (“fork in the road” clause);
- waive its rights to submit its claim to any other forum as a precondition to
international arbitration; or
- have prior recourse to State courts for a fixed period of time.2021
15.2.1.1. Three techniques aimed at avoiding the duplication of proceedings
15.2.1.1.1. The “fork in the road” clause
Many investment treaties provide that the investor has to choose between the litigation
of its claims in the host State’s domestic courts or international arbitration and that,
2017 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco
(Decision of Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001).
2018 The parallel arbitration proceeding was ICSID Case No. ARD/00/6, Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom
of Morocco.
2019 Crivellaro, p. 89.
2020 Ibid.
2021 See Crivellaro, p. 97.
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once made, the choice is final.2022 However, while the “fork in the road” clause obliges
the investor to make a forum selection which cannot be modified thereafter, it is
questionable whether the “fork in the road” clause actually achieves consolidation.2023
Nevertheless, the “fork in the road” clauses, when investors choose to initiate
proceedings in State domestic courts, bar host State’s consent to arbitration for the
same dispute. Therefore, it becomes of prime importance how the concept of “same
dispute” is interpreted. It has been observed that the case-law on “fork in the road”
provisions in BITs is consistent.2024
15.2.1.1.2. The waiver of alternative forums
Article 1121(1)(b) NAFTA contains another approach to the ne bis in idem principle in
the relationship between international tribunals and domestic courts.2025 This
provision2026 requires, as a condition for jurisdiction, that the claimant submits a waiver
of the right to initiate or continue before domestic judiciaries any proceedings with
respect to the measures taken by the respondent that are alleged to be in breach of the
NAFTA.2027 The NAFTA requires a specific declaration of waiver, i.e. the mere
abstention from domestic proceedings may not be enough.2028 The waiver can be seen
as a material condition to be fulfilled in order to be able to accept the host State’s
consent (in form of a standing offer) to arbitration.
15.2.1.1.3. The prior recourse to State courts for a fixed period of time
A third technique used to prevent the duplication of proceedings, which is found in
some BITs, requires the investor to first have recourse to the domestic courts for a
certain period of time as a precondition to the right to refer the matter to international
arbitration under the BIT after the expiration of the time limit (the “prior recourse”
clause).2029
2022 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 301.
2023 Crivellaro, p. 98.
2024 See Schreuer, Vivendi, pp. 304 et seq., with reference to cases of this consistent case-law.
2025 Schreuer, Vivendi, p. 308.
2026 The meaning of Article 1121 NAFTA was discussed extensively in Waste Management Inc. v. United
Mexican States, Award, 2 June 2000, 40 ILM 56 (2001), 5 ICSID Reports 443.
2027 Schreuer, Vivendi, pp. 308 et seq.
2028 Ibid.
2029 Crivellaro, p. 100. Article X of the Spain-Argentina BIT, whose meaning was considered by the
ICSID tribunal in the Maffezini case, contains such a clause.
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Such a clause achieves consolidation—at least temporarily—by avoiding the split of the
claims based on their legal nature2030 as well as their parallel referral to different
forums.2031 The “prior recourse” clause can be seen as a temporal condition to be
fulfilled in order to be able to accept the host State’s consent (in form of a standing
offer) to arbitration. However, unless the state has conditioned its consent on the
exhaustion of such remedies, the general rule is that there is no such requirement, as
recognised by the ICSID Convention.2032
15.2.1.2. The consolidating effects of “non-duplication” clauses
While the “non-duplication” clauses may sometimes have effects comparable to the
one of consolidation,2033 on the other hand, when considering issues related to parties’
consent they are less problematic. Indeed, they may be seen as a condition to be
fulfilled in order to be able to accept the host State’s consent (in form of a standing
offer) to arbitration or as an investor’s choice barring the State’s consent to arbitration.
Conversely, the true consolidation provisions raise a fundamental question with regard
to consent: whether the original parties to the proceeding have all consented to arbitrate
with the parties which are to be joined through the consolidation.
15.2.2. Consolidation
Although the consolidation of parallel proceedings has unquestionable advantages,
guaranteeing a uniform application of the law and preventing unnecessary costs,
consolidation raises difficult issues in relation to confidentiality and the effective
administration of the case when the two proceedings were filed under different
mechanisms.2034
15.2.2.1. NAFTA and consolidation
One peculiar feature of NAFTA arbitrations is the right to demand consolidation if a
controversial State measure affects several investors under Article 1126 NAFTA.2035
2030 Treaty v. contract claims.
2031 Crivellaro, p. 102.
2032 Cremades/Madalena, p. 527. See the wording of Article 26 ICSID Convention. See also Schreuer,
Commentary, p. 392.
2033 See, e.g. Article 1121 NAFTA (waiver of alternative forums). This is, however, not the case for prior-
recourse clauses and uncertain for “fork in the road” ones (see Crivellaro, p. 103).
2034 Cremades/Madalena, p. 534.
2035 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-29.
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Article 1126 NAFTA provides that a disputing party, whether a State party or an
investor, may request the establishment of a special tribunal by the Secretary General of
ICSID, pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, to hear a request to consolidate
claims.2036
Once such a tribunal has assumed jurisdiction, other tribunals lose their jurisdiction to
resolve claims.2037 Indeed, in the event the tribunal established under Article 1126
NAFTA determines that claims have a question of law or fact in common and that the
interests of fair and efficient resolution of claims favour consolidation, it may assume
jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims or assume
jurisdiction over and determine one or more of the claims in order to assist in the
resolution of the others.2038
The consolidation provision of Article 1126 NAFTA allows multiple claims arising
from a single measure taken by a NAFTA party to be decided consistently in a way that
relieves States from the administrative difficulties and potential legal perils of facing a
multiplicity of actions arising out of the same underlying facts.2039 On the other hand,
Article 1126 NAFTA cannot be construed as a possible means to consolidate claims
which are unrelated but filed by the same investor.2040 As stated in the Pope & Talbot
case:
“consolidation under the NAFTA provision appears to be directed to consolidation of
cases involving different investors making similar claims, rather than a single investor
making different claims”.2041
15.2.2.1.1. Characteristics of the NAFTA consolidation provision
The NAFTA consolidation provision is very innovative and unique because of the
following characteristics:
a. “Same State measure”: a more precise criterion
Article 1126 NAFTA addresses the possibility of multiple arbitral claims arising from a
“same State measure”, whilst usually the other provisions address the possibility of
2036 Alvarez H.C., p. 413.
2037 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 2.44.
2038 Alvarez H.C., p. 413.
2039 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 2.44.
2040 Cremades/Madalena, p. 533.
2041 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, award regarding the “Super Fee”, 7 August 2000.
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parallel referral of a “same dispute” to arbitration and to court proceedings.2042 It has
been observed that this is a positive development in respect of traditional arbitration
law. The concept of State “measure” is a much more precise notion to determine and
identify claims than the concept of “dispute” used in traditional legal terms, as, on the
one hand, there might be, within a same “dispute”, several claims involving different
parties, possibly based on different legal grounds, and, on the other hand, the rule
applies to two or more arbitrations, not to arbitration and court proceedings.2043
b. A State does not have to defend itself in multiple arbitrations
In particular the State party should be protected from having to defend numerous
arbitrations for the same measures with the threat of conflicting awards.2044 Article 1126
NAFTA relieves a State from the burden of having to defend against multiple claims
(arising from a same measure) in scattered arbitrations, as a State may request the
consolidation of related claims.2045 On the other hand, while it may be assumed that this
consolidation provision is primarily intended to relieve a State party from the hardship
of having to defend multiple claims arising from the same measure, it is interesting to
note that consolidation can be requested by either disputing party.2046
c. The risk of inconsistent decisions is avoided
Article 1126 NAFTA avoids the risk of inconsistent decisions in arbitrations arising
from a same measure—including the risk that the State be condemned in one arbitration
and absolved in another.2047
d. A hierarchy of arbitral tribunals is created
Consolidation is made by order of a new tribunal constituted pursuant to a request for
consolidation.2048 The tribunal previously constituted in a specific arbitration is subject
to the authority of the consolidation tribunal.2049 Indeed, if the consolidation tribunal
assume jurisdiction, the previously constituted tribunal loses its jurisdiction to the extent
2042 See Crivellaro, p. 105.
2043 Ibid.
2044 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 28-29.
2045 Crivellaro, p. 105.
2046 Alvarez H.C., p. 414. See also Eklund, p. 149.
2047 Crivellaro, p. 105.
2048 Eklund, p. 149.
2049 See Crivellaro, p. 105.
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that it is assumed by the consolidation tribunal.2050 The consolidation decision is final
and no challenge or appeal against it is possible.2051
e. Consolidation must be requested by one of the parties
Although the consolidation tribunal renders a binding final decision, consolidation can
never be decided ex officio by either the consolidation tribunal, the arbitration tribunal
firstly constituted in a specific case, the NAFTA Secretariat or the ICSID Secretary-General,
even though they might be aware of the existence of parallel arbitration claims—
consolidation can only be decided upon the request of one the parties involved in one
of the arbitrations.2052
15.2.2.1.2. The Corn Products and Softwood Lumber disputes
The provisions of Article 1126 NAFTA have been considered by two consolidation
tribunals established under the distinctive provisions of that Article:
- in the first case, the Corn Products dispute,2053 the consolidation tribunal found
against consolidation of two claims brought in relation to the same excise tax
measure against Mexico;
- in the second case, the Softwood Lumber dispute,2054 the consolidation tribunal
decided to consolidate and hear a series of cases on antidumping duty in the
softwood lumber industry against the United States.2055
The order in the Softwood Lumber dispute represents a particularly elaborate
consideration of the requirements of Article 1126 NAFTA.2056
2050 Alvarez H.C., p. 413.
2051 See Crivellaro, p. 105.
2052 Crivellaro, p. 106.
2053 Corn Products Int'l, Inc. v. United Mexican States and Archer Daniels Midland Co. & Tate & Lyle
Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, 20 May 2005,
available at
http://www.economiasnci.gob.mx/sphp_pages/importa/sol_contro/consultoria/Casos_Mexico/
Consolidacion/ acuerdos/050520_Orden_de_Tribunal_de_Acumulacion.pdf.
2054 See Order of the Consolidation Tribunal: Canfor Corp., Tembec et al. and Terminal Forest Products
Ltd. v. United States, available at US Department of State, available at:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53113.pdf.
2055 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, para. 4.146.
2056 Ibid. On the examination of the key principles of the Softwood Lumber Dispute Order, see in
particular Loong.
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15.2.2.1.3. Is consolidation ultimately based on consent?
It has been argued that mandatory consolidation makes good sense in the case of
NAFTA Chapter 11, which is not the usual private, consensual context of international
commercial arbitration, but creates a broad range of claims which may be brought by an
equally broad range of claimants who have mandatory access to a binding arbitration
process without the requirement of an arbitration agreement in the conventional sense
nor even the need for a contract between the disputing parties.2057 Conversely, it has
also been observed that NAFTA consolidation ultimately takes its source from the
parties’ consent, as:
- an investor, by submitting a claim to arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11B,
inevitably agrees to the NAFTA rules, which include the consolidation rule; and
- the State consents to arbitration under the same rules, being a party of the NAFTA
treaty.2058
However, while consolidation primarily affects the investors, it has to be observed that
in the Corn Products dispute as well as in the Softwood Lumber dispute the requests of
consolidation were introduced by the States parties. Furthermore, the question has to
be posed as to whether the investors, if they wish to benefit from NAFTA, really have
any other choice than to agree to the NAFTA rules. This question can be answered in
the negative. In fact, the investors by choosing to begin an arbitration proceeding also
accept conducting the proceeding under the relevant NAFTA arbitration rules.
Therefore, the possibility of consolidation seems to be “the price to be paid” by the
investors for the open standing offer to arbitrate by the host State. Indeed, the States
parties to the NAFTA make arbitration available to the investors as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism to the State courts where consolidation is a well known
mechanism. For this reason, it could even be argued that it would not be
comprehensible why the investors—to whom the States make available a neutral dispute
resolution forum (arbitration)—should be better placed than claimants in State courts.
This makes it also appear as less compelling to have the possibility of opting-out from
the consolidation rules.
2057 Alvarez H.C., p. 414.
2058 Crivellaro, p. 106.
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15.2.2.2. BITs/free trade agreements and consolidation
15.2.2.2.1. In general
Recent model BITs2059 and similar free trade agreements2060 follow the NAFTA
example with regard to consolidation.2061 Similarly to Article 1126 NAFTA, the new
BIT practice provides for consolidation of multiple claims which arise from a same fact,
usually a State measure which is alleged to be in breach of the State’s obligations, only
upon application by a disputing party.2062
However, whereas under the US Model BIT and the Free Trade Agreements, a
consolidation tribunal assumes jurisdiction over, hears and determines either treaty
claims, contract claims, or both, under the Canada Model BIT2063 only treaty claims
may be referred to arbitration and possibly consolidated under the BIT provisions.2064
15.2.2.2.2. With regard to consent
It has been observed that the consolidation provisions rest on a treaty regime that is
consented to by all the parties involved. Therefore, even though consolidation results
from an order provoked by one of the parties which is finally binding upon all other
parties and on previously established tribunals, consolidation ultimately remains a
consensual mechanism.2065
This view needs in my opinion to be refined. While it is true that the States parties
consent to consolidation by signing the BITs or the free trade agreements, the situation
is different for the investors. Although it might be said that they consent to the
eventuality of consolidation by beginning the arbitration proceeding, on the other hand
one may question if they really have an alternative to arbitration when they wish to
have a neutral dispute resolution forum.
2059 See the New US Model BIT or the New Canada Model BIT.
2060 See the Chile-US Free Trade Agreement, the Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement, the Singapore-US
Free Trade Agreement, the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement.
2061 Crivellaro, p. 106.
2062 See also Crivellaro, p. 111.
2063 See Articles 22, 23 and 24 Canada Model BIT.
2064 Crivellaro, p. 112.
2065 See Crivellaro, pp. 111 et seq.
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This issue is accentuated by the fact that consolidation is certainly an advantage for a
State called to respond for a measure it has taken in respect of a certain investment, as
without consolidation, the State would be a respondent in multiple parallel cases,
whereas, on the other hand, it is not as certain that consolidation is as equally
advantageous to an investor.2066 Nevertheless, the possibility provided for consolidation
strengthens the jurisdictional side of arbitration.
15.3. Consolidation in commercial and investment arbitration:
different approaches
15.3.1. Consolidation with regard to parties’ consent
Although consolidation of related commercial arbitrations remains in principle2067 fully
dependent on the consent of all the parties involved,2068 the consolidation of related
investment arbitrations may be achieved by a tribunal’s binding order, as the guiding
consolidation principles in international investment law are the unity of the economic
transaction affected by a same State measure.2069
15.3.2. The justification of the difference in approach
In commercial disputes, the parties are equal, i.e. no party has a right or a legitimate
interest which is superior or deserves a higher legal protection over the right or the
legitimate interest of the other party; on the contrary, in investment disputes one of the
parties is inevitably a State, and a State can legitimately rely on its superior interest not
to be judged twice for the same action or omission.2070 Moreover, the situation of
conflicting awards rendered in commercial arbitration may receive judicial redress,
because the conduct of various related tribunals and the coordination between different
arbitral awards (or between awards and court decisions) remain subject to the courts’
2066 Crivellaro, pp. 111 et seq.
2067 An exeption is, e.g. Article 1046 Netherlands CCP which provides for the possibility of mandatory
consolidation. About this provision, see under IV.7.2.2.2.2.b.
2068 See, e.g. the consent given by the parties by choosing the Swiss Rules to consolidation according to
Article 4 Swiss Rules.
2069 Which on the other hand do not find application in international commercial arbitration (Crivellaro, p.
119).
2070 Ibid.
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control in the annulment or enforcement phase, while two ICSID conflicting awards
escape any further remedy, because the annulment of ICSID awards by domestic courts
is excluded by the Convention and their enforcement is immediate and does not allow
for any judicial control over the award as such.2071
2071 Crivellaro, p. 120.
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VI. SPORT ARBITRATION
The explosion of what is called the sport phenomenon, which has found its most notable
expression in worldwide events like the Olympic Games, the Football World Cup,
Formula 1, and the considerable economic and financial interests involved have
provoked deep changes in the nature of sport’s relationships.2072 One of the most
distinctive characteristics of sport is its vertical/pyramidal structure2073 and Chapter VI.
begins by dealing with the structural organisation of sport (section 1.).
Sport is characterised by its particular rules2074 and by what has also be perceived as the
lex sportiva.2075 Therefore, and even though the Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that
rules issued by private associations2076 could neither be characterised as “law” nor be
recognised as “lex sportiva transnationalis”,2077 unsurprisingly arbitration has been
seen as the privileged dispute resolution method in the field of sport. After discussing
the main arbitral instances in the sport’s area (section 2.), where the focus will clearly
be on the leading institution, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),2078 the thesis will
then examine the reasons for the use of arbitration in the field of sport, the specific
needs of sport in terms of dispute resolution and the acceptance of arbitration by the
sport community (section 3.). Indeed, most sport organisations provide for arbitration to
resolve all kinds of dispute, such as disputes between international or national
federations and their member-federations, but also between federations and individual
athletes.2079 The proceedings are frequently based on arbitration clauses contained in the
2072 Simon, p. 187.
2073 So, e.g. Netzle p. 46 for the traditional structure of sport organisations in continental Europe. See also
DFT 133 III 235 (Cañas decision).
2074 See, e.g. the eligibility rules for participating to sport competitions or the rules in the field of doping.
However, there are also further rules. For an overview, see in particular Rigozzi, paras 31 et seq. On the
distinction between “Spielregel” (“game rules”—not considered to be subject to judicial review) and
“Rechtsregel” (“legal rules”—considered to be subject to judicial review), see in particular Kummer.
2075 See, e.g. Simon, p. 190. See also CAS 15 July 2005, No. 2004/A/776, Clunet 2005, p. 1322; CAS
2005/A/983 & 984, CA Penarol v. PSG et al., 12 July 2006, paras 66-69.
2076 In the case in question it was the FIFA.
2077 DFT 132 III 285, consid. 1.3. (Poudret/Besson, para. 702). In relation to the Cañas decision (DFT 133
III 235), see also Oschütz, paras 20 et seq.
2078 Due to the fact that the CAS has its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland, the State court where appeals
against CAS awards are heard is the Swiss Federal Tribunal. It has also to be observed that many sport
organisations (FIFA, FIS, IOC, UEFA, etc.) have their seat in Switzerland (see also Walter, p. 133).
2079 Netzle, p. 45.
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statutes or by-laws of the governing sport organisation;2080 the applicability of such
statutory arbitration clauses on individual athletes may generate, with regard to the
athlete’s consent to arbitration, two main issues:
- usually, no complete, mutually signed arbitration agreements between sport
organisations and athletes exist, as the federations trust in arbitration clauses in their
own statutes or in rather general references in the licence forms;
- even if the athlete signed an arbitration agreement with a sport organisation, the
question remains as to whether the athlete had a real choice not to sign.2081
After analysing arbitration agreements in sport (section 4.) and how consent to
arbitration is reached, the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement with regard
to consent will be more deeply discussed (section 5.) as well as the role of mandatory
arbitration to solve disputes in the sport’s field (section 6.). The final part will be
devoted to the relevance of parties’ consent with regard to procedural aspects, in
particular the identifying and joining of parties (section 7.).
1. THE STRUCTURAL ORGANISATION OF SPORT
1.1. The federation’s structure
1.1.1. Evolution and characteristics
Historically, the federation’s structure has built up from the bottom in accordance to a
relatively uniform mechanism, although in different epochs depending upon the
countries and the sport disciplines.2082 Starting from the clubs, sport federations have
developed, beginning from a regional level, then national, and lastly international and
worldwide.2083 Sport clubs represent at the same time the basic cell and the initial
grouping of the federation’s structure.2084 Sport clubs can be party to international
litigations in team sports, for instance when they participate in international
2080 On sport associations, see Baddeley, Association, and on the autonomy of sport associations in Swiss
law, thus also in the adoption of their statutes, see Baddeley, Autonomie. Moreover, see also Baddeley, Le
sportif.
2081 Netzle, pp. 45 et seq.
2082 Rigozzi, para. 59.
2083 Simon, pp. 3 et seq.
2084 See Rigozzi, para. 60.
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competitions like the Champions League organised by the UEFA,2085 or when they
engage a player playing in a foreign club.2086 In disciplinary matters the World Anti-
Doping Code also provides consequences for teams.2087
The traditional structure of sport organisations is that of a pyramid: the base consists
of individuals who are members of associations which constitute regional or national
federations; the national federations are then eventually combined in a single
international federation.2088 The main characteristic of the federative movement resides
in its monopolistic character: indeed for almost all sport disciplines2089 at every level
only one federation exists2090 (“one flag” principle).2091 It is also important to note that
there is a membership merely between individuals (e.g. athletes) and associations, or
associations and national federations, but not between individuals and organisations of
the level after next; also neither athletes nor any federation can be members of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC).2092
1.1.2. The relationships between athlete and sport organisation
1.1.2.1. The indirect membership
The different regional, national or international federations do not usually have
individuals as members, because, as a principle, the athlete is only a member of his
sport club.2093 An individual joining an association at a lower level has no obligation to
clarify what other organisations the association is a member of—directly or indirectly—
and what implications this could have on his own legal status.2094 In such a structure the
qualification of the relations linking the athletes to the federations of their sport is
problematic,2095 but in the meantime of great relevance.
International federations usually invoke the theory of “indirect membership” to
establish jurisdiction upon all national and regional federations, associations or
2085 CAS 98/199, Real Madrid v. Uefa, in Reeb, Digest II, p. 479.
2086 CAS 2003/O/486, Fulham FC v. Olympique Lyonnais.
2087 See Article 11 WADA-Code.
2088 So Netzle, p. 46 for Europe.
2089 An exception can be found in boxing with several organisations: IBF, WBA, WBC.
2090 See, e.g. Articles 5.2. and 11.1. of UCI Constitution.
2091 Rigozzi, para. 65.
2092 Netzle, p. 46.
2093 Rigozzi, para. 85.
2094 Netzle, p. 47.
2095 See Vigoriti, p. 654.
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individuals exercising a particular sport, therefore the member-associations are required
to insert a clause in their regulations, referring to the statutes of the international
federation or national federation.2096 The German BGH, in a landmark decision,2097 held
that such a construction may theoretically work but the requirements (e.g. an
uninterrupted “chain of references”, complete coverage of all entities and individuals
participating in the particular sport) are almost impossible to meet in practice.2098
Moreover, the BGH rejected the so-called “dynamic reference”, i.e. a general reference
to the provisions in the statutes of the federation “in their actual stage”: Any alteration
of the regulations of the federation must be explicitly followed by the statutes of the
subordinated entities.2099 On the other hand, Swiss scholars2100 and jurisprudence2101
speak of “indirect membership” and this approach has also been followed by the CAS:
“The Appellant, through his membership to the Olympiakos Sport Club and the
National Team of Greece, is an indirect member of the FINA, the former being a
member of the latter”.2102
However, it has been observed that contrarily to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (which has
held2103 that, independently from any contractual relationship, a sport organisation had
an enforceable duty to act in good faith vis-à-vis athletes and to account for their
legitimate expectations) the CAS by making reference to the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s
decision—though the Swiss Supreme Court had precisely denied the existence of any
contract binding the parties2104—has conceded the existence of “reciprocal contractual
obligations” between the athlete (a member of the national federation which was in its
turn member of the Norwegian Olympic Committee) and the IOC.2105 Nevertheless,
even if the links between international federations, national federations, and clubs, etc.
are seen as a chain of contractual obligations2106 and not as a relationship of
membership, the relationship between athlete and sport organisation remains indirect
and, therefore, problematic.2107 Yet, since the Olympic Movement and most
international federations have given up the concept of amateurism, the jurisdiction of
sport organisations based on the notion of membership has been fading out. Indeed,
2096 Netzle, p. 46.
2097 BGH 28.11.1994 “Reiter”, SpuRt 1995 43.
2098 Netzle, p. 46.
2099 Ibid.
2100 See Hausheer/Aebi-Müller, p. 375.
2101 See Gundel decision, DFT 119 II 271 (Gundel v. FEI).
2102 CAS 2002/A/432, Demetis v. FINA, p. 2
2103 Grossen decision, DFT 121 III 350 (FSLA v. Grossen).
2104 See DFT 121 III 354.
2105 CAS 2002/O/372, NOC et al. v. IOC, p. 23 (note 27). See also Rigozzi, para. 87.
2106 So in a common law approach Beloff/Kerr/Demetriou, p. 27.
2107 Rigozzi, para. 87.
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today, the relationship between sport organisations and athletes is increasingly defined
by licences and contracts.2108
1.1.2.2. The licence and the athlete’s contract
Increasingly, federations and athletes are bound by a licence which authorises the
athletes to compete in sport competitions organised by the federation under the
condition that the athletes accept the statutes and the federation’s regulations.2109 The
exact qualification and the question of whether a licence creates a contractual
relationship is, however, controversial.2110 While in Germany in the Reiter decision2111
the BGH has considered that the issuing of a licence is nothing else than a particular
modality of submission to a federation’s regulations which leads to a “quasi
associative” relationship and does not change fundamentally the qualification, in Swiss
law the licence is considered to be a sui generis contract.2112 In the measure that the
licence2113 contains a written arbitral clause, the issuing of a licence is of particular
utility for assuring the (formal) validity of the arbitration agreement.2114 For this reason
more and more sport organisations make recourse to arbitration agreements expressly
contained in competition inscription forms or in licences.2115 When receiving the licence
the athletes submit themselves to the body of rules then in force.2116
It has been observed that the issue of the juridical links between athlete and sport
organisation is particularly acute with regard to the Olympic Games, as neither the
international federations nor the National Olympic Committees (NOCs)—recognised by
the IOC—are members of the IOC. This particularity has been solved with the entry
forms by which the athletes (as well as the coaches, officials and the NOCs) submit
themselves to the Olympic Charter and the applicable sport regulations.2117
Consequently, by signing the entry form the Olympic Games’ participants are bound to
the IOC by a direct contractual link.2118 The entry forms are therefore an important
2108 See Netzle, p. 47.
2109 Rigozzi, para. 88.
2110 Ibid.
2111 BGH 28.11.1994 “Reiter”, SpuRt 1995 43, 48.
2112 See Hausheer/Aebi-Müller, p. 341.
2113 Or the documentation related to its issue.
2114 Rigozzi, para. 89.
2115 Rochat, Arbitrage, p. 69. See also Netzle, p. 55; Rigozzi, para. 804.
2116 See Fenners, para. 150.
2117 Rigozzi, para. 90.
2118 Which has also been defined as “Teilnahmevertrag” (contract of participation). See Bernasconi, pp.
113 et seq.
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aspect of the growing contractualisation of the relationships between athletes and sport
organisations.2119
1.2. The Olympic solution
The International Olympic Committee2120 is an organisation based in Lausanne,
Switzerland, created by Pierre de Coubertin in Paris in 1894.2121 Its membership
comprises 205 NOCs. The IOC organises the modern Olympic Games held in summer
and winter, every four years.2122
Like sport federations the Olympic authorities are organised in a pyramidal way.2123
However, while the pyramid of the international sport federations has grown from the
bottom, the pyramid of the Olympic Movement has been created from the top.2124 The
juridical form of the NOCs varies from country to country.2125 From a structural point of
view the “Olympic pyramid” and the “Federation’s pyramid” are bounded in what is
called the “Olympic Movement”. The authority of the IOC over the Olympic Movement
is exercised in two ways:
- on the one hand, the IOC recognises only one international federation for each
Olympic sport discipline,2126 which in its turn only recognises one national
federation2127 for each country;2128
- on the other hand, the NOCs do only recognise one national federation for each
sport discipline, and the NOCs are in their turn only recognised by the IOC when
they regroup all the national federations (affiliated to their respectively international
federation as recognised by the IOC).2129
2119 Rigozzi, para. 91.
2120 See under http://www.olympic.org/uk/index_uk.asp.
2121 See, e.g. Zen-Ruffinen, para. 425.
2122 Beginning in 1994 the Olympic games have alternated on different 4–year cycles.
2123 See, e.g. Baddeley, Association, p. 7; Fenners, para. 17.
2124 Rigozzi, para. 71.
2125 For some chosen examples, see Rigozzi, para. 77.
2126 Rules 26 and 30 of the Olympic Charter.
2127 See, e.g. Article 10 para. 1 of the FIFA Statutes: “only one Association shall be recognised in each
country”.
2128 So called “Ein-Platz-Prinzip” (“one-place-principle”).
2129 Rules 29 and 30 of the Olympic Charter (see also Rigozzi, para. 79).
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The national federations are therefore, at the same time members of the NOC of their
respective countries as well as of the international federations of their respective sports
(principle of the double affiliations of national federations).2130
The overview of the structures of worldwide sport within the Olympic Movement
shows a basically monopolistic character of the sport organisations.2131 This has great
importance with regard to consent to arbitration, as an athlete who wishes to carry out
an Olympic sport will have to do it in the ambit of the given structure. When the latter
provides that disputes have to be solved through arbitration, the athlete will have to
accept this clause,2132 without really having the choice to do otherwise. The Olympic
Charter has, since 1995, contained an arbitration clause referring “any dispute arising on
the occasion of or in connection with, the Olympic Games … exclusively to the Court
of Arbitration for Sport”.2133 The clause becomes binding by an explicit reference in the
entry form that every athlete, official and coach has to sign as a condition precedent to
participation in the Olympic Games.2134 In addition, the entry form already includes an
express acceptance of the jurisdiction of the CAS.2135
1.3. Other structures
The organisation of sport in the United States does not correspond to the European
model—in America the Olympic movement is only one of the three main structures of
organised sport, the other two being sport at University level (Intercollegiate Sport) and
sport at professional level (Professional Sport).2136
A bigger commercialisation of sport is not only to be observed with regard to the
professional leagues of the big four North American Team Sports,2137 but also in other
big sport competitions which are organised outside the Olympic movement, for
instance: Formula 1, the America’s Cup (sailing), the Six Nations Championship
(rugby) and the Cricket World Cup.
2130 Zen-Ruffinen, para. 110.
2131 See, e.g. Zen Ruffinen, paras 103 et seq.
2132 Rigozzi, para. 84.
2133 See Article 59 of the Olympic Charter (as in force as from 7 July 2007).
2134 Netzle, p. 53.
2135 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 107, with regard to arbitration at the Atlanta Games.
2136 See Rigozzi, para. 93.
2137 MBL, NBA, NFL and NHL.
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2. THE MAIN ARBITRAL INSTANCES IN THE SPORT’S FIELD
2.1. The ordinary arbitral tribunals
2.1.1. Ad hoc arbitration
A major international sport competition where ad hoc arbitration is used is the
America’s Cup. Indeed, the Protocol governing the 32nd America’s Cup provided that
disputes related to the financing and organisation of the competition had to be solved by
an ad hoc tribunal with seat in Geneva in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 12
of the Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law.2138 However, due to the
generalisation of the CAS competences at the international level, it is particularly in
national (or internal) disputes where ad hoc arbitration still plays a significant role in
sport arbitration.2139
2.1.2. Institutional arbitration
Although the most widely used and accepted international arbitration institution is the
ICC,2140 the one which has the longest experience in solving sport related disputes is
without doubt the AAA. The biggest part of the disputes to be solved by the AAA in the
field of sport is between the athletes and the owners of the clubs playing in the
professional leagues of the big four North American Team Sports because arbitration,
especially for solving salary disputes, is systematically provided for in collective
bargaining agreements and standard player contracts.2141 However, AAA arbitration
also plays a growing role in the context of Olympic sport. Indeed, the existing AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules2142 were adapted2143 in the course of the implementation
2138 See Article 22.3(g) of the Protocol governing the 32nd America’s Cup. In the 33rd America’s Cup the
Arbitration Panel will have its seat in New York and it will act in accordance with the New York
arbitration law (see Articles 23 and 24 of the Protocol governing the 33rd America’s Cup).
2139 Rigozzi, para. 225.
2140 On ICC arbitration, see in particular Craig/Park/Paulsson and Derains/Schwartz. The Concorde
Agreement, governing the Formula One World Championship, provides for that disputes between the
racing teams and the FIA will be solved by an arbitral tribunal in accordance to the ICC Rules (see
Beloff/Kerr/Demetriou, p. 256). Moreover, the Concorde Agreement also requires that the disputes
between drivers and racing teams are solved by an arbitral tribunal in accordance to the ICC Rules (see
Walkinshaw v. Diniz, Arb. Int. 2001, pp. 193 and 205).
2141 Rigozzi, para. 229.
2142 Which applies to internal commercial arbitration and should not to be confused with the AAA
International Arbitration Rules.
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of the United States Anti-Doping Agency.2144 Recently, the DIS has also issued sport
arbitration rules (“DIS-Sportschiedsgerichtsordnung”).2145 The German sport arbitral
tribunal is a common initiative of the National Anti-Doping Agency2146 and the DIS.2147
Despite its name, the CAS—like the AAA, the DIS or the ICC—is a permanent
arbitration institution. Its mission is to settle sport-related disputes through
arbitration,2148 and it can be said that the CAS is a specialised arbitration institution.2149
2.2. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
With regard to the CAS it has been observed that the specific position occupied by this
specialised arbitration institution within the sport system, in particular with regard to its
international dimension, and the authority which is attached to its awards shows the
CAS as a sort of supranational sport organism with the task to develop a lex sportiva
applicable to the ensemble of sport community and recognised by the States.2150
2.2.1. Brief historical overview of the CAS
2.2.1.1. The origins
The CAS, created in 1983 and headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, is an arbitration
institution devoted to the resolution of sports disputes, which now operates under the
auspices of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). In 1996, the ICAS
founded a special body for the settlement of all disputes arising in the course of and in
connection with Olympic Games—to be known as the ad hoc Division of the CAS.2151
From the beginning it was established that the jurisdiction of the CAS should in no way
be imposed on athletes or federations, but remain freely available to the parties.2152
2143 Leading to the American Arbitration Association Supplementary Rules for Arbitration initiated by the
United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA). See under http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627.
2144 See Rigozzi, para. 405.
2145 See Mertens. These Rules, which entered into force on the 1 January 2008, can be found under
http://www.dis-arb.de/sport/default.htm.
2146 Nationale Anti Doping Agentur (NADA).
2147 See Berninger/Theissen, pp. 185 et seq.
2148 See Article S1 CAS Code.
2149 Rigozzi, para. 230.
2150 Simon, p. 190.
2151 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 1.
2152 See Reeb, p. xxiv.
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Several courts have held that arbitral tribunals constituted under the CAS Code for
Sports-related Arbitration are true tribunals,2153 unlike the internal “tribunals” of sport
federations.2154
At the beginning the CAS Statute and the Regulations provided for just one type of
contentious proceedings, whatever the nature of the dispute, in which the claimant had
to lodge his request with the CAS, accompanied by the arbitration agreement. However,
in 1991 the CAS published a Guide to arbitration which included several model
arbitration clauses, and among these there was one for inclusion in the statutes or
regulations of sports federations or clubs.2155 This clause prefigured the subsequent
creation of special rules to settle disputes related to decisions taken by sports federations
or associations (appeals procedure).2156 The International Equestrian Federation (FEI)
was the first sports body in 1991 to adopt this clause.2157 This was the starting point for
several “appeals” procedures even though, in formal terms, such a procedure did not yet
exist.2158
2.2.1.2. The Gundel case: recognition of CAS awards by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
Despite some concerns among scholars the Swiss Federal Tribunal has recognised the
CAS as a true arbitral tribunal.2159 Although in the case of other arbitral tribunals in the
field of sport2160 the procedural requirements have always to be assessed, the CAS
generally fulfils these requirements.2161 The Gundel case has been defined as the
cornerstone on which the arbitration system of the CAS is built.2162
Gundel was a member of his country’s equestrian team. He held a license granted by the
German equestrian federation which entitled him to compete in national and
international meetings. On the occasion of every renewal of his licence, Gundel
2153 See, e.g. the Court of Appeals of Munich, Germany, in a decision of 26 October 2000 (SpuRt 2/2001,
p. 64), involving the basketball player Stanley Roberts; the Swiss Federal Tribunal in its leading decision
of 1992 (DFT 119 II 271), involving the horse rider Gundel (on this case, see under VI.2.2.1.2.).
2154 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 3.
2155 Reeb, pp. xxiv et seq.
2156 Ibid.
2157 Simon, p. 198.
2158 Reeb, p. xxv.
2159 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 377. See DFT 4P.105/2006, 4.8.2006; DFT 129 III 445,
consid. 3.3.; DFT 119 II 271, Gundel.
2160 See, e.g. the Swiss Olympic Disciplinary Board on doping. On the latter, see Peter/Paparelli/
Fioravanti.
2161 See Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 377 et seq.
2162 See Rigozzi, para. 522.
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undertook to submit himself to the rules of the German federation, which with respect to
international competitions, in turn referred to the rules of the FEI.2163
After a CAS award2164 was rendered, Gundel applied to the Swiss Supreme Court for
the annulment of it.2165 The appellant primarily disputed the validity of the award,
which he claimed was rendered by a court which did not meet the conditions of
impartiality and independence needed to be considered a proper arbitration court.2166 In
the Gundel case the central issue defined by the Swiss Federal Tribunal was “the legal
nature of awards rendered by CAS” and it remained to be seen whether the Swiss
courts would acknowledge CAS awards in situations where its jurisdiction was not
created by a negotiated contract, but by virtue of the conditions stipulated in a licence.
The Court held that the FEI’s Legal Commission was an organ of FEI and therefore did
no more than express the will of one of the parties to the dispute.2167 The Court then
considered that the CAS decision was rendered on the basis of an arbitration
agreement by a private tribunal to which the parties had entrusted the task of ruling on
a dispute dealing with “patrimonial” interests and having an international character.2168
It observed that a true award supposes that the arbitral tribunal is sufficiently
impartial and independent.2169
A party considering itself adversely affected by a decision of an association should be
entitled, in the reasoning of the court, to challenge the decision even if the complainant
was only an “indirect” member of the association2170 and indeed even if he was not a
member at all.2171 The challenged decision had to be subject to independent judicial
control. This control, however, might be entrusted to an arbitral tribunal provided that
it was “a veritable judicial authority and not a mere organ of the association interested
in the outcome of the dispute”.2172
2163 The FEI is an association comprised entirely of national equestrian federations. It has its seat in
Lausanne. Under the 1991 edition of its Rules a party dissatisfied with a decision rendered by the FEI’s
“Legal Commission” may appeal to the CAS for a “definitive” decision.
2164 See arbitration CAS 92/63 G. v. FEI in Digest of CAS Awards 1986-1998.
2165 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 184.
2166 Reeb, p. xxv.
2167 Paulsson, Sport disputes, pp. 364 et seq.
2168 DFT 119 II 275.
2169 Ibid.
2170 I.e. a member of another association which in turn is a member of the association, or rather federation,
in question.
2171 E.g. a person required to accept certain rules as a condition of participating in an event organised by
the association.
2172 Paulsson, Sport disputes, pp. 365 et seq.
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After having undertaken a careful analysis of the CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal
concluded that one may accept that the CAS is possessed of the degree of
independence which Swiss law requires as a condition of the waiver of recourse to the
ordinary courts. On the other hand, the Swiss Supreme Court expressed its own view to
the effect that this analysis of the role of the CAS was acceptable “not without
hesitation”, given the “organic and economic” connections between the CAS and the
IOC.2173 Indeed, in the view of the Swiss Supreme Court, such links would have been
sufficiently serious to call into question the independence of the CAS in the event of the
IOC’s being a party to proceedings before it. The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s message was
thus perfectly clear: the CAS had to be made more independent of the IOC both
organisationally and financially.2174
2.2.1.3. The Paris agreement
The creation of the ICAS2175 and the new structure of the CAS were approved in Paris,
on 22 June 1994.2176 The agreement was signed by the highest authorities representing
the sports world.2177 Since the Paris Agreement was signed, all Olympic International
Federations and many NOCs have recognised the jurisdiction of the CAS and included
in their statutes an arbitration clause referring disputes to the CAS.
The only incertitude which remained was to know whether after the reform the CAS
could be considered a true arbitral tribunal in proceedings where the IOC is a
party.2178 It was not until 27 May 2003 that the Swiss Federal Tribunal assessed the
Court’s independence in detail, having heard an appeal by two Russian cross-country
skiers, Larissa Lazutina and Olga Danilova, against a CAS award disqualifying them
from an event at the Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City. In a remarkably detailed
and exhaustive judgment,2179 the Swiss Supreme Court dissected the current
organisation and structure of the ICAS and CAS, concluding that the CAS was not “the
vassal of the IOC” and was sufficiently independent of it, as it was of all other parties
that called upon its services, for decisions it made in cases involving the IOC to be
2173 Paulsson, Sport disputes, pp. 365 et seq.
2174 Reeb, p. xxvi.
2175 The main task of the ICAS is to safeguard the independence of the CAS and the rights of the parties.
Moreover, the ICAS also appoints the CAS arbitrators and approves the budget and accounts of the CAS.
2176 Reeb, p. xxvi.
2177 See Simon, p. 198.
2178 See Rigozzi, para. 539.
2179 DFT 129 III 445.
323
considered as true awards, comparable to the judgments of a State tribunal.2180 The
Swiss Federal Tribunal also noted the widespread recognition of the CAS amongst the
international sporting community, showing that the CAS was meeting a real need.2181
2.2.1.4. The ad hoc Division of the CAS
In 1996, the ICAS founded a special body for the settlement of all disputes arising in the
course of and in connection with Olympic Games, to be known as the ad hoc Division
of the CAS.2182 The Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games provide the resolution of
any disputes by arbitration insofar as they arise during the Olympic Games or during
the ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony.2183 Without question, in the context of
disputes relating to Olympic Games, the precedence-setting decision was rendered by
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Raguz v. Sullivan.2184 Indeed, in the run up to
the Olympic Games in Sydney, this court rejected its own jurisdiction and recognised
the CAS as the global court for sports. It has been stated that “the New South Wales
Court of Appeal set a remarkable precedent and lent support to the CAS’ effort to create
a global system of dispute resolution consistent with the needs of global sports”.2185
While, formerly, an athlete’s signature on the entry form alone was not considered
sufficient to establish the CAS’ jurisdiction and required the endorsement by the
athlete’s NOC, now every participant at the Olympic Games,2186 by signing the entry
form, agrees that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, in connection with,
or on the occasion of the Olympic Games, shall be submitted exclusively to the CAS
for final and binding arbitration.2187
2.2.1.5. Comments
This brief historical overview of the CAS shows how in sport arbitration, when
jurisdiction is not created by a negotiated contract but by virtue of the conditions
stipulated in a licence, the focus, rather than being on the qualification of arbitration
2180 Reeb, p. xxvi.
2181 Ibid.
2182 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 1.
2183 See Article 1 of the Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games.
2184 New South Wales Court of Appeal, Angela Raguz v. Rebecca Sulivan, 1 September 2000, referred to
as Raguz, in Mealey’s IAR 2000, Issue #10, p. 3D; and also in ASA Bulletin (2001), pp. 335-354.
2185 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 20.
2186 I.e. athlete, coach, trainer, official, other member of the NOC Delegation.
2187 Nater, pp. 200 et seq.
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as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism, lies on whether the organisation and
structure of the CAS within the sport is such that the CAS can be considered an
impartial and independent arbitral tribunal. Indeed, an arbitral tribunal with such
characteristics should be able to conduct fair proceedings.
2.2.2. Characteristics of the disputes submitted to the CAS
2.2.2.1. Types of proceedings before the CAS
Generally speaking, a dispute may be submitted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
only if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties which specifies recourse to
the CAS. Such disputes may arise out of an arbitration clause inserted into a contract or
regulations, or of a later arbitration agreement (ordinary arbitration proceedings), or
involve an appeal against a decision rendered by a federation, association or sports-
related body where the statutes or regulations of such bodies, or a specific agreement
provides for an appeal to the CAS (appeal arbitration proceedings).2188
2.2.2.2. Connection of the dispute with sport
Article R27 of the Code stipulates that the CAS has jurisdiction solely to rule on
disputes related to sport. Nevertheless, since its creation, the CAS has never declared
itself lacking jurisdiction on the grounds of a dispute not being linked to sport.2189 In
fact, for the CAS to have jurisdiction it is enough that the dispute has some connection
with sport.2190 This general competence of the CAS to resolve disputes—conceived in
such an extensive manner—is not only valid with regard to the object of dispute but
also with regard to territoriality, as the competence of the tribunal extends to all sport
disputes whether their character is national or international.2191
2.2.2.3. Types of dispute
In principle, two types of dispute may be submitted to the CAS: those of a commercial
nature, and those of a disciplinary nature.
2188 See Article R27 CAS Code.
2189 Reeb, p. xxix. See on this regard the award delivered in the arbitration CAS 92/81 in the Digest of
CAS Awards 1986-1998.
2190 Simon, p. 191.
2191 Ibid.
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2.2.2.3.1. Commercial cases
The first category essentially involves disputes relating to the execution of contracts,
such as those relating to sponsorship, the sale of television rights, the staging of sports
events, player transfers and relations between players or coaches and clubs and/or
agents.2192 Disputes relating to civil liability issues2193 also come under this category.2194
These so-called commercial disputes are handled by the CAS acting as a court of sole
instance.2195 The CAS is directly and exclusively competent because of a submission
agreement or an arbitration clause.2196
2.2.2.3.2. Disciplinary cases
Disciplinary cases represent the second group of disputes submitted to the CAS, of
which a large number are doping-related. In addition to doping cases, the CAS is called
upon to rule on various disciplinary cases.2197 Such disciplinary cases are generally dealt
with in the first instance by the competent sports authorities, and subsequently become
the subject of an appeal to the CAS, which then acts as a court of last instance.2198
However, it has been observed that it should not be abused of the qualification as
“appeal”, because this would presuppose that the competent sports authorities cast
themselves as arbitrators.2199
2.3. Other arbitral tribunals
In addition to the ordinary arbitral tribunals and to the CAS there are other arbitral
tribunals:2200
- the arbitral tribunals of the international federations which have lost more and more
of their importance;
- the national sport arbitral tribunals which, on the other hand, are expanding;2201 and
2192 Employment contracts and agency contracts.
2193 E.g. an accident to an athlete during a sports competition
2194 Reeb, p. xxix.
2195 See Rochat, Procédure, p. 18.
2196 See Simon, p. 194.
2197 Reeb, p. xxix.
2198 See under http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/.
2199 Simon, p. 194.
2200 For an overview, see Rigozzi, paras 251 et seq.
326
- the arbitral tribunals outside the Olympic movement, for instance the Contract
Recognition Board (CRB) in Formula 12202 or the America’s Cup Arbitration
Panel.2203
3. ARBITRATION FOR RESOLVING SPORT DISPUTES
International sports law has been described as a process for avoiding and resolving
disputes.2204 In this process arbitration plays a main role. Indeed, on the one hand
arbitration constitutes a smoother and softer form of dispute resolution than making
recourse to ordinary State courts which function in the “classical” way,2205 and, on the
other hand, athletes and officials are familiar with the idea of resolving sport disputes by
arbitration.2206 Furthermore, it has also been observed that while organised sport is one
of the most regulated domains of social life with a superposition of regulations of
different orders, most of the time the association regulations are primarily applied, and
these are often very technical, complex and difficult to learn.2207 Therefore, because
ordinary State judges2208 have little opportunity to use these regulations, they do not
always understand their ratio and their spirit.2209
3.1. Reasons for the use of arbitration
Historically three main reasons can be identified for the use of arbitration for resolving
sport disputes:
- the aspiration of autonomy of the sport organisations;
- the financial risks linked with the intervention of State courts in disputes between
athletes and federations;
2201 See, e.g. in Italy the “Camera di conciliazione e di arbitrato per lo sport (CCAS)” created by the
“Comitato olimpico nazionale italiano (CONI)”, in New Zealand the “Sport Disputes Tribunal of New
Zealand” or in the United Kingdom the “Sport Dispute Resolution Panel”.
2202 On the CRB in Formula 1, see Peter H., Contracts; Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter.
2203 On the America’s Cup Arbitration Panel, see Foster/Manasse/Peter/Tomkins, Peter H., America’s
Cup; Peter/Faire/Foster; Peter/Züblin; Tompkins.
2204 Nafziger, p. 130.
2205 Oswald, p. 4.
2206 Netzle, p. 47.
2207 See Oswald, p. 4.
2208 It was observed that the role of national courts is among the most difficult issues of international sport
today, as some would argue that they are too intrusive in the sport arena, whereas others would argue the
opposite (see Nafziger, p. 131).
2209 Oswald, p. 4.
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- the wish of the State.2210
3.1.1. The aspiration towards autonomy of the sport movement
The aspiration towards autonomy of the sport organisations finds the most manifest
expression in their wish to avoid making recourse to the State justice system and stays
at the origin of the creation of sport arbitral tribunals.2211 However, not only is there the
wish to resolve sport disputes by specialised tribunals within the sport family, but
proceedings in the field of sport before State courts have also proved to be, on different
occasions, unsatisfactory.2212 On the other hand, arbitration appears to be adapted to the
organisation and functioning of sport relationships: indeed the internalisation of the
sport movement and its very strong cohesion, which even includes the recognition of
the existence of an autonomous juridical order,2213 justify a system of dispute resolution
which espouses this autonomy.2214
3.1.2. The financial aspect
Another reason for independence was the awareness of the financial risks that actions in
State courts could bring for the sport federations.2215 In the Reynolds case2216 the IAAF
was condemned by a US judge and ordered to pay to Harry “Butch” Reynolds a sum of
USD 27.4 million for having suspended him from competitions due to the fact that he
had tested positive on doping substances which the athlete had always denied taking.2217
3.1.3. The wish of the State
Considering the traditional reluctance of State courts in solving sport disputes, it is not
surprising that the State, many of whose tribunals are overloaded, has a direct interest in
2210 See Rigozzi, para. 213.
2211 Rigozzi, para. 215.
2212 See Oswald, p. 4 et seq. The establishment of the CRB was, e.g. the consequence of what has been
called a “multiparty drama” before State courts (see Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 174).
2213 See in particular Karaquillo.
2214 Simon, p. 186.
2215 Rigozzi, para. 221.
2216 On the Reynolds case, see in particular Nafziger, pp. 134 et seq.
2217 Simon, p. 187. See also Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 360.
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seeing sport disputes solved by private arbitral tribunals.2218 Inaugurated by the US
legislator who rendered compulsory for the national federations to provide for an
arbitration system for solving disputes related to participation at the Olympic
Games,2219 this tendency now seems to have found its definitive affirmation with the
adoption by the governments of the WADA-Code which makes the CAS the exclusive
forum2220 for the resolution of international doping cases arising in an international
event or involving international-level athletes.2221
3.2. Specific needs of sport in terms of dispute resolution
3.2.1. Maintenance of uniform standard/harmonisation
The main advantage of making recourse to arbitration for solving international sport
disputes has been seen in ensuring equality of treatment of the athletes across
borders.2222 Indeed, in sport, which is international by nature, it is essential that all
athletes in the world are treated in the same way.2223
The strongest argument in favour of arbitration derives from the fundamental principles
in sport, namely fairness and equal opportunity, which require that same rule
violations must be treated and sanctioned alike.2224 In international sport, this can only
be achieved through arbitration instead of different national or even local court
decisions.2225 In fact, an arbitral tribunal is in a better position to ensure the
indispensable unity of jurisprudence requested by sport.2226 Moreover, at most levels of
sport, where federations struggle against considerable odds to maintain uniform
standards of sportsmanship and organisational quality, it would seem irresponsible to
insist that they should be routinely subjected to judicial review, and obliged to defend
2218 Rigozzi, para. 222.
2219 Already in 1974 the statutes of the US Olympic Committee had been amended with two provisions
permitting to bring disputes concerning the participation at the Olympic Games before an arbitral tribunal
constituted according to the AAA. In 1978 the statutes of the the USOC have then been integrated in the
US Amateur Sports Act where the possibility of making recourse to arbitration was maintained and even
rendered compulsory for certain types of disputes. The role of arbitration has also been recognised and
reinforced with the 1998 revision of the US Amateur Sports Act.
2220 Therefore, it has been defined as a system of “mandatory arbitration” (see, e.g. Rigozzi, para. 472).
2221 Rigozzi, paras 222 and 229. See Article 13.2.1 WADA-Code.
2222 Mannig/Dithie, pp. 263 et seq.
2223 Oswald, p. 5.
2224 See Pfister, p. 202.
2225 Netzle, p. 47.
2226 Oswald, p. 5.
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themselves in the courts of any country where their activity may have some
ramification.2227
The need of uniformity is particularly necessary with regard to disciplinary
disputes.2228 Indeed, in disputes regarding sport arbitration in disciplinary matters,
which represent 85% of the cases submitted to the CAS, the awards need to be executed
in all the countries where the athlete will be participating in competitions.2229 Moreover,
in doping cases an athlete must be sanctioned with the same severity irrespective of his
nationality or domicile.2230
3.2.2. Speed
In traditional commercial arbitration, there is already much talk about speed.2231 While
the development of fast-track or expedited arbitration is welcome and may contribute to
the appeal of arbitration to potential users who have been reluctant because of costs and
time spent, fast-track or expedited proceedings can only be used for issues which are
capable of being resolved in such a manner.2232
The realities of international sport call for a decision-making speed rarely found in
national judicial systems.2233 As a suspension measure or a ban of participation can
have direct and immediate economic and financial consequences on the career of an
athlete or a club’s situation, the contestation of such measures, and the resolution of a
particular dispute must be done rapidly.2234 In disciplinary matters one of the parties is
almost always an individual whose personal fundamental rights have been affected.2235
Moreover, the dispute mostly arises in the context of a competition which continues to
evolve and whose regularity would be compromised by a decision taken with delay.2236
2227 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
2228 Rigozzi, para. 453.
2229 Oswald, p. 6.
2230 Oswald, p. 5. This is the reason why the WADA-Code for appeals in cases arising from competition
in an international event or in cases involving international-level athletes provides for that the decision
may exclusively be appealed to the CAS in accordance with the provisions applicable before such court
(see Article 13.2.1 WADA-Code).
2231 On fast track arbitration, see, e.g. Rovine; ICC Final award in cases No. 7385 (1992) and No. 7402
(1992), XVIII YBCA 68 (1993). See also Davis; Müller E. with a comparative table. See as well the
special issue—10(4) J Int'l Arb (1993).
2232 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 21-87.
2233 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 362.
2234 Simon, p. 195.
2235 Oswald, p. 9.
2236 Ibid.
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Therefore, what is needed within the shortest amount of time possible is not any decision,
but a final decision binding all persons affected by it.2237 Especially at the Olympics
speed is not only an issue for debate: it is a must. In fact, in the case of the Olympic
Games the advantage of the expedited ad hoc process is obvious: the resolution of all
disputes before the close of the Games.2238
However, in order for the decision to be made quickly, it is not only necessary to have
an appropriate procedure and organisational structure, but arbitrators who know the
subject.2239
3.2.3. Specialisation
Ordinary judges may not be best suited to deal with specialised areas of sports
discipline.2240 Therefore, in order to be accepted by the sporting community, it is
desirable for arbitrators to reflect the diversity of the community and that former
athletes are included.2241
3.2.4. Finality
When competitions are ongoing, arbitration cases need to be solved speedily, but also in
a final way. For instance, in creating the Olympic Division, the CAS was pursuing the
objective of providing athletes and other participants with a body able to resolve
disputes occurring during the Games in a final manner within the time limits appropriate
to the pace of the competition.2242 In order for the decisions to be final, a “real” arbitral
tribunal was thus required, i.e. an independent tribunal following the fundamental
principles of procedure.2243 The same need, however, also arises in other areas of sport
arbitration.2244
2237 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, pp. 35 et seq.
2238 Rivkin, p. 187 and pp. 191 et seq.
2239 So Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 105, for the Olympic Division.
2240 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 361.
2241 So Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 105, for the Olympic Division.
2242 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 105.
2243 Ibid.
2244 So, e.g. the purpose of the CRB system is to provide for the speedy and final resolution of disputes
regarding the team for which a particular driver will render his racing services in any given Formula 1
Championship (see Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 174).
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3.3. Acceptance of arbitration in sport
3.3.1. In general
Originally, sport arenas have been considered “law-free zones” and related disputes as
non-justiciable controversies.2245 However, some violations of the rules require more
severe sanctions than just a penalty kick or a free throw, but sanctions that exceed the
frame of a particular competition, such as fines, bans or exclusions, are inevitably
subject to judicial review and the only way to keep the ordinary courts out of such
review proceedings is to provide for arbitration.2246
3.3.2. Balance between the necessities of sport competitions and the respect
of fundamental rights
Arbitration has been seen as a third jurisdictional way to avoid conflicts among
juridical orders by combining the necessities of sport competitions and the respect of
fundamental rights.2247 Given this context of tension between fundamental individual
rights and equally legitimate institutional objectives, the challenge is striking the right
balance.2248 This synthesis is well illustrated by the organisation and the functioning of
the CAS: while its organisation—notably the composition of its members—let it appear
as a component of the sport movement, at the same time, the procedural guarantees and
the independence of the arbitration panels ensure the effective exercise of a sport justice
which merits its name.2249
3.3.3. Presumption in favour of arbitration, with particular regard to consent
to arbitration
In sport, there has always been a strong tendency to resolve any kind of dispute by
excluding the ordinary courts. It has been observed that whatever the legal deficiencies
and flaws of the internal arbitration systems of the sport organisations may be, there is
2245 On the distinction between “Spielregel” (“game rules”—not considered to be subject to judicial
review) and “Rechtsregel” (“legal rules”—considered to be subject to judicial review), see Kummer.
2246 Netzle, p. 47.
2247 Simon, p. 189.
2248 Paulsson, Sport disputes, p. 362.
2249 Simon, p. 189.
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probably no other area in life where arbitration is equally accepted.2250 Therefore, the
fact that there is at least a certain presumption in favour of arbitration as the preferred
method of dispute resolution in sports has to be remembered when the validity of an
arbitration agreement, especially one by reference, has to be determined.2251
Rigozzi has argued2252 that the presumption in favour of arbitration could be inspired by
the attitude of jurisprudence—particularly French—in the field of international
commercial arbitration which considers that arbitrators have become the natural judges
of international commerce, and are therefore recognised by the professionals as such,2253
leading to the fact that it is logical and legitimate to presume consent to arbitration.2254
However, the Swiss Supreme Court2255 has not considered the issue on consent to
arbitration either from the point of view of athletes’ professionalism2256 or from the
point of view of the more or less usual character of the CAS arbitration clause.2257
Finally, it can also be observed that in the WADA-Code a provision has been inserted
according to which “every government will respect arbitration as the preferred means
of resolving doping-related disputes”.2258
3.4. Structural specificities of sport arbitration with regard to
consent
It has been observed that sport arbitration seems to be qualitatively different from
commercial arbitration, because like arbitration of working disputes2259 and consumer
arbitration2260 it is characterised by an inequality among the parties which can be
qualified as structural. 2261 In the Cañas case the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that this
structural difference between the two types of relationship is not without influence on
2250 Netzle, p. 47.
2251 Ibid.
2252 Rigozzi, para. 833.
2253 See Oppetit, Référence, p. 558.
2254 Simon, p. 204.
2255 It is remembered that all CAS’s arbitrations have their seat in Lausanne, Switzerland, independently
from where they take place. See in particular R28 (Seat) of the CAS Code. See also Kaufmann-Kohler,
Lieu de l’arbitrage, p. 526.
2256 See the DFT 4P.230/2000 of 7 February 2001 (Roberts v. FIBA), ASA Bulletin, Vol. 19 No. 3 (2001),
p. 528. On the other hand, the CAS arbitral tribunal had held that Stanley Roberts was “experienced in the
field of professional sports” (CAS 2000/A/262, Roberts v. FIBA, in Reeb, Digest II, p. 385).
2257 Rigozzi, para. 833.
2258 Article 22.3 WADA-Code.
2259 On voluntary consent in employment arbitration, see, e.g. Ware.
2260 On consumer arbitration, see, e.g. Brafford, with numerous references, or Alpa.
2261 Rigozzi, para. 330.
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the consensual process leading to the formation of any agreement.2262 While, in
principle, when two parties are treated equally each of them expresses its will without
being subject to the will of the other—as is the case in international commercial
arbitration, the situation is very different in the field of sport.2263 Indeed, as is the case
in mandatory arbitration, an athlete who wishes to participate in a competition has no
other choice than to accept the arbitration clause, because this form of dispute
resolution is not negotiable and imperatively provided for by the regulations of sport
organisations, which, it has been sustained, in the sport juridical order represents the
functional equivalent of the law in the State juridical order.2264 This is even more true in
the case of a professional athlete who will be confronted with the following dilemma:
to consent to arbitration or practice his sport as an amateur.2265 Therefore, the athlete
will not have any choice other than nolens volens to accept arbitration.2266 However, it
should also be remarked that, contrarily to workers and consumers, the protection of
athletes appears to be sometimes less indispensable, as their bargaining strength
(individually and, above all, as a group) is usually quite high. Besides, in arbitration for
disciplinary matters it is the athlete himself who infringes the rules and creates a
possible case to be solved through arbitration.
Furthermore, it has been observed that sport arbitration is, in some aspects, similar to
treaty arbitration:
- from the moment when it is provided for by the pertinent sport regulation,
arbitration will apply to every athlete who is participating in a competition held in
accordance with that regulation, and this is independent from the existence of any
contractual (or other) relationship between the sport organisation and the participant;
and
- the sport organisation gives its consent to submit to arbitration disputes, without
knowing their nature and exact importance, with parties whose identities are not yet
known.2267
However, although arbitration clauses included in sport regulations may be seen as a
sort of standing offer to arbitrate on the part of sport organisations, there is in my
opinion a difference with treaty arbitration where the investor often consents to
arbitration by instituting the proceeding. Indeed, while in the latter case the investor’s
2262 DFT 133 III 235, consid. 4.3.2.2.
2263 Ibid.
2264 See Rigozzi, para. 331.
2265 See DFT 133 III 235, consid. 4.3.2.2.
2266 Ibid.
2267 See Rigozzi, para. 332.
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consent is given after a dispute case has arisen, in sport arbitration the athletes mainly
give their consent to arbitration prior to the break-out of the dispute. Moreover, the
view that arbitration will apply independently from the existence of any contractual (or
other) relationship between sport organisations and the participant has in my view to be
differentiated. Indeed, for instance under English law some situations have been seen as
contracts of adhesion,2268 and the Swiss Federal Tribunal recently held in the Cañas
case that an athlete who wishes to participate in competitions organised under the
control of a federation whose regulations provide for recourse to arbitration will not
have any other choice than to accept the arbitration clause, notably by adhering to the
statutes of the said sport federation where the clause is inserted.2269
4. THE PLACE WHERE CONSENT TO ARBITRATION IS
EXPRESSED: ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD
OF SPORT
As in commercial arbitration or investment arbitration, in sport arbitration the parties
express their consent to arbitrate in an arbitration agreement. Indeed, although like in
investment arbitration there is not always an arbitration agreement in the traditional
sense, the resolution of a dispute by private judges without the parties’ consent would
not be arbitration.2270
In sport arbitration there are different types of arbitration clauses. While already in
commercial arbitration arbitration clauses by reference are important, in sport
arbitration they are central. Another particularity is also the place where arbitration
clauses are often found: the regulations of sport organisations, the Olympic Charter or
the entry forms for competitions.
4.1. Different types of arbitration clauses
With respect to the form of arbitration agreements in the field of sport, there are two
main categories:
2268 See Walkinshaw & Ors v. Diniz, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Commercial Court, 19
May 1999, Arbitration International, Vol. 17 No. 2 (2001).
2269 DFT 133 III 235, consid. 4.3.2.2.
2270 So for investment arbitration Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
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- complete arbitration clauses contained in sport-related contracts; and
- arbitration clauses by reference to another document.2271
Through the membership in his sport club the athlete submits himself to the articles of
association and, through the therein contained reference, generally also to the rules of
the hierarchal higher sport organisations, in particular those of the international
federation of its sport discipline, of the IOC and of the WADA.2272 However, also in the
agreements between athletes and other contractual partners of the sport world—
typically in work, licence and participation contracts—reference is made to the rules of
the hierarchal higher sport organisations, and therewith the athletes’ submission to the
corresponding duties.2273 Sometimes jurisdiction of the CAS is also given by a
compromis arbitral after the dispute has arisen.2274
4.1.1. Complete arbitration clauses in sport-related contracts
Within this category, two kinds of contracts may be distinguished:
- contracts with partners outside sport, e.g. sponsorship contracts, and
- contracts within sport, i.e. between sport organisations and athletes, e.g. licences.2275
4.1.1.1. Arbitration clauses in sponsorship contracts
Arbitration clauses in contracts between sport organisations and outside business
partners2276 do not pose particular issues just because the contracts are somehow sport-
related and the general rules on the validity of contractual arbitration clauses
apply.2277 Because of the commercial nature of the relationships, the recourse to
arbitration corresponds to the classical method of solving disputes.2278 The principal
reason for submitting purely commercial cases involving sport to arbitration is expertise
2271 Netzle, p. 48.
2272 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 357.
2273 Ibid.
2274 See, e.g. Arbitrage TAS 87/10, X./HC Y., sentence du 15 juillet 1989, Digest of CAS Awards 1986-
1998, pp. 3 et seq.
2275 See also Netzle, p. 48.
2276 Such as sponsors, suppliers, service providers, advertising and marketing agencies, merchandisers,
broadcasters and others.
2277 Netzle, p. 48. See also Simon, p. 196 et seq.
2278 Simon, p. 197.
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in the technical areas concerned,2279 as in construing contracts and assessing damages, a
detailed knowledge of sport-related commercial law is essential.2280
There may also be situations where the extension of a contractual arbitration clause to
non-signatories could be an issue, for example, the question of whether an athlete-
member of a national sports team is bound by an arbitration clause between his
federation and the “official sponsor of the national team”?2281
4.1.1.2. Arbitration clauses in athletes’ agreements or submissions forms
Although athletes are not usually members of their national federations,2282 on the other
hand, they may participate in international competitions only through their national
federations.2283 Thus, there is a need for an immediate legal relationship because there
are a number of issues to regulate, such as coaching, financial support, training camps,
medical care, advertising activities, etc. While in the past such issues have been
regulated by unilateral orders of the federations, today it is usual to conclude athletes’
agreements.2284 Such agreements may well contain a comprehensive arbitration
clause, which is at least binding upon the contractual parties, i.e. the athlete and the
national federation.2285
In the case of licences the sport organisations give a general authorisation to the single
athlete for participating in particular sport competitions of the federation,2286 usually for
a certain period.2287 Increasingly, international federations are issuing so-called athletes’
declarations to be signed by all athletes participating in international competitions.2288
While the original purpose of such declarations was to enforce uniform doping
regulations, athletes’ declarations are also excellent opportunities to provide
immediately applicable arbitration agreements.2289 It has been observed that, like in
commercial arbitration, the main defect of arbitration clauses in such forms is their often
2279 Each sport has its own operational context and commercial language which have to be understood by
an arbitral tribunal.
2280 Samuel/Gearhart, p. 40.
2281 Netzle, p. 48.
2282 See, e.g. Hausheer/Aebi-Müller, p. 340.
2283 Netzle, p. 49.
2284 See Haas/Prokop, pp. 109 and 187.
2285 Netzle, p. 49.
2286 Hausheer/Aebi-Müller, p. 341.
2287 Fenners, para. 149.
2288 See, e.g. CAS 94/129, USA Shooting v. UIT.
2289 Netzle, p. 49.
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too broad scope.2290 The athlete consents therefore in advance to a wide range of
possible disputes to be solved through arbitration. In doing so the consensual
character of arbitration declines.
4.1.2. Arbitration clauses in the regulations of sport organisations
The meaning of arbitration clauses in the regulations of sport organisations is threefold:
- the clause can be directly applied based upon membership of the federation;
- the clause can be applied by reference if there is a corresponding agreement; or
- the clause can be understood as offer of the federation to submit to arbitration.2291
4.1.2.1. Direct application based upon membership
An arbitration agreement is applicable if the dispute arises in relation to a particular
legal relationship. While it is undisputed that arbitration clauses incorporated in statutes
are, in principle, binding upon the members of that legal entity, the requirement of a
direct application based upon membership is merely met in disputes between an
association and its immediate members.2292 Therefore, in international federations,
membership may only serve as a sufficient legal base for arbitration of disputes
between the international federation and its member-federations and also between two
member-federations.2293 Indeed, the arbitration agreement in the statutes of an
association not only applies to disputes between a member and the association, but
between two members of the same association, as long as the dispute relates to their
affiliation to that association.2294 When an association’s statutes or contract designate an
arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes based on Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code between
the association and its members two conditions are laid down in the CAS case-law:
- first, that consent to arbitration should be given knowingly and willingly;2295 and
- second, that the arbitral tribunal should act with full independence, offering
complete equality between the parties in proceedings that are fully lawful.2296
2290 See Rüede/Hadenfeldt, footnote 12, pp. 43, 46; Netzle, p. 49.
2291 Netzle, p. 49.
2292 Ibid.
2293 See Netzle, pp. 49 et seq.
2294 Such as, e.g. a dispute on the transfer of an athlete from one club to another (ibid.).
2295 DFT 112 II 254.
2296 DFT 97 I 488 and DFT 67 I 214. See Arbitration CAS 98/185, Royal Sporting Club Anderlecht v.
Union des Associations Européenes de Football (UEFA), award of 22 July 1998 (translation), Digest of
CAS Awards 1998-2000, pp. 469 et seq.
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On the other hand, since only the national federations are members of the international
organisation and not the individual athletes,2297 when a dispute between an
international federation and an individual athlete arises, the application of the
arbitration clause without further reference may not be based upon membership.2298
4.1.2.2. Application by reference2299
Arbitration clauses in the statutes of a federation may also be applicable to disputes in
which a party is involved that is not itself a member of the federation when both a
sufficient reference and a satisfactory arbitration clause are present in the statutes.2300
4.1.2.3. Offer to submit to arbitration
It has been observed that even though the reference in the primary document does not
meet the criteria for being considered an application by reference, the arbitration clause
in the statutes or regulations of a sport organisation may still serve as the starting point
for an arbitration proceeding.2301 Indeed, it may bind the sport federation unilaterally
and be accepted by all persons or organisations to which such an offer is directed.2302
4.1.2.4. Terms of reference
When the CAS receives a request for arbitration, the court office summarily reviews
whether there is an arbitration agreement providing for the CAS. While in many cases
the CAS is confronted with arbitration agreements that would probably not meet the
above standards, particularly because there is no sufficient reference or their scope is
too broad, any deficiencies are regularly cured by the terms of reference.2303
2297 See Baddeley, Association, p. 6; Fenners, para. 16.
2298 See Netzle, p. 50. Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 357.
2299 See more in detail under VI.5.1.
2300 Netzle, p. 50.
2301 See Netzle, p. 52.
2302 See, e.g. Baddeley, Association, p. 283.
2303 The award then usually states: “La compétence du TAS pour réexaminer en appel les décisions de la
Commission juridique déroule de l’art. … des Statuts de la Fédération. Par surabondance de droit, la
competence du Tribunal de céans est donné par l’ordonnance no. 1 du … contresignée par les deux
parties pour valoir compromise arbitral” (Netzle, p. 53 and footnote 34).
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4.1.3. Contract of adhesion2304
The institutionalisation of the relationships in sport is reached through the adhesion to
the statutes and the regulations of the national and international federations. The
materialisation of the adhesion happens through the delivery of a licence to the
athletes and the affiliation of the clubs to the federations, which have the significance
of an engagement to respect the statutes and the regulations.2305 The submission to the
CAS of the disputes within the members of the sport community happens with the
insertion of an arbitration clause into the statutes or the regulations with the effect of
obtaining not only the adhesion to arbitration of the sport federations but in an
indirect manner of the totality of the athletes who have adhered to the statutes and
regulations.2306
Submission declarations of athletes have to be seen as standard form contracts in which
the single clauses are not negotiated by the parties.2307 This would also not be possible
in professional competition sport due to the number of athletes and sport
organisations, and also due to the fact that the competition can only take place on the
basis of uniform rules—in particular uniform competition rules.2308 This is even the
case for top sportsmen who, possibly, benefit from individual contracts.2309 Therefore, it
has been observed that the athlete is in a similar position, with respect to the knowledge
of the content of the contract and his bargaining power, as a consumer2310 who enters an
agreement in which only little is bargained and most is established in pre-printed
clauses and cannot be changed.2311
In Walkinshaw & Ors v. Diniz2312 the court, considering the importance placed on
consent in the definition of arbitration provided by Mustill and Boyd, held that the
jurisdiction of the CRB is conferred by the contracts between the FIA and the teams and
by those between the teams and the drivers.2313 Indeed, the fact that there is no bilateral
2304 The term “contract of adhesion” refers to a standardised contract prepared entirely by one party to the
transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power
between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a “take
it or leave it” basis, without opportunity for bargaining and under such conditions that the “adherer”
cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.
2305 Simon, p. 197.
2306 Ibid.
2307 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, pp. 367 et seq.
2308 Ibid.
2309 See Thaler, p. 60 et seq.
2310 On arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion, see Brafford.
2311 See Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 368.
2312 Thomas J, Commercial Court, 19 May 1999 (unreported), 1999 Folio No. 522.
2313 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p. 183.
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contract between the teams does not matter, nor does—in Thomas J.’s words—the fact
that “these are contracts of adhesion and the parties have to assent thereto if they wish
to participate in Formula 1 racing”.2314 On the other hand, the global acceptance of
standard clauses does not include the acceptance of unusual provisions which have to
be judged in accordance to the knowledge and experience of the athletes.2315 With
regard to arbitration clauses, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has, however, traditionally
taken a particular, liberal position.2316
4.2. Olympic arbitration
4.2.1. Arbitration clause contained in the Olympic Charter
The Olympic Charter has contained since 1995 an arbitration clause referring “any
dispute arising on the occasion of or in connection with, the Olympic Games …
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport”.2317 The clause becomes binding by
an explicit reference in the entry form that every athlete, official and coach has to sign
as a condition precedent to participation in the Olympic Games.2318 To make sure that
the athlete is really conscious of what he or she has signed, the declaration further
states: “The relevant provisions and rules have brought to my attention by my National
Olympic Committee and/or my National Sports Federation”. And as an additional
precaution, the IOC makes the NOCs responsible that its competitors are fully aware of
and comply with the Olympic Charter.2319
4.2.2. Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Division
During the Olympic Games in Sydney the ad hoc Division for the first time considered
the basis for its jurisdiction over all of the different parties involved in Olympic
arbitration. Some aspects were uncontroversial:
2314 See Walkinshaw & Ors v. Diniz, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Commercial Court, 19
May 1999, Arbitration International, Vol. 17 No. 2 (2001), p. 209. See also Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter, p.
183.
2315 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 371.
2316 Ibid., footnote 46.
2317 See Article 59 Olympic Charter (in force from 7 July 2007).
2318 Netzle, p. 53. See also Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 107, with regard to arbitration at the Atlanta
Games.
2319 Olympic Charter, by-laws to Rule 49. See also Netzle, p. 53.
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- first, it is obvious that the IOC is bound by the arbitration agreement inserted in the
Olympic Charter;2320
- second, it is equally clear that a claimant voluntarily submits to CAS arbitration by
filing an application;2321 and
- finally, a respondent who does not raise a defence at the outset of the arbitration is
deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction.2322
4.2.2.1. Athletes
Athletes are usually the claimants, so that the issue of challenging the ad hoc Division
does not even arise. However, the ad hoc Division’s jurisdiction over the athlete arises
out of the arbitration clause which is inserted in the entry form to the Games signed by
each participant, and that clause is further supported by Article 59 of the Olympic
Charter, to which the athletes consent in the entry form by way of a global
reference.2323 The language of the entry form to the Sydney Olympic Games, which
qualified the disputes submitted to the CAS as disputes “not resolved after exhaustion of
the legal remedies established by my NOC, the International Federation governing my
sport, SOCOG and the IOC”, and which was already present in earlier entry forms, did
not give rise to difficulties.2324
In the Melinte case,2325 however, the internal remedies of the international federation
had not been exhausted as this would have been unfeasible due to time constraints. The
panel thus held that the existence of a dispute was sufficient to create jurisdiction
under Article 74 (now Article 59) of the Olympic Charter and, at the same time, it
expressly limited the scope of its decision to the Olympic Games, thereby preserving
the federation’s role in assessing the doping offence and related sanctions.2326
Similarly, the fact that the IOC had not (until then) acted to remove an athlete’s
accreditation, which might suggest that the athlete had not suffered an adverse decision
from which to appeal, was held not to affect jurisdiction.2327 In two cases, the panel held
that the claimant had a dispute with the respondent and the competition schedule
2320 E.g. Andreea Raducan v. IOC, referred to as Raducan, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000, para. 3 in fine.
2321 E.g. Dieter Baumann v. IOC, National Committee of Germany and IAAF, 22 September 2000,
referred as Baumann, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000, para. 11.
2322 See Article 186(2) Swiss PIL; Baumann, para. 16 (Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 23).
2323 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 23. See also under VI.4.2.1.
2324 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24.
2325 Michaela Melinte v. IAAF, referred as Melinte, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000.
2326 Melinte, paras 6 and 9 (Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24).
2327 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24.
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required prompt clarification of the athlete’s status, or in the words of the Tzagaev
panel:
“the fact is, however, that the Claimant clearly has a dispute with the Respondent [...];
and above all that the schedule for this event requires clarity with respect to its Status
within a matter of hour”.2328
4.2.2.2. International federations
At the time of the Olympic Games in Sydney all of the summer sports international
federations had adopted the CAS arbitration clauses in their by-laws with the exception
of FIFA and the IAAF.2329 The latter was a respondent in several cases and, with one
exception, raised a defence of lack of jurisdiction. However, the panels consistently held
that they had jurisdiction by virtue of Article 74 (now Article 59) of the Olympic
Charter because of the federation’s very close integration within the Olympic
Movement.2330 In other words, as a result of their commitment to the Olympic
Movement and their participation in the Games, the international federations were
deemed to have subscribed to the arbitration clause in the Olympic Charter, this
conclusion was further buttressed by Article 29 (now Article 26) of the Olympic Charter
which provided that the international federations’ statutes, practice and activities must
conform to the Olympic Charter.2331
4.2.2.3. National Olympic Committees (NOCs)
Similar reasoning was applied to affirm jurisdiction over NOCs, as under the Olympic
Charter NOCs are entrusted with developing the Olympic Movement and ensuring
compliance with the Charter in their home countries.2332
4.2.2.4. National federations
The ad hoc Division’s jurisdiction over a national federation was addressed in FFG,2333
where the federation was the claimant: the application suggested that jurisdiction arose
2328 Alan Tzagaev v. International Weightlifting Federation, referred as Tzagaev, CAS Awards—Sydney
2000, para. 7. See also Melinte, para. 6.
2329 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24.
2330 Baumann, paras 12 and 13; and Melinte, para. 5.
2331 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24.
2332 Baumann , para. 14 (Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 24).
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out of the arbitration clause inserted in the entry form for the Olympic Games. That
form states that the NOC signs on behalf of the national federation; additionally, the
panel considered that national federations accepted jurisdiction by being members of
international federations which are themselves subject to the CAS’s jurisdiction.2334
4.2.2.5. Organising Committee of the Olympic Games
One arbitration also involved the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic
Games (SOCOG) as a respondent.2335 The application challenged a decision of the
SOCOG at the medals ceremony for the rhythmic gymnastics which ordered French
gymnasts to hide the trademark logo that appeared on their clothing.2336 The panel held
that the SOCOG received its instructions for the Organisation of the Olympic Games
from the IOC, that the Organisation included decisions as to advertising made under the
Olympic Charter, and that the SOCOG was thus necessarily bound by the Charter,
including the arbitration clause in Article 74 (now Article 59).2337
4.2.2.6. Manufacturers of sports equipment
In the same FFG arbitration, the respondent (SOCOG) opposed jurisdiction because the
manufacturer of the clothing bearing the litigious trademark was not a party to the
proceedings; the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction over the manufacturer, which was
not a party to any instrument giving the CAS jurisdiction, but that the manufacturer’s
absence was immaterial.2338
A similar fact pattern involving the display of a trademark on sports equipment had
given rise to a dispute at the Nagano Games; there, the manufacturer itself filed the
application, which explained that the ad hoc Division exercised jurisdiction.2339
2333 Fédération Française de Gymnastique v. Sidney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games,
referred as FFG, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000.
2334 FFG, paras 1 and 2 (Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 25).
2335 See the FFG case.
2336 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 25.
2337 FFG, para. 4 (Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 25).
2338 FFG, para. 3 (ibid.).
2339 CAS Award 98/003, unreported (see Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 25).
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5. THE SUBSTANTIVE VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO ISSUES RELATED TO
PARTIES’ CONSENT
The substantive validity of arbitration agreements raises issues with regard to parties’
consent to arbitration because sport arbitration is often induced and the arbitration
agreement results from arbitration clauses by reference. Rigozzi observed that in sport
arbitration to shift the issue of consent from the stage of qualification to the one on
the validity of the arbitration agreement would have a big practical advantage when
one considers that most of the time it is the athlete who decides to begin the arbitration
proceeding. In doing so he accepts the arbitration clause and therefore renders the issue
of consent to the clause contained in the by-laws superfluous.2340
5.1. Arbitration clauses by reference
International federations provide, often in a mandatory way, that their members and the
persons validly subordinated to their regulation submit their disputes to an arbitral
jurisdiction.2341 Most of the time the arbitration clause is not contained in the
contractual documents signed by the parties, but reference is made to the association’s
regulation to which the athlete is subordinated or to the qualification that he has
obtained for a particular competition.2342
Generally the athletes are not members of the international federation whose statutes
contain an arbitration clause. The athletes submit themselves to the arbitration
agreement essentially in two ways:
- by adhering to a club or a (local or national) federation whose statutes make
reference to the regulation of the international federation;2343 or
- by subscribing to a licence.2344
In both cases the arbitration agreement is concluded by reference to another
document. The references can be specific or global. The Swiss Federal Tribunal tends
2340 See Rigozzi, para. 478.
2341 Rochat/Cuendet, p. 53.
2342 Zen Ruffinen, para. 144.
2343 See also under VI.4.1.2.2.
2344 Rigozzi, para. 821.
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to analyse the question of the arbitration clause by reference under the angle of
consent.2345 In particular, usually an athlete is considered to know and thus explicitly
accept the arbitration clause of a body of rules of a sport organisation of which he is a
direct or indirect member.2346
5.1.1. The specific reference
The case of a specific reference, i.e. a reference referring explicitly to the arbitration
agreement contained in another document, does not give rise to problems, as the
agreement between the parties clearly expresses the will to submit the dispute to
arbitration and the fact that this will is contained in a separate document is of little
importance.2347
5.1.2. The global reference
In the presence of a global reference, the classical jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal
Tribunal tends to distinguish in function as to the circumstances of the particular
case.2348 The global consent to pre-formulated wordings does not include the consent of
unusual provisions.2349 While this issue arises in particular with respect to arbitration
clauses which may be on the whole known to the athletes, but whose details need not be
clear, it can nevertheless be observed that the Swiss Federal Tribunal traditionally has a
quite liberal approach to arbitration clauses.2350
5.1.2.1. The Nagel case
Nagel was disqualified by the Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) for a period of
six months, as his horse was found positive on an anti-doping control during a
competition. Nagel was not a member of the FEI, but of an equestrian club which was a
member of the national federation which was in its turn a member of the FEI. While
2345 See also Rigozzi, para 822.
2346 A fortiori a signed submission declaration of an athlete leads to the same result (see Baddeley,
Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 378).
2347 Poudret/Besson, para. 214.
2348 See Tradax v. Amoco, DFT 110 II 54 = YBCA 1986, p. 532.
2349 Which provisions of the declaration of submission have to be considered as unusual and which not
has to be judged in accordance with the knowledge and the experience of the athletes (Baddeley,
Unterwerfungserklärungen, pp. 370 et seq.).
2350 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 371 and footnote 46.
346
Nagel brought a court action against his disqualification, the FEI raised the exception of
arbitration.2351
The Swiss Federal Tribunal considered that in the presence of a global reference
accepted in writing the issue shifts from the question about the observance of the form
to the one of consent and then applied the principle of confidence.2352 In this particular
case, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the athlete was bound by the arbitration
clause. Indeed, the following circumstances led the Supreme Court to conclude that the
athlete had accepted submission to the arbitration agreement, in validly giving his
consent:
- the athlete already knew the arbitration clause contained in the regulation when he
signed the document referring to it;
- he had already made use of the clause for applying the CAS in occasion of a
previous dispute;
- the clause in question had been communicated to him textually and he made no
objection to such clause.2353
Moreover, the Swiss Federal Tribunal considered that the athlete had, through his
subsequent behaviour, regarded himself as bound.2354 This is the expression of the
principle generally recognised by the Swiss Federal Tribunal according to which the
circumstances or the behaviour may replace, due to rules of good faith, the
observation of form rules.2355
5.1.2.2. The Stanley Roberts case2356
5.1.2.2.1. In general
Roberts was a professional basketball player, who played in the NBA. On 24 November
1999, the NBA banned Roberts from its league for two years because of a violation of
the Anti-Drug Program agreed by the NBA and the National Basketball Players
2351 See DFT 4C.44/1996 dated 31 October 1996 (Nagel v. FEI), p. 585 (translation from Digest of CAS
Awards 1986-1998, pp. 585 et seq.).
2352 Ibid.
2353 Ibid.
2354 Ibid.
2355 DFT 129 III 727, p. 735, citing DFT 121 III 38, p. 45.
2356 Preliminary Award of 28 July 2000—CAS 2000/A/262, Roberts v. FIBA, in Reeb, Digest II, pp. 377
et seq.
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Association following a positive test for amphetamine.2357 While on 3 March 2000
Roberts lodged a “Further Appeal” with the CAS against the arbitral award of the
Appeals Commission of FIBA dated 4 February 2000, in his statement of appeal the
athlete nevertheless contested the existence of a legally effective arbitration
agreement.2358
There is no doubt that the statutes and regulations of FIBA clearly stipulated the
settlement of any dispute arising from the enforcement of the by-laws and other internal
regulations solely and exclusively by way of arbitration before the CAS.2359
5.1.2.2.2. CAS tribunal’s award
The CAS tribunal remembered that the Swiss Federal Tribunal considers that in the case
of a global reference accepted in writing the issue shifts from the question about the
observance of the form to the one of consent and the Swiss Supreme Court then applies
the principle of trust. The CAS Tribunal then held that:
- a global reference is not sufficient when the party proposing an arbitration clause in
this way knew or should have known by experience that the other party did not
want to agree to such a clause or if such a clause was unusual under the given
circumstances;
- a global reference on the other hand is valid and sufficient between two parties, who
are experienced in the field or when an arbitration clause is customary in the
particular sector of business, regardless of whether the other party has indeed read
the document of reference and therefore knew that it contained such a clause.2360
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has applied and confirmed this principle of trust in sports
related disputes. The CAS tribunal in affirming its jurisdiction on the base of a global
reference considered in particular the following circumstances:
- a professional basketball player can be considered experienced in the field of
professional sports;
- arbitration clauses have become customary in most international sports federations
and many by-laws or procedural regulations of these organisations refer to CAS
arbitration with the explicit exclusion of the right to appeal to ordinary courts;
2357 Preliminary Award of 28 July 2000—CAS 2000/A/262, Roberts v. FIBA, in Reeb, Digest II, pp. 377
et seq.
2358 Ibid.
2359 Ibid.
2360 Ibid.
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- arbitration is also a widely applied way of dispute resolution in sport in the US and
an arbitration clause such as the one contained in the FIBA Rules can therefore not
be considered unusual.2361
5.1.2.2.3. Swiss Federal Tribunal’s decision
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, by later confirming the Roberts award, has generalised the
Nagel decision in the sense that normally it should be admitted that:
- a party who accepts without any reservation a global reference and thereby knows
the arbitration clause contained in the referenced document, consents to the
arbitration clause; and, further, that
- an athlete recognises the regulation of a federation, when he asks the latter for a
general admission to compete. 2362
5.1.2.2.4. Comments
It has been observed that while, contrarily to the CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal did
not mention that Roberts was a professional basketball player and thus experienced
in the field of professional sports, an area in which dispute resolution through
arbitration was not unusual, it is not however insensible to the specificity of the sport
context, particularly when the Swiss Supreme Court added that the clause incorporated
in the regulations of a federation can not only have an effect on direct or indirect
members, but to those who simply ask to be admitted.2363 Indeed, with his appeal,
without any reservation with regard to the known arbitration clause, the athlete has
implicitly requested the issuing of a general admission to competition and therefore it
can be held that he has also recognised the relevant regulations of the federation as well
as the arbitration clause.2364
2361 Preliminary Award of 28 July 2000—CAS 2000/A/262, Roberts v. FIBA, in Reeb, Digest II, pp. 377
et seq.
2362 See DFT 4P.230/2000 of 7 February 2001 (Roberts v. FIBA), consid. 2a. See also ASA Bulletin, Vol.
19 No. 3 (2001), p. 528.
2363 Rigozzi, para. 834.
2364 See DFT 4P.230/2000 of 7 February 2001, consid. 2b.
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5.1.2.3. Knowledge of the arbitration clause
5.1.2.3.1. Presumption of the knowledge of the arbitration clause
It has been observed that the CAS establishes a sort of presumption of the knowledge
of the arbitration clause by the participants.2365 Although from a point of view of the
need of uniformity in sport matters this approach is interesting because it permits
avoidance of the question as to whether the sportsman knew about the arbitration
clause, it is however doubtful if it corresponds to the current jurisprudence of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.2366 Nevertheless, while in the past it has been observed that arbitration
was not considered the natural method of dispute resolution in the sport area,2367 with
the development and the generalisation of the competence of the CAS this position
needs to be reconsidered, particularly in light of the current case law of the CAS where
it has been held that:
“the arbitration clause in favour of the CAS was and is in no way unusual. In fact it
is in line with similar regulations of many other international sports federations. The
objection from the part of the Appellant, that ‘knowledge does not amount to consent’
cannot be heard”.2368
Furthermore, the Swiss Supreme Court has already seen in the adoption of the World
Anti-Doping Code a true recognition of the role of the CAS by the international
community.2369
5.1.2.3.2. Distinction between professional athletes and amateurs with regard to form
requirements
Despite the fact that, in decisions regarding the CAS, the Swiss Supreme Court does not
consider the issue of the presumption of consent from the point of view of an athlete’s
professionalism, nor under the more or less usual character of the CAS arbitration
clause,2370 it is particularly at these times—when the athletes are not professionals and
2365 See Rigozzi, para. 835.
2366 Ibid.
2367 So Simon, p. 204, in the year 1995.
2368 CAS 2000/A/262, Roberts v. FIBA, in Reeb, Digest II, p. 387.
2369 DFT 129 III 462 (Lazutina v. CIO & FIS), (Rigozzi, para. 835).
2370 Rigozzi, para. 833.
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the arbitration clause appears to be unusual—that the requirements of form reacquire
their importance.2371
5.2. Induced arbitration
Despite the issues which are debated among scholars, CAS-awards in which arbitrators
are confronted with the question of the arbitration agreement’s validity, from the point
of view of parties’ consent, are rare.2372 This is primarily due to the fact that the athlete
is commonly the claimant in disciplinary matters.2373 The same is true for challenges of
the Olympic ad hoc Division, here again athletes are usually the claimants.2374
5.2.1. Specificity of sport arbitration
In the domain of sport the recourse to arbitration is often the only route to protection
which is, on the one hand, efficacy for the athletes, and, on the other hand, open to all of
them.2375 Indeed, arbitration in sport can be an effective instrument in safeguarding the
equal application of the competition rules across the borders of local and national
jurisdictions and, therefore, serves the fundamental principles in sport—fairness and
equal opportunity.2376 The preponderant interests of the sport organisations and all
the athletes (considered as a group) have to prevail over the interests of a single
athlete who would, possibly, not be willing to submit to arbitration.2377 It has also been
underlined that the objective of the international sport federations to avoid a splitting of
the control of their decisions justifies the obligation for athletes to sign the arbitration
agreement.2378
However, while this obligation seems to be necessary to avoid a situation where the
athletes who have voluntarily accepted the arbitration agreement are judged differently
from the others, the question about the limits arises.
2371 Simon, p. 204.
2372 One case has been Royal Sporting Club Anderlecht v. Union des Associations Européenes de Football
(UEFA), award of 22 July 1998 (translation), Digest of CAS Awards 1998-2000, pp. 469 et seq. (Rigozzi,
para. 812).
2373 Rigozzi, para. 812.
2374 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 23.
2375 Ibid.
2376 Netzle, p. 54.
2377 Rigozzi, para. 817.
2378 Adolphsen, p. 295.
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5.2.2. Consent and different bargaining power
Among scholars the question of whether a sport organisation may make the
participation of an athlete to the sport competitions dependent from the signing of an
arbitration clause is discussed.2379 Athletes do not really have the option to not sign
declarations containing or making reference to an arbitration clause,2380 because
acceptance of such declarations is usually required before admittance to
competitions.2381 Such “pressure” is also exercised by the IOC before the Olympic
Games, as only athletes who have signed a declaration in which they recognise the
jurisdiction of the CAS for all disputes arising during the Olympic Games are allowed
to participate in the competitions.2382
In sport the unequal bargaining power when concluding a contract is accentuated by
the strong position of power of the sport organisations.2383 Indeed, since the
international federations are organisations enjoying a world-wide monopoly,2384 the
athletes have little opportunity to exercise their sports and compete elsewhere.2385 But
how can this affect the arbitration agreement? Are such arbitration clauses invalid
because of the predominant position of sport organisations? Some authors suggest that
an arbitration clause concluded under economic or social pressure goes against Article
27 Swiss Civil Code and that it has, in accordance to Articles 19 and 20 of the Swiss
Code of Obligation, to be considered null and void.2386 On the other hand, other scholars
sustain that the non-voluntary submission to arbitration of an athlete is justified by the
preponderant interest of the sport organisations, even though they use their freedom to
contract and their monopolistic position to oblige the athlete to sign the arbitration
clause.2387
There have been cases, with the CAS,2388 where the plaintiffs have raised fundamental
objections based on Article 20 CO and Article 27 CC (unjustified restraint upon
2379 Fenners, para. 614.
2380 See also DFT 133 III 235, consid. 4.3.2.2. (Cañas case).
2381 Netzle, p. 53. See also Schillig, p. 78 and Haas/Prokop, p. 187.
2382 Fenners, para. 614.
2383 Baddeley, Unterwerfungserklärungen, p. 373.
2384 An exception can be found in boxing with several organisations: IBF, WBA, WBC.
2385 Netzle, p. 53.
2386 Zen-Ruffinen, para. 1445.
2387 See, e.g. Fenners, paras 614 et seq.
2388 See, e.g. CAS 96/160, Chiandiani v. FEI; CAS 96/166, Kierkegaard v. FEI.
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personality) or brought up anti-trust issues.2389 According to the case-law there is no
doubt that agreements between individual athletes and international sport
organisations are basically valid, although the parties provide for different
bargaining powers—the mere fact that sport organisations are monopolies does not
render their orders or agreements invalid.2390
The answer to the question of whether such a powerful sport organisation abused its
supremacy2391 depends on the content of the individual agreement and a fair balance of
interests. In this balance of interests the crucial point is whether a certain duty to which
an athlete is required to accept as a condition to participate in competitions is qualified
to safeguard a fair and safe sport event.2392 Normally, an international sport federation
does not abuse its supremacy by requiring the athletes to sign an arbitration
agreement, if the athletes are informed on the content and meaning of the clause2393
and may expect fair arbitral proceedings.2394 This principle has also been
acknowledged in other areas of different bargaining powers, i.e. where a party has no
real alternative but to accept a contract submitted by the other party.2395
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, on the one hand, considers that excessive binding in
accordance with Article 27(1) Swiss Civil Code is given when the agreed arbitral
tribunal does not give enough guarantees for an independent judgment of the
dispute,2396 but, on the other hand, it recognises an independent arbitral tribunal as a full
and equivalent alternative to State courts.2397 Among scholars it has been observed that
when one accepts that arbitration represents the functional equivalent of State
justice,2398 precisely because of its guarantees of independence and impartiality, the fact
that a party can impose arbitration on the other does not mean that the latter is
disadvantaged.2399 With regard to the CAS, in the Nagel case the Swiss Federal
Tribunal observed that the CAS has sufficient independence and its awards can, thus,
be assimilated to the judgments of State’s courts. The Swiss Federal Tribunal therefore
concluded that under such circumstances it is excluded that the signing of an arbitration
2389 Netzle, p. 53.
2390 See, e.g. CAS 96/166, Kierkegaard v. FEI (own translation).
2391 On this aspect, see, e.g. Hoffet, pp. 182 and 187.
2392 Netzle, p. 54.
2393 See, e.g. Decision of the Tribunal civil de l’arrondissement de la Sarine of 20 June 1997, Monn et al.
v. Fédération Suisse de Basketball et al. (not published).
2394 Röhricht, pp. 23 and 26. See also BGH NJW 84, 1355.
2395 See Netzle, p. 54.
2396 DFT 85 II 489. See also DFT 119 II 271.
2397 Fenners, para. 616.
2398 See Adolphsen, p. 550.
2399 Rigozzi, para. 814.
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agreement for being able to participate to a sport competition can be considered as an
unjustified restraint upon personality in accordance with Article 27 Swiss Civil
Code.2400
5.2.3. The relevance of the social context
A scholar (Rigozzi) argued that in the field of sport the issue of consent to arbitration
must take account of the social context where arbitration is used. Indeed, in sport
arbitration consent to arbitration is necessarily mediated and not direct. Basing his
view on the theoretical approach of legal pluralism he sustained the idea that the
athlete’s consent to arbitration is expressed in a social contract (binding also the other
members of the sport organisation to which he adheres)—social contract which is at the
origin of the sport juridical order.2401 Therefore, according to him arbitration has still to
be seen as consensual.2402
6. MANDATORY ARBITRATION
6.1. In general
Sport arbitration is one of the new fields of arbitration in which there is a growing
tendency toward compulsory arbitration forms. While, increasingly, the word
“arbitration” is used to designate dispute resolution mechanisms when parties’ consent
is inexistent, for some scholars the absence of parties’ consent excludes the qualification
as arbitration.2403
In the United States, according to the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act,2404
the United States Olympic Committee has “to provide swift resolution of conflicts and
disputes involving amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sport
organisations”. The latter are only eligible to be recognised, or to continue to be
recognised, as a national governing body if they agree to submit to binding arbitration in
any controversy involving the opportunity of any US athlete to participate in the
2400 DFT 4C.44/1996 dated 31 October 1996 (Nagel v. FEI), pp. 583 et seq.
2401 Rigozzi, para. 819.
2402 See Punzi, p. 243. See also Napolitano, p. 1159.
2403 See, e.g. Jarrosson, Frontières, p. 15.
2404 See section 220509 of the United States Code.
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Olympic Games, World Championships or other international competition where the
athletes represent the United States.2405 According to Rigozzi this tendency toward
creating arbitration mechanisms through legislative acts for resolving sport disputes
seems to expand, and there is no doubt that the jurisdictions of the States whose law
imposes recourse to arbitration in the field of sport will consider these proceedings
true arbitrations.2406
Moreover, in my view, one should distinguish between classical commercial arbitration
cases and regulatory (disciplinary or allocation) matters. While in the former the
consensual character of arbitration has to be strictly observed, in the latter this aspect
is less compelling because the function is that of accomplishment of a governmental
task which is delegated by the State who would act by virtue of its sovereignty (iure
imperii).
In international sport the most significant area where the States have delegated their
role in the resolution of disputes to private tribunals is in the fight against doping.
Indeed, with the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA-Code)2407 arbitration has become
in the international sport arena de facto compulsory for solving disputes concerning
doping cases.2408
6.2. The fight against doping
6.2.1. The legal framework
In 1998 a large number of prohibited medical substances were found by police in a raid
during the Tour de France; the scandal led to a major reappraisal of the role of public
authorities in anti-doping affairs.2409 Therefore, the IOC decided to convene a world
conference on doping, bringing together all parties involved in the fight against it.2410
The conference held in Lausanne in February 1999 produced the Lausanne Declaration
on Doping in Sport. This document provided for the creation of an independent
2405 Rigozzi, para. 470.
2406 Ibid.
2407 The World Anti-Doping Code is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement (see Rule 44 of the
Olympic Charter).
2408 See under VI.6.2.2.
2409 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312.
2410 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=253.
355
international anti-doping agency to be fully operational for the Games of the XXVII
Olympiad in Sydney in 2000:2411 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).2412
One of WADA’s main activities is the surveillance of the World Anti-Doping Code
(WADA-Code) adoption and implementation to ensure a harmonised approach to anti-
doping in all sports and all countries.2413 More than 570 sport organisations have
already adopted the WADA-Code.2414 The ultimate goal of the latter is for all athletes to
benefit from the same anti-doping procedures and protections, no matter the sport,
nationality, or country where tested. The WADA-Code, which entered into force on
January 1, 2004, has already undergone a thorough review and consultation with
WADA stakeholders for its practical improvement. The revised WADA-Code is
effective as of January 1, 2009.
Each government’s commitment to the WADA-Code is evidenced by its signatory to
the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport of March 3, 2003,2415 and by
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the UNESCO International Convention
against Doping in Sport (UNESCO Convention).2416 Indeed, as most governments
cannot be parties to, or bound by, private non-governmental instruments such as the
WADA-Code, governments are not asked to be signatories to the WADA-Code but
rather to sign the Copenhagen Declaration and ratify, accept, approve or accede to the
UNESCO Convention.2417 On the other hand the UNESCO Convention applies only
among signatory States, and is not binding therefore on the sport organisations or the
athletes.2418
The Anti-Doping Convention of the Council of Europe served as a basis for the
UNESCO Convention,2419 whose drafting happened in the unusually short time—for
international treaties—of two years.2420 On November 12, 2008, the 100th country
ratified the UNESCO Convention.2421 The UNESCO Convention enables the States to
align their domestic legislation with the WADA-Code and thereby harmonise the sport
2411 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=253.
2412 The WADA is a Swiss private law Foundation, with its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland.
2413 See Kohler, para. 6 citing http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=255.
2414 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=273.
2415 192 governments have signed the Copenhagen Declaration (see the list of countries under
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=391).
2416 See preamble to Article 22 WADA-Code.
2417 Comment to Article 22 WADA-Code.
2418 Kohler, para. 32.
2419 Kamber, para. 31.
2420 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=273.
2421 See the list of countries under http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=484.
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and public legislation in the fight against doping in sport.2422 However, it has been
observed that the UNESCO Convention brings only a relative harmonisation of the law
and cannot be qualified as loi uniforme.2423
6.2.2. The compulsory transposition of CAS arbitration for international
doping cases
The most significant area in sport with compulsory arbitration is the WADA-Code
which designates the CAS as the exclusive competent instance to hear appeal in doping
cases arising from participation in an international event or in cases involving
international-level athletes.2424 In fact, with the transposition of this provision into
different national legislations, arbitration before the CAS is de facto compulsorily
provided for by the law.2425
Each government’s commitment to the WADA-Code had to be evidenced by signing a
declaration on or before the first day of the Athens Olympic Games; this had to be
followed by a process leading to a convention or other obligation to be implemented as
appropriate to the constitutional and administrative context of each government on or
before the first day of the Turin Winter Olympic Games.2426 Moreover, the
transposition and implementation of the anti-doping policies and rules, and therefore
also of the arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes in this area, are supported by
different means:
- The failure of a government to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the UNESCO
Convention by January 1, 2010, or to comply with the UNESCO Convention
thereafter could result in ineligibility to bid for the organisation of Olympic
Games,2427 World Championships2428 or other major events.2429
- According to the WADA-Code the IOC has the responsibility to withhold Olympic
funding of sport organisations that are not in compliance with the Code.2430
2422 See http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=273.
2423 Kohler, para. 32.
2424 See Article 13.2.1 WADA-Code.
2425 Rigozzi, para. 472.
2426 See preamble to Article 22 WADA-Code 2003.
2427 See Article 20.1.8 WADA-Code.
2428 See Article 20.3.10 WADA-Code.
2429 See Article 20.6.6 WADA-Code and Article 22.6 WADA-Code. See also Kohler, para. 13.
2430 See Article 20.1.3 WADA-Code.
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- The IOC,2431 the international federations2432 and major event organisations2433 also
have to require that all athletes and the athlete support personnel who participate at
the Olympic Games, competitions, events or activities organised by them, agree to
be bound by anti-doping rules in conformity with the WADA-Code as a condition
of such participation.2434
Finally, the uniformity in the application of the WADA-Code is guaranteed by the fact
that it has to be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by
reference to the existing law or statutes of the signatories or governments.2435
7. RELEVANCE OF PARTIES’ CONSENT WITH REGARD TO
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS: IDENTIFYING AND JOINING THE
PARTIES
7.1. Sport arbitration as structurally inherent multiparty situation
The issue with parties’ consent in multiparty arbitration—well known in commercial
arbitration—is in sport arbitration, particularly in disputes between an athlete or a club
against a sport federation, not the most difficult aspect to cope with, as most of the time
all other interested parties will be bound by the same arbitration agreement2436 from
the beginning.
This was the situation in the Raguz case,2437 where the athletes Mrs. Raguz and Mrs.
Sullivan and the Australian Judo Federation were parties2438 to a relevant arbitration
agreement, which had been initially entered by the Australian Olympic Committee and
the Judo Federation. This agreement set up a resolution mechanism for athletes’
nomination disputes. While, at the outset, it bound only the Olympic Committee and
the Federation and was open-ended as to other parties, thereafter, individual athletes
2431 See Article 20.1.6 WADA-Code.
2432 See Article 20.3.3 WADA-Code.
2433 See Article 20.6.4 WADA-Code.
2434 See also Kohler, para. 13.
2435 See Article 24.3. WADA-Code.
2436 Rigozzi, para. 1057. This is due to the fact that the athletes are subject to the same sport regulation
containing the arbitration agreement.
2437 New South Wales Court of Appeal, Angela Raguz v. Rebecca Sulivan, 1 September 2000, referred to
as Raguz, in Mealey’s IAR 2000, Issue #10, p. 3D; and also in ASA Bulletin (2001), pp. 335-354.
2438 The Judo Federation Appeal Tribunal and the CAS were also parties.
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were invited to adhere to the selection agreement through the execution of so-called
nomination and team membership forms, which both athletes had done.2439 The
nomination form reiterated the critical provisions of the selection agreement, i.e. the
arbitration and the exclusion agreements. In the Court’s view, these interlocking
documents constituted a single arbitration agreement between the Judo Federation and
the Olympic Committee, on the one hand, and all relevant athletes, on the other; this
resulted in an integrated arbitration scheme, which was particularly warranted
considering that, when signing the nomination form, each athlete knew that a claim by
another athlete on the right of nomination may have the consequence of eliminating
the first athlete from the team.2440
Like investment arbitration, where the host State gives its consent in a BIT to arbitrate
to a group of investors of a particular State, the sport federations give their consent to
arbitrate to a group of athletes of a particular sport discipline. Additionally in sport
arbitration the individual athletes also give their consent to arbitrate among each other,
and this is not necessarily an—in advance—clearly identifiable set of “concrete”
athletes but rather an “abstract” group of athletes.
7.2. Participation of third parties to arbitration
7.2.1. Joinder and intervention of third parties
In CAS arbitrations, for the cases where a respondent intends to cause a third party to
participate in the arbitration (see Article R41.2 CAS Code on Joinder) or where a third
party intends to participate as a party in the arbitration (see Article R41.3 CAS Code on
Intervention), Article R41.4 CAS Code (Joint Provisions on Joinder and Intervention)
provides that “a third party may only participate in the arbitration if it is bound by the
arbitration agreement or if itself and the other parties agree in writing”.
Due to the open-ended arbitration agreements of the sport federations the following can
be observed: while the single athlete (by adhering to the arbitration agreement of a sport
federation) gives—when neither the dispute has broken out nor the proceeding begun—
its consent to arbitrate to a group of athletes, during the proceeding before the CAS,
2439 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, pp. 22 et seq.
2440 Ibid.
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when in the case of joinder and intervention of third parties an athlete agrees in writing,
he consents to arbitration with a concrete party.
7.2.2. Joining of proceedings in the case of the ad hoc Division
On the other hand, the arbitration rules of the ad hoc Division merely refer to the
claimant and to the respondent without further specification.2441 The only possibility
provided for by the arbitration rules of the CAS ad hoc Division which permits a
“practical consolidation” of the proceedings to be reached is given by the possibility of
joining two related cases by assigning the second dispute to the panel appointed to
decide the first dispute.2442 In order to decide upon the joining of the proceedings, the
President of the ad hoc Division will take into account all the circumstances, including
the relation between the two cases and the progress already made in the first case.2443
Therefore, the President of the ad hoc Division is vested with more power than the
“habitual” CAS panels which in the absence of specific provisions in the CAS Code
can only join proceedings with the agreement of all parties involved.2444
7.3. Determination of the parties who can participate to the
arbitration proceeding
7.3.1. The issue of the “other athlete”
The true problem in the sport field is determining the parties who can participate in an
arbitration proceeding because they have an interest in the dispute between the original
parties.2445 Indeed, the issue of the “other athlete”2446 can have important practical
repercussions:
- on the one hand, if arbitration is opened too much the risk is one of organisational
problems, particularly with regard to the nomination of the arbitrators; and
2441 Article 9 ad hoc Rules.
2442 See also Rigozzi, para. 1070.
2443 See Article 11 ad hoc Rules.
2444 See, e.g. CAS 2007/A/1298, Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian; CAS 2007/A/1299, Heart of
Midlothian v. Webster & Wigan Athletic FC; CAS 2007/A/1300, Webster v. Heart of Midlothian, p. 10.
See also Rigozzi, para. 1070.
2445 Rigozzi, para. 1058. In commercial arbitration the parties are normally the persons or entities named
by the claimant in the request for arbitration.
2446 Rowan, p. 4, cited by Rigozzi, para. 1059.
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- on the other hand, if a too restrictive approach is adopted the risk is that situations
like the one of the Lindland-Sieracki case2447 arise, where both athletes obtained an
arbitral award ordering the US Olympic Committee to select them for the Olympic
Games, even though according to the rules of the IOC there was only one place
available.2448
It has been observed that the possibility to join connected affairs is only of use when the
third party also begins an arbitration proceeding. Thus, the third party must be informed
about the first arbitration2449 and from there he will, possibly, decide to begin an
arbitration.2450 For this reason there have been situations where the secretary of the
CAS took the initiative to inform athletes who would be affected by an eventual change
of the results and of their NOCs.2451
The issue with regard to parties’ consent to arbitration is the following: while the parties
have in the arbitration agreement consented to arbitrate, the question is how open-
ended their consent has to be considered with respect to the jurisdiction ratione
personae. In answering this question one has to bear in mind that the parties are usually
bound by the same arbitration agreement, and the particularities of sport arbitration
where disputes in disciplinary or allocation matters have to be solved.
7.3.2. In arbitration at the Olympics
7.3.2.1. Who can join them?
Whereas in commercial arbitration it is unheard-of for the arbitration institution to sua
sponte identify and join additional parties, in sport arbitration this has proved to be a
necessity.2452 For instance, in arbitration at the Olympics, if after an initial review of the
application it turns out that the relevant parties are not named as respondents, the ad hoc
Division, as an institution,2453 adds these parties to the proceedings when issuing the
2447 Keith Sieracki v. IOC, 21 September 2000, referred to as Sieracki, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000.
2448 Rigozzi, para. 1059.
2449 And this in a sufficiently early stage.
2450 Rigozzi, paras 1070 et seq.
2451 This has been the case in disputes over the award of medals in certain cross-country skiing
competition in the the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games (see CAS 2002/O/372, NOC et al. v.
IOC; CAS 2002/O/373, COC et al. v. IOC; CAS 2002/A/370, Lazutina v. IOC; CAS 2002/A/371,
Danilova v. IOC; CAS 2002/A/374, Muehlegg v. IOC.
2452 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 35.
2453 Not the panel for reasons of timing.
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summons to appear at the hearing.2454 It has been observed that, while this practice is well
accepted and efficient, it would certainly be on safer ground if it were contained in an
express provision of the arbitration rules.2455
7.3.2.2. Who must be joined?
The rules applicable in commercial arbitration and in civil procedure are of little
assistance to answer this question which does not arise in these areas,2456 as dispute
resolution in sports is closer to administrative or criminal procedures; in the latter
fields, under varying conditions of course, a person whose legal interests may be
affected may become a party to the proceedings.2457 Here the jurisdictional nature of
arbitration can be well seen.
While it is obvious that the athlete whose result is being challenged should be made a
party, whenever possible, the question arises as to what has to happen with the other
athletes. In each of the following cases: Segura,2458 Raducan,2459 and Neykova,2460 where
the gold medal was at stake, the ad hoc Division joined all of the medalists.2461 Although,
strictly speaking, one could argue that the outcome of the arbitration equally threatened the
ranking of all the other competitors, a reasonable balance must be achieved or the process
would become unmanageable.2462
7.3.3. In appeal cases
The Swiss Federal Tribunal requires the existence of an interest to appeal for all legal
remedies.2463 The CAS had occasion to apply this principle in deciding the appeal of
some athletes against the decision of the IOC to not disqualify other competitors.2464
Making reference to the situation in civil procedural law, the arbitral tribunal held that:
2454 See Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 36.
2455 Ibid.
2456 Rowan, para. IV.
2457 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 36.
2458 Bernardo Segura v. IAAF, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000.
2459 Raducan, CAS Awards—Sydney 2000.
2460 Rumyana Dimitrova Neykova v. International Rowing Federation and IOC, CAS Awards—Sydney
2000.
2461 Kaufmann-Kohler, Olympics, p. 36.
2462 Ibid.
2463 DFT 127 III 429, p. 431.
2464 CAS 2002/O/372, NOC and others v. IOC.
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“In Swiss civil procedural law, the basic principle is that a claimant has standing to sue
and the claim is admissible providing the person is invoking a substantive right of its
own, i.e. a right deriving from contract, tort or another source”.2465
On this basis, the arbitral tribunal accorded the quality to appeal to the athletes, but not
to the NOCs.2466 Moreover, the tribunal also made reference to the situation in
administrative procedural law:
“Alternatively under Swiss rules of administrative procedure, the claim would also be
admissible; the basic principle being that an appellant has standing to sue if she/he has
an interest worthy of protection. This is deemed to be the case if the appellant is
actually and directly affected by the litigious decision in a fashion that can be
eliminated by its annulment and if the appellant did not have the opportunity to be
heard in the fist instance”.2467
2465 CAS 2002/O/372, NOC and others v. IOC, para. 71.
2466 Rigozzi, para. 1061.
2467 CAS 2002/O/372, NOC and others v. IOC, para. 73.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the notion, nature and extent of consent in
international arbitration. Starting from the traditional field of commercial arbitration, a
comparison has been drawn with two other areas in the international context where
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is employed: investment arbitration and
sport arbitration.
When speaking of arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism several
distinctions are needed:
1. from a definition perspective, while the consensual nature is one of the essential
criteria for arbitration’s qualification, consent is a condition as well for the validity
of the arbitration agreement;
2. from a historical perspective the concept of arbitration has evolved in time and the
dispute resolution mechanism of arbitration is today the most common method of
settling international disputes, this is also the case in areas other than the traditional
one of international commerce;
3. from a scope/extent perspective a tendency can be perceived to define the scope of
arbitration as widely as possible and to enlarge the field of application of arbitration;
4. from a chronological perspective a differentiation might be required by taking into
account the different needs before the arbitral proceeding has begun and once the
proceeding is ongoing;
5. from a structural perspective in the time there has been an increase of circumstances
which cannot anymore be explained with the typical bi-polar horizontal arbitration
scheme, but where there are situations characterised by multi-polarism and/or a
rather vertical structure. This can—broadly speaking—be ascribed to two reasons:
a. a growing complexity of the facts of the cases in dispute which often leads to
multiparty situations where non-signatories can also be involved;
b. the steadily growing importance of new types of arbitration, i.e. in particular
investment arbitration and sport arbitration, where the structure and needs are
different from those in the traditional field of commercial arbitration.
All these perspectives have then to be considered with respect to the relation of consent
with the juridical nature of arbitration.
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1. The definition perspective
In Chapter I. it has been shown that when speaking about consent it is important to
differentiate between the characterisation of “consensual” as one of the essential criteria
for arbitration’s qualification and “consent” as a condition for the (substantive) validity
of the arbitration agreement.
It has been observed that with the growing acceptance of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism and its use in areas other than the traditional one of commercial
arbitration, the consensual character of arbitration tends to decrease. This is mainly due
to the fact that the relationships between the parties in investment dispute arbitration
and sport arbitration have—when compared to commercial arbitration—another
structure, with the consequence that the process of reaching an agreement to arbitrate
appears to be different. Thus, also in consideration of the particularities of these new
areas where arbitration is used, it has then been suggested under I.5. that distinct types
of consent should be differentiated. Starting from the fact that:
- on the one hand, consent to arbitration can be directed to a defined person, i.e. be
individual, or be addressed to a group of persons who are not yet identified, i.e. be
general; and
- on the other hand, consent to arbitration can be expressed after a dispute has arisen
or can be given before and for the case of the breaking out of a dispute, i.e. consent
can refer either to a concrete dispute or to an abstract one,
the following categories for the classification of different types of consent have been
proposed:
- individual-concrete consent;
- individual-abstract consent;
- general-abstract consent; and
- general-concrete consent.
Such categorisation could have several advantages—for instance, it could permit:
- a better explanation of the reach of an agreement to arbitrate where there is no
horizontal and bi-polar situation, like in the traditional situations of commercial
arbitration;
- to distinguish different types of consent in investment arbitration and sport
arbitration; and
- the making of a distinction as to how consent has to be interpreted.
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On the other hand, while it is important to differentiate between the characterisation of
“consensual” as one of the essential criteria for arbitration’s qualification and “consent”
as a condition for the validity of the arbitration agreement, in the thesis it has also been
shown that these two aspects influence each other. Therefore, the interplay between the
process of reaching consent and the consensual character of arbitration remains
important. In fact, it is the process of reaching consent which influences the perception
of the consensual character of arbitration.
Nevertheless in this thesis it has been argued that also when the process of reaching
consent differs due to structural diversities or because consent to arbitrate is reached
through clauses by reference, arbitration is not a less consensual dispute resolution
mechanism.
2. The historical perspective
Under II.2. it has been shown, within a historical perspective, that there has been a shift
from an understanding of arbitration where consent was given by the parties after the
dispute had broken out to one where consent is expressed before the dispute has arisen.
This evolution brings a reduction of the pure consensual character of arbitration, but
also a bigger acceptance of arbitration as a mechanism for the resolution of international
disputes. Today, arbitration is therefore considered the natural forum for the resolution
of international disputes.
This development has also led to the use of arbitration in new fields where the
consensual nature of arbitration seems to be different. In an international context two of
these new fields are: investment arbitration and sport arbitration.
2.1. Investment arbitration
In investment arbitration consent is often based on national legislation, bilateral and
multilateral investment treaties. In the last two decades there has been an exponential
growth in the number of BITs. The particularity of this type of arbitration is that the
State gives in advance a unilateral standing offer (consent) to arbitrate. In other words,
there has been an evolution from retrospective to prospective consent (see under V.7.).
This implies consent more than requiring an express and specific manifestation of it.
However, although there is no arbitration agreement in the traditional sense, the
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resolution of a dispute by private judges without the parties’ consent would not be
arbitration. In investment arbitration we can see a “verticalisation” of arbitration, and a
declining importance of the classic “mirror arbitration” scheme. In fact, it is only the
aggrieved investor that can bring a claim against the State.
2.2. Sport arbitration
Another field where the consensual character of arbitration has at first sight lost its
importance, or at least is of a different nature, is sport arbitration. Indeed, in relation to
sport arbitration, it has been observed that when one examines the circumstances of the
purported consent to arbitration, it often appears to have been entirely fictional.
Therefore, “induced arbitration” has been spoken of, and the suggestion has been made
to shift the focus on consent from the question about the qualification of arbitration as a
consensual dispute resolution mechanism to one of (substantive) validity of the
arbitration agreement (see under II.2.3.2. and VI.5.). This is particularly the case when
considering arbitration clauses by reference of sport organisations.
Moreover, in the field of sport a tendency to create arbitration mechanisms for resolving
sport disputes through legislative acts can be perceived. The most significant area in
sport with compulsory arbitration today is the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA-Code)
which designates the CAS as the exclusive competent instance to hear appeals in cases
relating to doping arising from competitions at an international event or in cases
involving international-level athletes. It has been observed that by rendering
compulsory arbitration in a particular domain the State includes in some way this type
of dispute resolution in the application field of the law of arbitration, so that the
question of its qualification as arbitration in the sense of the aforementioned legislation
has no real scope anymore. Nevertheless, the arbitrators remain individuals who are not
vested with any prerogative of public power (see under II.2.3.3. and VI.6.).
In the field of sport, arbitration is seen as a third jurisdictional way permitting the
avoidance of conflicts among juridical orders by combining the necessities of sport
competitions and the respect of fundamental rights. Given this context of tension
between fundamental individual rights and equally legitimate institutional objectives,
the challenge is naturally to strike the right balance. Therefore, procedural guarantees
and the independence/impartiality of arbitrators become of paramount importance (see
under VI.3.3.2.).
367
2.3. Differentiation between investment and sport arbitration compared to
commercial arbitration
In the thesis it has been observed (see under VI.6.1.) that differentiation should be made
between classical commercial arbitration cases and those regarding regulatory
(disciplinary or allocation) matters. While in the former the consensual character of
arbitration should be strictly observed, in the latter this aspect is less compelling
because the function is often that of the accomplishment of a governmental task which
is delegated by the State who would act by virtue of its sovereignty (iure imperii).
3. The scope/extent perspective
While the scope in commercial arbitration is defined by the parties, the situation is
different in investment arbitration where the parties are also bound by the conditions of
the ICSID Convention and by limitations in investment legislations and BITs. In sport
arbitration the scope is circumscribed by the regulations of the sport federations, by the
CAS Rules and sometimes also by the law (anti-doping legislation). The scope is
therefore essentially defined before the dispute has broken out. On the other hand,
expansion happens rather on the ground of courts’ decisions and tribunals’ awards once
the dispute has arisen. Indeed, courts and arbitral tribunals tend to enlarge the field of
application of arbitration.
3.1. Commercial arbitration
3.1.1. Scope
In commercial arbitration most arbitration agreements are broadly worded (see under
IV.2.1.2.), and, usually, when parties agree to resolve any disputes between them by
arbitration, they intend to resolve all disputes between them by this method (unless a
specific exception is made).
The parties to the arbitration agreement, by choosing corresponding arbitration rules,
may consent in advance to leave some discretion to the arbitral tribunal, respectively to
the arbitration institution, in defining the scope—in particular the personal scope—of an
arbitration (see under IV.7.1.2.5. and IV.7.2.2.1.4.e.).
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Important issues relating to the scope of the arbitration agreement also arise with regard
to cross-claims (see under IV.3.3.1.). The basic procedural prerequisite where the cross-
claim is not subject to a jurisdiction or a different arbitration clause is derived from the
consensual character of arbitration: the cross-claim has to be within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. Conversely, although for cross-claims subject to a jurisdiction or
a different arbitration clause the simultaneous adjudication of claim and cross-claim via
the set-off defence is alleged to be in the presumed interest of the parties to the
arbitration, taking a purely pragmatic approach to this problem would neglect the will of
the parties. Instead, the arbitrators have to determine the will of the parties at the
moment of conclusion of the arbitration agreement covering the main claim on the one
hand and the different forum clause covering the cross-claim on the other.
Finally, counterclaims must also fall under an arbitration agreement between the parties,
although not necessarily that upon which the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over the
principal claims is based. In the latter case, however, the admissibility of the
counterclaim presupposes that the modalities of arbitration pursuant to both agreements
are compatible (see under IV.3.3.2.).
3.1.2. Expansion of consent
Already the model clauses recommended by the various institutions have an expansive
effect on parties’ consent to arbitration. Indeed, with their broad wording parties agree
that a bigger number of disputes fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
However, as consent is given before disputes break out, there is at the same time a
reduction of the pure consensual character of arbitration. This leads to a phenomenon
which I have called the “paradox of consent”: the expansion of parties’ consent to
arbitration causes a reduction of the pure consensual character of arbitration itself (see
under IV.2.1.2.).
An expansion of consent to arbitration between the same parties may also exist because
of related agreements between them. Whether the arbitration clause in the main contract
can, in such cases, be extended to other related contracts is usually a question of
interpretation (see under IV.3.4.).
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A further type of expansion occurs when the arbitration agreement is extended to non-
signatories within a group of companies (see under IV.6.). This happens particularly in
France—where there is no exigency for the form of the agreement to arbitrate in
international cases—in arbitrations according to the ICC Rules. On the other hand, in
other countries the “group of companies” doctrine is rejected. Here the question as to
which law governs arbitration, respectively the arbitration agreement, is thus of
paramount importance (see under III.3.). In the ICC award No. 4131, Dow Chemical v.
Isover, the arbitrators found that they should decide “based on the mutual will of the
parties” and “usage conforming to the needs of international commerce, notably where a
group of companies is concerned”. Indeed, in all “group of companies” decisions the
finding of an (implied) consensus of the parties remains key in binding non-signatories
to an arbitration clause.
Finally, although these cases have to be seen rather as an exception, there are also
situations where an extension takes place on grounds unrelated to consent (see under
IV.6.5.). This is in particular the case when the corporate veil is pierced. While the
French courts, due to their following of the “group of companies” doctrine, have rarely
had to rely on notions such as fraud in order to pierce the corporate veil, the situation is
different in other countries.
3.2. Investment arbitration
3.2.1. Scope
While in commercial arbitration the parties are free to determine the scope of
arbitration, in investment arbitration the situation is different. Indeed, Article 25 ICSID
Convention sets forth three cumulative conditions for the establishment of the Centre’s
jurisdiction. These conditions are that:
1. one of the parties to the dispute must be a State which has acceded to the
Convention, whereas the other party (investor) must be a national of another
Contracting State;
2. the dispute must be a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment; and
3. there must be the consent of the parties to submit certain disputes to the Centre (see
under V.11.).
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Moreover, the scope may also be limited by national investment legislations or by BITs
(see under V.12.).
3.2.2. Expansion of consent
For investment arbitration it has been shown that several types of expansion of consent
have to be distinguished:
a. Expansion ratione personae
As Article 25(2)(b) ICSID Convention already deals with the juridical persons that are
incorporated in the host State but are controlled by nationals of another State, in
investment arbitration the issue with regard to the expansion of consent because of
ratione personae is primarily one of how the concept of “control” has to be defined (see
under V.11.1.3.). In a pyramid of control two aspects may be controversial:
- Which is the relevant party for the control? and
- How much control is necessary? (see under V.11.1.3.1.3.).
However, the determination of “foreign control” is not an easy task. The difficulties are
mainly due to the fact that different criteria may be applied to interpret the concept of
“foreign control”, and there is an area of conflict between economic reality and legal
structure (see under V.11.1.4.).
b. Expansion ratione materiae
The fact that the concept of “investment” is not defined by the ICSID Convention
permits an enlargement of the limits upon the parties’ ability to consent to ICSID
arbitration. Through the broad interpretation of the concept of “investment”, and the
“subjectivist movement”, which attaches greater importance to the will of the parties in
defining an economic operation as an investment, consent to arbitration experiences an
expansion. However, while a broad interpretation stresses rather the jurisdictional side
of arbitration, and normally goes to the “advantage” of one of the parties, the
“subjectivist movement” underlines the contractual side of arbitration by taking into
account the will of both of them (see under V.11.2.).
371
c. Expansion because of treaties’ provisions
aa. MFN-clause
Although in the Maffezini case the tribunal decided the question of whether more
favourable provisions on dispute settlement contained in the basic treaty can be
extended to a beneficiary of another treaty by operation of the MFN-clause in the
affirmative on the ground that procedural and substantive rights were intimately
connected, other ICSID arbitral tribunals considered that the MFN-clause cannot prevail
over the fundamental arbitration requirement—which is the meeting of the parties’
consents to arbitrate (see under V.14.1.2.).
In the thesis it has been suggested that where the dispute settlement matters are not
expressly excluded from the field of application of the MFN-clause, a careful
interpretation of the BIT should be undertaken in order to determine whether the State
has consented to use arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism or not. In such a case
further distinction should be drawn between:
- the ability to use MFN-clauses to avoid a local remedies procedural requirement: in
this case there should be a presumption that the MFN-clause applies;
- the ability to use MFN-clauses to “shop” for a wholly different dispute resolution
mechanism and forum. In this situation a careful analysis of all the BITs concluded
with other States by the host State in dispute with the investor should be undertaken
(see under V.14.1.6.1.).
On the other hand the investor’s consent is evidently less problematic than the one of
the host State, as the investor will be the party who invokes the dispute resolution
provision contained in another BIT based on an MFN-clause in the basic BIT (see under
V.14.1.6.2.).
bb. Umbrella clause
Another technique found in investment treaties, which may extend the scope of their
protection, is the so-called “umbrella clause”. With umbrella clauses an expansion of
treaty’s consent takes place by elevating contractual disputes to treaty’s disputes.
In the thesis it has been argued that the difficulties in relation to umbrella clauses are
essentially due to the fact that the host State gives, on the one hand, in the BIT a double
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consent with regard to the dispute resolution mechanism (to the investor’s State, as
party to the treaty, and to the investor) and, above all, on the other hand, a parallel
consent. The latter (parallel consent) arises because there are two relationships between
the host State and the investor: the one based on a BIT and the other on an investment
contract. In such a situation the problems clearly occur when there are different fora
which are provided for in the BIT and in the investment contract. It is therefore
important how umbrella clauses are interpreted and drafted (see under V.14.2.4.).
3.3. Sport arbitration
3.3.1. Scope
Article R27 CAS Code stipulates that the CAS has jurisdiction to rule on disputes
related to sport. The CAS has conceived this general competence in the field of sport in
an extensive manner not only with regard to the object of the dispute but also with
regard to territoriality (see under VI.2.2.2.2.).
It has also been observed that sport arbitration may be seen as a structurally inherent
multiparty situation. Indeed, most of the time all interested parties will be bound by the
same arbitration agreement from the beginning (see under VI.7.1.). However, with
regard to proceedings the issue of the “other athlete” arises. The dilemma is the
following: while the parties have in the arbitration agreement all consented to arbitrate,
the question is how open-ended their consent has to be considered with respect to the
jurisdiction ratione personae (see under VI.7.3.).
3.3.2. Expansion of consent
In sport there has always been a strong tendency to resolve any kind of dispute by
exclusion of the ordinary courts. Consequently, the fact that there is at least a certain
presumption in favour of arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution has to
be remembered when the validity of an arbitration agreement, especially the one by
reference, has to be determined. In the WADA-Code a provision has even been inserted
according to which “every government will respect arbitration as the preferred means of
resolving doping-related disputes”2468 (see under VI.3.3.3.).
2468 Article 22.3 WADA-Code.
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4. The chronological perspective with regard to the course of the proceeding
From a chronological perspective the thesis discussed the requirements for the validity
of the arbitration agreement—and more in particular of its substantive validity,
respectively consent—at the outset of the proceeding, and issues of consent with regard
to procedural mechanisms once the proceeding has begun.
4.1. Validity at the beginning of the proceeding
4.1.1. Ways of reaching an agreement to arbitrate
In the thesis the ways in which agreements to arbitrate are reached have been discussed:
- in commercial arbitration the arbitration agreement is a contract which is concluded
through an offer and its acceptance (see under I.2. and I.4.). Of particular
importance is the determination of which law governs the validity of the arbitration
agreement. This has been examined under III.3. Issues may also arise in relation to
questions about who can consent to arbitration on behalf of another person (agency)
and when a transfer of arbitration agreements should be possible (see under IV.4.
and IV.5.);
- due to the different modalities of reaching consent in investment arbitration the
ways of expressing agreement to arbitrate have been extensively dealt with in
respect of this type of arbitration (see under V.6.). With regard to the arbitration
agreement it has been observed that the contractual arrangement must be understood
broadly in the sense that the parties’ consent can be given in different ways and also
subsequently (see under V.7.3.2.);
- although they are also an issue in commercial arbitration, arbitration clauses by
reference have in this thesis in particular been considered when discussing sport
arbitration. With the CAS having its seat in Lausanne, it was the Swiss Federal
Tribunal which primarily dealt with arbitration clauses by reference in the field of
sport. The Swiss Supreme Court considers that in the case of a global reference
accepted in writing the issue shifts from the question about the observance of the
form to one of consent and applies then the principle of confidence. Moreover, it
should also be submitted that a party who accepts without any reservation a global
reference knowing the arbitration clause contained in the referenced document,
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recognises the regulation of the federation, and consents by this fact to the
arbitration clause itself. Finally, the arbitration clause incorporated in the regulations
of a federation cannot only have an effect on direct or indirect members, but also
those who simply ask to be admitted (see under VI.5.1.2.).
4.1.2. Interplay between form and consent
The development which could be observed is that, as a tendency, while still important,
the weight of formal requirements is decreasing (see under III.5.3. and III.5.4.).
4.1.3. The essential elements/criteria for which consent is required
The essential elements for which consent is required in commercial arbitration have
been discussed under IV.2. A controversial question here is whether the determination
of the seat of arbitration has to be seen as one of the essential elements of the arbitration
agreement or not (see under IV.2.2.2.). Moreover, in commercial arbitration issues with
regard to consent may also arise because of implied terms (see under IV.2.3.).
While in traditional international commercial arbitration—administered by private
institutions and even more so in ad hoc proceedings—the jurisdictional power of an
arbitral tribunal stands entirely on the consent of the parties, in investment arbitration
the situation is different. Indeed, in arbitration proceedings conducted under ICSID one
cannot ignore the fact that ICSID jurisdiction is limited by the nature of the operation at
hand. The essential criteria for arbitrations according to the ICSID Convention have
been discussed under V.11.
In sport arbitration the characteristics of the disputes submitted to the CAS have been
discussed under VI.2.2.2. Although Article R27 CAS Code stipulates that the CAS has
jurisdiction solely to rule on disputes related to sport, since its creation, the CAS has
never declared itself lacking in jurisdiction on the grounds that a dispute is not linked to
sport. Indeed, for the CAS to have jurisdiction it is enough that the dispute has some
link with sport. This general competence conceived in such an extensive manner is not
only valid with regard to the object of dispute but also with regard to territoriality, as the
competence of the CAS extends to all sport disputes without distinction whether their
character is national or international.
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4.1.4. Interpretation
It has also been discussed how the parties’ consent has to be interpreted. For both
commercial arbitration and investment arbitration it has been concluded that a neutral
manner of interpretation has to be preferred:
- for commercial arbitration it has been sustained (see under IV.3.1.2.3.) that
arbitration agreements should be interpreted in a neutral way—therefore neither
restrictively nor extensively—not simply with regard to their validity, but also in
relation to their scope. Indeed, in respect to consent to arbitration, not only the
question of whether the parties prefer arbitration over State courts as a dispute
resolution mechanism is important, but also the extent of what is covered by the
parties’ consent to arbitration. Furthermore, it has also been observed that a neutral
manner of interpretation is even more appropriate with the steadily diminishing
importance of the formal requirements of arbitration agreements. A rule of “in
favour of arbitration” should only be applied when the goal is to eliminate barriers
against parties’ consent to arbitration, i.e. limitations on the subject matter at issue
(objective arbitrability);
- with regard to investment arbitration it has been concluded (see under V.9.6.) that
the structure of investment arbitration, as well as its development and the interests at
stake, do not really make it appear as necessary to interpret consent with a particular
inclination (neither restrictive nor expansive).
Finally, in the field of sport the fact that there is at least a certain presumption in favour
of arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution has to be remembered when
the validity of an arbitration agreement, especially of clauses by reference, has to be
determined (see under VI.3.3.3.).
4.2. Consent with regard to procedural mechanisms
Under IV.7. it has been suggested that, in respect of the relevance of parties’ consent
with regard to procedural mechanisms, in commercial arbitration a strong contractual
approach should be preferred. Indeed, the opinion has been expressed that in the
traditional field of commercial arbitration, where the parties who oust State courts are in
a horizontal relationship, the consensual character of arbitration finds its major
expression. Therefore, for the case of joinder and intervention of third parties in arbitral
proceedings a distinction was made as to whether the new party to the arbitral
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proceeding is a party to the arbitration agreement or not (see under IV.7.1.5.). Only
when this is the case should a joinder or intervention, without the consent of the parties
already involved in the proceeding, be possible. However, for the joining party consent
may be necessary, even though the joining party is a party to the arbitration agreement,
when the arbitral tribunal is already constituted and the principle of equality of the
parties in the appointment of the arbitrators cannot be waived before the dispute has
arisen, as is the case when the seat of arbitration is in France.
This strong contractual approach also led me to the conclusion that it is preferable if the
issue of consolidation is first solved at the level of the institutional arbitration rules, and
only in a second step at the level of statutory regulations, which should in my view be
opt-in provisions in order to ensure the awareness of the parties (see under IV.7.2.2.3.).
Nevertheless, in commercial arbitration there have also been attempts to strengthen the
jurisdictional side of arbitration by conferring more discretionary powers to the
arbitration institution and the arbitral tribunals—as has been done by the Swiss Rules
for the case of joinder (see under IV.7.1.2.5.) and consolidation (see under
IV.7.2.2.1.4.e.). Moreover, efforts in this direction have also been made in some
arbitration laws (see under IV.7.2.2.2.2.). However, in this respect the question arises as
to whether the parties can be considered to have really consented to a consolidation
provision like the Dutch one or not.
Under V.15. it has been observed that in investment arbitration, in situations where the
BITs or the free trade agreements provide for the possibility to consolidate proceedings,
the State party consents to consolidation by signing the treaties, but the situation is
different for the investors who might be obliged to participate in a proceeding which has
been joined. For instance in the case of NAFTA, although the investors, by choosing to
begin an arbitration proceeding under NAFTA, also accept the relevant consolidation
provision contained therein, if they wish to benefit from the NAFTA they have no other
choice than to agree to the NAFTA rules. Moreover, the consolidation of related
investment arbitrations may be achieved by a tribunal’s binding order, as the guiding
consolidation principles in international investment law are primarily the unity of the
economic transaction affected by a same State measure. The reason for this
differentiation is that a State should be able to legitimately rely on its superior interest
not to be judged twice for the same action or omission. Furthermore, the situation of
conflicting awards in investment arbitration is different from the one in commercial
arbitration.
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Under VI.7. it has been observed that in the area of sport arbitration the issue with
parties’ consent in multiparty arbitration is not the most difficult aspect to cope with, as
most of the time all interested parties will be bound by the same arbitration agreement
from the beginning. Therefore, sport arbitration has been viewed as a structurally
inherent multiparty situation (see under VI.7.1.). On the other hand, the real problem in
the sport field consists of determining the parties who can participate in an arbitration
proceeding because they have an interest in the dispute between the original parties (see
under VI.7.3.).
5. The structural perspective
The structural diversities among the different types of arbitration may influence, on the
one hand, the formation and the validity of the arbitration agreement and, on the other
hand, herewith related questions of interpretation.
5.1. Commercial arbitration
In the classical field of commercial arbitration the consensual character of arbitration
has in the past been questioned with regard to proceedings with the former socialist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Today the same issue arises with regard to the
People’s Republic of China. However, in this thesis it has been sustained that arbitration
with parties of (former) communist countries is not really an exception from the
consensual character of commercial arbitration. Indeed, the parties had, and will have, a
possibility of choice, although perhaps more limited. Also the aspects related to the
unequal bargaining powers should not be seen as an exception from the consensual
character of commercial arbitration but rather as a question about the validity of the
arbitration agreement (see under IV.1.2.3.).
The growing complexity of the facts of the cases is taken into account by recent
arbitration rules, for instance the Swiss Rules which deal with aspects like consolidation
of proceedings (see under IV.7.2.2.1.4.e.) and participation of third parties (see under
IV.7.1.2.5.). Here the initial parties to the proceeding consent in advance to, possibly,
have further parties participating or joining the proceeding in due course. They do this
by increasing the jurisdictional power of the arbitrators or of the institution. However, in
this thesis it has been advocated that in commercial arbitration a strong contractual
(consensual) approach has to be preferred (see under IV.7.1.5. and IV.7.2.2.3.).
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5.2. Investment arbitration
In investment arbitration the impressive number of investment laws and treaties
implement a process which allows private complainants direct access to arbitration
against a State and public authorities, irrespective of the existence of a contractual
agreement to that effect. It has been observed that through these new types of
investment conventions we have entered the era of arbitration without contractual
relationship between the parties to the dispute—or arbitration without privity. This has
been seen as nothing short of a revolution of the (traditional) arbitration theory, which
postulates that arbitration is the product of a contract: either an arbitration clause for
future disputes or an arbitration agreement for existing disputes.
In investment arbitration we look at the “verticalisation” of arbitration, but also at the
declining importance of the classic “mirror arbitration” scheme. Whereas the classic
theory (commercial arbitration) postulates the equal situation of both contracting
parties, in which each of them can initiate arbitration proceedings and each of them—if
a defendant—can counterclaim, under the investment conventions, it is not so: only the
aggrieved investor can bring a claim, and whether the defending State can bring a
counterclaim is unclear (see under II.2.3.1.).
In the thesis it has been suggested that the interpretation in the presence of a standing
offer of a State in a treaty should be differentiated from the interpretation of arbitration
clauses contained in contracts or investment agreements, as the (host) State in the case
of a treaty gives a double consent: not only to the investor, but also to the other State
party to the treaty (see under V.9.2.3.).
However, it has also been observed that the borders between what is classically
considered to be public international law, on the one hand, and private international law
respectively commercial/private law, on the other hand, are getting more and more
diffuse. This phenomenon is accentuated by the fact that in the global economic arena
the State is often an economic player, as is the investor (see under V.9.6.).
5.3. Sport arbitration
With regard to sport arbitration it has to be borne in mind that competition sport is
characterised by a very hierarchical structure, both at the international and national
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level. Established on a vertical axis, the relationships between athletes and the
organisations of the different sport disciplines are distinct from the horizontal relations
which bind the parties of a contractual relationship. According to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal this structural difference between the two types of relationship is not without
influence on the consensual process leading to the formation of any agreement. While,
in principle, two parties are treated equally and each of them expresses its will without
being subject to the will of the other, as is the case in international commercial
arbitration, the situation is very different in the field of sport. Indeed, an athlete wishing
to participate in competitions organised under the control of a federation whose
regulation provides for recourse to arbitration will not have any other choice than to
accept the arbitration clause, notably by adhering to the statutes of the said sport
federation where the clause is inserted. This is even more true in the case of a
professional athlete who will be confronted with the following dilemma: to consent to
arbitration or to practice his sport as an amateur. Therefore, the athlete will not have any
other choice than nolens volens to accept arbitration (see under VI.3.4.).
However, in relation to the fundamental principles in sport—fairness and equal
opportunity—the preponderant interests of the sport organisation and the athletes
considered in their ensemble have to prevail over the interest of a single athlete who
would not be intentioned to submit to arbitration. Indeed, sport arbitration is primarily
concerned with disciplinary matters which in one way or another also affect the other
competing athletes (see under VI.5.2.1.).
6. Consent with respect to the juridical nature of arbitration
The reason why the consensual nature of arbitration has evolved over time and why it is
different among the various fields of arbitration might be attributed to the fact that there
is an inherent tension between the contractual and the jurisdictional side of arbitration.
Under II.3. the four traditional theories (jurisdictional, contractual, mixed/hybrid and
autonomous) used to explain the juridical nature of arbitration have been illustrated.
While in these theories the relationship between State and arbitration as a private
dispute resolution mechanism is of central importance, in the thesis other possible
approaches have been suggested—without exploring them fully, as this would have
gone beyond the scope of the present study—which could explain the interaction of
arbitration with the areas/fields where arbitration is expected to resolve disputes:
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- Legal pluralism: in the thesis it was mentioned that one scholar in particular has
suggested that there is a distinct legal order for each type of arbitration. The notion
of arbitral legal order would then cover an ensemble of juridical principles which
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of arbitration. The arbitral legal order
would have its source in the will of the parties, and this would be independent from
all national references (see under II.3.5.1.).
- Systems theory: systems are seen as being both open to the environment and
adaptive. Therefore, they can be directly influenced, regulated, and even
determined, by their environment. It has been observed that the adaptive feature is
one of the most distinctive characteristics of arbitration, and that in all the
adaptation processes parties’ consent seems to play a fundamental, although
differing role. The consensual nature of arbitration may be more (in commercial
arbitration) or less (for instance, in sport arbitration) present. Therefore, it could be
spoken of as a sort of “relativity of consent” (see under II.3.5.2.).
- Self-referentiality and autopoiesis: the idea of self-reference and autopoiesis
presupposes that systems seek the fixed points of their mode of operation in
themselves and not in the environmental conditions to which they adapt themselves
as best they can (in other words, the perspective is rather inverted compared to the
systems theory). In the case of self-referentiality parties’ consent may be seen as the
foundation stone on which the ability of the arbitral system to produce an
autonomous order rests. However, the degree of the consensual character for
different types of arbitration may vary: sometimes the contractual characteristics
may appear to prevail, at other times the jurisdictional ones (see under II.3.5.3.).
* * * * *
In my opinion the qualification of arbitration as a “consensual” mechanism for dispute
resolution needs to be differentiated, but not abandoned. Indeed, while at first sight it
might be tempting to speak of the “dogma of consent”, I think that it is more useful to
employ the consensual nature of arbitration as a point of departure to better understand
the differences among the diverse types of arbitration.
This is very well illustrated and has been done in an exemplary manner by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal in the Cañas case2469 in relation to the differences between commercial
arbitration and sport arbitration (see under VI.3.4.). In its decision the Swiss Federal
2469 Decision dated 22 March 2007, 4P.172/2006; DFT 133 III 235. See also ASA Bulletin 3/2007, p. 592.
On the Cañas case, see, e.g. Baddeley, Cañas; and Brunner.
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Tribunal recognised the special factors inherent in international sports and sport
arbitration and held that the provisions of the Swiss PIL, which are tailored to
arbitration in the area of commerce, had to be adapted to these specific features. In
particular, the Swiss Supreme Court found that the relationships between athletes and
the organisations of the different sport disciplines are, when compared to the horizontal
relations which bind the parties of a contractual relationship, structurally different. After
having concluded that this is not without influence on the consensual process leading to
the formation of any agreement, the Swiss Federal Tribunal then considered the
substantive validity of the agreement.2470
On the other hand, in the case of compulsory arbitration it could be asked whether the
qualification of consensual still has a raison d’être or rather should it be abandoned?
Indeed, in this type of arbitration the consensual boundaries of arbitration are reached.
However, in my opinion mandatory arbitration has to be seen as the exception which
confirms the rule of the consensual character of arbitration.
In the international context a field where compulsory arbitration was implemented is the
WADA-Code (see under VI.6.). This field is fundamentally different from commercial
arbitration. Indeed, it is not contractual disputes that are solved, but disciplinary ones.
Thus, the dispute does not arise because of the breach of a contract but due to a breach
of rules/law provisions. It could even be argued—although this would undoubtedly be a
quantum leap—that the athletes consent to arbitration by breaching the anti-doping
rules/law provisions. It has also been sustained that in the case of mandatory arbitration
the question of the qualification of arbitration loses its importance, as it is the State
itself which decides that arbitration is the most appropriate means for resolving
disputes. Moreover, in the case of the WADA-Code it does so in an area (disciplinary
matter in the field of sport) where arbitration is widely accepted as a dispute resolution
mechanism.
In the case of compulsory arbitration it is not the relationship between State and
arbitration which is of importance, as the State itself chooses the dispute resolution
mechanism of arbitration, but the interaction of arbitration with the area/field in which
arbitration is expected to resolve disputes. Therefore, the traditional theories
(jurisdictional, contractual, mixed/hybrid and autonomous) seem to explain the nature
of arbitration only partially. For this reason further possible approaches, some of which
2470 In the case in question, it was a waiver of the right to appeal.
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have their origin in fields other than law, have been indicated for a tentative explanation
of the increasing pervasiveness of arbitration in areas other than international
commercial arbitration. It has also been stressed that for the explanation of these
approaches “consent” could play a key role.
The searching of possible alternative explications for the expansion of arbitration in
fields other than commercial arbitration could be one of the most fascinating intellectual
challenges for future research in the field of international arbitration. It could be
challenging, in particular to find converging points, but also to stress diverging features
among the different types of arbitration. Phenomena of amalgamation of
private/commercial law and international law are already to be found in investment
arbitration, and in the field of disciplinary sanctions in sport arbitration even analogies
to aspects of criminal and/or administrative law might be of relevance.
The contribution of this thesis was to point out the possible role played by parties’
consent in the different fields of arbitration in an international context, and to show the
evolution of the consensual character of arbitration; while remembering that the
resolution of a dispute by private judges without the parties’ consent is not
arbitration.2471
2471 See Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, para. 5-21.
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CONVENTIONS, NATIONAL LAWS, ARBITRATION RULES,
STANDARD FORMS AND CODES
I. CONVENTIONS
1. ECT
PART I. DEFINITIONS AND PURPOSE
ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS
As used in this Treaty:
…
(6) “Investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor and
includes:
(a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property, and any property rights such as
leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges;
(b) a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity participation in a
company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of a company or business enterprise;
(c) claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract having an economic value and
associated with an Investment;
(d) Intellectual Property;
(e) Returns;
(f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licences and permits granted pursuant
to law to undertake any Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.
A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments and
the term “Investment” includes all investments, whether existing at or made after the later of the date
of entry into force of this Treaty for the Contracting Party of the Investor making the investment and
that for the Contracting Party in the Area of which the investment is made (hereinafter referred to as
the “Effective Date”) provided that the Treaty shall only apply to matters affecting such investments
after the Effective Date.
“Investment” refers to any investment associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector and
to investments or classes of investments designated by a Contracting Party in its Area as “Charter
efficiency projects” and so notified to the Secretariat.
PART III. INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
ARTICLE 10
PROMOTION, PROTECTION AND TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS
(1) Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create
stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make
Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments
of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy
the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by
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unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In
no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by international
law, including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into
with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.
(2) Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to accord to Investors of other Contracting Parties, as regards
the Making of Investments in its Area, the Treatment described in paragraph (3).
(3) For the purposes of this Article, “Treatment” means treatment accorded by a Contracting Party which
is no less favourable than that which it accords to its own Investors or to Investors of any other
Contracting Party or any third state, whichever is the most favourable.
(4) A supplementary treaty shall, subject to conditions to be laid down therein, oblige each party thereto
to accord to Investors of other parties, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, the Treatment
described in paragraph (3). That treaty shall be open for signature by the states and Regional Economic
Integration Organizations which have signed or acceded to this Treaty. Negotiations towards the
supplementary treaty shall commence not later than 1 January 1995, with a view to concluding it by 1
January 1998.
(5) Each Contracting Party shall, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, endeavour to:
(a) limit to the minimum the exceptions to the Treatment described in paragraph (3);
(b) progressively remove existing restrictions affecting Investors of other Contracting Parties.
(6)
(a) A Contracting Party may, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, at any time declare
voluntarily to the Charter Conference, through the Secretariat, its intention not to introduce new
exceptions to the Treatment described in paragraph (3).
(b) A Contracting Party may, furthermore, at any time make a voluntary commitment to accord to
Investors of other Contracting Parties, as regards the Making of Investments in some or all Economic
Activities in the Energy Sector in its Area, the Treatment described in paragraph (3). Such
commitments shall be notified to the Secretariat and listed in Annex VC and shall be binding under
this Treaty.
(7) Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of Investors of other Contracting
Parties, and their related activities including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal,
treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments of its own Investors or of the
Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state and their related activities including
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most favourable.
(8) The modalities of application of paragraph (7) in relation to programmes under which a Contracting
Party provides grants or other financial assistance, or enters into contracts, for energy technology research
and development, shall be reserved for the supplementary treaty described in paragraph (4). Each
Contracting Party shall through the Secretariat keep the Charter Conference informed of the modalities it
applies to the programmes described in this paragraph.
(9) Each state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which signs or accedes to this Treaty shall,
on the date it signs the Treaty or deposits its instrument of accession, submit to the Secretariat a report
summarizing all laws, regulations or other measures relevant to:
(a) exceptions to paragraph (2); or
(b) the programmes referred to in paragraph (8).
A Contracting Party shall keep its report up to date by promptly submitting amendments to the
Secretariat. The Charter Conference shall review these reports periodically.
In respect of subparagraph (a) the report may designate parts of the energy sector in which a Contracting
Party accords to Investors of other Contracting Parties the Treatment described in paragraph (3).
In respect of subparagraph (b) the review by the Charter Conference may consider the effects of such
programmes on competition and Investments.
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the treatment described in paragraphs (3) and
(7) shall not apply to the protection of Intellectual Property; instead, the treatment shall be as specified in
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the corresponding provisions of the applicable international agreements for the protection of Intellectual
Property rights to which the respective Contracting Parties are parties.
(11) For the purposes of Article 26, the application by a Contracting Party of a trade-related investment
measure as described in Article 5(1) and (2) to an Investment of an Investor of another Contracting Party
existing at the time of such application shall, subject to Article 5(3) and (4), be considered a breach of an
obligation of the former Contracting Party under this Part.
(12) Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its domestic law provides effective means for the assertion
of claims and the enforcement of rights with respect to Investments, investment agreements, and
investment authorizations.
PART V. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
ARTICLE 26
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN AN INVESTOR AND A CONTRACTING PARTY
(1) Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an
Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the
former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.
(2) If such disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of paragraph (1) within a period of
three months from the date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the
Investor party to the dispute may choose to submit it for resolution:
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party party to the dispute;
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or
(c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article.
(3)
(a) Subject only to subparagraphs (b) and (c), each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional
consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in accordance with
the provisions of this Article.
(b) (i) The Contracting Parties listed in Annex ID do not give such unconditional consent where the
Investor has previously submitted the dispute under subparagraph (2)(a) or (b).
(ii) For the sake of transparency, each Contracting Party that is listed in Annex ID shall provide a
written statement of its policies, practices and conditions in this regard to the Secretariat no later
than the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval in accordance
with Article 39 or the deposit of its instrument of accession in accordance with Article 41.
(c) A Contracting Party listed in Annex IA does not give such unconditional consent with respect to a
dispute arising under the last sentence of Article 10(1).
(4) In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under subparagraph (2)(c),
the Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to:
(a) (i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other
States opened for signature at Washington, 18 March 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “ICSID
Convention”), if the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party party to the
dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention; or
(ii) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the
Convention referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), under the rules governing the Additional Facility
for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre (hereinafter referred to as
the “Additional Facility Rules”), if the Contracting Party of the Investor or the Contracting Party
party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention;
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as “UNCITRAL”); or
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(c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
(5)
(a) The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written consent of the Investor given pursuant to
paragraph (4) shall be considered to satisfy the requirement for:
(i) written consent of the parties to a dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention
and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules;
(ii) an “agreement in writing” for purposes of article II of the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958
(hereinafter referred to as the “New York Convention”); and
(iii) “the parties to a contract [to] have agreed in writing” for the purposes of article 1 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
(b) Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that
is a party to the New York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered
to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of article I of that Convention.
(6) A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this
Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.
(7) An Investor other than a natural person which has the nationality of a Contracting Party party to the
dispute on the date of the consent in writing referred to in paragraph (4) and which, before a dispute
between it and that Contracting Party arises, is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall
for the purpose of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention be treated as a “national of another
Contracting State” and shall for the purpose of article 1(6) of the Additional Facility Rules be treated as a
“national of another State”.
(8) The awards of arbitration, which may include an award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the
parties to the dispute. An award of arbitration concerning a measure of a sub-national government or
authority of the disputing Contracting Party shall provide that the Contracting Party may pay monetary
damages in lieu of any other remedy granted. Each Contracting Party shall carry out without delay any
such award and shall make provision for the effective enforcement in its Area of such awards.
ARTICLE 27
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN CONTRACTING PARTIES
(1) Contracting Parties shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the application or interpretation of
this Treaty through diplomatic channels.
(2) If a dispute has not been settled in accordance with paragraph (1) within a reasonable period of time,
either party thereto may, except as otherwise provided in this Treaty or agreed in writing by the
Contracting Parties, and except as concerns the application or interpretation of Article 6 or Article 19 or,
for Contracting Parties listed in Annex IA, the last sentence of Article 10(1), upon written notice to the
other party to the dispute submit the matter to an ad hoc tribunal under this Article.
(3) Such an ad hoc arbitral tribunal shall be constituted as follows:
(a) The Contracting Party instituting the proceedings shall appoint one member of the tribunal and inform
the other Contracting Party to the dispute of its appointment within 30 days of receipt of the notice
referred to in paragraph (2) by the other Contracting Party;
(b) Within 60 days of the receipt of the written notice referred to in paragraph (2), the other Contracting
Party party to the dispute shall appoint one member. If the appointment is not made within the time
limit prescribed, the Contracting Party having instituted the proceedings may, within 90 days of the
receipt of the written notice referred to in paragraph (2), request that the appointment be made in
accordance with subparagraph (d);
(c) A third member, who may not be a national or citizen of a Contracting Party party to the dispute, shall
be appointed by the Contracting Parties parties to the dispute. That member shall be the President of
the tribunal. If, within 150 days of the receipt of the notice referred to in paragraph (2), the
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Contracting Parties are unable to agree on the appointment of a third member, that appointment shall
be made, in accordance with subparagraph (d), at the request of either Contracting Party submitted
within 180 days of the receipt of that notice;
(d) Appointments requested to be made in accordance with this paragraph shall be made by the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration within 30 days of the receipt of a request
to do so. If the Secretary-General is prevented from discharging this task, the appointments shall be
made by the First Secretary of the Bureau. If the latter, in turn, is prevented from discharging this task,
the appointments shall be made by the most senior Deputy;
(e) Appointments made in accordance with subparagraphs (a) to (d) shall be made with regard to the
qualifications and experience, particularly in matters covered by this Treaty, of the members to be
appointed;
(f) In the absence of an agreement to the contrary between the Contracting Parties, the Arbitration Rules
of UNCITRAL shall govern, except to the extent modified by the Contracting Parties parties to the
dispute or by the arbitrators. The tribunal shall take its decisions by a majority vote of its members;
(g) The tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles
of international law;
(h) The arbitral award shall be final and binding upon the Contracting Parties parties to the dispute;
(i) Where, in making an award, a tribunal finds that a measure of a regional or local government or
authority within the Area of a Contracting Party listed in Part I of Annex P is not in conformity with
this Treaty, either party to the dispute may invoke the provisions of Part II of Annex P;
(j) The expenses of the tribunal, including the remuneration of its members, shall be borne in equal
shares by the Contracting Parties parties to the dispute. The tribunal may, however, at its discretion
direct that a higher proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Contracting Parties parties to the
dispute;
(k) Unless the Contracting Parties parties to the dispute agree otherwise, the tribunal shall sit in The
Hague, and use the premises and facilities of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;
(l) A copy of the award shall be deposited with the Secretariat which shall make it generally available.
PART VIII. FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 44
ENTRY INTO FORCE
(1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the thirtieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval thereof, or of accession thereto, by a state or Regional
Economic Integration Organization which is a signatory to the Charter as of 16 June 1995.
(2) For each state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which ratifies, accepts or approves this
Treaty or accedes thereto after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval, it shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such state or Regional
Economic Integration Organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), any instrument deposited by a Regional Economic Integration
Organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by member states of such Organization.
ARTICLE 45
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
(1) Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry into force for such
signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent
with its constitution, laws or regulations.
(2)
(a) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may, when signing, deliver to the Depository a
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declaration that it is not able to accept provisional application. The obligation contained in paragraph
(1) shall not apply to a signatory making such a declaration. Any such signatory may at any time
withdraw that declaration by written notification to the Depository.
(b) Neither a signatory which makes a declaration in accordance with subparagraph (a) nor Investors of
that signatory may claim the benefits of provisional application under paragraph (1).
(c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), any signatory making a declaration referred to in subparagraph (a)
shall apply Part VII provisionally pending the entry into force of the Treaty for such signatory in
accordance with Article 44, to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its
laws or regulations.
(3)
(a) Any signatory may terminate its provisional application of this Treaty by written notification to the
Depository of its intention not to become a Contracting Party to the Treaty. Termination of
provisional application for any signatory shall take effect upon the expiration of 60 days from the date
on which such signatory's written notification is received by the Depository.
(b) In the event that a signatory terminates provisional application under subparagraph (a), the obligation
of the signatory under paragraph (1) to apply Parts III and V with respect to any Investments made in
its Area during such provisional application by Investors of other signatories shall nevertheless remain
in effect with respect to those Investments for twenty years following the effective date of
termination, except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (c).
(c) Subparagraph (b) shall not apply to any signatory listed in Annex PA. A signatory shall be removed
from the list in Annex PA effective upon delivery to the Depository of its request therefor.
(4) Pending the entry into force of this Treaty the signatories shall meet periodically in the provisional
Charter Conference, the first meeting of which shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat referred
to in paragraph (5) not later than 180 days after the opening date for signature of the Treaty as specified in
Article 38.
(5) The functions of the Secretariat shall be carried out on an interim basis by a provisional Secretariat
until the entry into force of this Treaty pursuant to Article 44 and the establishment of a Secretariat.
(6) The signatories shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) or
subparagraph (2)(c) as appropriate, contribute to the costs of the provisional Secretariat as if the
signatories were Contracting Parties under Article 37(3). Any modifications made to Annex B by the
signatories shall terminate upon the entry into force of this Treaty.
(7) A state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which, prior to this Treaty's entry into force,
accedes to the Treaty in accordance with Article 41 shall, pending the Treaty's entry into force, have the
rights and assume the obligations of a signatory under this Article.
2. ICSID Convention
Chapter II. Jurisdiction of the Centre
Article 25
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,
between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated
to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may
withdraw its consent unilaterally.
(2) “National of another Contracting State” means:
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration
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as well as on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or
paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either date also had the
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration
and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that
date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of
another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of
that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required.
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at
any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such
notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by
paragraph (1).
Article 26
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting State may require the
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under
this Convention.
Chapter III. Conciliation/request for conciliation
Article 28
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute conciliation
proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary-General who shall send a
copy of the request to the other party.
(2) The request shall contain information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the parties and
their consent to conciliation in accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation
and arbitration proceedings.
(3) The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information
contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall
forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register.
Chapter IV. Arbitration
Article 36
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration
proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary-General who shall send a
copy of the request to the other party.
(2) The request shall contain information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the parties and
their consent to arbitration in accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and
arbitration proceedings.
(3) The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information
contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall
forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register.
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Article 39
The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State party to the
dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute; provided, however, that the
foregoing provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or each individual member of the
Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the parties.
Article 40
(1) Arbitrators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the case of
appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38.
(2) Arbitrators appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators shall possess the qualities stated in
paragraph (1) of Article 14.
Article 42
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party
to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable.
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law.
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide ex
aequo et bono if the parties so agree.
Article 44
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section and,
except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on
which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.
Article 46
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any incidental
or additional claims or counter-claims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided
that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the
Centre.
3. NAFTA
NAFTA - PART FIVE: INVESTMENT, SERVICES AND RELATED MATTERS,
Chapter 11: Investment
Section A. Investment
Article 1101
Scope and Coverage
1. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to:
(a) investors of another Party;
(b) investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party; and
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(c) with respect to Articles 1106 and 1114, all investments in the territory of the Party.
2. A Party has the right to perform exclusively the economic activities set out in Annex III and to refuse
to permit the establishment of investment in such activities.
3. This Chapter does not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party to the extent that they are
covered by Chapter Fourteen (Financial Services).
4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from providing a service or performing a
function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or
insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not
inconsistent with this Chapter.
Section B. Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party
Article 1116
Claim by an Investor of a Party on Its Own Behalf
1. An investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that another Party has
breached an obligation under:
(a) Section A or Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises), or
(b) Article 1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and State Enterprises) where the monopoly has acted in a manner
inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Section A,
and that the investor has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.
2. An investor may not make a claim if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the
investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that
the investor has incurred loss or damage.
Article 1117
Claim by an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise
1. An investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the
investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that
the other Party has breached an obligation under:
(a) Section A or Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises), or
(b) Article 1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and State Enterprises) where the monopoly has acted in a manner
inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Section A, and that the enterprise has incurred loss or
damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.
2. An investor may not make a claim on behalf of an enterprise described in paragraph 1 if more than
three years have elapsed from the date on which the enterprise first acquired, or should have first
acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage.
3. Where an investor makes a claim under this Article and the investor or a non-controlling investor in
the enterprise makes a claim under Article 1116 arising out of the same events that gave rise to the claim
under this Article, and two or more of the claims are submitted to arbitration under Article 1120, the
claims should be heard together by a Tribunal established under Article 1126, unless the Tribunal finds
that the interests of a disputing party would be prejudiced thereby.
4. An investment may not make a claim under this Section.
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Article 1120
Submission of a Claim to Arbitration
1. Except as provided in Annex 1120.1, and provided that six months have elapsed since the events
giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration under:
(a) the ICSID Convention, provided that both the disputing Party and the Party of the investor are parties
to the Convention;
(b) the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing Party or the Party of the
investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or
(c) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
2. The applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified by this
Section.
Article 1121
Conditions Precedent to Submission of a Claim to Arbitration
1. A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1116 to arbitration only if:
(a) the investor consents to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement; and
(b) the investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage to an interest in an enterprise of another Party
that is a juridical person that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive
their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the
disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in Article 1116, except for proceedings for
injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an
administrative tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party.
2. A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1117 to arbitration only if both the investor and
the enterprise:
(a) consent to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement; and
(b) waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of
any Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the
disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in Article 1117, except for proceedings for
injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an
administrative tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party.
3. A consent and waiver required by this Article shall be in writing, shall be delivered to the disputing
Party and shall be included in the submission of a claim to arbitration.
4. Only where a disputing Party has deprived a disputing investor of control of an enterprise:
(a) a waiver from the enterprise under paragraph 1(b) or 2(b) shall not be required; and
(b) Annex 1120.1(b) shall not apply.
Article 1122
Consent to Arbitration
1. Each Party consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set
out in this Agreement.
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2. The consent given by paragraph 1 and the submission by a disputing investor of a claim to arbitration
shall satisfy the requirement of:
(a) Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and the Additional Facility Rules for
written consent of the parties;
(b) Article II of the New York Convention for an agreement in writing; and
(c) Article I of the InterAmerican Convention for an agreement.
Article 1125
Agreement to Appointment of Arbitrators
For purposes of Article 39 of the ICSID Convention and Article 7 of Schedule C to the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules, and without prejudice to an objection to an arbitrator based on Article 1124(3) or on a
ground other than nationality:
(a) the disputing Party agrees to the appointment of each individual member of a Tribunal established
under the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules;
(b) a disputing investor referred to in Article 1116 may submit a claim to arbitration, or continue a claim,
under the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, only on condition that the
disputing investor agrees in writing to the appointment of each individual member of the Tribunal;
and
(c) a disputing investor referred to in Article 1117(1) may submit a claim to arbitration, or continue a
claim, under the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, only on condition that the
disputing investor and the enterprise agree in writing to the appointment of each individual member of
the Tribunal.
Article 1126
Consolidation
1. A Tribunal established under this Article shall be established under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
and shall conduct its proceedings in accordance with those Rules, except as modified by this Section.
2. Where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfied that claims have been submitted to
arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of law or fact in common, the Tribunal may, in the
interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, by order:
(a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims; or
(b) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of the claims, the determination of
which it believes would assist in the resolution of the others.
3. A disputing party that seeks an order under paragraph 2 shall request the Secretary-General to
establish a Tribunal and shall specify in the request:
(a) the name of the disputing Party or disputing investors against which the order is sought;
(b) the nature of the order sought; and
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought.
4. The disputing party shall deliver to the disputing Party or disputing investors against which the order
is sought a copy of the request.
5. Within 60 days of receipt of the request, the Secretary-General shall establish a Tribunal comprising
three arbitrators. The Secretary-General shall appoint the presiding arbitrator from the roster referred to in
Article 1124(4). In the event that no such presiding arbitrator is available to serve, the Secretary-General
shall appoint, from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, a presiding arbitrator who is not a national of any of
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the Parties. The Secretary-General shall appoint the two other members from the roster referred to in
Article 1124(4), and to the extent not available from that roster, from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, and
to the extent not available from that Panel, in the discretion of the Secretary-General. One member shall
be a national of the disputing Party and one member shall be a national of a Party of the disputing
investors.
6. Where a Tribunal has been established under this Article, a disputing investor that has submitted a
claim to arbitration under Article 1116 or 1117 and that has not been named in a request made under
paragraph 3 may make a written request to the Tribunal that it be included in an order made under
paragraph 2, and shall specify in the request:
(a) the name and address of the disputing investor;
(b) the nature of the order sought; and
(c) the grounds on which the order is sought.
7. A disputing investor referred to in paragraph 6 shall deliver a copy of its request to the disputing
parties named in a request made under paragraph 3.
8. A Tribunal established under Article 1120 shall not have jurisdiction to decide a claim, or a part of a
claim, over which a Tribunal established under this Article has assumed jurisdiction.
9. On application of a disputing party, a Tribunal established under this Article, pending its decision
under paragraph 2, may order that the proceedings of a Tribunal established under Article 1120 be stayed,
unless the latter Tribunal has already adjourned its proceedings.
10. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat, within 15 days of receipt by the disputing Party, a
copy of:
(a) a request for arbitration made under paragraph (1) of Article 36 of the ICSID Convention;
(b) a notice of arbitration made under Article 2 of Schedule C of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or
(c) a notice of arbitration given under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
11. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made under paragraph 3:
(a) within 15 days of receipt of the request, in the case of a request made by a disputing investor;
(b) within 15 days of making the request, in the case of a request made by the disputing Party.
12. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made under paragraph 6 within
15 days of receipt of the request.
13. The Secretariat shall maintain a public register of the documents referred to in paragraphs 10, 11 and
12.
NAFTA - PART FIVE: INVESTMENT, SERVICES AND RELATED MATTERS,
Chapter 15: Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises
Article 1502
Monopolies and State Enterprises
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from designating a monopoly.
2. Where a Party intends to designate a monopoly and the designation may affect the interests of persons
of another Party, the Party shall:
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(a) wherever possible, provide prior written notification to the other Party of the designation; and
(b) endeavor to introduce at the time of the designation such conditions on the operation of the monopoly
as will minimize or eliminate any nullification or impairment of benefits in the sense of Annex 2004
(Nullification and Impairment).
3. Each Party shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the application of
other measures, that any privately-owned monopoly that it designates and any government monopoly that
it maintains or designates:
(a) acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party's obligations under this Agreement wherever
such a monopoly exercises any regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority that the
Party has delegated to it in connection with the monopoly good or service, such as the power to grant
import or export licenses, approve commercial transactions or impose quotas, fees or other charges;
(b) except to comply with any terms of its designation that are not inconsistent with subparagraph (c) or
(d), acts solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or sale of the monopoly
good or service in the relevant market, including with regard to price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation and other terms and conditions of purchase or sale;
(c) provides non-discriminatory treatment to investments of investors, to goods and to service providers
of another Party in its purchase or sale of the monopoly good or service in the relevant market; and
(d) does not use its monopoly position to engage, either directly or indirectly, including through its
dealings with its parent, its subsidiary or other enterprise with common ownership, in anti-competitive
practices in a non-monopolized market in its territory that adversely affect an investment of an
investor of another Party, including through the discriminatory provision of the monopoly good or
service, cross-subsidization or predatory conduct.
4. Paragraph 3 does not apply to procurement by governmental agencies of goods or services for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production
of goods or the provision of services for commercial sale.
5. For purposes of this Article “maintain” means designate prior to the date of entry into force of this
Agreement and existing on January 1, 1994.
Article 1503
State Enterprises
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from maintaining or establishing a
state enterprise.
2. Each Party shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the application of
other measures, that any state enterprise that it maintains or establishes acts in a manner that is not
inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Chapters Eleven (Investment) and Fourteen (Financial
Services) wherever such enterprise exercises any regulatory, administrative or other governmental
authority that the Party has delegated to it, such as the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve
commercial transactions or impose quotas, fees or other charges.
3. Each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it maintains or establishes accords non-
discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods or services to investments in the Party's territory of
investors of another Party.
4. New York Convention
Article II
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect
of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.
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2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties
have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed.
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it
is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement
is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those
not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may
be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Article VII
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting
States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in
the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought
to be relied upon.
2. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect between Contracting States on their becoming
bound and to the extent that they become bound, by this Convention.
5. UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport
Article 37 – Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period
of one month after the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.
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2. For any State that subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the Convention shall enter into
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of
deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
6. VCLT
Article 31 General rule of Interpretation
l. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the Interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty;
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Article 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages
l. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in
each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular
text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall
be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not
remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the
treaty, shall be adopted.
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II. NATIONAL LAWS
1. Australia
(International Arbitration Act 1974-1989)
22. APPLICATION OF OPTIONAL PROVISIONS
If the parties to an arbitration agreement have (whether in the agreement or in any other document in
writing) agreed that the other provisions, or any of the other provisions, of this Division are to apply in
relation to the settlement of any dispute (being a dispute that is to be settled in accordance with the Model
Law) that has arisen or may arise between them, those provisions apply in relation to the settlement of
that dispute.
24. CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
(1) A party to arbitral proceedings before an arbitral tribunal may apply to the tribunal for an order under
this section in relation to those proceedings and other arbitral proceedings (whether before that tribunal or
another tribunal or other tribunals) on the ground that:
(a) a common question of law or fact arises in all those proceedings;
(b) the rights to relief claimed in all those proceedings are in respect of, or arise out of, the same
transaction or series of transactions; or
(c) for some other reason specified in the application, it is desirable that an order be made under this
section.
(2) The following orders may be made under this section in relation to 2 or more arbitral proceedings:
(a) that the proceedings be consolidated on terms specified in the order;
(b) that the proceedings be heard at the same time or in a sequence specified in the order;
(c) that any of the proceedings be stayed pending the determination of any other of the proceedings.
(3) Where an application has been made under subsection (1) in relation to 2 or more arbitral proceedings
(in this section called the “related proceedings”), the following provisions have effect.
(4) If all the related proceedings are being heard by the same tribunal, the tribunal may make such order
under this section as it thinks fit in relation to those proceedings and, if such an order is made, the
proceedings shall be dealt with in accordance with the order.
(5) If 2 or more arbitral tribunals are hearing the related proceedings:
(a) the tribunal that received the application shall communicate the substance of the application to the
other tribunals concerned; and
(b) the tribunals shall, as soon as practicable, deliberate jointly on the application.
(6) Where the tribunals agree, after deliberation on the application, that a particular order under this
section should be made in relation to the related proceedings:
(a) the tribunals shall jointly make the order;
(b) the related proceedings shall be dealt with in accordance with the order; and
(c) if the order is that the related proceedings be consolidated - the arbitrator or arbitrators for the
purposes of the consolidated proceedings shall be appointed, in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of
the Model Law, from the members of the tribunals.
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(7) If the tribunals are unable to make an order under subsection (6), the related proceedings shall
proceed as if no application has been made under subsection (1).
(8) This section does not prevent the parties to related proceedings from agreeing to consolidate them and
taking such steps as are necessary to effect that consolidation.
2. Belgium
Article 1696bis Belgian Judicial Code
1. Any affected third party may request the arbitral tribunal to intervene in the proceedings. Such request
shall be addressed in writing to the arbitral tribunal which shall communicate it to the parties.
2. A party may serve a notice of joinder on a third party.
3. In any event, in order to be admitted, the intervention of a third party requires an arbitration agreement
between the third party and the parties in dispute. Furthermore, it is subject to the unanimous consent of
the arbitral tribunal.
3. China
Chapter 3. Arbitration Agreement
Article 16
An arbitration agreement includes an arbitration clause included in the contract, and an agreement on
submission to arbitration that is concluded in other written forms before or after the dispute arises.
An arbitration agreement shall contain the following particulars:
(1) an expression of the intention to apply for arbitration;
(2) matters for arbitration; and
(3) a designated arbitration commission.
Article 18
If an arbitration agreement contains no or unclear provisions concerning the matters for arbitration or the
arbitration commission, the parties may reach a supplementary agreement. If no such supplementary
agreement can be reached, the arbitration agreement shall be void.
4. England
3. THE SEAT OF THE ARBITRATION
In this Part “the seat of the arbitration” means the juridical seat of the arbitration designated-
(a) by the parties to the arbitration agreement, or
(b) by any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in that regard, or
(c) by the arbitral tribunal if so authorised by the parties, or determined, in the absence of any such
designation, having regard to the parties' agreement and all the relevant circumstances.
7. SEPARABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form
part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or
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ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become
ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.
35. CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS AND CONCURRENT HEARINGS
(1) The parties are free to agree-
(a) that the arbitral proceedings shall be consolidated with other arbitral proceedings, or
(b) that concurrent hearings shall be held, on such terms as may be agreed.
(2) Unless the parties agree to confer such power on the tribunal, the tribunal has no power to order
consolidation of proceedings or concurrent hearings.
5. France
Article 1443
To be valid, an arbitration clause shall be in writing and included in the contract or in a document to
which it refers.
To be valid, an arbitration clause shall furthermore appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators, or provide for the
method of their appointment.
Article 1458
If a dispute pending before an arbitral tribunal on the basis of an arbitration agreement is brought before a
State court, it shall declare itself incompetent.
If the dispute is not yet before an arbitral tribunal, the State court shall also declare itself incompetent,
unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void.
In neither case may the State court declare itself incompetent at its own motion.
Article 1493
An arbitration agreement may, directly or by reference to arbitration rules, appoint the arbitrator or
arbitrators or provide for the method of their appointment.
If in an arbitration taking place in France or subjected by the parties to French procedural law difficulties
arise in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the interested party may bring the matter before the
President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris as provided in Art. 1457, unless the parties agree
otherwise.
6. Germany
Old section 1025(2) ZPO
The arbitration agreement is not valid if one of the parties has used any superiority it possesses by virtue
of economic or social position in order to constrain the other party to make this agreement or to accept
conditions therein, resulting in the one party having an advantage over the other in the procedure, and
more especially in regard to the nomination or the non-acceptance of the arbitrator.
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7. Hong Kong
Cap. 341 of the Laws of Hong Kong
6B. CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRATIONS
(1) Where in relation to two or more arbitration proceedings it appears to the Court –
(a) that some common question of law or fact arises in both or all of them, or
(b) that the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series
of transactions, or
(c) that for some other reason it is desirable to make an order under this section, the Court may order
those arbitration proceedings to be consolidated on such terms as it thinks just or may order them to
be heard at the same time, or one immediately after another, or may order any of them to be stayed
until after the determination of any other of them.
(2) Where the Court orders arbitration proceedings to be consolidated under subsection (1) and all parties
to the consolidated arbitration proceedings are in agreement as to the choice of arbitrator or umpire
for those proceedings the same shall be appointed by the Court but if all parties cannot agree the
Court shall have power to appoint an arbitrator or umpire for those proceedings.
(3) Where the Court makes an appointment under subsection (2) of an arbitrator or umpire for
consolidated arbitration proceedings, any appointment of any other arbitrator or umpire that has been
made for any of the arbitration proceedings forming part of the consolidation shall for all purposes
cease to have effect on and from the appointment under subsection (2).
8. The Netherlands
Article 1045 Netherlands CCP (Third parties)
1. At the written request of a third party who has an interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceedings,
the arbitral tribunal may permit such party to join the proceedings, or to intervene therein. The arbitral
tribunal shall send without delay a copy of the request to the parties.
2. A party who claims to be indemnified by a third party may serve a notice of joinder on such a party. A
copy of the notice shall be sent without delay to the arbitral tribunal and the other party.
3. The joinder, intervention or joinder for the claim of indemnity may only be permitted by the arbitral
tribunal, having heard the parties, if the third party accedes by agreement in writing between him and the
parties to the arbitration agreement.
4. On the grant of a request for joinder, intervention, or joinder for the claim of indemnity, the third party
becomes a party to the arbitral proceedings. Unless the parties have agreed there on the arbitral tribunal
shall determine the further conduct of the proceedings.
Article 1046 Netherlands CCP (Consolidation of arbitral proceedings)
1. If arbitral proceedings have been commenced before an arbitral tribunal in the Netherlands concerning
a subject matter which is connected with the subject matter of arbitral proceedings commenced before
another arbitral tribunal in the Netherlands, any of the parties may, unless the parties have agreed
otherwise, request the President of the District Court in Amsterdam to order a consolidation of the
proceedings.
2. The President may wholly or partially grant or refuse the request, after he has given all parties and the
arbitrators an opportunity to be heard. His decision shall be communicated in writing to all parties and the
arbitral tribunals involved.
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3. If the President orders consolidation in full, the parties shall in consultation with each other appoint one
arbitrator or an uneven number of arbitrators and determine the procedural rules which shall apply to the
consolidated proceedings. If, within the period of time prescribed by the President, the parties have not
reached agreement on the above, the President shall, at the request of any of the parties, appoint the
arbitrator or arbitrators and, if necessary, determine the procedural rules which shall apply to the
consolidated proceedings. The President shall determine the remuneration for the work already carried
out by the arbitrators whose mandate is terminated by reason of the full consolidation.
4. If the President orders partial consolidation, he shall decide which disputes shall be consolidated. The
President shall, if the parties fail to agree within the period of time prescribed by him, at the request of
any of the parties, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators and determine which rules shall apply to the
consolidated proceedings. In this event the arbitral tribunals before which arbitrations have already been
commenced shall suspend those arbitrations. The award of the arbitral tribunal appointed for the
consolidated arbitration shall be communicated in writing to the other arbitral tribunals involved. Upon
receipt of this award, these arbitral tribunals shall continue the arbitrations commenced before them and
decide in accordance with the award rendered in the consolidated proceedings.
5. The provisions of article 1027(4) shall apply accordingly in the cases mentioned in paragraphs (3) and
(4) above.
6. An award rendered under paragraphs (3) and (4) above shall be subject to appeal to a second arbitral
tribunal if and to the extent that all parties involved in the consolidated proceedings have agreed upon
such an appeal.
9. New Zealand
Second Schedule - Additional Optional Rules Applying to Arbitration
Section 2 CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
(1) Where arbitral proceedings all have the same arbitral tribunal,-
(a) The arbitral tribunal may, on the application of at least one party in each of the arbitral proceedings,
order-
(i) Those proceedings to be consolidated on such terms as the arbitral tribunal thinks just; or
(ii) Those proceedings to be heard at the same time, or one immediately after the other; or
(iii) Any of those proceedings to be stayed until after the determination of any other of them:
(b) If an application has been made to the arbitral tribunal under paragraph (a) and the arbitral tribunal
refuses or fails to make an order under that paragraph, the High Court may, on application by a party
in any of the proceedings, make any such order as could have been made by the arbitral tribunal.
(2) Where arbitral proceedings do not all have the same arbitral tribunal,-
(a) The arbitral tribunal for any one of the arbitral proceedings may, on the application of a party in the
proceedings, provisionally order-
(i) The proceedings to be consolidated with other arbitral proceedings on such terms as the arbitral
tribunal thinks just; or
(ii) The proceedings to be heard at the same time as other arbitral proceedings, or one immediately
after the other; or
(iii) Any of those proceedings to be stayed until after the determination of any other of them:
(b) An order ceases to be provisional when consistent provisional orders have been made for all of the
arbitral proceedings concerned:
(c) The arbitral tribunals may communicate with each other for the purpose of conferring on the
desirability of making orders under this subclause and of deciding on the terms of any such order:
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(d) If a provisional order is made for at least one of the arbitral proceedings concerned, but the arbitral
tribunal for another of the proceedings refuses or fails to make such an order (having received an
application from a party to make such an order), the High Court may, on application by a party in any
of the proceedings, make an order or orders that could have been made under this subclause:
(e) If inconsistent provisional orders are made for the arbitral proceedings, the High Court may, on
application by a party in any of the proceedings, alter the orders to make them consistent.
(3) When arbitral proceedings are to be consolidated under subclause (2), the arbitral tribunal for the
consolidated proceedings shall be that agreed on for the purpose by all the parties to the individual
proceedings, but, failing such an agreement, the High Court may appoint an arbitral tribunal for the
consolidated proceedings.
(4) An order or a provisional order may not be made under this clause unless it appears-
(a) That some common question of law or fact arises in all of the arbitral proceedings; or
(b) That the rights to relief claimed in all of the proceedings are in respect of, or arise out of, the same
transaction or series of transactions; or
(c) That for some other reason it is desirable to make the order or provisional order.
(5) Any proceedings before an arbitral tribunal for the purposes of this clause shall be treated as part of
the arbitral proceedings concerned.
(6) Arbitral proceedings may be commenced or continued, although an application to consolidate them is
pending under subclause (1) or (2) and although a provisional order has been made in relation to them
under subclause (2).
(7) Subclauses (1) and (2) apply in relation to arbitral proceedings whether or not all or any of the parties
are common to some or all of the proceedings.
(8) There shall be no appeal from any decision of the High Court under this clause.
(9) Nothing in this clause prevents the parties to 2 or more arbitral proceedings from agreeing to
consolidate those proceedings and taking such steps as are necessary to effect that consolidation.
10. Sweden
Section 48
Where an arbitration agreement has an international connection, the agreement shall be governed by the
law agreed upon by the parties. Where the parties have not reached such an agreement, the arbitration
agreement shall be governed by the law of the country in which, by virtue of the agreement, the
proceedings have taken place or shall take place.
The first paragraph shall not apply to the issue of whether a party was authorised to enter into an
arbitration agreement or was duly represented.
11. Switzerland
Swiss PIL
Article 178 (Arbitration agreement)
1. The arbitration agreement must be made in writing, by telegram, telex, telecopier or any other means of
communication which permits it to be evidenced by a text.
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2. Furthermore, an arbitration agreement is valid if it conforms either to the law chosen by the parties, or
to the law governing the subject matter of the dispute, in particular the main contract, or to Swiss law.
3. The arbitration agreement cannot be contested on the grounds that the main contract is not valid or that
the arbitration agreement concerns a dispute which had not as yet arisen.
Article 179 (Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal)
1. The arbitrators shall be appointed, removed or replaced in accordance with the agreement of the
parties.
2. In the absence of such agreement, the judge where the tribunal has its seat may be seized with the
question; he shall apply, by analogy, the provisions of cantonal law on appointment, removal or
replacement of arbitrators.
3. If a judge has been designated as the authority for appointing an arbitrator, he shall make the
appointment unless a summary examination shows that no arbitration agreement exists between the
parties.
Article 185 (Other judicial assistance)
For any further judicial assistance the state judge at the seat of the Arbitral Tribunal shall have
jurisdiction.
Article 192 (Waiver of annulment)
1. If none of the parties have their domicile, their habitual residence, or a business establishment in
Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the arbitration agreement or by a subsequent written
agreement, waive fully the action for annulment or they may limit it to one or several of the ground listed
in Art. 190(2).
2. If the parties have waived fully the action for annulment against the awards and if the awards are to be
enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention of June 10, 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards applies by analogy.
Swiss Civil Code
Article 27 (Personality, how protected – excessive commitment)
1. No one may waive, in full or in part, his legal capacity or his capacity to act.
2. No one may relinquish his liberty or restrict the exercise of his liberty to an extent violating the law or
morality.
Article 75 (Maintenance of members’ right)
Any member who has not consented to a resolution which infringes the law or the articles of association
is entitled by law to challenge such resolution in court within one month of learning thereof.
Swiss Code of Obligations
Article 19 (Contents of the contract)
1. The content of a contract can, within the limits of the law, be established at the discretion of the parties.
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2. Agreements deviating from what is provided for by law are valid only if the law does not contain
mandatory provisions which may not be modified, or where such deviation does not violate public policy,
boni mores or basic personal rights (Art. 20).
Article 20 (Nullity)
1. A contract providing for an impossibility, having illegal contents, or violating boni mores, is null and
void.
2. If such defect only affects particular parts of the contract, however, then only those parts shall be null
and void, unless it is to be presumed that the contract would not have been concluded without the
defective parts.
12. UNCITRAL Model Law
Article 1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION
1. This Law applies to international commercial** arbitration, subject to any agreement in force between
this State and any other State or States.
** The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all
relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature
include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange
of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing;
construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance;
exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation;
carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
Article 16 COMPETENCE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO RULE ON ITS JURISDICTION
1. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part
of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision
by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the
arbitration clause.
2. A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission
of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has
appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is
exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of
its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a
later plea if it considers the delay justified.
3. The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a
preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question
that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that
ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal;
while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an
award.
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13. USA
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 2000
Section 10 (Consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings)
a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), upon [motion] of a party to an agreement to arbitrate
or to an arbitration proceeding, the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings
as to all or some of the claims if:
(1) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings between the same
persons or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitration
proceeding with a third person;
(2) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in substantial part from the same
transaction or series of related transactions;
(3) the existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of conflicting decisions in
the separate arbitration proceedings; and
(4) prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk of undue delay or
prejudice to the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.
b) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to some claims and allow
other claims to be resolved in separate arbitration proceedings.
c) The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an agreement to arbitrate if the
agreement prohibits consolidation.
United States Code
Chapter 2205 – United States Olympic Committee
§220509. Resolution of disputes
(a) General. – The corporation shall establish and maintain provisions in its constitution and bylaws for
the swift and equitable resolution of disputes involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity
of an amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in the Olympic
Games, the Paralympic Games, the Pan-American Games, world championship competition, or other
protected competition as defined in the constitution and bylaws of the corporation. …
…
III. ARBITRATION RULES
1. CAS Rules
R27 Application of the Rules
These Procedural Rules apply whenever the parties have agreed to refer a sportsrelated dispute to the
CAS.
Such disputes may arise out of an arbitration clause inserted in a contract or regulations or of a later
arbitration agreement (ordinary arbitration proceedings) or involve an appeal against a decision rendered
by a federation, association or sports-related body where the statutes or regulations of such bodies, or a
specific agreement provides for an appeal to the CAS (appeal arbitration proceedings). Such disputes may
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involve matters of principle relating to sport or matters of pecuniary or other interests brought into play in
the practice or the development of sport and, generally speaking, any activity related or connected to
sport.
These Procedural Rules also apply where the CAS is called upon to give an advisory opinion
(consultation proceedings).
R28 Seat
The seat of the CAS and of each Arbitration Panel (“Panel”) is in Lausanne, Switzerland. However,
should circumstances so warrant, and after consultation with all parties, the President of the Panel or, if he
has not yet been appointed, the President of the relevant Division may decide to hold a hearing in another
place and issues the appropriate directions related to such hearing.
R41 Multiparty Arbitration
R41.1 Plurality of Claimants / Respondents
If the request for arbitration names several Claimants and/or Respondents, the CAS shall proceed with the
formation of the Panel in accordance with the number of arbitrators and the method of appointment
agreed by all parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the President of the Division shall decide on
the number of arbitrators in accordance with Article R40.1.
If a sole arbitrator is to be appointed, Article R40.2 shall apply. If three arbitrators are to be appointed and
there are several Claimants, the Claimants shall jointly appoint an arbitrator. If three arbitrators are to be
appointed and there are several Respondents, the Respondents shall jointly appoint an arbitrator. In the
absence of such a joint appointment, the President of the Division shall proceed with the appointment in
lieu of the Claimants/Respondents. If there are three or more parties with divergent interests, both
arbitrators shall be appointed in accordance with the agreement between the parties. In the absence of
such agreement, the arbitrators shall be appointed by the President of the Division in accordance with
Article R40.2. In all cases, the arbitrators shall select the President of the Panel in accordance with Article
R40.2.
R41.2 Joinder
If a Respondent intends to cause a third party to participate in the arbitration, it shall mention it in its
answer, together with the reasons therefor, and file an additional copy of its answer. The Court Office
shall communicate this copy to the person whose participation is requested and set such person a time
limit to state its position on its participation and to submit a response pursuant to Article R39. It shall also
set a time limit for the Claimant to express its position on the participation of the third party.
R41.3 Intervention
If a third party intends to participate as a party in the arbitration, it shall file with the CAS an application
to this effect, together with the reasons therefor within the time limit set for the Respondent’s answer to
the request for arbitration. To the extent applicable, such application shall have the same contents as a
request for arbitration. The Court Office shall communicate a copy of this application to the parties and
set a time limit for them to express their position on the participation of the third party and to file, to the
extent applicable, an answer pursuant to Article R39.
R41.4 Joint Provisions on Joinder and Intervention
A third party may only participate in the arbitration if it is bound by the arbitration agreement or if itself
and the other parties agree in writing.
Upon expiration of the time limit set in Articles R41.2 and R41.3, the President of the Division or the
Panel, if it has already been appointed, shall decide on the participation of the third party, taking into
account, in particular, the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement as referred to in Article R39
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above. The decision of the President of the Division shall be without prejudice to the decision of the Panel
on the same matter.
If the President of the Division accepts the participation of the third party, the CAS shall proceed with the
formation of the Panel in accordance with the number of arbitrators and the method of appointment
agreed by all parties. In the absence of such an agreement between the parties, the President of the
Division shall decide on the number of arbitrators in accordance with Article R40.1. If a sole arbitrator is
to be appointed, Article R40.2 shall apply. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, the arbitrators shall be
appointed by the President of the Division and shall choose the President of the Panel in accordance with
Article R40.2.
Regardless of the decision of the Panel on the participation of the third party, the formation of the Panel
cannot be challenged. In the event that the Panel accepts the participation, it shall, if required, issue
related procedural directions.
2. Cepani Rules
Article 12 (Multi-party arbitration)
When several contracts containing a CEPANI arbitration clause give rise to disputes that are closely
related or indivisible, the Appointments Committee or the Chairman is empowered to order the joinder of
the arbitration proceedings.
This decision shall be taken either at the request of the Arbitral Tribunal, or, prior to any other issue, at
the request of the parties or of the most diligent party, or upon CEPANI's own motion.
Where the request is granted, the Appointments Committee or the Chairman shall appoint the Arbitral
Tribunal that shall decide on the disputes that have been joined. If necessary, it shall increase the number
of arbitrators to a maximum of five. The Appointments Committee or the Chairman shall take its decision
after having summoned the parties, and, if need be, the arbitrators who have already been appointed.
They may not order the joinder of disputes in which an interim award or an award on admissibility or on
the merits of the claim has already been rendered.
3. CIMAR
Rule 3.9
“Where the same arbitrator is appointed in two or more arbitral proceedings each of which involves some
common issue, whether or not involving the same parties, the arbitrator may, if all the parties so agree,
order that any two or more such proceedings shall be consolidated”.
4. Geneva Rules
Article 16
16.1 If an arbitration is initiated between parties already involved in another arbitration governed by these
Rules, the CCIG may assign the second case to the arbitral tribunal appointed to decide the first case, in
which case the parties shall be deemed to have waived their right to select an arbitrator in the second case.
16.2 In order to decide upon such assignment, the CCIG shall take into account all the circumstances,
including the links between the two cases and the progress already made in the first case.
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Article 18
18.1 If a respondent intends to cause a third party to participate in the arbitration, it shall so state in its
answer and shall state the reasons for such participation. The respondent shall deliver to the CCIG an
additional copy of its answer.
18.2 The CCIG shall send the answer to the third party whose participation is sought, the provisions of
Articles 8 and 9 being applicable by analogy.
18.3 Upon receipt of the third party's answer the CCIG shall decide on the participation of the third party
in the already pending proceeding, taking into account all of the circumstances. If the CCIG accepts the
participation of the third party, it shall proceed with the formation of the arbitral tribunal in accordance
with Article 17, if it does not accept the participation, it shall proceed according to Article 12.
18.4 The decision of the CCIG regarding the participation of third parties shall not prejudice the decision
of the arbitrators on the same subject. Regardless of the decision of the arbitrators on such participation
the formation of the arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged. Emphasis added.
5. ICC Rules
Article 4 (Request for Arbitration)
1. A party wishing to have recourse to arbitration under these Rules shall submit its Request for
Arbitration (the “Request”) to the Secretariat, which shall notify the Claimant and Respondent of the
receipt of the Request and the date of such receipt.
2. The date on which the Request is received by the Secretariat shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be
the date of the commencement of the arbitral proceedings.
3. The Request shall, inter alia, contain the following information:
(a) the name in full, description and address of each of the parties;
(b) a description of the nature and circumstances of the dispute giving rise to the claims;
(c) a statement of the relief sought, including, to the extent possible, an indication of any amount(s)
claimed;
(d) the relevant agreements and, in particular, the arbitration agreement;
(e) all relevant particulars concerning the number of arbitrators and their choice in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 8, 9 and 10, and any nomination of an arbitrator required thereby; and
(f) any comments as to the place of arbitration, the applicable rules of law and the language of the
arbitration.
4. Together with the Request, the Claimant shall submit the number of copies thereof required by Article
3(1) and shall make the advance payment on administrative expenses required by Appendix III
(“Arbitration Costs and Fees”) in force on the date the Request is submitted. In the event that the
Claimant fails to comply with either of these requirements, the Secretariat may fix a time limit within
which the Claimant must comply, failing which the file shall be closed without prejudice to the right of
the Claimant to submit the same claims at a later date in another Request.
5. The Secretariat shall send a copy of the Request and the documents annexed thereto to the Respondent
for its Answer to the Request once the Secretariat has sufficient copies of the Request and the required
advance payment.
6. When a party submits a Request in connection with a legal relationship in respect of which arbitration
proceedings between the same parties are already pending under these Rules, the Court may, at the
request of a party, decide to include the claims contained in the Request in the pending proceedings
provided that the Terms of Reference have not been signed or approved by the Court. Once the Terms of
Reference have been signed or approved by the Court, claims may only be included in the pending
proceedings subject to the provisions of Article 19.
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Article 4(6) - (under Request for Arbitration)
When a party submits a Request in connection with a legal relationship in respect of which arbitration
proceedings between the same parties are already pending under these Rules, the Court may, at the
request of a party, decide to include the claims contained in the Request in the pending proceedings
provided that the Terms of Reference have not been signed or approved by the Court. Once the Terms of
Reference have been signed or approved by the Court, claims may only be included in the pending
proceedings subject to the provisions of Article 19.
Article 8 (General Provisions)
1. The disputes shall be decided by a sole arbitrator or by three arbitrators.
2. Where the parties have not agreed upon the number of arbitrators, the Court shall appoint a sole
arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of
three arbitrators. In such case, the Claimant shall nominate an arbitrator within a period of 15 days from
the receipt of the notification of the decision of the Court, and the Respondent shall nominate an arbitrator
within a period of 15 days from the receipt of the notification of the nomination made by the Claimant.
3. Where the parties have agreed that the dispute shall be settled by a sole arbitrator, they may, by
agreement, nominate the sole arbitrator for confirmation. If the parties fail to nominate a sole arbitrator
within 30 days from the date when the Claimant's Request for Arbitration has been received by the other
party, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the Secretariat, the sole arbitrator shall be
appointed by the Court.
4. Where the dispute is to be referred to three arbitrators, each party shall nominate in the Request and
the Answer, respectively, one arbitrator for confirmation by the Court. If a party fails to nominate an
arbitrator, the appointment shall be made by the Court. The third arbitrator, who will act as chairman of
the Arbitral Tribunal, shall be appointed by the Court, unless the parties have agreed upon another
procedure for such appointment, in which case the nomination will be subject to confirmation pursuant to
Article 9. Should such procedure not result in a nomination within the time limit fixed by the parties or
the Court, the third arbitrator shall be appointed by the Court.
Article 10 (Multiple Parties)
1. Where there are multiple parties, whether as Claimant or as Respondent, and where the dispute is to be
referred to three arbitrators, the multiple Claimants, jointly, and the multiple Respondents, jointly, shall
nominate an arbitrator for confirmation pursuant to Article 9.
2. In the absence of such a joint nomination and where all parties are unable to agree to a method for the
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Court may appoint each member of the Arbitral Tribunal and
shall designate one of them to act as chairman. In such case, the Court shall be at liberty to choose any
person whom it regards as suitable to act as arbitrator, applying Article 9 when it considers this
appropriate.
Article 15 (Rules governing the proceedings)
1. The proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules, and, where these Rules
are silent, any rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or not
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration.
2. In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a
reasonable opportunity to present its case.
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Article 19 (New Claims)
After the Terms of Reference have been signed or approved by the Court, no party shall make new claims
or counterclaims which fall outside the limits of the Terms of Reference unless it has been authorized to
do so by the Arbitral Tribunal, which shall consider the nature of such new claims or counterclaims, the
stage of the arbitration and other relevant circumstances.
ICC standard and suggested clauses for Dispute Resolution Services
For arbitration in Mainland China:
“All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be submitted to the
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce and shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the said Rules.”
6. ICSID Rules
Rule 40 (Ancillary Claims)
(1) Except as the parties otherwise agree, a party may present an incidental or additional claim or
counter-claim arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute, provided that such ancillary claim
is within the scope of the consent of the parties and is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.
(2) An incidental or additional claim shall be presented not later than in the reply and a counter-claim no
later than in the counter-memorial, unless the Tribunal, upon justification by the party presenting the
ancillary claim and upon considering any objection of the other party, authorizes the presentation of the
claim at a later stage in the proceeding.
(3) The Tribunal shall fix a time limit within which the party against which an ancillary claim is
presented may file its observations thereon.
Rule 41 (Objections to Jurisdiction)
(1) Any objection that the dispute or any ancillary claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre or, for
other reasons, is not within the competence of the Tribunal shall be made as early as possible. A party
shall file the objection with the Secretary-General no later than the expiration of the time limit fixed for
the filing of the counter-memorial, or, if the objection relates to an ancillary claim, for the filing of the
rejoinder – unless the facts on which the objection is based are unknown to the party at that time.
(2) The Tribunal may on its own initiative consider, at any stage of the proceeding, whether the dispute
or any ancillary claim before it is within the jurisdiction of the Centre and within its own competence.
(3) Upon the formal raising of an objection relating to the dispute, the proceeding on the merits shall be
suspended. The President of the Tribunal, after consultation with its other members, shall fix a time limit
within which the parties may file observations on the objection.
(4) The Tribunal shall decide whether or not the further procedures relating to the objection shall be oral.
It may deal with the objection as a preliminary question or join it to the merits of the dispute. If the
Tribunal overrules the objection or joins it to the merits, it shall once more fix time limits for the further
procedures.
(5) If the Tribunal decides that the dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre or not within its
own competence, it shall render an award to that effect.
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7. ICSID Schedule C. Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules
Article 7 (Nationality of Arbitrators)
(1) The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the State party to the dispute and
of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, unless the sole arbitrator or each individual member
of the Tribunal is appointed by agreement of the parties. Where the Tribunal is to consist of three
members, a national of either of these States may not be appointed as an arbitrator by a party without the
agreement of the other party to the dispute. Where the Tribunal is to consist of five or more members,
nationals of either of these States may not be appointed as arbitrators by a party if appointment by the
other party of the same number of arbitrators of either of these nationalities would result in a majority of
arbitrators of these nationalities.
(2) Arbitrators appointed by the Chairman shall not be nationals of the State party to the dispute or of the
State whose national is a party to the dispute.
8. LCIA Rules
Article 22(1) - (under Additional powers of the arbitral tribunal)
Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power, on
the application of any party or of its own motion, but in either case only after giving the parties a
reasonable opportunity to state their views:
…
(h) to allow, only upon the application of a party, one or more third persons to be joined in the arbitration
as a party provided any such third person and the applicant party have consented thereto in writing, and
thereafter to make a single final award, or separate awards, in respect of all parties so implicated in the
arbitration.
9. (The) L.M.A.A. Terms (2002)
Paragraph 14
In addition to the powers set out in the Act, the tribunal shall have the following specific powers to be
exercised in a suitable case so as to avoid unnecessary delay or expense, and so as to provide a fair means
for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined:
(a) The tribunal may limit the number of expert witnesses to be called by any party or may direct either
that no expert be called on any issue(s) or that no expert evidence shall be called save with the leave of
the tribunal.
(b) Where two or more arbitrations appear to raise common issues of fact or law, the tribunals may direct
that the two or more arbitrations shall be heard concurrently. Where such an order is made, the tribunals
may give such directions as the interests of fairness, economy and expedition require including:
(i) that the documents disclosed by the parties in one arbitration shall be made available to the parties to
the other arbitration upon such conditions as the tribunals may determine;
(ii) that the evidence given in one arbitration shall be received and admitted in the other arbitration,
subject to all parties being given a reasonable opportunity to comment upon it and subject to such other
conditions as the tribunals may determine.
(c) If a party fails to comply with a peremptory order of the tribunal to provide security for costs, then
without prejudice to the power granted by section 41(6) of the Act, the tribunal shall have power to stay
that party's claim or such part of it as the tribunal thinks fit in its sole discretion.
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10. NAI Rules
Article 41.4 (under Third Parties)
The joinder, intervention or joinder for the claim of indemnity may only be permitted by the arbitral
tribunal, having heard the parties and the third party, if the third party accedes to the arbitration agreement
by an agreement in writing between him and the parties to the arbitration agreement. On the grant of
request for joinder, intervention or joinder for the claim of indemnity, the third party becomes a party to
the arbitral proceedings.
11. Swiss Rules
Article 4 (Consolidation of arbitral proceedings (joinder), participation of third parties)
1. Where a Notice of Arbitration is submitted between parties already involved in other arbitral
proceedings pending under these Rules, the Chambers may decide, after consulting with the parties to all
proceedings and the Special Committee, that the new case shall be referred to the arbitral tribunal already
constituted for the existing proceedings. The Chambers may proceed likewise where a Notice of
Arbitration is submitted between parties that are not identical to the parties in the existing arbitral
proceedings. When rendering their decision, the Chambers shall take into account all circumstances,
including the links between the two cases and the progress already made in the existing proceedings.
Where the Chambers decide to refer the new case to the existing arbitral tribunal, the parties to the new
case shall be deemed to have waived their right to designate an arbitrator.
2. Where a third party requests to participate in arbitral proceedings already pending under these Rules or
where a party to arbitral proceedings under these Rules intends to cause a third party to participate in the
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on such request, after consulting with all parties, taking into
account all circumstances it deems relevant and applicable.
Article 15 paras. (1) and (2) - (under General provisions)
1. Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that it ensures equal treatment of the parties and their right to be heard.
2. At any stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may hold hearings for the presentation of evidence
by witnesses, including expert witnesses, or for oral argument. After consulting with the parties, the
arbitral tribunal may also decide to conduct the proceedings on the basis of documents and other
materials.
Article 21(5) - (under Pleas as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal)
5. The arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear a set-off defence even when the relationship out of
which this defence is said to arise is not within the scope of the arbitration clause or is the object of
another arbitration agreement or forum-selection clause.
12. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
Article 15 (General provisions)
1. Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings
each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.
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Article 20 (Amendments to the claim or defence)
During the course of the arbitral proceedings either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence
unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay
in making it or prejudice to the other party or any other circumstances. However, a claim may not be
amended in such a manner that the amended claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or
separate arbitration agreement.
13. Zurich Rules
Article 13 (Multi-Party Arbitration)
If there are several claimants or several respondents, or if the respondent, within the deadline for the
answer, files a claim with the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, against a third party based on an arbitration
clause valid according to Article 2 subs. 2 an identical three-men Arbitral Tribunal is appointed according
to Article 12 subs. 3 for the first and all other arbitrations.
The Arbitral Tribunal may conduct the arbitrations separately, or consolidate them, partly or altogether.
Article 14 (Assignment of further Arbitrations)
A new dispute between parties which already have an arbitration pending under the International
Arbitration Rules may be assigned by the President of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce to the existing
Arbitral Tribunal.
The Arbitral Tribunal may conduct the arbitrations separately, or consolidate them, partly or altogether.
IV. STANDARD FORMS / CHARTERS / CODES
1. FCEC Standard Form of Subcontract
Clause 18(2)
If any dispute arises in connection with the main contract and the contractor is of the opinion that such
dispute touches or concerns the subcontract works, then provided that an arbitrator has not already been
agreed or appointed in pursuance of the preceding sub-clause, the contractor may by notice in writing to
the subcontractor require that any such dispute under this subcontract shall be dealt with jointly with the
dispute under the main contract in accordance with the provisions of clause 66 thereof. In connection with
such joint dispute the subcontractor shall be bound in like manner as the contractor by any decision of the
engineer or any award by an arbitrator.
2. Olympic Charter
Article 26 Recognition of the IFs
In order to develop and promote the Olympic Movement, the IOC may recognise as Ifs international non-
governmental organisations administering one or several sports at world level and encompassing
organisations administering such sports at national level.
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The statutes, practice and activities of the Ifs within the Olympic Movement must be in conformity with
the Olympic Charter, including the adoption and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code. Subject
to the foregoing, each IF maintains its independence and autonomy of its sport.
Article 29 Composition of the NOCs
1. Whatever their composition, NOCs must include:
1.1. all IOC members in their country, if any. Such members have the right to vote in the general
assemblies of the NOC. In addition, the IOC members in the country referred to in Rule 16.1.1.1
are ex officio members of the NOC executive body, within which they have the right to vote;
1.2. all national federations affiliated to the IFs governing sports included in the Programme of the
Olympic Games or their representatives;
1.3. active athletes or retired athletes having taken part in the Olympic Games; however, the latter
must retire from their posts at the latest by the end of the third Olympiad after the last Olympic
Games in which they took part.
2. The NOCs may include as members:
2.1. national federations affiliated to IFs recognised by the IOC, the sports of which are not included
in the Programme of the Olympic Games;
2.2. multi-sports groups and other sports-oriented organisations or their representatives, as well as
nationals of the country liable to reinforce the effectiveness of the NOC or who have rendered
distinguished Services to the cause of sport and Olympism.
3. The voting majority of an NOC and of its executive body shall consist of the votes cast by the
national federations referred to in paragraph 1.2 above or their representatives. When dealing with
questions relating to the Olympic Games, only the votes cast by such federations and by the members
of the executive body of the NOC are taken into consideration. Subject to the approval of the IOC
Executive Board, an NOC may also include in its voting majority as well as in the votes taken into
consideration on questions relating to the Olympic Games, the votes cast by the IOC members in its
country referred to in paragraph 1.1 above and by the active or retired athletes in its country referred
to in paragraph 1.3 above.
4. Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any members of an NOC. However, an
NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as members representatives of such authorities.
5. The area of Jurisdiction of an NOC must coincide with the limits of the country in which it is
established and has its headquarters.
Article 30 The National Federations
To be recognised by an NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national federation must exercise
a specific, real and on-going sports activity, be affiliated to an IF recognised by the IOC and be governed
by and comply in all aspects with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF.
Article 59 Disputes - Arbitration
Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sport-Related
Arbitration.
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3. World Anti-Doping Code
Article 11 (Consequences to Teams)
11.1 Testing of Team Sports
Where more than one member of a team in a Team Sport has been notified of an anti-doping rule
violation under Article 7 in connection with an Event the ruling body for the Event shall conduct
appropriate Target Testing of the team during the Event Period.
11.2 Consequences for Team Sports
If more than two members of a team in Team Sport are found to have committed an anti-doping
rule violation during an Event Period, the ruling body of the Event shall impose an appropriate
sanction on the team (e.g. loss of points, Disqualification form a Competition or Event, or other
sanction) in addition to any Consequences imposed upon the individual Athletes committing the
anti-doping rule violation.
11.3 Event Ruling Body May Establish Stricter Consequences for Team Sports
The ruling body for an Event may elect to establish rules for the Event which impose
Consequences for Team Sports stricter than those in Article 11.2 for purposes of the Event.
Article 13 (Appeals)
13.2. Appeals from Decisions Regarding Anti-Doping Rule Violations, Consequences, and
Provisional Suspensions
13.2.1 Appeals
In cases arising from participation in an International Event or in cases involving International-
Level-Athletes, the decision may be appealed exclusively to CAS in accordance with the
provisions applicable before such court.
…
Article 20 (Additional Roles and Responsibilities of Signatories)
20.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the International Olympic Committee
20.1.1 To adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules for the Olympic Games which conform
with the Code.
20.1.2 To require as a condition of recognition by the International Olympic Committee, that
International Federations within the Olympic Movement are in compliance with the Code.
20.1.3 To withhold some or all Olympic funding of sport organizations that are not in compliance with
the Code.
20.1.4 To take appropriate action to discourage noncompliance with the Code as provided in Article
23.5.
20.1.5 To authorize and facilitate the Independent Observer Program.
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20.1.6 To require all Athletes and each Athlete Support Personnel who participates as coach, trainer,
manager, team staff, official, medical or paramedical personnel in the Olympic Games to agree
to be bound by anti-doping rules in conformity with the Code as a condition of such
participation.
20.1.7 To vigorously pursue all potential anti-doping rule violations within its Jurisdiction including
investigation into whether Athlete Support Personnel or other Persons may have been involved
in each case of doping.
20.1.8 To accept bids for the Olympic Games only from countries where the government has ratified,
accepted, approved or acceded to the UNESCO Convention and the National Olympic
Committee, National Paralympic Committee and National Anti-Doping Organization are in
compliance with the Code.
20.1.9 To promote anti-doping education.
20.1.10 To cooperate with relevant national organizations and agencies and other Anti-Doping
Organizations.
20.3 Roles and Responsibilities of International Federations
20.3.1 To adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules which conform with the Code.
20.3.2 To require as a condition of membership that the policies, rules and programs of National
Federations are in compliance with the Code.
20.3.3 To require all Athletes and each Athlete Support Personnel who participates as coach, trainer,
manager, team staff, official, medical or paramedical personnel in a Competition or activity
authorized or organized by the International Federation or one of its member organizations to
agree to be bound by anti-doping rules in conformity with the Code as a condition of such
participation.
20.3.4 To require Athletes who are not regular members of the International Federation or one of its
member National Federations to be available for Sample collection and to provide accurate and
up-to-date whereabouts information as part of the International Federations Registered Testing
Pool consistent with the conditions for eligibility established by the International Federation or,
as applicable, the Major Event Organization.
20.3.5 To require each of its National Federations to establish rules requiring all Athletes and each
Athlete Support Personnel who participates as coach, trainer, manager, team staff, official,
medical or paramedical personnel in a Competition or activity authorized or organized by a
National Federation or one of its member organizations to agree to be bound by anti-doping rules
in conformity with the Code as a condition of such participation.
20.3.6 To take appropriate action to discourage noncompliance with the Code as provided in Article
23.5.
20.3.7 To authorize and facilitate the Independent Observer Program at International Events.
20.3.8 To withhold some or all funding to its member National Federations that are not in compliance
with the Code.
20.3.9 To vigorously pursue all potential anti-doping rule violations within its Jurisdiction including
investigation into whether Athlete Support Personnel or other Persons may have been involved
in each case of doping.
20.3.10 After 1 January 2010, to do everything possible to award World Championships only to
countries where the government has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the UNESCO
Convention and the National Olympic Committee, National Paralympic Committee and National
Anti-Doping Organization are in compliance with the Code.
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20.3.11 To promote anti-doping education.
20.3.12 To cooperate with relevant national organizations and agencies and other Anti-Doping
Organizations.
20.6 Roles and Responsibilities of Major Event Organizations
20.6.1 To adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules for their Events which conform with the
Code.
20.6.2 To take appropriate action to discourage noncompliance with the Code as provided in Article
23.5.
20.6.3 To authorize and facilitate the Independent Observer Program.
20.6.4 To require all Athletes and each Athlete Support Personnel who participates as coach, trainer,
manager, team staff, official, medical or paramedical personnel in the Event to agree to be bound
by anti-doping rules in conformity with the Code as a condition of such participation.
20.6.5 To vigorously pursue all potential anti-doping rule violations within its Jurisdiction including
investigation into whether Athlete Support Personnel or other Persons may have been involved
in each case of doping.
20.6.6 After 1 January 2010, to do everything possible to award Events only to countries where the
government has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the UNESCO Convention and the
National Olympic Committee, National Paralympic Committee and National Anti-Doping
Organization are in compliance with the Code.
20.6.7 To promote anti-doping education.
20.6.8 To cooperate with relevant national organizations and agencies and other Anti-Doping
Organizations.
Article 22 (Involvement of Governments)
Each government's commitment to the Code will be evidenced by its signing the Copenhagen Declaration
on Anti-Doping in Sport of March 3, 2003, and by ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the
UNESCO Convention. The following Articles set forth the expectations of the Signatories.
22.1 Each government will take all actions and measures necessary to comply with the UNESCO
Convention.
22.2 Each government will encourage all of its public Services or agencies to share information with
Anti-Doping Organizations which would be useful in the fight against doping and where to do so
would not otherwise be legally prohibited.
22.3 Each government will respect arbitration as the preferred means of resolving doping-related
disputes.
22.4 All other governmental involvement with anti-doping will be brought into harmony with the
Code.
22.5 Governments should meet the expectations of this Article by January 1, 2010.
22.6 Failure by a government to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the UNESCO Convention by
January 1, 2010, or to comply with the UNESCO Convention thereafter may result in
ineligibility to bid for Events as provided in Articles 20.1.8 (International Olympic Committee),
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20.3.10 (International Federation), and 20.6.6 (Major Event Organizations) and may result in
additional consequences, e.g., forfeiture of offices and positions within WADA; ineligibility or
non-admission of any candidature to hold any International Event in a country, cancellation of
International Events; symbolic consequences and other consequences pursuant to the Olympic
Charter.
Article 24 (under Interpretation of the Code)
24.3 The Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the
existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments.
4. World Anti-Doping Code (2003)
Preamble to Article 22 (under Involvement of Governments)
Each government’s commitment to the Code will be evidenced by its signing a Declaration on or before
the first day of the Athens Olympic Games to be followed by a process leading to a convention or other
obligation to be implemented as appropriate to the constitutional and administrative contexts of each
government on or before the first day of the Turin Winter Olympic Games.
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